diff options
author | Francesco Colista <fcolista@alpinelinux.org> | 2017-08-08 10:27:04 +0000 |
---|---|---|
committer | Francesco Colista <fcolista@alpinelinux.org> | 2017-08-08 10:27:04 +0000 |
commit | 397245574b5fd00de29202a36b2e30c43320369c (patch) | |
tree | 233179aaf33d7cdeed6ee3d425360feaf72a3447 | |
parent | fa16ba1f57b1ddf30ec6b90884142a9fab471315 (diff) |
main/spice: fix for CVE-2017-7506. Fixes #7593
-rw-r--r-- | main/spice/APKBUILD | 18 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | main/spice/CVE-2017-7506.patch | 151 |
2 files changed, 164 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/main/spice/APKBUILD b/main/spice/APKBUILD index fca99cee8f4..0c94cbf37ef 100644 --- a/main/spice/APKBUILD +++ b/main/spice/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=spice pkgver=0.12.6 -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=2 pkgdesc="Implements the SPICE protocol" url="http://www.spice-space.org/" arch="all" @@ -15,9 +15,14 @@ makedepends="$depends_dev alsa-lib-dev libjpeg-turbo-dev libxrandr-dev install="" subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-server" source="http://www.spice-space.org/download/releases/spice-$pkgver.tar.bz2 - " + CVE-2017-7506.patch" _builddir="$srcdir"/spice-$pkgver + +# secfixes: +# 0.12.6-r2: +# - CVE-2017-7506 + prepare() { local i cd "$_builddir" @@ -58,6 +63,9 @@ server() { mv "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/*server.so.* "$subpkgdir"/usr/lib/ } -md5sums="605a8c8ea80bc95076c4b3539c6dd026 spice-0.12.6.tar.bz2" -sha256sums="f148ea30135bf80a4f465ce723a1cd6d4ccb34c098b6298a020b378ace8569b6 spice-0.12.6.tar.bz2" -sha512sums="877d9c447a09055c61db7839ae1a2bbd97ab1178d8fd30fff83883064f8a2f269479649e696732095833ed3fda2d0cc0cbe2a420decb89d36d2cf2f18ad9a3db spice-0.12.6.tar.bz2" +md5sums="605a8c8ea80bc95076c4b3539c6dd026 spice-0.12.6.tar.bz2 +47eef95ef416029b88e0d38ae9bf1c30 CVE-2017-7506.patch" +sha256sums="f148ea30135bf80a4f465ce723a1cd6d4ccb34c098b6298a020b378ace8569b6 spice-0.12.6.tar.bz2 +ec75c6a3c8a104aef22c040d945b52ecd31735e35a3f95078da5656bfc721704 CVE-2017-7506.patch" +sha512sums="877d9c447a09055c61db7839ae1a2bbd97ab1178d8fd30fff83883064f8a2f269479649e696732095833ed3fda2d0cc0cbe2a420decb89d36d2cf2f18ad9a3db spice-0.12.6.tar.bz2 +8a7387fd297aa3d59e38af650f3f12d9b89e46283e2ceaf53ca6e01db6db3c2ac0df164fde05decc4a0d8a05296d3f31195e86e383029804e91b23c84e1292a2 CVE-2017-7506.patch" diff --git a/main/spice/CVE-2017-7506.patch b/main/spice/CVE-2017-7506.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..dcdeea6e7dd --- /dev/null +++ b/main/spice/CVE-2017-7506.patch @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +From 257f69d619fed407493156c8a7b952abc8a51314 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@...hat.com> +Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100 +Subject: [spice-server 1/3] reds: Disconnect when receiving overly big + ClientMonitorsConfig + +Total message size received from the client was unlimited. There is +a 2kiB size check on individual agent messages, but the MonitorsConfig +message can be split in multiple chunks, and the size of the +non-chunked MonitorsConfig message was never checked. This could easily +lead to memory exhaustion on the host. + +Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@...hat.com> +--- + server/reds.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c +index f439a3668..7be85fdfc 100644 +--- a/server/reds.c ++++ b/server/reds.c +@@ -993,19 +993,34 @@ static void reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(void) + static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( + MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size) + { ++ const unsigned int MAX_MONITORS = 256; ++ const unsigned int MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE = ++ sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig) + MAX_MONITORS * sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig); ++ + VDAgentMessage *msg_header; + VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config; + RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config; + ++ // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through ++ // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows ++ if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) + MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE - cmc->buffer_size < size) { ++ goto overflow; ++ } + cmc->buffer_size += size; + cmc->buffer = realloc(cmc->buffer, cmc->buffer_size); + spice_assert(cmc->buffer); + cmc->mcc = mcc; + memcpy(cmc->buffer + cmc->buffer_pos, message, size); + cmc->buffer_pos += size; ++ if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size) { ++ spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size); ++ return; ++ } + msg_header = (VDAgentMessage *)cmc->buffer; +- if (sizeof(VDAgentMessage) > cmc->buffer_size || +- msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) { ++ if (msg_header->size > MAX_MONITOR_CONFIG_SIZE) { ++ goto overflow; ++ } ++ if (msg_header->size > cmc->buffer_size - sizeof(VDAgentMessage)) { + spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size); + return; + } +@@ -1013,6 +1028,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( + spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors); + red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config); + reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(); ++ return; ++ ++overflow: ++ spice_warning("received invalid MonitorsConfig request from client, disconnecting"); ++ red_channel_client_disconnect(main_channel_client_get_base(mcc)); ++ reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(); + } + + void reds_on_main_agent_data(MainChannelClient *mcc, void *message, size_t size) +-- +2.13.0 + +From ff2b4ef70181087d5abd50bad76d026ec5088a93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@...hat.com> +Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100 +Subject: [spice-server 2/3] reds: Avoid integer overflows handling monitor + configuration + +Avoid VDAgentMessage::size integer overflows. + +Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@...hat.com> +--- + server/reds.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c +index 7be85fdfc..e1c8c1086 100644 +--- a/server/reds.c ++++ b/server/reds.c +@@ -1024,6 +1024,9 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( + spice_debug("not enough data yet. %d", cmc->buffer_size); + return; + } ++ if (msg_header->size < sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) { ++ goto overflow; ++ } + monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header)); + spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors); + red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config); +-- +2.13.0 + +From 8cc3d7df2792751939cc832f4110c57e2addfca5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@...hat.com> +Date: Mon, 15 May 2017 15:57:28 +0100 +Subject: [spice-server 3/3] reds: Avoid buffer overflows handling monitor + configuration + +It was also possible for a malicious client to set +VDAgentMonitorsConfig::num_of_monitors to a number larger +than the actual size of VDAgentMOnitorsConfig::monitors. +This would lead to buffer overflows, which could allow the guest to +read part of the host memory. This might cause write overflows in the +host as well, but controlling the content of such buffers seems +complicated. + +Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@...hat.com> +--- + server/reds.c | 7 +++++++ + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c +index e1c8c1086..3a42c3755 100644 +--- a/server/reds.c ++++ b/server/reds.c +@@ -1000,6 +1000,7 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( + VDAgentMessage *msg_header; + VDAgentMonitorsConfig *monitors_config; + RedsClientMonitorsConfig *cmc = &reds->client_monitors_config; ++ uint32_t max_monitors; + + // limit size of message sent by the client as this can cause a DoS through + // memory exhaustion, or potentially some integer overflows +@@ -1028,6 +1029,12 @@ static void reds_on_main_agent_monitors_config( + goto overflow; + } + monitors_config = (VDAgentMonitorsConfig *)(cmc->buffer + sizeof(*msg_header)); ++ // limit the monitor number to avoid buffer overflows ++ max_monitors = (msg_header->size - sizeof(VDAgentMonitorsConfig)) / ++ sizeof(VDAgentMonConfig); ++ if (monitors_config->num_of_monitors > max_monitors) { ++ goto overflow; ++ } + spice_debug("%s: %d", __func__, monitors_config->num_of_monitors); + red_dispatcher_client_monitors_config(monitors_config); + reds_client_monitors_config_cleanup(); +-- +2.13.0 + |