main/sudo: fix CVE-2019-18634

2 files changed, 104 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/main/sudo/APKBUILD b/main/sudo/APKBUILD
index 48aa12c8336..e5f671526c7 100644
--- a/main/sudo/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/sudo/APKBUILD
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ if [ "${pkgver%_*}" != "$pkgver" ]; then
 else
 	_realver=$pkgver
 fi
-pkgrel=3
+pkgrel=4
 pkgdesc="Give certain users the ability to run some commands as root"
 url="https://www.sudo.ws/sudo/"
 arch="all"
@@ -22,10 +22,13 @@ source="https://www.sudo.ws/dist/sudo-${_realver}.tar.gz
 	libcrypt.patch
 	musl-fix-headers.patch
 	CVE-2019-14287.patch
+	CVE-2019-18634.patch
 	"
 options="suid"
 
 # secfixes:
+#   1.8.23-r4:
+#   - CVE-2019-18634
 #   1.8.23-r3:
 #   - CVE-2019-14287
 #   1.8.20_p2-r0:
@@ -73,4 +76,5 @@ f0f462f40502da2194310fe4a72ec1a16ba40f95a821ba9aa6aabaa423d28c4ab26b684afa7fb81c
 b2d7816d334826545420c578114e5af361ced65c00e5bfc2e0b16f3c9325aa9d2b902defeebb181da3cf7bc6aba3a59a496293d2f11d83c9793f11138ba50343  fix-tests.patch
 5ad20254aa587ef615f794081ecd55344eada5cf8c1a1d7956cc3f73375554716c483eeb74081da9a8501afce92cfbaf2abe59d1067aac67ce6e4874eb5a23e1  libcrypt.patch
 113416fed7532c6092687c8bdd9913d04888d2f0a32e4333dd27a6b3d39145717ad5c3b3f05ba11bd6462612a9a013d446d254d50b2b651c33eeebe670f41ab5  musl-fix-headers.patch
-347431718717ff00f11375df4c039e778be3f873014f68586054915bca9f818f8fd000ea256ac97739026bc36f32dd771afc69c290ee9f6ae7aa29752b2328e1  CVE-2019-14287.patch"
+347431718717ff00f11375df4c039e778be3f873014f68586054915bca9f818f8fd000ea256ac97739026bc36f32dd771afc69c290ee9f6ae7aa29752b2328e1  CVE-2019-14287.patch
+171cdd24833da4fa819003dbe38b247537d27fa7306f3e78eb4b2e28ccf66e06f02a2104d051d75a42197959489bedfb6633f5efbd436903746e667b79d59ee6  CVE-2019-18634.patch"
diff --git a/main/sudo/CVE-2019-18634.patch b/main/sudo/CVE-2019-18634.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..4d0fdd41d5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/sudo/CVE-2019-18634.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+From: "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
+Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2020 20:15:21 -0700
+Subject: Fix a buffer overflow when pwfeedback is enabled and input is a not a
+ tty. In getln() if the user enters ^U (erase line) and the write(2) fails,
+ the remaining buffer size is reset but the current pointer is not. While
+ here, fix an incorrect break for erase when write(2) fails. Also disable
+ pwfeedback when input is not a tty as it cannot work. CVE-2019-18634 Credit:
+ Joe Vennix from Apple Information Security.
+Origin: https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/b5d2010b6514ff45693509273bb07df3abb0bf0a
+Bug-Debian-Security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2019-18634
+Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/950371
+
+--HG--
+branch : 1.8
+[Salvatore Bonaccorso: Backport to 1.8.19p1. Changes from ab2cba0f5d8b ("Print
+a warning for password read issues. Issues include: timeout at the password
+prompt, read error while reading the password, and EOF reading the password.")
+upstream in 1.8.26 changes signature of getln function.]
+---
+ src/tgetpass.c | 20 ++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+--- a/src/tgetpass.c
++++ b/src/tgetpass.c
+@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ static volatile sig_atomic_t signo[NSIG]
+ 
+ static bool tty_present(void);
+ static void tgetpass_handler(int);
+-static char *getln(int, char *, size_t, int);
++static char *getln(int, char *, size_t, bool);
+ static char *sudo_askpass(const char *, const char *);
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ tgetpass(const char *prompt, int timeout
+     static const char *askpass;
+     static char buf[SUDO_CONV_REPL_MAX + 1];
+     int i, input, output, save_errno, neednl = 0, need_restart;
++    bool feedback = ISSET(flags, TGP_MASK);
+     debug_decl(tgetpass, SUDO_DEBUG_CONV)
+ 
+     (void) fflush(stdout);
+@@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ restart:
+      */
+     if (!ISSET(flags, TGP_ECHO)) {
+ 	for (;;) {
+-	    if (ISSET(flags, TGP_MASK))
++	    if (feedback)
+ 		neednl = sudo_term_cbreak(input);
+ 	    else
+ 		neednl = sudo_term_noecho(input);
+@@ -150,6 +151,9 @@ restart:
+ 	    }
+ 	}
+     }
++    /* Only use feedback mode when we can disable echo. */
++    if (!neednl)
++	feedback = false;
+ 
+     /*
+      * Catch signals that would otherwise cause the user to end
+@@ -175,7 +179,7 @@ restart:
+ 
+     if (timeout > 0)
+ 	alarm(timeout);
+-    pass = getln(input, buf, sizeof(buf), ISSET(flags, TGP_MASK));
++    pass = getln(input, buf, sizeof(buf), feedback);
+     alarm(0);
+     save_errno = errno;
+ 
+@@ -294,7 +298,7 @@ sudo_askpass(const char *askpass, const
+ extern int sudo_term_erase, sudo_term_kill;
+ 
+ static char *
+-getln(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int feedback)
++getln(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, bool feedback)
+ {
+     size_t left = bufsiz;
+     ssize_t nr = -1;
+@@ -316,15 +320,15 @@ getln(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsiz,
+ 		while (cp > buf) {
+ 		    if (write(fd, "\b \b", 3) == -1)
+ 			break;
+-		    --cp;
++		    cp--;
+ 		}
++		cp = buf;
+ 		left = bufsiz;
+ 		continue;
+ 	    } else if (c == sudo_term_erase) {
+ 		if (cp > buf) {
+-		    if (write(fd, "\b \b", 3) == -1)
+-			break;
+-		    --cp;
++		    ignore_result(write(fd, "\b \b", 3));
++		    cp--;
+ 		    left++;
+ 		}
+ 		continue;