path: root/src/apk_archive.h
diff options
authorTimo Teräs <>2018-09-05 19:49:22 +0300
committerTimo Teräs <>2018-09-10 10:59:39 +0300
commit6484ed9849f03971eb48ee1fdc21a2f128247eb1 (patch)
treeed0ecf3a027f0497596355ae7895112c5cb99a4a /src/apk_archive.h
parentb11f9aa9286320a73a02cd14bfff5974e05a430b (diff)
rework unpacking of packages and harden package file format requirements
A crafted .apk file could to trick apk writing unverified data to an unexpected file during temporary file creation due to bugs in handling long link target name and the way a regular file is extracted. Several hardening steps are implemented to avoid this: - the temporary file is now always first unlinked (apk thus reserved all filenames .apk.* to be it's working files) - the temporary file is after that created with O_EXCL to avoid races - the temporary file is no longer directly the archive entry name and thus directly controlled by potentially untrusted data - long file names and link target names are now rejected - hard link targets are now more rigorously checked - various additional checks added for the extraction process to error out early in case of malformed (or old legacy) file Reported-by: Max Justicz <>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/apk_archive.h')
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/src/apk_archive.h b/src/apk_archive.h
index 6d1916d..7436dd3 100644
--- a/src/apk_archive.h
+++ b/src/apk_archive.h
@@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ int apk_tar_write_entry(struct apk_ostream *, const struct apk_file_info *ae,
int apk_tar_write_padding(struct apk_ostream *, const struct apk_file_info *ae);
int apk_archive_entry_extract(int atfd, const struct apk_file_info *ae,
- const char *suffix, struct apk_istream *is,
+ const char *extract_name, const char *hardlink_name,
+ struct apk_istream *is,
apk_progress_cb cb, void *cb_ctx);