path: root/src/commit.c
diff options
authorTimo Teräs <>2018-09-05 19:49:22 +0300
committerTimo Teräs <>2018-09-10 10:59:39 +0300
commit6484ed9849f03971eb48ee1fdc21a2f128247eb1 (patch)
treeed0ecf3a027f0497596355ae7895112c5cb99a4a /src/commit.c
parentb11f9aa9286320a73a02cd14bfff5974e05a430b (diff)
rework unpacking of packages and harden package file format requirements
A crafted .apk file could to trick apk writing unverified data to an unexpected file during temporary file creation due to bugs in handling long link target name and the way a regular file is extracted. Several hardening steps are implemented to avoid this: - the temporary file is now always first unlinked (apk thus reserved all filenames .apk.* to be it's working files) - the temporary file is after that created with O_EXCL to avoid races - the temporary file is no longer directly the archive entry name and thus directly controlled by potentially untrusted data - long file names and link target names are now rejected - hard link targets are now more rigorously checked - various additional checks added for the extraction process to error out early in case of malformed (or old legacy) file Reported-by: Max Justicz <>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/commit.c')
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/commit.c b/src/commit.c
index e82537f..ac6d7a5 100644
--- a/src/commit.c
+++ b/src/commit.c
@@ -232,8 +232,8 @@ static int run_commit_hook(void *ctx, int dirfd, const char *file)
struct apk_database *db = hook->db;
char fn[PATH_MAX], *argv[] = { fn, (char *) commit_hook_str[hook->type], NULL };
- if ((apk_flags & (APK_NO_SCRIPTS | APK_SIMULATE)) != 0)
- return 0;
+ if (file[0] == '.') return 0;
+ if ((apk_flags & (APK_NO_SCRIPTS | APK_SIMULATE)) != 0) return 0;
snprintf(fn, sizeof(fn), "etc/apk/commit_hooks.d" "/%s", file);
if ((apk_flags & APK_NO_COMMIT_HOOKS) != 0) {