main/wpa_supplicant: security fix (CVE-2019-16275)

ref #10800

2 files changed, 78 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD b/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
index 85cbe4ac38b..aa623317c4b 100644
--- a/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/APKBUILD
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=wpa_supplicant
 pkgver=2.6
-pkgrel=15
+pkgrel=16
 pkgdesc="A utility providing key negotiation for WPA wireless networks"
 url="https://w1.fi/wpa_supplicant/"
 arch="all"
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ source="http://w1.fi/releases/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
 	rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
 	0014-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch
 	0015-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch
+	CVE-2019-16275.patch
 
 	wpa_supplicant.initd
 	wpa_supplicant.confd
@@ -34,6 +35,8 @@ source="http://w1.fi/releases/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz
 	wpa_cli.sh"
 
 # secfixes:
+#   2.6-r16:
+#     - CVE-2019-16275
 #   2.6-r15:
 #     - CVE-2019-11555
 #   2.6-r14:
@@ -116,6 +119,7 @@ fc84edd8b30305cc42053c872554098f3f077292ec980ed6a442f37884087ff2f055738fd55977ed
 c275cb1a41901d3e5389ca301809baa16a73b40afdcd3a24b63b294e1b9e5eaead148b30742273deecbdd03c6b387a6b3da74de2ae6c49a499b5dd326ff4da9f  rebased-v2.6-0001-WPA-Ignore-unauthenticated-encrypted-EAPOL-Key-data.patch
 7038044885871271ac724790663d5c0a428db83b41a691747be7a618ae893670a98f3ba52a297937249084296b0e9bcfd791edaa3928548efddb259e1a15f46c  0014-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch
 99c734fe395b4231aa6a097a08a00e5dab65ea9c37a7c83b1904a37c39307d9e7e95485734b0d483687126f4100c75f8a7b1420f0a2edcbfe07b454a14548822  0015-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-reassembly-buffer-handling.patch
+63710cfb0992f2c346a9807d8c97cbeaed032fa376a0e93a2e56f7742ce515e9c4dfadbdb1af03ba272281f639aab832f0178f67634c222a5d99e1d462aa9e38  CVE-2019-16275.patch
 11eed22f6e793f40c788d586c715deecae03c421d11761b7b4a376660bce812c54cc6f353c7d4d5da9c455aeffd778baefb9e76d380027a729574a756e54ddcc  wpa_supplicant.initd
 cbfc6b80cb47d4e33415018054a0d8ba39acbadbc3e44776afa918cc4c1e4d36ed3dd809b3448332575ac4fa0b82ad77d7530563f0b9f5e1374a5deea73a3b93  wpa_supplicant.confd
 c3db077fa78dd296d90d07626cb4e684f87618a77ffd51c1ae04b47be7bc0db1e9a3e0f7442acef21c081f6bb782f150cbbd3d0bf245d6ab43f19da3899b53b9  wpa_cli.confd
diff --git a/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2019-16275.patch b/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2019-16275.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..d764a9db016
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/wpa_supplicant/CVE-2019-16275.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+From 8c07fa9eda13e835f3f968b2e1c9a8be3a851ff9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2019 11:52:04 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] AP: Silently ignore management frame from unexpected source
+ address
+
+Do not process any received Management frames with unexpected/invalid SA
+so that we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end up
+sending out frames to unexpected destination. This prevents unexpected
+sequences where an unprotected frame might end up causing the AP to send
+out a response to another device and that other device processing the
+unexpected response.
+
+In particular, this prevents some potential denial of service cases
+where the unexpected response frame from the AP might result in a
+connected station dropping its association.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
+---
+ src/ap/drv_callbacks.c | 13 +++++++++++++
+ src/ap/ieee802_11.c    | 12 ++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+index 31587685fe3b..34ca379edc3d 100644
+--- a/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
++++ b/src/ap/drv_callbacks.c
+@@ -131,6 +131,19 @@ int hostapd_notif_assoc(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *addr,
+ 			   "hostapd_notif_assoc: Skip event with no address");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
++
++	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(addr) ||
++	    is_zero_ether_addr(addr) ||
++	    os_memcmp(addr, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
++		/* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
++		 * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
++		 * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "%s: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
++			   " in received indication - ignore this indication silently",
++			   __func__, MAC2STR(addr));
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	random_add_randomness(addr, ETH_ALEN);
+ 
+ 	hostapd_logger(hapd, addr, HOSTAPD_MODULE_IEEE80211,
+diff --git a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+index c85a28db44b7..e7065372e158 100644
+--- a/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
++++ b/src/ap/ieee802_11.c
+@@ -4626,6 +4626,18 @@ int ieee802_11_mgmt(struct hostapd_data *hapd, const u8 *buf, size_t len,
+ 	fc = le_to_host16(mgmt->frame_control);
+ 	stype = WLAN_FC_GET_STYPE(fc);
+ 
++	if (is_multicast_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
++	    is_zero_ether_addr(mgmt->sa) ||
++	    os_memcmp(mgmt->sa, hapd->own_addr, ETH_ALEN) == 0) {
++		/* Do not process any frames with unexpected/invalid SA so that
++		 * we do not add any state for unexpected STA addresses or end
++		 * up sending out frames to unexpected destination. */
++		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "MGMT: Invalid SA=" MACSTR
++			   " in received frame - ignore this frame silently",
++			   MAC2STR(mgmt->sa));
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (stype == WLAN_FC_STYPE_BEACON) {
+ 		handle_beacon(hapd, mgmt, len, fi);
+ 		return 1;
+-- 
+2.20.1
+