diff options
author | Daniel Néri <dne+alpine@mayonnaise.net> | 2020-09-07 23:59:23 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Leo <thinkabit.ukim@gmail.com> | 2020-09-11 02:32:34 +0000 |
commit | 245ac703f93a253e3b42199aa12ceb152dd27706 (patch) | |
tree | 7137387861d089105675ef9474e7c564193f8cd6 | |
parent | 8ffc0fe905f21e472724f58b101d61271a6571ff (diff) | |
download | aports-245ac703f93a253e3b42199aa12ceb152dd27706.tar.gz aports-245ac703f93a253e3b42199aa12ceb152dd27706.tar.bz2 aports-245ac703f93a253e3b42199aa12ceb152dd27706.tar.xz |
main/xen: security fix for CVE-2020-14364/XSA-335
-rw-r--r-- | main/xen/APKBUILD | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | main/xen/xsa335-qemu.patch | 84 |
2 files changed, 89 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/main/xen/APKBUILD b/main/xen/APKBUILD index a9ab75ca52..9d4ea5fcd1 100644 --- a/main/xen/APKBUILD +++ b/main/xen/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=xen pkgver=4.13.1 -pkgrel=4 +pkgrel=5 pkgdesc="Xen hypervisor" url="https://www.xenproject.org/" arch="x86_64 armhf aarch64" # enable armv7 when builds with gcc8 @@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ options="!strip" # - CVE-2020-15565 XSA-321 # - CVE-2020-15564 XSA-327 # - CVE-2020-15567 XSA-328 +# 4.13.1-r5: +# - CVE-2020-14364 XSA-335 case "$CARCH" in x86*) @@ -254,6 +256,7 @@ source="https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/$pkgver/xen-$pkgver.tar.gz xsa321-4.13-6.patch xsa321-4.13-7.patch xsa327.patch + xsa335-qemu.patch qemu-xen-time64.patch @@ -516,6 +519,7 @@ a9551daa73a7deb332fcfd647d0df6ebab84699a91eaca43697e182612304910610f80c1edc3c5e3 d7edad538e74d27d877e6393b6a98cd7df44d405d9b99534c16a3e7eee60193b53a1fa983cd90700ea8ffaf74e444327bf92ffb432591ceb963e028ae57c1e8f xsa321-4.13-6.patch 061a6ad3c01de21bb980fd11df38c4f9d4e48288f1a2f28bcbd82c2b01ce85e65c2b3103a84f2f95c87af50ee6344a1c0850f533528f6a32aa0961780f2b0a5a xsa321-4.13-7.patch 83823056dbd0142585d8b0fb9b3179ac8cc099a21ee489008a4cfb1f310daae72dff1fb6c7cd3a1c8ca5cec43a6b964587d8121a2423226baad0bcd302e73263 xsa327.patch +a18f552845ca105ce846ff8281b6c5b10f45301571f3163a33a6c212b87b742bb039f15c2d346bd34a9fdedd8a007fd9e51f319900cb8ee05febf178ed6ef8b0 xsa335-qemu.patch 61d27f5ec967e59b416cf2b29e7e3dc9774897a7d75d2744b9327a1a6d66522d11de7a61434fd1ffa87518dee327db4a680bfeabce38ab71663429709a1e9dc7 qemu-xen-time64.patch 52c43beb2596d645934d0f909f2d21f7587b6898ed5e5e7046799a8ed6d58f7a09c5809e1634fa26152f3fd4f3e7cfa07da7076f01b4a20cc8f5df8b9cb77e50 xenstored.initd 093f7fbd43faf0a16a226486a0776bade5dc1681d281c5946a3191c32d74f9699c6bf5d0ab8de9d1195a2461165d1660788e92a3156c9b3c7054d7b2d52d7ff0 xenstored.confd diff --git a/main/xen/xsa335-qemu.patch b/main/xen/xsa335-qemu.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..320b419782 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa335-qemu.patch @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +From c5bd2924c6d6a5bcbffb8b5e7798a88970131c07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> +Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 08:34:22 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] usb: fix setup_len init (CVE-2020-14364) + +Store calculated setup_len in a local variable, verify it, and only +write it to the struct (USBDevice->setup_len) in case it passed the +sanity checks. + +This prevents other code (do_token_{in,out} functions specifically) +from working with invalid USBDevice->setup_len values and overrunning +the USBDevice->setup_buf[] buffer. + +Fixes: CVE-2020-14364 +Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> +--- + hw/usb/core.c | 16 ++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/hw/usb/core.c b/hw/usb/core.c +index 5abd128b6bc5..5234dcc73fea 100644 +--- a/tools/qemu-xen/hw/usb/core.c ++++ b/tools/qemu-xen/hw/usb/core.c +@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ void usb_wakeup(USBEndpoint *ep, unsigned int stream) + static void do_token_setup(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p) + { + int request, value, index; ++ unsigned int setup_len; + + if (p->iov.size != 8) { + p->status = USB_RET_STALL; +@@ -138,14 +139,15 @@ static void do_token_setup(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p) + usb_packet_copy(p, s->setup_buf, p->iov.size); + s->setup_index = 0; + p->actual_length = 0; +- s->setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6]; +- if (s->setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) { ++ setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6]; ++ if (setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) { + fprintf(stderr, + "usb_generic_handle_packet: ctrl buffer too small (%d > %zu)\n", +- s->setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf)); ++ setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf)); + p->status = USB_RET_STALL; + return; + } ++ s->setup_len = setup_len; + + request = (s->setup_buf[0] << 8) | s->setup_buf[1]; + value = (s->setup_buf[3] << 8) | s->setup_buf[2]; +@@ -259,26 +261,28 @@ static void do_token_out(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p) + static void do_parameter(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p) + { + int i, request, value, index; ++ unsigned int setup_len; + + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + s->setup_buf[i] = p->parameter >> (i*8); + } + + s->setup_state = SETUP_STATE_PARAM; +- s->setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6]; + s->setup_index = 0; + + request = (s->setup_buf[0] << 8) | s->setup_buf[1]; + value = (s->setup_buf[3] << 8) | s->setup_buf[2]; + index = (s->setup_buf[5] << 8) | s->setup_buf[4]; + +- if (s->setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) { ++ setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6]; ++ if (setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) { + fprintf(stderr, + "usb_generic_handle_packet: ctrl buffer too small (%d > %zu)\n", +- s->setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf)); ++ setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf)); + p->status = USB_RET_STALL; + return; + } ++ s->setup_len = setup_len; + + if (p->pid == USB_TOKEN_OUT) { + usb_packet_copy(p, s->data_buf, s->setup_len); +-- +2.18.4 |