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authorNatanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>2018-09-10 10:40:02 +0000
committerNatanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>2018-09-10 10:40:02 +0000
commit685fa426c5c984f78ebcf0ac1189fe147fc832c3 (patch)
tree057a50426a0b93d55946749f5801dd55383ecd18
parent7a608303a8adbbb30cf8ca602162f94be44a4420 (diff)
downloadaports-685fa426c5c984f78ebcf0ac1189fe147fc832c3.tar.gz
aports-685fa426c5c984f78ebcf0ac1189fe147fc832c3.tar.bz2
aports-685fa426c5c984f78ebcf0ac1189fe147fc832c3.tar.xz
main/dropbear: backport security fix (CVE-2018-15599)
fixes #9347
-rw-r--r--main/dropbear/APKBUILD13
-rw-r--r--main/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch222
2 files changed, 232 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/main/dropbear/APKBUILD b/main/dropbear/APKBUILD
index d3991417dc..f9c274cd99 100644
--- a/main/dropbear/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/dropbear/APKBUILD
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
# Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
pkgname=dropbear
pkgver=2018.76
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=2
pkgdesc="small SSH 2 client/server designed for small memory environments"
url="http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/dropbear.html"
arch="all"
@@ -21,7 +21,13 @@ source="http://matt.ucc.asn.au/dropbear/releases/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.tar.bz2
dropbear.initd
dropbear.confd
dropbear-0.53.1-static_build_fix.patch
- dropbear-options_sftp-server_path.patch"
+ dropbear-options_sftp-server_path.patch
+ CVE-2018-15599.patch
+ "
+
+# secfixes:
+# 2018.76-r2:
+# - CVE-2018-15599
_progs="dropbear dropbearkey dbclient dropbearconvert scp"
@@ -82,4 +88,5 @@ sha512sums="82323279f7e78c366ba1ea07ff242259132b2576122429f54326518dd6092aba8ae5
9c55ab3d8b61955cde1ccc1b8acbd3d2ef123feb9489e92737304c35315d07b7f85fad8a12ac7b0ec2c1dcee3d76b8bc4aa18518f4ddd963917805db33e48826 dropbear.initd
83f2c1eaf7687917a4b2bae7d599d4378c4bd64f9126ba42fc5d235f2b3c9a474d1b3168d70ed64bb4101cc251d30bc9ae20604da9b5d819fcd635ee4d0ebb0f dropbear.confd
c9b0f28eb9653de21da4e8646fc27870a156112bce3d8a13baa6154ebf4baada3dee4f75bd5fdf5b6cd24a43fb80fb009e917d139d9e65d35118b082de0ebfbf dropbear-0.53.1-static_build_fix.patch
-e11456ec3bc7e1265727c8921a6eb6151712a9a498c7768e2d4b7f9043256099457cebf29b2d47dd61eb260746d97f4b19e9429443bda1c3e441ea50ced79b48 dropbear-options_sftp-server_path.patch"
+e11456ec3bc7e1265727c8921a6eb6151712a9a498c7768e2d4b7f9043256099457cebf29b2d47dd61eb260746d97f4b19e9429443bda1c3e441ea50ced79b48 dropbear-options_sftp-server_path.patch
+f204c2ee5aea8c0962573c4c49479ac17e9f6a9ab9ce21060a252b449323be841c1e64460f0e191fc72c6e213ffe829544418715d120a8f6c40de7b6374428e0 CVE-2018-15599.patch"
diff --git a/main/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch b/main/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..963ed35bb9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/dropbear/CVE-2018-15599.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+
+# HG changeset patch
+# User Matt Johnston <matt@ucc.asn.au>
+# Date 1535038992 -28800
+# Node ID 5d2d1021ca0006337af58859c861f2349715b73b
+# Parent cd23631dab5c653c66fe697e24f026aefbfcecb3
+Wait to fail invalid usernames
+
+diff -r cd23631dab5c -r 5d2d1021ca00 auth.h
+--- a/auth.h Thu Aug 23 22:10:07 2018 +0800
++++ b/auth.h Thu Aug 23 23:43:12 2018 +0800
+@@ -37,9 +37,9 @@
+ void send_msg_userauth_failure(int partial, int incrfail);
+ void send_msg_userauth_success(void);
+ void send_msg_userauth_banner(const buffer *msg);
+-void svr_auth_password(void);
+-void svr_auth_pubkey(void);
+-void svr_auth_pam(void);
++void svr_auth_password(int valid_user);
++void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user);
++void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user);
+
+ #if DROPBEAR_SVR_PUBKEY_OPTIONS_BUILT
+ int svr_pubkey_allows_agentfwd(void);
+diff -r cd23631dab5c -r 5d2d1021ca00 svr-auth.c
+--- a/svr-auth.c Thu Aug 23 22:10:07 2018 +0800
++++ b/svr-auth.c Thu Aug 23 23:43:12 2018 +0800
+@@ -149,10 +149,8 @@
+ if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
+ strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
+ AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
+- if (valid_user) {
+- svr_auth_password();
+- goto out;
+- }
++ svr_auth_password(valid_user);
++ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -164,10 +162,8 @@
+ if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN &&
+ strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD,
+ AUTH_METHOD_PASSWORD_LEN) == 0) {
+- if (valid_user) {
+- svr_auth_pam();
+- goto out;
+- }
++ svr_auth_pam(valid_user);
++ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ #endif
+@@ -177,12 +173,7 @@
+ if (methodlen == AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN &&
+ strncmp(methodname, AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY,
+ AUTH_METHOD_PUBKEY_LEN) == 0) {
+- if (valid_user) {
+- svr_auth_pubkey();
+- } else {
+- /* pubkey has no failure delay */
+- send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
+- }
++ svr_auth_pubkey(valid_user);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ #endif
+diff -r cd23631dab5c -r 5d2d1021ca00 svr-authpam.c
+--- a/svr-authpam.c Thu Aug 23 22:10:07 2018 +0800
++++ b/svr-authpam.c Thu Aug 23 23:43:12 2018 +0800
+@@ -178,13 +178,14 @@
+ * Keyboard interactive would be a lot nicer, but since PAM is synchronous, it
+ * gets very messy trying to send the interactive challenges, and read the
+ * interactive responses, over the network. */
+-void svr_auth_pam() {
++void svr_auth_pam(int valid_user) {
+
+ struct UserDataS userData = {NULL, NULL};
+ struct pam_conv pamConv = {
+ pamConvFunc,
+ &userData /* submitted to pamvConvFunc as appdata_ptr */
+ };
++ const char* printable_user = NULL;
+
+ pam_handle_t* pamHandlep = NULL;
+
+@@ -204,12 +205,23 @@
+
+ password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);
+
++ /* We run the PAM conversation regardless of whether the username is valid
++ in case the conversation function has an inherent delay.
++ Use ses.authstate.username rather than ses.authstate.pw_name.
++ After PAM succeeds we then check the valid_user flag too */
++
+ /* used to pass data to the PAM conversation function - don't bother with
+ * strdup() etc since these are touched only by our own conversation
+ * function (above) which takes care of it */
+- userData.user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
++ userData.user = ses.authstate.username;
+ userData.passwd = password;
+
++ if (ses.authstate.pw_name) {
++ printable_user = ses.authstate.pw_name;
++ } else {
++ printable_user = "<invalid username>";
++ }
++
+ /* Init pam */
+ if ((rc = pam_start("sshd", NULL, &pamConv, &pamHandlep)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "pam_start() failed, rc=%d, %s",
+@@ -242,7 +254,7 @@
+ rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
+ dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
+ "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
+- ses.authstate.pw_name,
++ printable_user,
+ svr_ses.addrstring);
+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
+ goto cleanup;
+@@ -253,12 +265,18 @@
+ rc, pam_strerror(pamHandlep, rc));
+ dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING,
+ "Bad PAM password attempt for '%s' from %s",
+- ses.authstate.pw_name,
++ printable_user,
+ svr_ses.addrstring);
+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+
++ if (!valid_user) {
++ /* PAM auth succeeded but the username isn't allowed in for another reason
++ (checkusername() failed) */
++ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
++ }
++
+ /* successful authentication */
+ dropbear_log(LOG_NOTICE, "PAM password auth succeeded for '%s' from %s",
+ ses.authstate.pw_name,
+diff -r cd23631dab5c -r 5d2d1021ca00 svr-authpasswd.c
+--- a/svr-authpasswd.c Thu Aug 23 22:10:07 2018 +0800
++++ b/svr-authpasswd.c Thu Aug 23 23:43:12 2018 +0800
+@@ -48,22 +48,14 @@
+
+ /* Process a password auth request, sending success or failure messages as
+ * appropriate */
+-void svr_auth_password() {
++void svr_auth_password(int valid_user) {
+
+ char * passwdcrypt = NULL; /* the crypt from /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow */
+ char * testcrypt = NULL; /* crypt generated from the user's password sent */
+- char * password;
++ char * password = NULL;
+ unsigned int passwordlen;
+-
+ unsigned int changepw;
+
+- passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
+-
+-#ifdef DEBUG_HACKCRYPT
+- /* debugging crypt for non-root testing with shadows */
+- passwdcrypt = DEBUG_HACKCRYPT;
+-#endif
+-
+ /* check if client wants to change password */
+ changepw = buf_getbool(ses.payload);
+ if (changepw) {
+@@ -73,12 +65,21 @@
+ }
+
+ password = buf_getstring(ses.payload, &passwordlen);
+-
+- /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
+- testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
++ if (valid_user) {
++ /* the first bytes of passwdcrypt are the salt */
++ passwdcrypt = ses.authstate.pw_passwd;
++ testcrypt = crypt(password, passwdcrypt);
++ }
+ m_burn(password, passwordlen);
+ m_free(password);
+
++ /* After we have got the payload contents we can exit if the username
++ is invalid. Invalid users have already been logged. */
++ if (!valid_user) {
++ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 1);
++ return;
++ }
++
+ if (testcrypt == NULL) {
+ /* crypt() with an invalid salt like "!!" */
+ dropbear_log(LOG_WARNING, "User account '%s' is locked",
+diff -r cd23631dab5c -r 5d2d1021ca00 svr-authpubkey.c
+--- a/svr-authpubkey.c Thu Aug 23 22:10:07 2018 +0800
++++ b/svr-authpubkey.c Thu Aug 23 23:43:12 2018 +0800
+@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@
+
+ /* process a pubkey auth request, sending success or failure message as
+ * appropriate */
+-void svr_auth_pubkey() {
++void svr_auth_pubkey(int valid_user) {
+
+ unsigned char testkey; /* whether we're just checking if a key is usable */
+ char* algo = NULL; /* pubkey algo */
+@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@
+ keybloblen = buf_getint(ses.payload);
+ keyblob = buf_getptr(ses.payload, keybloblen);
+
++ if (!valid_user) {
++ /* Return failure once we have read the contents of the packet
++ required to validate a public key.
++ Avoids blind user enumeration though it isn't possible to prevent
++ testing for user existence if the public key is known */
++ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
++ goto out;
++ }
++
+ /* check if the key is valid */
+ if (checkpubkey(algo, algolen, keyblob, keybloblen) == DROPBEAR_FAILURE) {
+ send_msg_userauth_failure(0, 0);
+