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authorFrancesco Colista <fcolista@alpinelinux.org>2018-11-26 15:23:11 +0000
committerFrancesco Colista <fcolista@alpinelinux.org>2018-11-26 15:23:18 +0000
commit9a88176c5408adb5321fa11300cb63e4dbea80ed (patch)
treecd857e88dc8e33a15966ea38089fe09704d3155d
parent8e877af9d55e0a6c682dc9d15b20145545ce8ce7 (diff)
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testing/dmg2img: added missing patch
-rw-r--r--testing/dmg2img/openssl-compatibility.patch219
1 files changed, 219 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/testing/dmg2img/openssl-compatibility.patch b/testing/dmg2img/openssl-compatibility.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..831da4cdb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testing/dmg2img/openssl-compatibility.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+From f16f247d30f868e84f31e24792b4464488f1c009 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Wu <peter@lekensteyn.nl>
+Date: Tue, 2 May 2017 15:53:38 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] vfdecrypt: OpenSSL 1.1 compatibility
+
+Allocate contexts from the heap on all OpenSSL versions, this is needed
+since OpenSSL 1.1.0. No attempt is done at addressing issues like global
+variables and fixing potential memleaks on error paths.
+
+Compile-tested only with OpenSSL 1.1.0e (Arch Linux) and OpenSSL 1.0.2g
+(Ubuntu 16.04), I have no test file.
+
+Fixes https://github.com/Lekensteyn/dmg2img/issues/4
+---
+ vfdecrypt.c | 103 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
+ 1 file changed, 80 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/vfdecrypt.c b/vfdecrypt.c
+index 56d3530..b1a36d3 100644
+--- a/vfdecrypt.c
++++ b/vfdecrypt.c
+@@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ void adjust_v2_header_byteorder(cencrypted_v2_pwheader *pwhdr) {
+ pwhdr->encrypted_keyblob_size = htonl(pwhdr->encrypted_keyblob_size);
+ }
+
+-HMAC_CTX hmacsha1_ctx;
++HMAC_CTX *hmacsha1_ctx;
+ AES_KEY aes_decrypt_key;
+ int CHUNK_SIZE=4096; // default
+
+@@ -196,9 +196,9 @@ void compute_iv(uint32_t chunk_no, uint8_t *iv) {
+ unsigned int mdLen;
+
+ chunk_no = OSSwapHostToBigInt32(chunk_no);
+- HMAC_Init_ex(&hmacsha1_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+- HMAC_Update(&hmacsha1_ctx, (void *) &chunk_no, sizeof(uint32_t));
+- HMAC_Final(&hmacsha1_ctx, mdResult, &mdLen);
++ HMAC_Init_ex(hmacsha1_ctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
++ HMAC_Update(hmacsha1_ctx, (void *) &chunk_no, sizeof(uint32_t));
++ HMAC_Final(hmacsha1_ctx, mdResult, &mdLen);
+ memcpy(iv, mdResult, CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE);
+ }
+
+@@ -212,52 +212,75 @@ void decrypt_chunk(uint8_t *ctext, uint8_t *ptext, uint32_t chunk_no) {
+ /* DES3-EDE unwrap operation loosely based on to RFC 2630, section 12.6
+ * wrapped_key has to be 40 bytes in length. */
+ int apple_des3_ede_unwrap_key(uint8_t *wrapped_key, int wrapped_key_len, uint8_t *decryptKey, uint8_t *unwrapped_key) {
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ uint8_t *TEMP1, *TEMP2, *CEKICV;
+ uint8_t IV[8] = { 0x4a, 0xdd, 0xa2, 0x2c, 0x79, 0xe8, 0x21, 0x05 };
+ int outlen, tmplen, i;
+
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++#else
++ ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
++#endif
++ if (!ctx) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: EVP_CIPHER_CTX!\n");
++ return(-1);
++ }
++
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+ /* result of the decryption operation shouldn't be bigger than ciphertext */
+ TEMP1 = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
+ TEMP2 = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
+ CEKICV = malloc(wrapped_key_len);
+ /* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, IV);
++ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, IV);
+
+- if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len)) {
++ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, wrapped_key, wrapped_key_len)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (1) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+- if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
++ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (2) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ outlen += tmplen;
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
++#else
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
++#endif
+
+ /* reverse order of TEMP3 */
+ for(i = 0; i < outlen; i++) TEMP2[i] = TEMP1[outlen - i - 1];
+
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+ /* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, TEMP2);
+- if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, CEKICV, &outlen, TEMP2+8, outlen-8)) {
++ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, decryptKey, TEMP2);
++ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, CEKICV, &outlen, TEMP2+8, outlen-8)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (3) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+- if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, CEKICV + outlen, &tmplen)) {
++ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, CEKICV + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (4) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+
+ outlen += tmplen;
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
++#else
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
++#endif
+
+ memcpy(unwrapped_key, CEKICV+4, outlen-4);
+ free(TEMP1);
+ free(TEMP2);
+ free(CEKICV);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++#else
++ free(ctx);
++#endif
+ return(0);
+ }
+
+@@ -279,31 +302,46 @@ int unwrap_v1_header(char *passphrase, cencrypted_v1_header *header, uint8_t *ae
+ int unwrap_v2_header(char *passphrase, cencrypted_v2_pwheader *header, uint8_t *aes_key, uint8_t *hmacsha1_key) {
+ /* derived key is a 3DES-EDE key */
+ uint8_t derived_key[192/8];
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
+ uint8_t *TEMP1;
+ int outlen, tmplen;
+
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
++#else
++ ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
++#endif
++ if (!ctx) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: EVP_CIPHER_CTX!\n");
++ return(-1);
++ }
++
+ PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), (unsigned char*)header->kdf_salt, 20,
+ PBKDF2_ITERATION_COUNT, sizeof(derived_key), derived_key);
+
+ print_hex(derived_key, 192/8);
+
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx);
+ /* result of the decryption operation shouldn't be bigger than ciphertext */
+ TEMP1 = malloc(header->encrypted_keyblob_size);
+ /* uses PKCS#7 padding for symmetric key operations by default */
+- EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, derived_key, header->blob_enc_iv);
++ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_des_ede3_cbc(), NULL, derived_key, header->blob_enc_iv);
+
+- if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, header->encrypted_keyblob, header->encrypted_keyblob_size)) {
++ if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, TEMP1, &outlen, header->encrypted_keyblob, header->encrypted_keyblob_size)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (1) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+- if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
++ if(!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, TEMP1 + outlen, &tmplen)) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "internal error (2) during key unwrap operation!\n");
+ return(-1);
+ }
+ outlen += tmplen;
+- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
++#else
++ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
++ free(ctx);
++#endif
+ memcpy(aes_key, TEMP1, 16);
+ memcpy(hmacsha1_key, TEMP1, 20);
+
+@@ -446,8 +484,21 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+ CHUNK_SIZE = v2header.blocksize;
+ }
+
+- HMAC_CTX_init(&hmacsha1_ctx);
+- HMAC_Init_ex(&hmacsha1_ctx, hmacsha1_key, sizeof(hmacsha1_key), EVP_sha1(), NULL);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ hmacsha1_ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
++#else
++ hmacsha1_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*hmacsha1_ctx));
++#endif
++ if (!hmacsha1_ctx) {
++ fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory: HMAC CTX!\n");
++ exit(1);
++ }
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ HMAC_CTX_reset(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#else
++ HMAC_CTX_init(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#endif
++ HMAC_Init_ex(hmacsha1_ctx, hmacsha1_key, sizeof(hmacsha1_key), EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+ AES_set_decrypt_key(aes_key, CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH * 8, &aes_decrypt_key);
+
+ if (verbose >= 1) {
+@@ -472,5 +523,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+ }
+
+ if (verbose) fprintf(stderr, "%"PRIX32" chunks written\n", chunk_no);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
++ HMAC_CTX_free(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#else
++ HMAC_CTX_cleanup(hmacsha1_ctx);
++ free(hmacsha1_ctx);
++#endif
+ return(0);
+ }