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authorDaniel Néri <dne+alpine@mayonnaise.net>2020-09-07 23:59:23 +0200
committerDaniel Néri <dne+alpine@mayonnaise.net>2020-09-09 11:07:55 +0200
commitb9aebdae9aa486d822c99355f3e0cb43a247ee75 (patch)
treea8fe2ed1d1fbe144985cbe3bfa1d9b38048fcd1d
parent2392c9192ec3e2f3af5897f3a6dd8fed08665a19 (diff)
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main/xen: security fix for CVE-2020-14364/XSA-335
-rw-r--r--main/xen/APKBUILD6
-rw-r--r--main/xen/xsa335-qemu.patch84
2 files changed, 89 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/main/xen/APKBUILD b/main/xen/APKBUILD
index 22e23c7e48..8c005a8ca4 100644
--- a/main/xen/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/xen/APKBUILD
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
# Maintainer:
pkgname=xen
pkgver=4.12.3
-pkgrel=2
+pkgrel=3
pkgdesc="Xen hypervisor"
url="https://www.xenproject.org/"
arch="x86_64 armhf aarch64" # enable armv7 when builds with gcc8
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ options="!strip"
# - CVE-2020-15565 XSA-321
# - CVE-2020-15564 XSA-327
# - CVE-2020-15567 XSA-328
+# 4.12.3-r3:
+# - CVE-2020-14364 XSA-335
case "$CARCH" in
x86*)
@@ -254,6 +256,7 @@ source="https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/$pkgname/$pkgver/$pkgname-$pkgv
xsa321-4.12-6.patch
xsa321-4.12-7.patch
xsa327.patch
+ xsa335-qemu.patch
xenstored.initd
xenstored.confd
@@ -523,6 +526,7 @@ d57d8cfd749df1816060345bedd9fa7ef2381ea9d85562ddf0c39ffe832ca56834c3e8c1fb67a64f
83823056dbd0142585d8b0fb9b3179ac8cc099a21ee489008a4cfb1f310daae72dff1fb6c7cd3a1c8ca5cec43a6b964587d8121a2423226baad0bcd302e73263 xsa327.patch
81beeaabf03d10ea8610487d76f859f76e92f19b188abcb2e33e6c1e31ddf9f78dcb1b9decb6a403d8237fe9fa580ed4a0037d46628ff6730569c355ebc0e405 xsa328-4.12-1.patch
a9551daa73a7deb332fcfd647d0df6ebab84699a91eaca43697e182612304910610f80c1edc3c5e3b86e4a580137a4ae178fadba62fe148795a6ab240df174cf xsa328-4.12-2.patch
+a18f552845ca105ce846ff8281b6c5b10f45301571f3163a33a6c212b87b742bb039f15c2d346bd34a9fdedd8a007fd9e51f319900cb8ee05febf178ed6ef8b0 xsa335-qemu.patch
52c43beb2596d645934d0f909f2d21f7587b6898ed5e5e7046799a8ed6d58f7a09c5809e1634fa26152f3fd4f3e7cfa07da7076f01b4a20cc8f5df8b9cb77e50 xenstored.initd
093f7fbd43faf0a16a226486a0776bade5dc1681d281c5946a3191c32d74f9699c6bf5d0ab8de9d1195a2461165d1660788e92a3156c9b3c7054d7b2d52d7ff0 xenstored.confd
3c86ed48fbee0af4051c65c4a3893f131fa66e47bf083caf20c9b6aa4b63fdead8832f84a58d0e27964bc49ec8397251b34e5be5c212c139f556916dc8da9523 xenconsoled.initd
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa335-qemu.patch b/main/xen/xsa335-qemu.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..320b419782
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/xen/xsa335-qemu.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From c5bd2924c6d6a5bcbffb8b5e7798a88970131c07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2020 08:34:22 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] usb: fix setup_len init (CVE-2020-14364)
+
+Store calculated setup_len in a local variable, verify it, and only
+write it to the struct (USBDevice->setup_len) in case it passed the
+sanity checks.
+
+This prevents other code (do_token_{in,out} functions specifically)
+from working with invalid USBDevice->setup_len values and overrunning
+the USBDevice->setup_buf[] buffer.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2020-14364
+Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/usb/core.c | 16 ++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/usb/core.c b/hw/usb/core.c
+index 5abd128b6bc5..5234dcc73fea 100644
+--- a/tools/qemu-xen/hw/usb/core.c
++++ b/tools/qemu-xen/hw/usb/core.c
+@@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ void usb_wakeup(USBEndpoint *ep, unsigned int stream)
+ static void do_token_setup(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
+ {
+ int request, value, index;
++ unsigned int setup_len;
+
+ if (p->iov.size != 8) {
+ p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
+@@ -138,14 +139,15 @@ static void do_token_setup(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
+ usb_packet_copy(p, s->setup_buf, p->iov.size);
+ s->setup_index = 0;
+ p->actual_length = 0;
+- s->setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
+- if (s->setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
++ setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
++ if (setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "usb_generic_handle_packet: ctrl buffer too small (%d > %zu)\n",
+- s->setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
++ setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
+ p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
+ return;
+ }
++ s->setup_len = setup_len;
+
+ request = (s->setup_buf[0] << 8) | s->setup_buf[1];
+ value = (s->setup_buf[3] << 8) | s->setup_buf[2];
+@@ -259,26 +261,28 @@ static void do_token_out(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
+ static void do_parameter(USBDevice *s, USBPacket *p)
+ {
+ int i, request, value, index;
++ unsigned int setup_len;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ s->setup_buf[i] = p->parameter >> (i*8);
+ }
+
+ s->setup_state = SETUP_STATE_PARAM;
+- s->setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
+ s->setup_index = 0;
+
+ request = (s->setup_buf[0] << 8) | s->setup_buf[1];
+ value = (s->setup_buf[3] << 8) | s->setup_buf[2];
+ index = (s->setup_buf[5] << 8) | s->setup_buf[4];
+
+- if (s->setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
++ setup_len = (s->setup_buf[7] << 8) | s->setup_buf[6];
++ if (setup_len > sizeof(s->data_buf)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "usb_generic_handle_packet: ctrl buffer too small (%d > %zu)\n",
+- s->setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
++ setup_len, sizeof(s->data_buf));
+ p->status = USB_RET_STALL;
+ return;
+ }
++ s->setup_len = setup_len;
+
+ if (p->pid == USB_TOKEN_OUT) {
+ usb_packet_copy(p, s->data_buf, s->setup_len);
+--
+2.18.4