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authorLeo <thinkabit.ukim@gmail.com>2020-12-29 08:43:24 -0300
committerLeo <thinkabit.ukim@gmail.com>2020-12-29 12:12:23 +0000
commitde75decf1e18449746c1ca11109b9e7cce3834df (patch)
treea9eead598b4152d371a9eadaf7f88e370d955724
parent4a1e1ce6241a8510080f3b4e10317234497e6dae (diff)
downloadaports-de75decf1e18449746c1ca11109b9e7cce3834df.tar.gz
aports-de75decf1e18449746c1ca11109b9e7cce3834df.tar.bz2
aports-de75decf1e18449746c1ca11109b9e7cce3834df.tar.xz
main/openjpeg: upgrade to 2.4.0
-rw-r--r--main/openjpeg/APKBUILD22
-rw-r--r--main/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973.patch152
-rw-r--r--main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-15389.patch39
-rw-r--r--main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814.patch30
-rw-r--r--main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27823.patch28
-rw-r--r--main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27824.patch25
-rw-r--r--main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch29
-rw-r--r--main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch43
8 files changed, 4 insertions, 364 deletions
diff --git a/main/openjpeg/APKBUILD b/main/openjpeg/APKBUILD
index 71848afd20..b7349f9e1f 100644
--- a/main/openjpeg/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/openjpeg/APKBUILD
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# Maintainer: Francesco Colista <fcolista@alpinelinux.org>
pkgname=openjpeg
-pkgver=2.3.1
-pkgrel=6
+pkgver=2.4.0
+pkgrel=0
pkgdesc="Open-source implementation of JPEG2000 image codec"
url="https://www.openjpeg.org/"
arch="all"
@@ -11,13 +11,6 @@ makedepends="libpng-dev tiff-dev lcms2-dev doxygen cmake"
subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-tools"
source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/archive/v$pkgver.tar.gz
fix-cmakelists.patch
- CVE-2020-6851.patch
- CVE-2020-8112.patch
- CVE-2019-12973.patch
- CVE-2020-15389.patch
- CVE-2020-27814.patch
- CVE-2020-27823.patch
- CVE-2020-27824.patch
"
build() {
@@ -71,12 +64,5 @@ tools() {
mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin "$subpkgdir"/usr/
}
-sha512sums="339fbc899bddf2393d214df71ed5d6070a3a76b933b1e75576c8a0ae9dfcc4adec40bdc544f599e4b8d0bc173e4e9e7352408497b5b3c9356985605830c26c03 openjpeg-2.3.1.tar.gz
-b50cd382d08647db18f202769aae7df87613a18143a30e360e8f00aba1ec1b7fd0a153685dbea3950bc5623b06c314326777c4fb7aff56adfc6b17bc74c933e5 fix-cmakelists.patch
-c8ffc926d91392b38250fd4e00fff5f93fbf5e17487d0e4a0184c9bd191aa2233c5c5dcf097dd62824714097bba2d8cc865bed31193d1a072aa954f216011297 CVE-2020-6851.patch
-9659e04087e0d80bf53555e9807aae59205adef2d49d7a49e05bf250c484a2e92132d471ec6076e57ca69b5ce98fd81462a6a8c01205ca7096781eec06e401cc CVE-2020-8112.patch
-472deba1d521553f9c7af805ba3d0c4fc31564fd36e37c598646f468b7d05bf5f81d2320fd6fadf8c0e3344ebce7bc0d04cece55a1b3cec2ef693a6e65bd2516 CVE-2019-12973.patch
-f36ea384272b3918d194f7d64bcc321a66fa6ebb2d73ece3d69225f883ec8a2777284f633902cf954f9a847bd758da2c36c74d8ef28c4cd82a3bf076e326c611 CVE-2020-15389.patch
-fffaa91a3c67b4edbd313bb9bbd7a9f5abeb65bc0ddda3f676eed86662c0ef844b06a1331bfea785cc6178f31750cb9172a81a7359a618694b740915a9ce494a CVE-2020-27814.patch
-a5d5ff618a78ca16a5958c95860652101c59f39bb48ad13c1d802f559dca11d3a9c069e5898a48c5c5e5186ba186afe091653949bca6dfd3bdff236283a50be8 CVE-2020-27823.patch
-796f75d61db2cbb07dd8e3d7e52895a1b22dbf9e01763a1b0caaed413e76ef9b2f4927ceaefd5b07775639a4aaac5c50e641bcff6d646166d8d7160f17026f6f CVE-2020-27824.patch"
+sha512sums="55daab47d33823af94e32e5d345b52c251a5410f0c8e0a13b693f17899eedc8b2bb107489ddcba9ab78ef17dfd7cd80d3c5ec80c1e429189cb041124b67e07a8 openjpeg-2.4.0.tar.gz
+b50cd382d08647db18f202769aae7df87613a18143a30e360e8f00aba1ec1b7fd0a153685dbea3950bc5623b06c314326777c4fb7aff56adfc6b17bc74c933e5 fix-cmakelists.patch"
diff --git a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973.patch b/main/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0d330ae6d9..0000000000
--- a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2019-12973.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,152 +0,0 @@
-From 21399f6b7d318fcdf4406d5e88723c4922202aa3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
-Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 19:57:27 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] convertbmp: detect invalid file dimensions early
-
-width/length dimensions read from bmp headers are not necessarily
-valid. For instance they may have been maliciously set to very large
-values with the intention to cause DoS (large memory allocation, stack
-overflow). In these cases we want to detect the invalid size as early
-as possible.
-
-This commit introduces a counter which verifies that the number of
-written bytes corresponds to the advertized width/length.
-
-See commit 8ee335227bbc for details.
-
-Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
----
- src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-index 0af52f816..ec34f535b 100644
---- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-+++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-@@ -622,13 +622,13 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle8_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
- static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
- OPJ_UINT32 stride, OPJ_UINT32 width, OPJ_UINT32 height)
- {
-- OPJ_UINT32 x, y;
-+ OPJ_UINT32 x, y, written;
- OPJ_UINT8 *pix;
- const OPJ_UINT8 *beyond;
-
- beyond = pData + stride * height;
- pix = pData;
-- x = y = 0U;
-+ x = y = written = 0U;
- while (y < height) {
- int c = getc(IN);
- if (c == EOF) {
-@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
- for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
- ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
- *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
-+ written++;
- }
- } else { /* absolute mode */
- c = getc(IN);
-@@ -671,6 +672,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
- c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
- }
- *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
-+ written++;
- }
- if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
- getc(IN);
-@@ -678,6 +680,10 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
- }
- }
- } /* while(y < height) */
-+ if (written != width * height) {
-+ fprintf(stderr, "warning, image's actual size does not match advertized one\n");
-+ return OPJ_FALSE;
-+ }
- return OPJ_TRUE;
- }
-
-
-From 3aef207f90e937d4931daf6d411e092f76d82e66 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Young Xiao <YangX92@hotmail.com>
-Date: Sat, 16 Mar 2019 20:09:59 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] bmp_read_rle4_data(): avoid potential infinite loop
-
----
- src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-index ec34f535b..2fc4e9bc4 100644
---- a/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-+++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertbmp.c
-@@ -632,12 +632,18 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
- while (y < height) {
- int c = getc(IN);
- if (c == EOF) {
-- break;
-+ return OPJ_FALSE;
- }
-
- if (c) { /* encoded mode */
-- int j;
-- OPJ_UINT8 c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
-+ int j, c1_int;
-+ OPJ_UINT8 c1;
-+
-+ c1_int = getc(IN);
-+ if (c1_int == EOF) {
-+ return OPJ_FALSE;
-+ }
-+ c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
-
- for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
- ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
-@@ -647,7 +653,7 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
- } else { /* absolute mode */
- c = getc(IN);
- if (c == EOF) {
-- break;
-+ return OPJ_FALSE;
- }
-
- if (c == 0x00) { /* EOL */
-@@ -658,8 +664,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
- break;
- } else if (c == 0x02) { /* MOVE by dxdy */
- c = getc(IN);
-+ if (c == EOF) {
-+ return OPJ_FALSE;
-+ }
- x += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
- c = getc(IN);
-+ if (c == EOF) {
-+ return OPJ_FALSE;
-+ }
- y += (OPJ_UINT32)c;
- pix = pData + y * stride + x;
- } else { /* 03 .. 255 : absolute mode */
-@@ -669,13 +681,21 @@ static OPJ_BOOL bmp_read_rle4_data(FILE* IN, OPJ_UINT8* pData,
- for (j = 0; (j < c) && (x < width) &&
- ((OPJ_SIZE_T)pix < (OPJ_SIZE_T)beyond); j++, x++, pix++) {
- if ((j & 1) == 0) {
-- c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)getc(IN);
-+ int c1_int;
-+ c1_int = getc(IN);
-+ if (c1_int == EOF) {
-+ return OPJ_FALSE;
-+ }
-+ c1 = (OPJ_UINT8)c1_int;
- }
- *pix = (OPJ_UINT8)((j & 1) ? (c1 & 0x0fU) : ((c1 >> 4) & 0x0fU));
- written++;
- }
- if (((c & 3) == 1) || ((c & 3) == 2)) { /* skip padding byte */
-- getc(IN);
-+ c = getc(IN);
-+ if (c == EOF) {
-+ return OPJ_FALSE;
-+ }
- }
- }
- }
diff --git a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-15389.patch b/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-15389.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f5737a3b24..0000000000
--- a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-15389.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From e8e258ab049240c2dd1f1051b4e773b21e2d3dc0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com>
-Date: Sun, 28 Jun 2020 14:19:59 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] opj_decompress: fix double-free on input directory with mix
- of valid and invalid images (CVE-2020-15389)
-
-Fixes #1261
-
-Credits to @Ruia-ruia for reporting and analysis.
----
- src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c b/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c
-index 7eeb0952f..2634907f0 100644
---- a/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c
-+++ b/src/bin/jp2/opj_decompress.c
-@@ -1316,10 +1316,6 @@ static opj_image_t* upsample_image_components(opj_image_t* original)
- int main(int argc, char **argv)
- {
- opj_decompress_parameters parameters; /* decompression parameters */
-- opj_image_t* image = NULL;
-- opj_stream_t *l_stream = NULL; /* Stream */
-- opj_codec_t* l_codec = NULL; /* Handle to a decompressor */
-- opj_codestream_index_t* cstr_index = NULL;
-
- OPJ_INT32 num_images, imageno;
- img_fol_t img_fol;
-@@ -1393,6 +1389,10 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
-
- /*Decoding image one by one*/
- for (imageno = 0; imageno < num_images ; imageno++) {
-+ opj_image_t* image = NULL;
-+ opj_stream_t *l_stream = NULL; /* Stream */
-+ opj_codec_t* l_codec = NULL; /* Handle to a decompressor */
-+ opj_codestream_index_t* cstr_index = NULL;
-
- if (!parameters.quiet) {
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
diff --git a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814.patch b/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 85e92be8d6..0000000000
--- a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27814.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From 6cdba6bbdc78ce668a7e9147ba89fc8421187d72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Leo <thinkabit.ukim@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 00:00:17 -0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/3] CVE-2020-27814
-
----
- src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
-index be3b843..e6b84f9 100644
---- a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
-+++ b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
-@@ -1219,9 +1219,12 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_code_block_enc_allocate_data(opj_tcd_cblk_enc_t *
-
- /* +1 is needed for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/835 */
- /* and actually +2 required for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/982 */
-+ /* and +7 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 3) */
-+ /* and +26 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 7) */
-+ /* and +28 for https://github.com/uclouvain/openjpeg/issues/1283 (-M 44) */
- /* TODO: is there a theoretical upper-bound for the compressed code */
- /* block size ? */
-- l_data_size = 2 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
-+ l_data_size = 28 + (OPJ_UINT32)((p_code_block->x1 - p_code_block->x0) *
- (p_code_block->y1 - p_code_block->y0) * (OPJ_INT32)sizeof(OPJ_UINT32));
-
- if (l_data_size > p_code_block->data_size) {
---
-2.29.2
-
diff --git a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27823.patch b/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27823.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 58193afd4c..0000000000
--- a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27823.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From 40b4a8ea26a16cf95d9a63cec928eb0fbe65e04e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Leo <thinkabit.ukim@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 00:01:02 -0300
-Subject: [PATCH 2/3] CVE-2020-27823
-
----
- src/bin/jp2/convertpng.c | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/bin/jp2/convertpng.c b/src/bin/jp2/convertpng.c
-index 44d985f..1559c8f 100644
---- a/src/bin/jp2/convertpng.c
-+++ b/src/bin/jp2/convertpng.c
-@@ -223,9 +223,9 @@ opj_image_t *pngtoimage(const char *read_idf, opj_cparameters_t * params)
- image->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)params->image_offset_x0;
- image->y0 = (OPJ_UINT32)params->image_offset_y0;
- image->x1 = (OPJ_UINT32)(image->x0 + (width - 1) * (OPJ_UINT32)
-- params->subsampling_dx + 1 + image->x0);
-+ params->subsampling_dx + 1);
- image->y1 = (OPJ_UINT32)(image->y0 + (height - 1) * (OPJ_UINT32)
-- params->subsampling_dy + 1 + image->y0);
-+ params->subsampling_dy + 1);
-
- row32s = (OPJ_INT32 *)malloc((size_t)width * nr_comp * sizeof(OPJ_INT32));
- if (row32s == NULL) {
---
-2.29.2
-
diff --git a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27824.patch b/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27824.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index b176d60b1e..0000000000
--- a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-27824.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From dcb3063cd8101c751f3fd97249f41aaabe17ec82 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Leo <thinkabit.ukim@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2020 00:01:25 -0300
-Subject: [PATCH 3/3] CVE-2020-27824
-
----
- src/lib/openjp2/dwt.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/dwt.c b/src/lib/openjp2/dwt.c
-index 5930d1c..a1d5d61 100644
---- a/src/lib/openjp2/dwt.c
-+++ b/src/lib/openjp2/dwt.c
-@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ void opj_dwt_calc_explicit_stepsizes(opj_tccp_t * tccp, OPJ_UINT32 prec)
- if (tccp->qntsty == J2K_CCP_QNTSTY_NOQNT) {
- stepsize = 1.0;
- } else {
-- OPJ_FLOAT64 norm = opj_dwt_norms_real[orient][level];
-+ OPJ_FLOAT64 norm = opj_dwt_getnorm_real(level, orient);
- stepsize = (1 << (gain)) / norm;
- }
- opj_dwt_encode_stepsize((OPJ_INT32) floor(stepsize * 8192.0),
---
-2.29.2
-
diff --git a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch b/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9a70291f50..0000000000
--- a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-6851.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-From 024b8407392cb0b82b04b58ed256094ed5799e04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com>
-Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 01:51:19 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(): reject images whose
- coordinates are beyond INT_MAX (fixes #1228)
-
----
- src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c | 8 ++++++++
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
-index 14f6ff41a..922550eb1 100644
---- a/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
-+++ b/src/lib/openjp2/j2k.c
-@@ -9221,6 +9221,14 @@ static OPJ_BOOL opj_j2k_update_image_dimensions(opj_image_t* p_image,
- l_img_comp = p_image->comps;
- for (it_comp = 0; it_comp < p_image->numcomps; ++it_comp) {
- OPJ_INT32 l_h, l_w;
-+ if (p_image->x0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
-+ p_image->y0 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
-+ p_image->x1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX ||
-+ p_image->y1 > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
-+ opj_event_msg(p_manager, EVT_ERROR,
-+ "Image coordinates above INT_MAX are not supported\n");
-+ return OPJ_FALSE;
-+ }
-
- l_img_comp->x0 = (OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildiv((OPJ_INT32)p_image->x0,
- (OPJ_INT32)l_img_comp->dx);
diff --git a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch b/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 95cb8095f5..0000000000
--- a/main/openjpeg/CVE-2020-8112.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From 05f9b91e60debda0e83977e5e63b2e66486f7074 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Even Rouault <even.rouault@spatialys.com>
-Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 00:59:57 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] opj_tcd_init_tile(): avoid integer overflow
-
-That could lead to later assertion failures.
-
-Fixes #1231 / CVE-2020-8112
----
- src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
-index deecc4dff..aa419030a 100644
---- a/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
-+++ b/src/lib/openjp2/tcd.c
-@@ -905,8 +905,24 @@ static INLINE OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_init_tile(opj_tcd_t *p_tcd, OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no,
- /* p. 64, B.6, ISO/IEC FDIS15444-1 : 2000 (18 august 2000) */
- l_tl_prc_x_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->x0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
- l_tl_prc_y_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->y0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
-- l_br_prc_x_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
-- l_br_prc_y_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
-+ {
-+ OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1,
-+ (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx)) << l_pdx;
-+ if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
-+ opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
-+ return OPJ_FALSE;
-+ }
-+ l_br_prc_x_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
-+ }
-+ {
-+ OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1,
-+ (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy)) << l_pdy;
-+ if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
-+ opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
-+ return OPJ_FALSE;
-+ }
-+ l_br_prc_y_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
-+ }
- /*fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\tprc_x_start=%d, prc_y_start=%d, br_prc_x_end=%d, br_prc_y_end=%d \n", l_tl_prc_x_start, l_tl_prc_y_start, l_br_prc_x_end ,l_br_prc_y_end );*/
-
- l_res->pw = (l_res->x0 == l_res->x1) ? 0U : (OPJ_UINT32)((