main/python2: security upgrade to 2.7.17

5 files changed, 7 insertions, 395 deletions

diff --git a/main/python2/APKBUILD b/main/python2/APKBUILD
index a4268f16307..7e2aa94d9a7 100644
--- a/main/python2/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/python2/APKBUILD
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 
 pkgname=python2
 # the python2-tkinter's pkgver needs to be synchronized with this.
-pkgver=2.7.16
+pkgver=2.7.17
 _verbase=${pkgver%.*}
-pkgrel=3
+pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="A high-level scripting language"
 url="https://www.python.org/"
 arch="all"
@@ -18,15 +18,13 @@ makedepends="expat-dev openssl-dev zlib-dev ncurses-dev bzip2-dev
 source="https://www.python.org/ftp/python/$pkgver/Python-$pkgver.tar.xz
 	musl-find_library.patch
 	unchecked-ioctl.patch
-	CVE-2019-9636.patch
-	CVE-2019-9948.patch
-	CVE-2019-16056.patch
-	CVE-2019-16935.patch
 	"
 builddir="$srcdir/Python-$pkgver"
 
 # secfixes:
-#   2.7.16-33:
+#   2.7.17-r0:
+#   - CVE-2019-15903
+#   2.7.16-r3:
 #   - CVE-2019-16056
 #   - CVE-2019-16935
 #   2.7.16-r1:
@@ -147,10 +145,6 @@ wininst() {
 		"$subpkgdir"/usr/lib/python$_verbase/distutils/command
 }
 
-sha512sums="16e814e8dcffc707b595ca2919bd2fa3db0d15794c63d977364652c4a5b92e90e72b8c9e1cc83b5020398bd90a1b397dbdd7cb931c49f1aa4af6ef95414b43e0  Python-2.7.16.tar.xz
+sha512sums="2dc19a0b0d818c71429dae94783e58b2aac0fa31f5faa1e840cac06245a59932ecc4658d913515736601bcf70a78c9ec60367aed75f4567d1e41ff3bb104da9a  Python-2.7.17.tar.xz
 ab8eaa2858d5109049b1f9f553198d40e0ef8d78211ad6455f7b491af525bffb16738fed60fc84e960c4889568d25753b9e4a1494834fea48291b33f07000ec2  musl-find_library.patch
-5a8e013a4132d71c4360771f130d27b37275ae59330cf9a75378dc8a11236017f540eb224f2a148984e82ca3fb6b29129375b1080ba05b81044faa717520ab82  unchecked-ioctl.patch
-54086e7b4d3597969b945b1460fe578ff3a13289703d58d79b8f00f644eccc4acc11fc6128b7b114f022a6f6cedc91e02eead6373bac0d36e22eb580a1becb53  CVE-2019-9636.patch
-2f9523bd3e39c4831110821d93aef1562ca80708f1b553428eb5c228cdf2192feb13d7aef41097a5df4b4243da8b8f7247f691c0ab73967b0bf2bf6a1a0d487f  CVE-2019-9948.patch
-971006063001d3d2f40833d79e0317f3748c056b9c8d714ce1bb1e804ad4c3c174071324e123ea71d453a41b0db28caf49b8128d6adee5c9b5aea1b66d1da647  CVE-2019-16056.patch
-758a897f01665149a23cbc3898fe060c043647d6fe6d22d8ca9038554b4ef1c7b2ac638d37eaed265167cd50f9329be2518f07464dccb7a7ab34ec9be4710095  CVE-2019-16935.patch"
+5a8e013a4132d71c4360771f130d27b37275ae59330cf9a75378dc8a11236017f540eb224f2a148984e82ca3fb6b29129375b1080ba05b81044faa717520ab82  unchecked-ioctl.patch"
diff --git a/main/python2/CVE-2019-16056.patch b/main/python2/CVE-2019-16056.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9ada54da1a1..00000000000
--- a/main/python2/CVE-2019-16056.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-From 4cbcd2f8c4e12b912e4d21fd892eedf7a3813d8e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Roberto=20C=2E=20S=C3=A1nchez?= <roberto@connexer.com>
-Date: Sat, 14 Sep 2019 13:26:38 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] [2.7] bpo-34155: Dont parse domains containing @ (GH-13079)
- (GH-16006)
-
-This change skips parsing of email addresses where domains include a "@" character, which can be maliciously used since the local part is returned as a complete address.
-
-(cherry picked from commit 8cb65d1381b027f0b09ee36bfed7f35bb4dec9a9)
-
-Excludes changes to Lib/email/_header_value_parser.py, which did not
-exist in 2.7.
-
-Co-authored-by: jpic <jpic@users.noreply.github.com>
-
-
-https://bugs.python.org/issue34155
----
- Lib/email/_parseaddr.py                            | 11 ++++++++++-
- Lib/email/test/test_email.py                       | 14 ++++++++++++++
- .../2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst       |  1 +
- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
-
-diff --git a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
-index 690db2c22d34d..dc49d2e45a5eb 100644
---- a/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
-+++ b/Lib/email/_parseaddr.py
-@@ -336,7 +336,12 @@ def getaddrspec(self):
-         aslist.append('@')
-         self.pos += 1
-         self.gotonext()
--        return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + self.getdomain()
-+        domain = self.getdomain()
-+        if not domain:
-+            # Invalid domain, return an empty address instead of returning a
-+            # local part to denote failed parsing.
-+            return EMPTYSTRING
-+        return EMPTYSTRING.join(aslist) + domain
- 
-     def getdomain(self):
-         """Get the complete domain name from an address."""
-@@ -351,6 +356,10 @@ def getdomain(self):
-             elif self.field[self.pos] == '.':
-                 self.pos += 1
-                 sdlist.append('.')
-+            elif self.field[self.pos] == '@':
-+                # bpo-34155: Don't parse domains with two `@` like
-+                # `a@malicious.org@important.com`.
-+                return EMPTYSTRING
-             elif self.field[self.pos] in self.atomends:
-                 break
-             else:
-diff --git a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
-index 4b4dee3d34644..2efe44ac5a73f 100644
---- a/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
-+++ b/Lib/email/test/test_email.py
-@@ -2306,6 +2306,20 @@ def test_parseaddr_empty(self):
-         self.assertEqual(Utils.parseaddr('<>'), ('', ''))
-         self.assertEqual(Utils.formataddr(Utils.parseaddr('<>')), '')
- 
-+    def test_parseaddr_multiple_domains(self):
-+        self.assertEqual(
-+            Utils.parseaddr('a@b@c'),
-+            ('', '')
-+        )
-+        self.assertEqual(
-+            Utils.parseaddr('a@b.c@c'),
-+            ('', '')
-+        )
-+        self.assertEqual(
-+            Utils.parseaddr('a@172.17.0.1@c'),
-+            ('', '')
-+        )
-+
-     def test_noquote_dump(self):
-         self.assertEqual(
-             Utils.formataddr(('A Silly Person', 'person@dom.ain')),
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000000..50292e29ed1d2
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-05-04-13-33-37.bpo-34155.MJll68.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1 @@
-+Fix parsing of invalid email addresses with more than one ``@`` (e.g. a@b@c.com.) to not return the part before 2nd ``@`` as valid email address. Patch by maxking & jpic.
diff --git a/main/python2/CVE-2019-16935.patch b/main/python2/CVE-2019-16935.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 632a3e77b37..00000000000
--- a/main/python2/CVE-2019-16935.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,92 +0,0 @@
-From 8eb64155ff26823542ccf0225b3d57b6ae36ea89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Dong-hee Na <donghee.na92@gmail.com>
-Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2019 19:58:01 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH] [2.7] bpo-38243: Escape the server title of DocXMLRPCServer
- (GH-16447)
-
-Escape the server title of DocXMLRPCServer.DocXMLRPCServer
-when rendering the document page as HTML.
----
- Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py                        | 13 +++++++++++-
- Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py                    | 20 +++++++++++++++++++
- .../2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst  |  3 +++
- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
-
-diff --git a/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py b/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py
-index 4064ec2e48d4d..90b037dd35d6b 100644
---- a/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py
-+++ b/Lib/DocXMLRPCServer.py
-@@ -20,6 +20,16 @@
-             CGIXMLRPCRequestHandler,
-             resolve_dotted_attribute)
- 
-+
-+def _html_escape_quote(s):
-+    s = s.replace("&", "&amp;") # Must be done first!
-+    s = s.replace("<", "&lt;")
-+    s = s.replace(">", "&gt;")
-+    s = s.replace('"', "&quot;")
-+    s = s.replace('\'', "&#x27;")
-+    return s
-+
-+
- class ServerHTMLDoc(pydoc.HTMLDoc):
-     """Class used to generate pydoc HTML document for a server"""
- 
-@@ -210,7 +220,8 @@ def generate_html_documentation(self):
-                                 methods
-                             )
- 
--        return documenter.page(self.server_title, documentation)
-+        title = _html_escape_quote(self.server_title)
-+        return documenter.page(title, documentation)
- 
- class DocXMLRPCRequestHandler(SimpleXMLRPCRequestHandler):
-     """XML-RPC and documentation request handler class.
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
-index 4dff4159e2466..c45b892b8b3e7 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_docxmlrpc.py
-@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
- from DocXMLRPCServer import DocXMLRPCServer
- import httplib
-+import re
- import sys
- from test import test_support
- threading = test_support.import_module('threading')
-@@ -176,6 +177,25 @@ def test_autolink_dotted_methods(self):
-         self.assertIn("""Try&nbsp;self.<strong>add</strong>,&nbsp;too.""",
-                       response.read())
- 
-+    def test_server_title_escape(self):
-+        """Test that the server title and documentation
-+        are escaped for HTML.
-+        """
-+        self.serv.set_server_title('test_title<script>')
-+        self.serv.set_server_documentation('test_documentation<script>')
-+        self.assertEqual('test_title<script>', self.serv.server_title)
-+        self.assertEqual('test_documentation<script>',
-+                self.serv.server_documentation)
-+
-+        generated = self.serv.generate_html_documentation()
-+        title = re.search(r'<title>(.+?)</title>', generated).group()
-+        documentation = re.search(r'<p><tt>(.+?)</tt></p>', generated).group()
-+        self.assertEqual('<title>Python: test_title&lt;script&gt;</title>',
-+                title)
-+        self.assertEqual('<p><tt>test_documentation&lt;script&gt;</tt></p>',
-+                documentation)
-+
-+
- def test_main():
-     test_support.run_unittest(DocXMLRPCHTTPGETServer)
- 
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000000000..8f02baed9ebe5
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-09-25-13-21-09.bpo-38243.1pfz24.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
-+Escape the server title of :class:`DocXMLRPCServer.DocXMLRPCServer`
-+when rendering the document page as HTML.
-+(Contributed by Dong-hee Na in :issue:`38243`.)
diff --git a/main/python2/CVE-2019-9636.patch b/main/python2/CVE-2019-9636.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 17a98a4196c..00000000000
--- a/main/python2/CVE-2019-9636.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,155 +0,0 @@
-From e37ef41289b77e0f0bb9a6aedb0360664c55bdd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Steve Dower <steve.dower@microsoft.com>
-Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 09:08:45 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH] bpo-36216: Add check for characters in netloc that normalize
- to separators (GH-12201)
-
----
- Doc/library/urlparse.rst                      | 20 ++++++++++++++++
- Lib/test/test_urlparse.py                     | 24 +++++++++++++++++++
- Lib/urlparse.py                               | 17 +++++++++++++
- .../2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst  |  3 +++
- 4 files changed, 64 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst
-
-diff --git a/Doc/library/urlparse.rst b/Doc/library/urlparse.rst
-index 22249da54fbb..0989c88c3022 100644
---- a/Doc/library/urlparse.rst
-+++ b/Doc/library/urlparse.rst
-@@ -119,12 +119,22 @@ The :mod:`urlparse` module defines the following functions:
-    See section :ref:`urlparse-result-object` for more information on the result
-    object.
- 
-+   Characters in the :attr:`netloc` attribute that decompose under NFKC
-+   normalization (as used by the IDNA encoding) into any of ``/``, ``?``,
-+   ``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is
-+   decomposed before parsing, or is not a Unicode string, no error will be
-+   raised.
-+
-    .. versionchanged:: 2.5
-       Added attributes to return value.
- 
-    .. versionchanged:: 2.7
-       Added IPv6 URL parsing capabilities.
- 
-+   .. versionchanged:: 2.7.17
-+      Characters that affect netloc parsing under NFKC normalization will
-+      now raise :exc:`ValueError`.
-+
- 
- .. function:: parse_qs(qs[, keep_blank_values[, strict_parsing[, max_num_fields]]])
- 
-@@ -232,11 +242,21 @@ The :mod:`urlparse` module defines the following functions:
-    See section :ref:`urlparse-result-object` for more information on the result
-    object.
- 
-+   Characters in the :attr:`netloc` attribute that decompose under NFKC
-+   normalization (as used by the IDNA encoding) into any of ``/``, ``?``,
-+   ``#``, ``@``, or ``:`` will raise a :exc:`ValueError`. If the URL is
-+   decomposed before parsing, or is not a Unicode string, no error will be
-+   raised.
-+
-    .. versionadded:: 2.2
- 
-    .. versionchanged:: 2.5
-       Added attributes to return value.
- 
-+   .. versionchanged:: 2.7.17
-+      Characters that affect netloc parsing under NFKC normalization will
-+      now raise :exc:`ValueError`.
-+
- 
- .. function:: urlunsplit(parts)
- 
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
-index 4e1ded73c266..73b0228ea8e3 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
-@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@
- from test import test_support
-+import sys
-+import unicodedata
- import unittest
- import urlparse
- 
-@@ -624,6 +626,28 @@ def test_portseparator(self):
-         self.assertEqual(urlparse.urlparse("http://www.python.org:80"),
-                 ('http','www.python.org:80','','','',''))
- 
-+    def test_urlsplit_normalization(self):
-+        # Certain characters should never occur in the netloc,
-+        # including under normalization.
-+        # Ensure that ALL of them are detected and cause an error
-+        illegal_chars = u'/:#?@'
-+        hex_chars = {'{:04X}'.format(ord(c)) for c in illegal_chars}
-+        denorm_chars = [
-+            c for c in map(unichr, range(128, sys.maxunicode))
-+            if (hex_chars & set(unicodedata.decomposition(c).split()))
-+            and c not in illegal_chars
-+        ]
-+        # Sanity check that we found at least one such character
-+        self.assertIn(u'\u2100', denorm_chars)
-+        self.assertIn(u'\uFF03', denorm_chars)
-+
-+        for scheme in [u"http", u"https", u"ftp"]:
-+            for c in denorm_chars:
-+                url = u"{}://netloc{}false.netloc/path".format(scheme, c)
-+                print "Checking %r" % url
-+                with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
-+                    urlparse.urlsplit(url)
-+
- def test_main():
-     test_support.run_unittest(UrlParseTestCase)
- 
-diff --git a/Lib/urlparse.py b/Lib/urlparse.py
-index f7c2b032b097..54eda08651ab 100644
---- a/Lib/urlparse.py
-+++ b/Lib/urlparse.py
-@@ -165,6 +165,21 @@ def _splitnetloc(url, start=0):
-             delim = min(delim, wdelim)     # use earliest delim position
-     return url[start:delim], url[delim:]   # return (domain, rest)
- 
-+def _checknetloc(netloc):
-+    if not netloc or not isinstance(netloc, unicode):
-+        return
-+    # looking for characters like \u2100 that expand to 'a/c'
-+    # IDNA uses NFKC equivalence, so normalize for this check
-+    import unicodedata
-+    netloc2 = unicodedata.normalize('NFKC', netloc)
-+    if netloc == netloc2:
-+        return
-+    _, _, netloc = netloc.rpartition('@') # anything to the left of '@' is okay
-+    for c in '/?#@:':
-+        if c in netloc2:
-+            raise ValueError("netloc '" + netloc2 + "' contains invalid " +
-+                             "characters under NFKC normalization")
-+
- def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
-     """Parse a URL into 5 components:
-     <scheme>://<netloc>/<path>?<query>#<fragment>
-@@ -193,6 +208,7 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
-                 url, fragment = url.split('#', 1)
-             if '?' in url:
-                 url, query = url.split('?', 1)
-+            _checknetloc(netloc)
-             v = SplitResult(scheme, netloc, url, query, fragment)
-             _parse_cache[key] = v
-             return v
-@@ -216,6 +232,7 @@ def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
-         url, fragment = url.split('#', 1)
-     if '?' in url:
-         url, query = url.split('?', 1)
-+    _checknetloc(netloc)
-     v = SplitResult(scheme, netloc, url, query, fragment)
-     _parse_cache[key] = v
-     return v
-diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000000..1e1ad92c6feb
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2019-03-06-09-38-40.bpo-36216.6q1m4a.rst
-@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
-+Changes urlsplit() to raise ValueError when the URL contains characters that
-+decompose under IDNA encoding (NFKC-normalization) into characters that
-+affect how the URL is parsed.
-\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/main/python2/CVE-2019-9948.patch b/main/python2/CVE-2019-9948.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e5d38bd0aca..00000000000
--- a/main/python2/CVE-2019-9948.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-From 8f99cc799e4393bf1112b9395b2342f81b3f45ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: push0ebp <push0ebp@shl-MacBook-Pro.local>
-Date: Thu, 14 Feb 2019 02:05:46 +0900
-Subject: [PATCH] bpo-35907: Avoid file reading as disallowing the unnecessary
- URL scheme in urllib
-
----
- Lib/test/test_urllib.py | 12 ++++++++++++
- Lib/urllib.py           |  5 ++++-
- 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
-index 1ce9201c0693..e5f210e62a18 100644
---- a/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
-+++ b/Lib/test/test_urllib.py
-@@ -1023,6 +1023,18 @@ def open_spam(self, url):
-             "spam://c:|windows%/:=&?~#+!$,;'@()*[]|/path/"),
-             "//c:|windows%/:=&?~#+!$,;'@()*[]|/path/")
- 
-+    def test_local_file_open(self):
-+        class DummyURLopener(urllib.URLopener):
-+            def open_local_file(self, url):
-+                return url
-+        self.assertEqual(DummyURLopener().open(
-+            'local-file://example'), '//example')
-+        self.assertEqual(DummyURLopener().open(
-+            'local_file://example'), '//example')
-+        self.assertRaises(IOError, urllib.urlopen,
-+            'local-file://example')
-+        self.assertRaises(IOError, urllib.urlopen,
-+            'local_file://example')
- 
- # Just commented them out.
- # Can't really tell why keep failing in windows and sparc.
-diff --git a/Lib/urllib.py b/Lib/urllib.py
-index d85504a5cb7e..a24e9a5c68fb 100644
---- a/Lib/urllib.py
-+++ b/Lib/urllib.py
-@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ def open(self, fullurl, data=None):
-         name = 'open_' + urltype
-         self.type = urltype
-         name = name.replace('-', '_')
--        if not hasattr(self, name):
-+        
-+        # bpo-35907: # disallow the file reading with the type not allowed
-+        if not hasattr(self, name) or \
-+            (self == _urlopener and name == 'open_local_file'):
-             if proxy:
-                 return self.open_unknown_proxy(proxy, fullurl, data)
-             else: