main/busybox: upgrade to 1.25.0

1 files changed, 71 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/main/busybox/0010-su-FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE.patch b/main/busybox/0010-su-FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..5f67bbbed10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/busybox/0010-su-FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From fea67b57ed920fafe595affb2954111c2bb67054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kaarle Ritvanen <kaarle.ritvanen@datakunkku.fi>
+Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2015 16:27:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 10/15] su: FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE
+
+When this feature is enabled, blank passwords are not accepted by su
+unless the user is on a secure TTY defined in /etc/securetty. This
+resembles the default PAM configuration of some Linux distros which
+specify the nullok_secure option for pam_unix.so.
+---
+ loginutils/su.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/loginutils/su.c b/loginutils/su.c
+index 3c0e8c1..bdcc6a9 100644
+--- a/loginutils/su.c
++++ b/loginutils/su.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@
+ //config:	bool "Enable su to check user's shell to be listed in /etc/shells"
+ //config:	depends on SU
+ //config:	default y
++//config:config FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE
++//config:       bool "Disallow blank passwords from TTYs other than specified in /etc/securetty"
++//config:       depends on SU
++//config:       default n
++
+ 
+ //applet:/* Needs to be run by root or be suid root - needs to change uid and gid: */
+ //applet:IF_SU(APPLET(su, BB_DIR_BIN, BB_SUID_REQUIRE))
+@@ -76,6 +81,7 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
+ 	struct passwd *pw;
+ 	uid_t cur_uid = getuid();
+ 	const char *tty;
++	int allow_blank = 1;
+ #if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP
+ 	char user_buf[64];
+ #endif
+@@ -96,6 +102,12 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
+ 		argv++;
+ 	}
+ 
++	tty = xmalloc_ttyname(STDIN_FILENO);
++	if (!tty) tty = "none";
++	tty = skip_dev_pfx(tty);
++
++	if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE) allow_blank = check_securetty(tty);
++
+ 	if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
+ 		/* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to
+ 		 * identify the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell.
+@@ -109,16 +121,12 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
+ 			pw = getpwuid(cur_uid);
+ 			old_user = pw ? xstrdup(pw->pw_name) : "";
+ 		}
+-		tty = xmalloc_ttyname(2);
+-		if (!tty) {
+-			tty = "none";
+-		}
+ 		openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	pw = xgetpwnam(opt_username);
+ 
+-	if (cur_uid == 0 || ask_and_check_password(pw) > 0) {
++	if (cur_uid == 0 || ask_and_check_password_extended(pw, 0, allow_blank, "Password: ") > 0) {
+ 		if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
+ 			syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
+ 				'+', tty, old_user, opt_username);
+-- 
+2.9.1
+