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authorNatanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>2016-08-04 13:20:41 +0200
committerNatanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>2016-08-04 15:39:25 +0200
commit6525b7aa7fbb97336a7656a5408d6505c2ac7ca3 (patch)
tree54eb98884f9d6e160768f06caa698a2b80fd8f08 /main/busybox/0010-su-FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE.patch
parent8b04cc5199ded248ac18049e1fee5d680539c47f (diff)
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main/busybox: upgrade to 1.25.0
Diffstat (limited to 'main/busybox/0010-su-FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE.patch')
-rw-r--r--main/busybox/0010-su-FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE.patch71
1 files changed, 71 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/main/busybox/0010-su-FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE.patch b/main/busybox/0010-su-FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5f67bbbed1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/busybox/0010-su-FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+From fea67b57ed920fafe595affb2954111c2bb67054 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Kaarle Ritvanen <kaarle.ritvanen@datakunkku.fi>
+Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2015 16:27:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 10/15] su: FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE
+
+When this feature is enabled, blank passwords are not accepted by su
+unless the user is on a secure TTY defined in /etc/securetty. This
+resembles the default PAM configuration of some Linux distros which
+specify the nullok_secure option for pam_unix.so.
+---
+ loginutils/su.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/loginutils/su.c b/loginutils/su.c
+index 3c0e8c1..bdcc6a9 100644
+--- a/loginutils/su.c
++++ b/loginutils/su.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@
+ //config: bool "Enable su to check user's shell to be listed in /etc/shells"
+ //config: depends on SU
+ //config: default y
++//config:config FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE
++//config: bool "Disallow blank passwords from TTYs other than specified in /etc/securetty"
++//config: depends on SU
++//config: default n
++
+
+ //applet:/* Needs to be run by root or be suid root - needs to change uid and gid: */
+ //applet:IF_SU(APPLET(su, BB_DIR_BIN, BB_SUID_REQUIRE))
+@@ -76,6 +81,7 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ uid_t cur_uid = getuid();
+ const char *tty;
++ int allow_blank = 1;
+ #if ENABLE_FEATURE_UTMP
+ char user_buf[64];
+ #endif
+@@ -96,6 +102,12 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
+ argv++;
+ }
+
++ tty = xmalloc_ttyname(STDIN_FILENO);
++ if (!tty) tty = "none";
++ tty = skip_dev_pfx(tty);
++
++ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_NULLOK_SECURE) allow_blank = check_securetty(tty);
++
+ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG) {
+ /* The utmp entry (via getlogin) is probably the best way to
+ * identify the user, especially if someone su's from a su-shell.
+@@ -109,16 +121,12 @@ int su_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv)
+ pw = getpwuid(cur_uid);
+ old_user = pw ? xstrdup(pw->pw_name) : "";
+ }
+- tty = xmalloc_ttyname(2);
+- if (!tty) {
+- tty = "none";
+- }
+ openlog(applet_name, 0, LOG_AUTH);
+ }
+
+ pw = xgetpwnam(opt_username);
+
+- if (cur_uid == 0 || ask_and_check_password(pw) > 0) {
++ if (cur_uid == 0 || ask_and_check_password_extended(pw, 0, allow_blank, "Password: ") > 0) {
+ if (ENABLE_FEATURE_SU_SYSLOG)
+ syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "%c %s %s:%s",
+ '+', tty, old_user, opt_username);
+--
+2.9.1
+