main/curl: security upgrade - fixes #64373.1-stable

CVE-2016-8615, CVE-2016-8616, CVE-2016-8617, CVE-2016-8618, CVE-2016-8619,
CVE-2016-8620, CVE-2016-8621 CVE-2016-8622, CVE-2016-8623, CVE-2016-8624

1 files changed, 50 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2016-8619.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2016-8619.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8470b359bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/curl/CVE-2016-8619.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+From 91239f7040b1f026d4d15765e7e3f58e92e93761 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
+Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2016 12:56:02 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] krb5: avoid realloc(0)
+
+If the requested size is zero, bail out with error instead of doing a
+realloc() that would cause a double-free: realloc(0) acts as a free()
+and then there's a second free in the cleanup path.
+
+CVE-2016-8619
+
+Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161102E.html
+Reported-by: Cure53
+---
+ lib/security.c | 9 ++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/security.c b/lib/security.c
+index a268d4a..4cef8f8 100644
+--- a/lib/security.c
++++ b/lib/security.c
+@@ -190,19 +190,22 @@ socket_write(struct connectdata *conn, curl_socket_t fd, const void *to,
+ static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn,
+                           curl_socket_t fd,
+                           struct krb5buffer *buf)
+ {
+   int len;
+-  void* tmp;
++  void *tmp = NULL;
+   CURLcode result;
+ 
+   result = socket_read(fd, &len, sizeof(len));
+   if(result)
+     return result;
+ 
+-  len = ntohl(len);
+-  tmp = realloc(buf->data, len);
++  if(len) {
++    /* only realloc if there was a length */
++    len = ntohl(len);
++    tmp = realloc(buf->data, len);
++  }
+   if(tmp == NULL)
+     return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
+ 
+   buf->data = tmp;
+   result = socket_read(fd, buf->data, len);
+-- 
+2.9.3
+