main/openssl: upgrade to 1.1.1c

2 files changed, 4 insertions, 72 deletions

diff --git a/main/openssl/APKBUILD b/main/openssl/APKBUILD
index 55958c76783..d9cb9a4dd45 100644
--- a/main/openssl/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/openssl/APKBUILD
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # Maintainer: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi>
 pkgname=openssl
-pkgver=1.1.1b
+pkgver=1.1.1c
 _abiver=${pkgver%.*}
-pkgrel=1
+pkgrel=0
 pkgdesc="Toolkit for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"
 url="https://www.openssl.org"
 arch="all"
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ makedepends_build="perl"
 makedepends_host="linux-headers"
 makedepends="$makedepends_host $makedepends_build"
 subpackages="$pkgname-dbg $pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc libcrypto$_abiver:_libcrypto libssl$_abiver:_libssl"
-source="https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-$pkgver.tar.gz
-	CVE-2019-1543.patch"
+source="https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-$pkgver.tar.gz"
 case "$CARCH" in
 s390x) options="$options !check";; # FIXME: test hangs
 esac
@@ -104,5 +103,4 @@ _libssl() {
 	done
 }
 
-sha512sums="b54025fbb4fe264466f3b0d762aad4be45bd23cd48bdb26d901d4c41a40bfd776177e02230995ab181a695435039dbad313f4b9a563239a70807a2e19ecf045d  openssl-1.1.1b.tar.gz
-f11c7b8e938dca3528eee36ddb64421072e1fdd6d5dfc40452f36e2db954b3e9ae888416bb26dc73068a14c94404eb66352e37a988f04ecc08600554eab16c99  CVE-2019-1543.patch"
+sha512sums="8e2c5cc11c120efbb7d7850980cb6eaa782d29b4996b3f3378d37613c1679f852d7cc08a90d62e78fcec3439f06bdbee70064579a8c2adaffd91532a97f646ff  openssl-1.1.1c.tar.gz"
diff --git a/main/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch b/main/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4d478c484c9..00000000000
--- a/main/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305
-
-ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
-every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
-should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
-front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
-also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
-only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
-ignored.
-
-It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
-Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
-confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
-the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
-nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
-reused nonce.
-
-Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
-integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
-integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
-affected.
-
-Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
-because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
-applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
-length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
-
-CVE-2019-1543
-
-Fixes #8345
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6)
----
- crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
-index c1917bb86a6..d3e2c622a1b 100644
---- a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
-+++ b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
-@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ typedef struct {
- 
- #define data(ctx)   ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
- 
-+#define CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN     12
-+
- static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-                            const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
-                            const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc)
-@@ -533,7 +535,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
-         return 1;
- 
-     case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
--        if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
-+        if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN)
-             return 0;
-         actx->nonce_len = arg;
-         return 1;