diff options
148 files changed, 8289 insertions, 929 deletions
diff --git a/community/ceph/APKBUILD b/community/ceph/APKBUILD index c6eaebe7632..8cfd2a24e6c 100644 --- a/community/ceph/APKBUILD +++ b/community/ceph/APKBUILD @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Contributor: Duncan Bellamy <dunk@denkimushi.com> # Maintainer: Duncan Bellamy <dunk@denkimushi.com> pkgname=ceph -pkgver=15.2.16 +pkgver=15.2.17 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Ceph is a distributed object store and file system" pkgusers="ceph" @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@ subpackages=" " # secfixes: +# 15.2.17-r0: +# - CVE-2022-0670 # 15.2.8-r0: # - CVE-2020-27781 # 15.2.6-r0: @@ -542,7 +544,7 @@ _pkg() { } sha512sums=" -532b8a5073e157fe9ed552b26976faeb64dc29b79a249910c0982134ad5f945d4f57d8bf451adf63487b6d285c6e4bd5c39f0e3fcd449230d6fb3087539f8c3b ceph_15.2.16.orig.tar.gz +952cd4db057fcab5efa3c6331fbc19cf1e904f5855266c2ed13e41ffb2e5a7d18ed133bd113fea493149005a182f429eef39931c4ceac7776aefe84a208a745a ceph_15.2.17.orig.tar.gz 110bdbcb40216c7ed155a8d23020784741b4992d895f4f04a146d275506e4e68053854d3b063b41e9c9b3e3e4f95b6b90602f92c185c853c0d8f47ad0c6b7121 ceph.confd ce5f162501f6b67fe254546dddf880d1a5b1d1a0fa69e0b1918de17e8da45c5c6124512b8cbd98b76f29d931403de0d11c5ffd330ed8ee1f4dc75bb04baecae3 ceph.initd c608f11cf358d76daf5281467a4ea941a81474fbe7f5faa41f7f4d0abaf9136a01576bbb1ab24bdd7bc91a49f66bd7f0a84717de5ec27250d74dd1e47e3b5dd3 10-musl-fixes.patch diff --git a/community/jool-modules-lts/APKBUILD b/community/jool-modules-lts/APKBUILD index e2ac5a91b4e..0f0446e2abe 100644 --- a/community/jool-modules-lts/APKBUILD +++ b/community/jool-modules-lts/APKBUILD @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ fi # Kernel version # Keep in sync with main/linux-lts! _kpkg=linux-$_flavor -_kver=5.10.109 +_kver=5.10.152 _krel=0 _kpkgver="$_kver-r$_krel" diff --git a/community/k3s/APKBUILD b/community/k3s/APKBUILD index 80f6afcfe77..27bc08f6f06 100644 --- a/community/k3s/APKBUILD +++ b/community/k3s/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Contributor: Oleg Titov <oleg.titov@gmail.com> # Maintainer: Oleg Titov <oleg.titov@gmail.com> pkgname=k3s -_pkgver=1.20.2+k3s1 +_pkgver=1.20.15+k3s1 pkgver=${_pkgver/+k3s/.} pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Lightweight Kubernetes. 5 less than k8s" @@ -78,8 +78,10 @@ package() { install -m644 -D "$srcdir"/k3s.modules-load "$pkgdir"/etc/modules-load.d/k3s.conf } -sha512sums="f381d6d3c481b686dbe673c8133d390925d601cc044af684b9bb0e6d4a3c7124c0e5ead3a569651b22ac5a0140a1c764030d1ba287b84dd0ca488a1c69efd647 k3s-1.20.2.1.tar.gz +sha512sums=" +95116e542d3115859b92962cfcafb39d39edfdb8de202a66ad8b53f45c3b211fe3bd86d18d5dd976a1a0d7fda68718ed499cdd6ebf7e6b51a8061672e47fdea9 k3s-1.20.15.1.tar.gz f03221efceb4ce2305c41c4c9e6d02ee5b799ed0cdfb1fc5018f8696e4d05575ae63b7c87596d765c5aa76c4a3bacf7c205e3eb61465e26886081a5d0da013ea k3s.confd 1015ee6ce5c69595df3150d7bbdfe528cf20305dac299831faa9cce00a454daf5548e78b1db79dcb8da300edc54553dfda0b95aed5e7bee27c1c726aef640350 k3s.initd 018a5e9b417a937c17f0a4a9e08eed434f06186207626ad038aec22ee667aba4cefa6e9e2a222e2c430d2cbb88c8663648f5bab0e76926a0edd13b8bdfd2673a k3s.logrotate -85ee1310cb36c85c42b4068a9549a3ef72b856cd61b2c1036c3e871ef43a69ed80b43599ad94ce5b069ddd823e730596bb3d3875d4ba8cd77c4cc1985335ffff k3s.modules-load" +85ee1310cb36c85c42b4068a9549a3ef72b856cd61b2c1036c3e871ef43a69ed80b43599ad94ce5b069ddd823e730596bb3d3875d4ba8cd77c4cc1985335ffff k3s.modules-load +" diff --git a/community/nss/APKBUILD b/community/nss/APKBUILD index 4d36adf6a1f..9c033d04fa3 100644 --- a/community/nss/APKBUILD +++ b/community/nss/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Contributor: Rasmus Thomsen <oss@cogitri.dev> # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=nss -pkgver=3.68.3 +pkgver=3.68.4 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Mozilla Network Security Services" url="https://developer.mozilla.org/docs/Mozilla/Projects/NSS" @@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ tools() { } sha512sums=" -70fa8ab48d45249c04424979640583e8bc867432b7e3f26c1602db49a13861dd070f081ed82660bb7451f835dc859b5788ae12a67f9ddab1f6bd1a7afb1174d2 nss-3.68.3.tar.gz +f97b63a9f8218f8fbd7b5d48c084b8166366d02cd50aac69a22d56324d2fea01c49d074e51430bd128f510c733085f3f43c9739ce4073a07a5666675e0ef3b15 nss-3.68.4.tar.gz 75dbd648a461940647ff373389cc73bc8ec609139cd46c91bcce866af02be6bcbb0524eb3dfb721fbd5b0bc68c20081ed6f7debf6b24317f2a7ba823e8d3c531 nss.pc.in 0f2efa8563b11da68669d281b4459289a56f5a3a906eb60382126f3adcfe47420cdcedc6ab57727a3afeeffa2bbb4c750b43bef8b5f343a75c968411dfa30e09 nss-util.pc.in 09c69d4cc39ec9deebc88696a80d0f15eb2d8c94d9daa234a2adfec941b63805eb4ce7f2e1943857b938bddcaee1beac246a0ec627b71563d9f846e6119a4a15 nss-softokn.pc.in diff --git a/community/python3-tkinter/APKBUILD b/community/python3-tkinter/APKBUILD index 283f53da478..44f792b40a9 100644 --- a/community/python3-tkinter/APKBUILD +++ b/community/python3-tkinter/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Contributor: Kiyoshi Aman <kiyoshi.aman@gmail.com> pkgname=python3-tkinter -pkgver=3.8.10 +pkgver=3.8.15 _basever="${pkgver%.*}" pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="A graphical user interface for the Python" @@ -107,6 +107,8 @@ _idle() { _mv_files usr/lib/python*/idlelib } -sha512sums="0be69705483ff9692e12048a96180e586f9d84c8d53066629f7fb2389585eb75c0f3506bb8182936e322508f58b71f4d8c6dfebbab9049b31b49da11d3b98e80 Python-3.8.10.tar.xz +sha512sums=" +4fb3827b13c2452faa75e5ed18dddf381e80b4fffcfde046e289b4629cff0bb87fba1d09916b9b8a6f8039dc422c952293ebdb381c49f8ca7e7893ae4be6c28d Python-3.8.15.tar.xz ab8eaa2858d5109049b1f9f553198d40e0ef8d78211ad6455f7b491af525bffb16738fed60fc84e960c4889568d25753b9e4a1494834fea48291b33f07000ec2 musl-find_library.patch -37b6ee5d0d5de43799316aa111423ba5a666c17dc7f81b04c330f59c1d1565540eac4c585abe2199bbed52ebe7426001edb1c53bd0a17486a2a8e052d0f494ad fix-xattrs-glibc.patch" +37b6ee5d0d5de43799316aa111423ba5a666c17dc7f81b04c330f59c1d1565540eac4c585abe2199bbed52ebe7426001edb1c53bd0a17486a2a8e052d0f494ad fix-xattrs-glibc.patch +" diff --git a/community/rtl8821ce-lts/APKBUILD b/community/rtl8821ce-lts/APKBUILD index 723a5f4cc69..e24885b7a00 100644 --- a/community/rtl8821ce-lts/APKBUILD +++ b/community/rtl8821ce-lts/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Contributor: Kevin Daudt <kdaudt@alpinelinux.org> # Maintainer: Kevin Daudt <kdaudt@alpinelinux.org> -_kver=5.10.109 +_kver=5.10.152 _krel=0 _flavor="$FLAVOR" [ -z "$_flavor" ] && _flavor=lts diff --git a/community/rtpengine-lts/APKBUILD b/community/rtpengine-lts/APKBUILD index 4bd55c7580f..3e6f57a7baa 100644 --- a/community/rtpengine-lts/APKBUILD +++ b/community/rtpengine-lts/APKBUILD @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ _ver=9.0.1.10 _rel=0 # kernel version -_kver=5.10.109 +_kver=5.10.152 _krel=0 _kpkgver="$_kver-r$_krel" diff --git a/main/alpine-base/APKBUILD b/main/alpine-base/APKBUILD index 474bf5df884..dd3f6dbd841 100644 --- a/main/alpine-base/APKBUILD +++ b/main/alpine-base/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Contributor: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=alpine-base -pkgver=3.13.10 +pkgver=3.13.12 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Meta package for minimal alpine base" url="https://alpinelinux.org" diff --git a/main/alpine-make-rootfs/APKBUILD b/main/alpine-make-rootfs/APKBUILD index 1914a65b319..9aaf8dd7627 100644 --- a/main/alpine-make-rootfs/APKBUILD +++ b/main/alpine-make-rootfs/APKBUILD @@ -2,13 +2,16 @@ # Maintainer: Jakub Jirutka <jakub@jirutka.cz> pkgname=alpine-make-rootfs pkgver=0.5.1 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Make customized Alpine Linux rootfs (base image) for containers" url="https://github.com/alpinelinux/alpine-make-rootfs" arch="noarch" license="MIT" depends="tar" -source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/alpinelinux/$pkgname/archive/v$pkgver.tar.gz" +source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/alpinelinux/$pkgname/archive/v$pkgver.tar.gz + add-new-signing-key-for-x86_64.patch + fix-missing-release-files-on-edge.patch + " builddir="$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver" options="!check" # no suitable tests provided @@ -17,4 +20,8 @@ package() { make install DESTDIR="$pkgdir" PREFIX=/usr } -sha512sums="d2c98c3fc69b4f61d798714711b668da7abafb111846a0a8d4cbcf1003a2b677a18ad9cfa3565a0f2cb0a74a2f30f485786310a8e09ff942037bf60d88bf3245 alpine-make-rootfs-0.5.1.tar.gz" +sha512sums=" +d2c98c3fc69b4f61d798714711b668da7abafb111846a0a8d4cbcf1003a2b677a18ad9cfa3565a0f2cb0a74a2f30f485786310a8e09ff942037bf60d88bf3245 alpine-make-rootfs-0.5.1.tar.gz +b1e42986e889f8924e46b08d4ca614f965b9a8d4e5bf4271f9901fffd9fe022b3930537ec8d0f17ca9cea77050b4a031e61eb26636e759a5587c9c0b4d2cc160 add-new-signing-key-for-x86_64.patch +5d46180968bd5d01c5235a5fe0d17d3f8949ab4ba6c4a69eb0e67fdc8f23563d7030e9bd1ad7ef231322b05e6518ec48b45628bb0496339829548c5028828174 fix-missing-release-files-on-edge.patch +" diff --git a/main/alpine-make-rootfs/add-new-signing-key-for-x86_64.patch b/main/alpine-make-rootfs/add-new-signing-key-for-x86_64.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2e94cd1b1a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/alpine-make-rootfs/add-new-signing-key-for-x86_64.patch @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/alpinelinux/alpine-make-rootfs/commit/64a89ab6973c3a60a975243bc2086d6743c50aae +-- +From 64a89ab6973c3a60a975243bc2086d6743c50aae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Jirutka <jakub@jirutka.cz> +Date: Sun, 14 Nov 2021 00:04:21 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Add new package signing key for x86_64 + +--- + alpine-make-rootfs | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/alpine-make-rootfs b/alpine-make-rootfs +index 0d033ff..56c99e3 100755 +--- a/alpine-make-rootfs ++++ b/alpine-make-rootfs +@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ readonly ALPINE_BASE_PKGS='alpine-baselayout busybox busybox-suid musl-utils' + readonly ALPINE_KEYS=' + alpine-devel@lists.alpinelinux.org-4a6a0840.rsa.pub:MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA1yHJxQgsHQREclQu4Ohe\nqxTxd1tHcNnvnQTu/UrTky8wWvgXT+jpveroeWWnzmsYlDI93eLI2ORakxb3gA2O\nQ0Ry4ws8vhaxLQGC74uQR5+/yYrLuTKydFzuPaS1dK19qJPXB8GMdmFOijnXX4SA\njixuHLe1WW7kZVtjL7nufvpXkWBGjsfrvskdNA/5MfxAeBbqPgaq0QMEfxMAn6/R\nL5kNepi/Vr4S39Xvf2DzWkTLEK8pcnjNkt9/aafhWqFVW7m3HCAII6h/qlQNQKSo\nGuH34Q8GsFG30izUENV9avY7hSLq7nggsvknlNBZtFUcmGoQrtx3FmyYsIC8/R+B\nywIDAQAB + alpine-devel@lists.alpinelinux.org-5261cecb.rsa.pub:MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAwlzMkl7b5PBdfMzGdCT0\ncGloRr5xGgVmsdq5EtJvFkFAiN8Ac9MCFy/vAFmS8/7ZaGOXoCDWbYVLTLOO2qtX\nyHRl+7fJVh2N6qrDDFPmdgCi8NaE+3rITWXGrrQ1spJ0B6HIzTDNEjRKnD4xyg4j\ng01FMcJTU6E+V2JBY45CKN9dWr1JDM/nei/Pf0byBJlMp/mSSfjodykmz4Oe13xB\nCa1WTwgFykKYthoLGYrmo+LKIGpMoeEbY1kuUe04UiDe47l6Oggwnl+8XD1MeRWY\nsWgj8sF4dTcSfCMavK4zHRFFQbGp/YFJ/Ww6U9lA3Vq0wyEI6MCMQnoSMFwrbgZw\nwwIDAQAB ++alpine-devel@lists.alpinelinux.org-6165ee59.rsa.pub:MIICIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAg8AMIICCgKCAgEAutQkua2CAig4VFSJ7v54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\nhtBqojBnThmjJQFgZXocHG8CAwEAAQ== + ' + # List of directories to remove when empty. + readonly UNNECESSARY_DIRS=' diff --git a/main/alpine-make-rootfs/fix-missing-release-files-on-edge.patch b/main/alpine-make-rootfs/fix-missing-release-files-on-edge.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7eeeddb797b --- /dev/null +++ b/main/alpine-make-rootfs/fix-missing-release-files-on-edge.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/alpinelinux/alpine-make-rootfs/commit/80a8e3f9d6f5ec701b2ae5e9a0d6bdb004ec1246 +-- +From 80a8e3f9d6f5ec701b2ae5e9a0d6bdb004ec1246 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jakub Jirutka <jakub@jirutka.cz> +Date: Sun, 21 Aug 2022 00:56:04 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Adapt to alpine-base not providing release files since v3.17 + and on edge + +https://gitlab.alpinelinux.org/alpine/aports/-/commit/23e66e85c95beef9d3f72a2ccc510671fdb3462d +--- + alpine-make-rootfs | 15 ++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/alpine-make-rootfs b/alpine-make-rootfs +index 63133f3..eb24005 100755 +--- a/alpine-make-rootfs ++++ b/alpine-make-rootfs +@@ -387,11 +387,16 @@ fi + + _apk add --root "$rootfs" --update-cache --initdb $rootfs_pkgs >&2 + +-if ! _apk info --root "$rootfs" --quiet --installed alpine-base; then +- # This package contains /etc/os-release, /etc/alpine-release and /etc/issue, +- # but we don't wanna install all its dependencies (e.g. openrc). +- _apk fetch --root "$rootfs" --stdout alpine-base \ +- | tar -xz -C "$rootfs" etc >&2 ++if ! [ -f "$rootfs"/etc/alpine-release ]; then ++ if _apk info --root "$rootfs" --quiet alpine-release >/dev/null; then ++ _apk add --root "$rootfs" alpine-release ++ else ++ # In Alpine <3.17, this package contains /etc/os-release, ++ # /etc/alpine-release and /etc/issue, but we don't wanna install all ++ # its dependencies (e.g. openrc). ++ _apk fetch --root "$rootfs" --stdout alpine-base \ ++ | tar -xz -C "$rootfs" etc >&2 ++ fi + fi + + [ -e "$rootfs"/var/run ] || ln -s /run "$rootfs"/var/run diff --git a/main/apache2/APKBUILD b/main/apache2/APKBUILD index 723a3ec23b3..f40e267ee5a 100644 --- a/main/apache2/APKBUILD +++ b/main/apache2/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Contributor: Valery Kartel <valery.kartel@gmail.com> pkgname=apache2 _pkgreal=httpd -pkgver=2.4.53 +pkgver=2.4.54 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="A high performance Unix-based HTTP server" url="https://httpd.apache.org/" @@ -51,6 +51,15 @@ options="suid" builddir="$srcdir"/$_pkgreal-$pkgver # secfixes: +# 2.4.54-r0: +# - CVE-2022-26377 +# - CVE-2022-28330 +# - CVE-2022-28614 +# - CVE-2022-28615 +# - CVE-2022-29404 +# - CVE-2022-30522 +# - CVE-2022-30556 +# - CVE-2022-31813 # 2.4.53-r0: # - CVE-2022-22719 # - CVE-2022-22720 @@ -387,7 +396,7 @@ _lua() { } sha512sums=" -07ef59594251a30a864cc9cc9a58ab788c2d006cef85b728f29533243927c63cb063e0867f2a306f37324c3adb9cf7dcb2402f3516b05c2c6f32469d475dd756 httpd-2.4.53.tar.bz2 +228493b2ff32c4142c6e484d304f2ea12e467498605fe12adce2b61388d8efe7b2e96ae2fd0abd1dc88a5f12d625e007d8da0ae5628cff2a5272806754f41e18 httpd-2.4.54.tar.bz2 8e62b101f90c67babe864bcb74f711656180b011df3fd4b541dc766b980b72aa409e86debf3559a55be359471c1cad81b8779ef3a55add8d368229fc7e9544fc apache2.confd 18e8859c7d99c4483792a5fd20127873aad8fa396cafbdb6f2c4253451ffe7a1093a3859ce719375e0769739c93704c88897bd087c63e1ef585e26dcc1f5dd9b apache2.logrotate 81a2d2a297d8049ba1b021b879ec863767149e056d9bdb2ac8acf63572b254935ec96c2e1580eba86639ea56433eec5c41341e4f1501f9072745dccdb3602701 apache2.initd diff --git a/main/aports-build/APKBUILD b/main/aports-build/APKBUILD index 7e9d595e70b..67abeaaa6fb 100644 --- a/main/aports-build/APKBUILD +++ b/main/aports-build/APKBUILD @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=aports-build -pkgver=1.5.3 +pkgver=1.5.4 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="MQTT based build-on-git-push scripts for Alpine Linux" url="https://alpinelinux.org" @@ -46,7 +46,9 @@ package() { EOF } -sha512sums="81c039c6999fddde2489fccdc48b29760c80ea1ff5265cc2d7f73d6575e0173a0f51b89a4d49e5100e2d841b6260adc48e4ab00e8608d52b3b69b17a590467ad aports-build +sha512sums=" +81c039c6999fddde2489fccdc48b29760c80ea1ff5265cc2d7f73d6575e0173a0f51b89a4d49e5100e2d841b6260adc48e4ab00e8608d52b3b69b17a590467ad aports-build 821035bda47152c341ec94bf960fa67e3377051826712ceb74f39103e6e422777b6e082231bfb87865653d2b93b7d3154cfc24abf65a52e3e66da69412dd7e41 aports-build.initd 62ed5cb6d1fef03fa707512c8c99c572a91e64706ebcc2e7097108811818615618bab908292d0ba0ad2afe93a27333d9c91deb347d6c99703eb8983d1ee5f480 mqtt-exec.aports-build.confd -cf0d8e65e517857ee781e451a1d3e6404cd72aeb5c7dba25017229ff79c4c43425712d2fcbbaad89af45a358e86f33467ac1df47e8fba0f30f81d84794e1206c report-build-errors.lua" +939ba54ab4159bc8fcd0cb08f16f67dac05d29c77005da6fca0463048ab991765665b35f2feb978bfd8409bd13fdbdf3d47a7652df842e76504d076ac040c337 report-build-errors.lua +" diff --git a/main/aports-build/report-build-errors.lua b/main/aports-build/report-build-errors.lua index 275b213f863..3621765783a 100644 --- a/main/aports-build/report-build-errors.lua +++ b/main/aports-build/report-build-errors.lua @@ -6,6 +6,26 @@ local f = io.open("/proc/sys/kernel/hostname") hostname = f:read() f:close() +local function read_mosquitto_conf() + local cfg = {} + local f = io.open((os.getenv("XDG_CONFIG_HOME") or "").."/mosquitto_pub") or io.open((os.getenv("HOME") or "").."/.config/mosquitto_pub") + if f == nil then + return cfg + end + for line in f:lines() do + key,value = line:match("^%-%-([^ ]+)%s+(.*)") + if key and value then + cfg[key] = value + end + end + f:close() + return cfg +end +local mcfg = read_mosquitto_conf() +publish.hostname = mcfg.hostname or "localhost" +publish.username = mcfg.username +publish.password = mcfg.pw + local m = {} function shell_escape(args) diff --git a/main/apr/APKBUILD b/main/apr/APKBUILD index c2a40dad1e9..ad0a43b3142 100644 --- a/main/apr/APKBUILD +++ b/main/apr/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=apr pkgver=1.7.0 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="The Apache Portable Runtime" url="http://apr.apache.org/" arch="all" @@ -12,8 +12,13 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dev" source="https://www.apache.org/dist/apr/apr-$pkgver.tar.bz2 apr-1.6.2-dont-test-dlclose.patch semtimedop-s390x.patch + CVE-2021-35940.patch " +# secfixes: +# 1.7.0-r1: +# - CVE-2021-35940.patch + build() { cd "$builddir" ./configure \ @@ -48,6 +53,9 @@ dev() { return 0 } -sha512sums="3dc42d5caf17aab16f5c154080f020d5aed761e22db4c5f6506917f6bfd2bf8becfb40af919042bd4ce1077d5de74aa666f5edfba7f275efba78e8893c115148 apr-1.7.0.tar.bz2 +sha512sums=" +3dc42d5caf17aab16f5c154080f020d5aed761e22db4c5f6506917f6bfd2bf8becfb40af919042bd4ce1077d5de74aa666f5edfba7f275efba78e8893c115148 apr-1.7.0.tar.bz2 9fb931e45f30fbe68af56849dfca148c09cdf85e300af14fb259cbd43470113288680bdb21189d4cf13f5ce95f8d28666822535e017e64ace5324339ab50cbef apr-1.6.2-dont-test-dlclose.patch -5d1afa9419d0481e7c3369724e8b4c1e199cbfd5d031bd9d9fc4f46ee0d3819353ff03c3b2c508d5b939f66ef4549953bbf9cdae7ff934002b9a01d824c843e8 semtimedop-s390x.patch" +5d1afa9419d0481e7c3369724e8b4c1e199cbfd5d031bd9d9fc4f46ee0d3819353ff03c3b2c508d5b939f66ef4549953bbf9cdae7ff934002b9a01d824c843e8 semtimedop-s390x.patch +33c072ad4e27afee4b93df5b1076a8d858c6f4ef57df4e2dd1bf750f8b0390cb130744aa3bf67c4de359b35a558da07e479b10e0028ec935aa9a1ea4820c995e CVE-2021-35940.patch +" diff --git a/main/apr/CVE-2021-35940.patch b/main/apr/CVE-2021-35940.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0b72ab964cd --- /dev/null +++ b/main/apr/CVE-2021-35940.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +Patch-Source: https://dist.apache.org/repos/dist/release/apr/patches/apr-1.7.0-CVE-2021-35940.patch +SECURITY: CVE-2021-35940 (cve.mitre.org) + +Restore fix for CVE-2017-12613 which was missing in 1.7.x branch, though +was addressed in 1.6.x in 1.6.3 and later via r1807976. + +The fix was merged back to 1.7.x in r1891198. + +Since this was a regression in 1.7.0, a new CVE name has been assigned +to track this, CVE-2021-35940. + +Thanks to Iveta Cesalova <icesalov redhat.com> for reporting this issue. + +https://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision&revision=1891198 + +Index: time/unix/time.c +=================================================================== +--- a/time/unix/time.c (revision 1891197) ++++ b/time/unix/time.c (revision 1891198) +@@ -142,6 +142,9 @@ + static const int dayoffset[12] = + {306, 337, 0, 31, 61, 92, 122, 153, 184, 214, 245, 275}; + ++ if (xt->tm_mon < 0 || xt->tm_mon >= 12) ++ return APR_EBADDATE; ++ + /* shift new year to 1st March in order to make leap year calc easy */ + + if (xt->tm_mon < 2) +Index: time/win32/time.c +=================================================================== +--- a/time/win32/time.c (revision 1891197) ++++ b/time/win32/time.c (revision 1891198) +@@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ + static const int dayoffset[12] = + {0, 31, 59, 90, 120, 151, 181, 212, 243, 273, 304, 334}; + ++ if (tm->wMonth < 1 || tm->wMonth > 12) ++ return APR_EBADDATE; ++ + /* Note; the caller is responsible for filling in detailed tm_usec, + * tm_gmtoff and tm_isdst data when applicable. + */ +@@ -228,6 +231,9 @@ + static const int dayoffset[12] = + {306, 337, 0, 31, 61, 92, 122, 153, 184, 214, 245, 275}; + ++ if (xt->tm_mon < 0 || xt->tm_mon >= 12) ++ return APR_EBADDATE; ++ + /* shift new year to 1st March in order to make leap year calc easy */ + + if (xt->tm_mon < 2) diff --git a/main/bind/APKBUILD b/main/bind/APKBUILD index 693203d6245..78f57021259 100644 --- a/main/bind/APKBUILD +++ b/main/bind/APKBUILD @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ # Contributor: ungleich <alpinelinux@ungleich.ch> # Maintainer: pkgname=bind -pkgver=9.16.27 +pkgver=9.16.33 _ver=${pkgver%_p*} _p=${pkgver#*_p} _major=${pkgver%%.*} @@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ source=" " # secfixes: +# 9.16.33-r0: +# - CVE-2022-2795 +# - CVE-2022-2881 +# - CVE-2022-2906 +# - CVE-2022-3080 +# - CVE-2022-38177 +# - CVE-2022-38178 # 9.16.27-r0: # - CVE-2022-0396 # - CVE-2021-25220 @@ -276,8 +283,7 @@ _gpgfingerprints=" BE0E 9748 B718 253A 28BB 89FF F1B1 1BF0 5CF0 2E57 " -sha512sums=" -5c71f228db83aa8cc9e65466d6e5afca4a9f80c693358111a003fe09e1a14522175eb2b6a0f11e2a2cd4fdba01f2ae315de52e394a441b3861ca2a011e02af62 bind-9.16.27.tar.xz +sha512sums="43fd2cea52dfd1115a4cca83830ab5b93208be401cdbbdff2bbf204b8f0d99fb434ad3156d3a21649488cc904ae09f145feba97b9b6918b0cf063ff5e2b10af5 bind-9.16.33.tar.xz 2b32d1e7f62cd1e01bb4fdd92d15460bc14761b933d5acc463a91f5ecd4773d7477c757c5dd2738e8e433693592cf3f623ffc142241861c91848f01aa84640d6 bind.plugindir.patch 7167dccdb2833643dfdb92994373d2cc087e52ba23b51bd68bd322ff9aca6744f01fa9d8a4b9cd8c4ce471755a85c03ec956ec0d8a1d4fae02124ddbed6841f6 bind.so_bsdcompat.patch 53db80f7ee4902f42fb1d0bc959242bcb6f20d95256bda99ce2c206af8b4703c7f72bb26d026c633f70451b84a37c3946b210951e34dd5d6620b181cd0183de4 named.initd @@ -285,5 +291,4 @@ sha512sums=" d2f61d02d7829af51faf14fbe2bafe8bc90087e6b6697c6275a269ebbddcaa14a234fff5c41da793e945e8ff1de3de0858a40334e0d24289eab98df4bb721ac5 named.conf.authoritative 3aba9763cfaf0880a89fd01202f41406b465547296ce91373eb999ea7719040bc1ac4e47b0de025a8060f693d3d88774a20d09a43fa7ac6aa43989b58b5ee8fe named.conf.recursive eed9886717539399518e011ae5eae6335aed4fae019e1def088c5be26bdc896c99c07adf84ee61babafa31d31ff3b028263d1c88d2eee17ecf4c95a9d77d524c 127.zone -340e86472a2c2746fe585c0aa5f079d3a9b46e828c1f53d48026533a169b7f77ded7d0a13d291d6962607bb9481456e6fa69df1834603e7555332615fb998f0b localhost.zone -" +340e86472a2c2746fe585c0aa5f079d3a9b46e828c1f53d48026533a169b7f77ded7d0a13d291d6962607bb9481456e6fa69df1834603e7555332615fb998f0b localhost.zone" diff --git a/main/build-base/APKBUILD b/main/build-base/APKBUILD index 7dff94e7ecf..709b5eec6bd 100644 --- a/main/build-base/APKBUILD +++ b/main/build-base/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=build-base pkgver=0.5 -pkgrel=2 +pkgrel=3 url=http://dev.alpinelinux.org/cgit pkgdesc="Meta package for build base" depends="binutils file gcc g++ make libc-dev fortify-headers patch" @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ if [ "$CHOST" != "$CTARGET" ]; then depends="binutils-$CTARGET_ARCH gcc-$CTARGET_ARCH g++-$CTARGET_ARCH $depends" fi arch="noarch" -license=none +license="MIT" options="!check" build() { diff --git a/main/busybox/APKBUILD b/main/busybox/APKBUILD index 6dcf60aa7aa..88d42bd3922 100644 --- a/main/busybox/APKBUILD +++ b/main/busybox/APKBUILD @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=busybox pkgver=1.32.1 -pkgrel=8 +pkgrel=9 pkgdesc="Size optimized toolbox of many common UNIX utilities" url="https://busybox.net/" arch="all" @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ source="https://busybox.net/downloads/busybox-$pkgver.tar.bz2 0001-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch 0002-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch + CVE-2022-30065.patch acpid.logrotate busyboxconfig @@ -57,6 +58,8 @@ source="https://busybox.net/downloads/busybox-$pkgver.tar.bz2 " # secfixes: +# 1.32.1-r9: +# - CVE-2022-30065 # 1.32.1-r8: # - ALPINE-13661 # - CVE-2022-28391 @@ -255,8 +258,7 @@ ifupdown() { mkdir -p "$subpkgdir" } -sha512sums=" -3a33e99adaf7cbd51dcbeb31b5361123bf61ac040c0a032656c654ddb69c4074af75fb4335ba63f283067f61a22d7d7cbca8e1ed265c9522982c453ce48ea2fd busybox-1.32.1.tar.bz2 +sha512sums="3a33e99adaf7cbd51dcbeb31b5361123bf61ac040c0a032656c654ddb69c4074af75fb4335ba63f283067f61a22d7d7cbca8e1ed265c9522982c453ce48ea2fd busybox-1.32.1.tar.bz2 84a6599d327d33350432d1f332006d8ce04363ecc53836a98a6180e0cc32fbc4f12c3f9f2b112a1cb2e787dce705b04562347d008465256e796c808433a188b6 0001-lineedit-fix-tab-completion-with-equal-sign.patch ead3403578c071c2216de17ab0543984c1f1509c12c062f03af49141547c3ea21356f3e8f0f0695550f05a41a1379dd73fc3cc18dcd78addbb411f247351e353 0001-nologin-Install-applet-to-sbin-instead-of-usr-sbin.patch a2787a3ecaf6746dadef62166e8ee6ecaa166147e5ad8b917c5838536057c875bab5f9cf40c3e05eba74d575484ac662929ac3799d58432d3a99ac46f364f302 0001-adduser-default-to-sbin-nologin-as-shell-for-system-.patch @@ -278,11 +280,11 @@ df02adb3e3cd3349cc8d070911e3392164cb2e30bd72cae7ceaa974b2db6f958fdcedf809abc7b4b 52c885b9e0f9cfaf6d1ab8f7c988f9e43bc422a9017ea4e369fc79cd0e63510b8eb375dde88ec138382b1d67c8045b661fda150434d80c131bd1b7302ee02771 awk-fixes.patch b52050678e79e4da856956906d07fcb620cbf35f2ef6b5a8ee3b8d244ea63b4b98eef505451184d5b4937740d91eef154ed748c30d329ac485be51b37626f251 0001-libbb-sockaddr2str-ensure-only-printable-characters-.patch ead4ad65d270d8659e1898fa16f76b6cbcf567d8aba238eacccda3764edb4362240d9359d6389873bedc126d405f805fc6dfce653a7181618ebcc67c94bd08d2 0002-nslookup-sanitize-all-printed-strings-with-printable.patch +22e2fa8f7a6105fd9990f93b71c235980fd4eab62269939a0e3a920fe517ee4f913c6bd0148a554b67fe01d1660bf0fd76a80e9dcac290b4b8b2c304ef6080a9 CVE-2022-30065.patch aa93095e20de88730f526c6f463cef711b290b9582cdbd8c1ba2bd290019150cbeaa7007c2e15f0362d5b9315dd63f60511878f0ea05e893f4fdfb4a54af3fb1 acpid.logrotate 2f093f620b6d9dcef6e2e00c5395143b6497882653b4155ff313dff26210be91059cabafc606324c0230e80a461e0560839b14bf37e20671a7b8762f488b6c8f busyboxconfig 931e628184a25ae29760f7853c15c570dfb33075af167346e9662b9c7c5829e834ec81027bb10526c376261d229152bb096eb741cea0a5c0e3c614dd2c9d287e busyboxconfig-extras 0becc2186d6c32fb0c401cf7bc0e46268b38ce8892db33be1daf40273024c1c02d518283f44086a313a2ccef34230a1d945ec148cc173f26e6aa9d88a7426e54 bbsuid.c b993ce589685d5d1f806153d0b7f71657f2d37556654ec60884130a40f09acc4944a13e0a4d02914000bedd779e5a35da08c760fed5f7ca5b601243aff7ba2c9 dad.if-up 646ad9aefe3596d0170d92c8506ca1846e43b5b83cbef97ae565f15ffa7b14665a8c7061bc69c608c043f834c134c5d63f042509f8999031e89163508a868e46 ssl_client.c -c3194ccffe7300a0f55d50fb56d38c8df55d588adac13056fd0be2676594974477f94de5570a5a882bc864c3711cf67aa43b6ad6808e672f4533dd0f7363d2f5 default.script -" +c3194ccffe7300a0f55d50fb56d38c8df55d588adac13056fd0be2676594974477f94de5570a5a882bc864c3711cf67aa43b6ad6808e672f4533dd0f7363d2f5 default.script" diff --git a/main/busybox/CVE-2022-30065.patch b/main/busybox/CVE-2022-30065.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4a9cd67c987 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/busybox/CVE-2022-30065.patch @@ -0,0 +1,63 @@ +From 3c284dcb726ff6599d3b87fb366fb04411cf5595 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> +Date: Fri, 17 Jun 2022 09:52:11 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] awk: fix use after free (CVE-2022-30065) + +fixes https://bugs.busybox.net/show_bug.cgi?id=14781 + +Signed-off-by: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> +--- + editors/awk.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/editors/awk.c b/editors/awk.c +index 079d0bde5..728ee8685 100644 +--- a/editors/awk.c ++++ b/editors/awk.c +@@ -3128,6 +3128,9 @@ static var *evaluate(node *op, var *res) + + case XC( OC_MOVE ): + debug_printf_eval("MOVE\n"); ++ /* make sure that we never return a temp var */ ++ if (L.v == TMPVAR0) ++ L.v = res; + /* if source is a temporary string, jusk relink it to dest */ + if (R.v == TMPVAR1 + && !(R.v->type & VF_NUMBER) +-- +2.36.1 + + +From 30c8f8e69230ef27f116a2c10ca2e4a6cc343dad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> +Date: Thu, 16 Jun 2022 21:54:48 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] awk: add tests for CVE-2022-30065 + +Signed-off-by: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> +--- + testsuite/awk.tests | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/testsuite/awk.tests b/testsuite/awk.tests +index 93e25d8c1..6c3a03c37 100755 +--- a/testsuite/awk.tests ++++ b/testsuite/awk.tests +@@ -479,4 +479,15 @@ testing 'awk backslash+newline eaten with no trace' \ + "Hello world\n" \ + '' '' + ++testing 'awk use-after-free (CVE-2022-30065)' \ ++ "awk '\$3i\$3in\$9=\$r||\$9=i6/6-9f'" \ ++ "" \ ++ "" \ ++ "" ++ ++testing 'awk assign while test' \ ++ "awk '\$1==\$1=\"foo\" {print \$1}'" \ ++ "foo\n" \ ++ "" \ ++ "foo" + exit $FAILCOUNT +-- +2.36.1 + diff --git a/main/ca-certificates/APKBUILD b/main/ca-certificates/APKBUILD index 8d3ba9faee6..6e1efdc82d7 100644 --- a/main/ca-certificates/APKBUILD +++ b/main/ca-certificates/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Contributor: Sören Tempel <soeren+alpine@soeren-tempel.net> # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=ca-certificates -pkgver=20211220 +pkgver=20220614 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Common CA certificates PEM files from Mozilla" url="https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/" @@ -65,5 +65,5 @@ bundle() { } sha512sums=" -6b486384c80b29632939a28524acfeeedc60f5df44da86bc16ce79f3cf2ff464455e963ebeb410c3072829b9083215961b32c18673ff77b211652d4c1e870799 ca-certificates-20211220.tar.bz2 +8e20d3021222bb3b470a935d34ffe23e7857bf0b7fedda5284049155aab01bc88ab54ae939376968fb7fbff41e6b06bd32e34405210a8e74faadb68ffa6d9dd4 ca-certificates-20220614.tar.bz2 " diff --git a/main/cairo/APKBUILD b/main/cairo/APKBUILD index 72d87e500b6..855c0692935 100644 --- a/main/cairo/APKBUILD +++ b/main/cairo/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=cairo pkgver=1.16.0 -pkgrel=3 +pkgrel=4 pkgdesc="A vector graphics library" url="https://cairographics.org/" arch="all" @@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ source="https://cairographics.org/releases/cairo-$pkgver.tar.xz CVE-2018-19876.patch pdf-flush.patch 85.patch - fix-inf-loop-patch + fix-inf-loop.patch " builddir="$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver" # secfixes: -# 1.16.0-r3: +# 1.16.0-r4: # - CVE-2019-6462 # 1.16.0-r2: # - CVE-2020-35492 @@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ sha512sums=" 8f13cdcae0f134e04778cf5915f858fb8d5357a7e0a454791c93d1566935b985ec66dfe1683cd0b74a1cb44a130923d7a27cf006f3fc70b9bee93abd58a55aa3 CVE-2018-19876.patch 533ea878dc7f917af92e2694bd3f535a09cde77f0ecd0cc00881fbc9ec1ea86f60026eacc76129705f525f6672929ad8d15d8cfe1bfa61e9962e805a7fbded81 pdf-flush.patch 20699d2dd10531f99587cdcd187a23e23bca5a9f031255c95aade4dadb79bbb62118c7ddff677c2fd20e4ba7694eee4debcd79a4d0736d62951a4fcee56ccae0 85.patch -ebe5d71b18aa9eefe1e0a6c150761bb7abef41f144f37eb0bfa8a01947aacb1292ac131cf815dcaaaa6478c0aac07ca5428fba28ad346a00c5aaa5fa64f6ff5b fix-inf-loop-patch +ebe5d71b18aa9eefe1e0a6c150761bb7abef41f144f37eb0bfa8a01947aacb1292ac131cf815dcaaaa6478c0aac07ca5428fba28ad346a00c5aaa5fa64f6ff5b fix-inf-loop.patch " diff --git a/main/cairo/fix-inf-loop-patch b/main/cairo/fix-inf-loop.patch index 2a26876c36d..2a26876c36d 100644 --- a/main/cairo/fix-inf-loop-patch +++ b/main/cairo/fix-inf-loop.patch diff --git a/main/cups/APKBUILD b/main/cups/APKBUILD index e8964262282..8fc057ab640 100644 --- a/main/cups/APKBUILD +++ b/main/cups/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=cups pkgver=2.3.3 -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=2 pkgdesc="The CUPS Printing System" url="https://www.cups.org/" arch="all" @@ -20,9 +20,12 @@ source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/OpenPrinting/cups/archive/v$ cupsd.initd cups-no-export-ssllibs.patch default-config-no-gssapi.patch + CVE-2022-26691.patch " # secfixes: +# 2.3.3-r2: +# - CVE-2022-26691 # 2.3.3-r0: # - CVE-2020-3898 # - CVE-2019-8842 @@ -126,8 +129,11 @@ _mv() { done } -sha512sums="5a43ef98f83c1783221155c01de940f3679023251709931ef28572c7b00620b36252afe894e86f2f08a527008dc2c95dc8af4129f0ab28a28663be8d3ccc3418 cups-2.3.3.tar.gz +sha512sums=" +5a43ef98f83c1783221155c01de940f3679023251709931ef28572c7b00620b36252afe894e86f2f08a527008dc2c95dc8af4129f0ab28a28663be8d3ccc3418 cups-2.3.3.tar.gz cf64211da59e79285f99d437c02fdd7db462855fb2920ec9563ba47bd8a9e5cbd10555094940ceedeb41ac805c4f0ddb9147481470112a11a76220d0298aef79 cups.logrotate 2c2683f755a220166b3a1653fdd1a6daa9718c8f0bbdff2e2d5e61d1133306260d63a83d3ff41619b5cf84c4913fae5822b79553e2822858f38fa3613f4c7082 cupsd.initd 7a8cd9ac33b0dd4627c72df4275db8ccd7cf8e201bce3833719b42f532f526bb347b842e3ea1ef0d61855b5c6e1088b5d20b68942f2c2c0acf504d8d9728efd3 cups-no-export-ssllibs.patch -ac1ec4453d6a4b641d40089c77d3b776963d90efb092851c8d93deceb6068b111dee71171967ffb7ad0f5adb424398a43f51feb7d5d9734287cfb9e419efaa93 default-config-no-gssapi.patch" +ac1ec4453d6a4b641d40089c77d3b776963d90efb092851c8d93deceb6068b111dee71171967ffb7ad0f5adb424398a43f51feb7d5d9734287cfb9e419efaa93 default-config-no-gssapi.patch +691509ee6cd05c6ccb07f4785096f7e94791cde9c87ebebe951e0d45d2f9292a88e7415ef272761090be0758ec14bde489325a07c9967e04deb7922d1205662d CVE-2022-26691.patch +" diff --git a/main/cups/CVE-2022-26691.patch b/main/cups/CVE-2022-26691.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..d1f2d37ca3b --- /dev/null +++ b/main/cups/CVE-2022-26691.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/OpenPrinting/cups/commit/de4f8c196106033e4c372dce3e91b9d42b0b9444 +From de4f8c196106033e4c372dce3e91b9d42b0b9444 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zdenek Dohnal <zdohnal@redhat.com> +Date: Thu, 26 May 2022 06:27:04 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] scheduler/cert.c: Fix string comparison (fixes + CVE-2022-26691) + +The previous algorithm didn't expect the strings can have a different +length, so one string can be a substring of the other and such substring +was reported as equal to the longer string. +--- + CHANGES.md | 1 + + scheduler/cert.c | 9 ++++++++- + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/scheduler/cert.c b/scheduler/cert.c +index b268bf1b2..9b65b96c9 100644 +--- a/scheduler/cert.c ++++ b/scheduler/cert.c +@@ -444,5 +444,12 @@ ctcompare(const char *a, /* I - First string */ + b ++; + } + +- return (result); ++ /* ++ * The while loop finishes when *a == '\0' or *b == '\0' ++ * so after the while loop either both *a and *b == '\0', ++ * or one points inside a string, so when we apply logical OR on *a, ++ * *b and result, we get a non-zero return value if the compared strings don't match. ++ */ ++ ++ return (result | *a | *b); + } diff --git a/main/curl/APKBUILD b/main/curl/APKBUILD index 0f49d219fd3..c82e481b899 100644 --- a/main/curl/APKBUILD +++ b/main/curl/APKBUILD @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=curl pkgver=7.79.1 -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=3 pkgdesc="URL retrival utility and library" url="https://curl.se/" arch="all" @@ -21,10 +21,27 @@ source="https://curl.se/download/curl-$pkgver.tar.xz CVE-2022-27774.patch CVE-2022-27775.patch CVE-2022-27776.patch + CVE-2022-27781.patch + CVE-2022-27782-1.patch + CVE-2022-27782-2.patch + CVE-2022-32205.patch + CVE-2022-32206.patch + CVE-2022-32207.patch + CVE-2022-32208.patch + CVE-2022-35252.patch " options="net" # Required for running tests # secfixes: +# 7.79.1-r3: +# - CVE-2022-35252 +# 7.79.1-r2: +# - CVE-2022-27781 +# - CVE-2022-27782 +# - CVE-2022-32205 +# - CVE-2022-32206 +# - CVE-2022-32207 +# - CVE-2022-32208 # 7.79.1-r1: # - CVE-2022-22576 # - CVE-2022-27774 @@ -175,4 +192,12 @@ sha512sums=" 4161539ebf5b9d4b1c5f4f83a8af313a96f5d9a4871a3da5f1ea564903b9079ac02003816f613e05aec9f3819bd2e152bb7885d0df138997abcaeb4adab897d6 CVE-2022-27774.patch c68b3eff3ef6120277c8acbd1d3ce4e16a26219a6b543af03a7bb9c5c3bc5d3480c237f11470995d088c9cbd06531352b86b151038cfcd551477038da0a96b33 CVE-2022-27775.patch 116d30037af107cd028bd6404b6488106ebe1f3482b65159fe6764c355edf57b5fc460ce034a4eb07053f97128d68e89ef50ae080b33ee82b0fc5460f09866c4 CVE-2022-27776.patch +fadf9c524f88077d43bcb578b46aa0e5587de2aeb1ed14ac5c29b18d30b230ca332d3c459bf2b34ad3b02cf5748803ad9a34947c803b75724a471359107e07b2 CVE-2022-27781.patch +79ee4ccfc88a5e398fc516111f17c03f1477602d91108b94741963ab3ebd0fe6b297e88378ce4e7c7fad6700f2a8e5e56f70a2342f52a466fc0ff017665338fc CVE-2022-27782-1.patch +a8571c6b34eaa635fb333949cfde0a5c6ddb9f02ed3ece91501e43a3d1536969f47cfb8b3044c9ffd6fd4afaf9fcf7904bc135c25089ccbab8e7d8eefbd2d0f1 CVE-2022-27782-2.patch +15fdc687ae01d5bc0a1f206d87bb91f76056cae788378d21b6110df0930672d864741bc29e93ecafea16433ef0f227c17852e6f5638de856c426d910de4763ae CVE-2022-32205.patch +81e28def4632cb542b0268889e6fb7f9b0c2950564cdeab39e582a22ab2b1e5a9c3e11865afe5833b8e892c501ba1aed609b4abf3131ec8668f70fcea8375e7c CVE-2022-32206.patch +1eb22a9ec7dad02927a53b2c81b9288ed52a8f4f76db66958622de6bcbb8024eb034e83b70cd1e20ed265e9f5f1c453d1ee37b6bfe54c4aa18b6f4c6bccd5a5f CVE-2022-32207.patch +f8eedaaa7a994ff763ce96f7e7e74b36eb1ce49ee8809cfe25e1562276702f70f064ee2b858ef2f07157a502ba71fb4b39b395fc53c2f47e2547597cb11a6bfa CVE-2022-32208.patch +1a8b058a8738f2d3558aecfc45eec67218c0c38c560916400a6e9eec64c44ae9beae05e48c20441579027427f0ff9c943c5c2aff35de3e66083205e92bf1e0e7 CVE-2022-35252.patch " diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2022-27781.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2022-27781.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..91dd127f778 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/curl/CVE-2022-27781.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/5c7da89d404bf59c8dd82a001119a16d18365917 +From 5c7da89d404bf59c8dd82a001119a16d18365917 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 10:07:15 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] nss: return error if seemingly stuck in a cert loop +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +CVE-2022-27781 + +Reported-by: Florian Kohnhäuser +Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27781.html +Closes #8822 +--- + lib/vtls/nss.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/lib/vtls/nss.c b/lib/vtls/nss.c +index 5b7de9f818952..569c0628feb5c 100644 +--- a/lib/vtls/nss.c ++++ b/lib/vtls/nss.c +@@ -983,6 +983,9 @@ static void display_cert_info(struct Curl_easy *data, + PR_Free(common_name); + } + ++/* A number of certs that will never occur in a real server handshake */ ++#define TOO_MANY_CERTS 300 ++ + static CURLcode display_conn_info(struct Curl_easy *data, PRFileDesc *sock) + { + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; +@@ -1018,6 +1021,11 @@ static CURLcode display_conn_info(struct Curl_easy *data, PRFileDesc *sock) + cert2 = CERT_FindCertIssuer(cert, now, certUsageSSLCA); + while(cert2) { + i++; ++ if(i >= TOO_MANY_CERTS) { ++ CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2); ++ failf(data, "certificate loop"); ++ return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM; ++ } + if(cert2->isRoot) { + CERT_DestroyCertificate(cert2); + break; diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2022-27782-1.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2022-27782-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c2a6bdb5d2e --- /dev/null +++ b/main/curl/CVE-2022-27782-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,355 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/f18af4f874cecab82a9797e8c7541e0990c7a64c (modified) +gnutls changes dropped as we build without it +--- +From f18af4f874cecab82a9797e8c7541e0990c7a64c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 23:13:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] tls: check more TLS details for connection reuse + +CVE-2022-27782 + +Reported-by: Harry Sintonen +Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27782.html +Closes #8825 +--- + lib/setopt.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++------------ + lib/url.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++------- + lib/urldata.h | 13 +++++++------ + lib/vtls/gtls.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++--------------- + lib/vtls/mbedtls.c | 2 +- + lib/vtls/nss.c | 6 +++--- + lib/vtls/openssl.c | 10 +++++----- + lib/vtls/vtls.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++ + 8 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/setopt.c b/lib/setopt.c +index 0df1afa614455..05e1a544dfd58 100644 +--- a/lib/setopt.c ++++ b/lib/setopt.c +@@ -2294,6 +2294,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) + + case CURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS: + arg = va_arg(param, long); ++ data->set.ssl.primary.ssl_options = (unsigned char)(arg & 0xff); + data->set.ssl.enable_beast = !!(arg & CURLSSLOPT_ALLOW_BEAST); + data->set.ssl.no_revoke = !!(arg & CURLSSLOPT_NO_REVOKE); + data->set.ssl.no_partialchain = !!(arg & CURLSSLOPT_NO_PARTIALCHAIN); +@@ -2307,6 +2308,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) + #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + case CURLOPT_PROXY_SSL_OPTIONS: + arg = va_arg(param, long); ++ data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.ssl_options = (unsigned char)(arg & 0xff); + data->set.proxy_ssl.enable_beast = !!(arg & CURLSSLOPT_ALLOW_BEAST); + data->set.proxy_ssl.no_revoke = !!(arg & CURLSSLOPT_NO_REVOKE); + data->set.proxy_ssl.no_partialchain = !!(arg & CURLSSLOPT_NO_PARTIALCHAIN); +@@ -2745,49 +2747,52 @@ CURLcode Curl_vsetopt(struct Curl_easy *data, CURLoption option, va_list param) + case CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_USERNAME: + result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME], + va_arg(param, char *)); +- if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME] && !data->set.ssl.authtype) +- data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */ ++ if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME] && ++ !data->set.ssl.primary.authtype) ++ data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */ + break; + case CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_USERNAME: + result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY], + va_arg(param, char *)); + #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY] && +- !data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype) +- data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */ ++ !data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype) ++ data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to ++ SRP */ + #endif + break; + case CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD: + result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD], + va_arg(param, char *)); +- if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME] && !data->set.ssl.authtype) +- data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */ ++ if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME] && ++ !data->set.ssl.primary.authtype) ++ data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default */ + break; + case CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD: + result = Curl_setstropt(&data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_PROXY], + va_arg(param, char *)); + #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + if(data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY] && +- !data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype) +- data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default to SRP */ ++ !data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype) ++ data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; /* default */ + #endif + break; + case CURLOPT_TLSAUTH_TYPE: + argptr = va_arg(param, char *); + if(!argptr || + strncasecompare(argptr, "SRP", strlen("SRP"))) +- data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; ++ data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; + else +- data->set.ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE; ++ data->set.ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE; + break; + #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + case CURLOPT_PROXY_TLSAUTH_TYPE: + argptr = va_arg(param, char *); + if(!argptr || + strncasecompare(argptr, "SRP", strlen("SRP"))) +- data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; ++ data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP; + else +- data->set.proxy_ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE; ++ data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE; + break; + #endif + #endif +diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c +index 8e7fb25eeb495..cf14a333ac694 100644 +--- a/lib/url.c ++++ b/lib/url.c +@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_init_userdefined(struct Curl_easy *data) + set->ssl.primary.verifypeer = TRUE; + set->ssl.primary.verifyhost = TRUE; + #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP +- set->ssl.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE; ++ set->ssl.primary.authtype = CURL_TLSAUTH_NONE; + #endif + set->ssh_auth_types = CURLSSH_AUTH_DEFAULT; /* defaults to any auth + type */ +@@ -1758,11 +1758,17 @@ static struct connectdata *allocate_conn(struct Curl_easy *data) + conn->ssl_config.verifystatus = data->set.ssl.primary.verifystatus; + conn->ssl_config.verifypeer = data->set.ssl.primary.verifypeer; + conn->ssl_config.verifyhost = data->set.ssl.primary.verifyhost; ++ conn->ssl_config.ssl_options = data->set.ssl.primary.ssl_options; ++#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP ++#endif + #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + conn->proxy_ssl_config.verifystatus = + data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.verifystatus; + conn->proxy_ssl_config.verifypeer = data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.verifypeer; + conn->proxy_ssl_config.verifyhost = data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.verifyhost; ++ conn->proxy_ssl_config.ssl_options = data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.ssl_options; ++#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP ++#endif + #endif + conn->ip_version = data->set.ipver; + conn->bits.connect_only = data->set.connect_only; +@@ -3848,7 +3854,8 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, + data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY]; + data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.issuercert_blob = + data->set.blobs[BLOB_SSL_ISSUERCERT_PROXY]; +- data->set.proxy_ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_PROXY]; ++ data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.CRLfile = ++ data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE_PROXY]; + data->set.proxy_ssl.cert_type = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE_PROXY]; + data->set.proxy_ssl.key = data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PROXY]; + data->set.proxy_ssl.key_type = data->set.str[STRING_KEY_TYPE_PROXY]; +@@ -3856,18 +3863,20 @@ static CURLcode create_conn(struct Curl_easy *data, + data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.clientcert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_PROXY]; + data->set.proxy_ssl.key_blob = data->set.blobs[BLOB_KEY_PROXY]; + #endif +- data->set.ssl.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]; ++ data->set.ssl.primary.CRLfile = data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]; + data->set.ssl.cert_type = data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE]; + data->set.ssl.key = data->set.str[STRING_KEY]; + data->set.ssl.key_type = data->set.str[STRING_KEY_TYPE]; + data->set.ssl.key_passwd = data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]; + data->set.ssl.primary.clientcert = data->set.str[STRING_CERT]; + #ifdef USE_TLS_SRP +- data->set.ssl.username = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME]; +- data->set.ssl.password = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD]; ++ data->set.ssl.primary.username = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME]; ++ data->set.ssl.primary.password = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD]; + #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY +- data->set.proxy_ssl.username = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY]; +- data->set.proxy_ssl.password = data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_PROXY]; ++ data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.username = ++ data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_USERNAME_PROXY]; ++ data->set.proxy_ssl.primary.password = ++ data->set.str[STRING_TLSAUTH_PASSWORD_PROXY]; + #endif + #endif + data->set.ssl.key_blob = data->set.blobs[BLOB_KEY]; +diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h +index 9c34ec444c08f..584434d774b3d 100644 +--- a/lib/urldata.h ++++ b/lib/urldata.h +@@ -253,10 +253,17 @@ struct ssl_primary_config { + char *cipher_list; /* list of ciphers to use */ + char *cipher_list13; /* list of TLS 1.3 cipher suites to use */ + char *pinned_key; ++ char *CRLfile; /* CRL to check certificate revocation */ + struct curl_blob *cert_blob; + struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob; + struct curl_blob *issuercert_blob; ++#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP ++ char *username; /* TLS username (for, e.g., SRP) */ ++ char *password; /* TLS password (for, e.g., SRP) */ ++ enum CURL_TLSAUTH authtype; /* TLS authentication type (default SRP) */ ++#endif + char *curves; /* list of curves to use */ ++ unsigned char ssl_options; /* the CURLOPT_SSL_OPTIONS bitmask */ + BIT(verifypeer); /* set TRUE if this is desired */ + BIT(verifyhost); /* set TRUE if CN/SAN must match hostname */ + BIT(verifystatus); /* set TRUE if certificate status must be checked */ +@@ -266,7 +273,6 @@ struct ssl_primary_config { + struct ssl_config_data { + struct ssl_primary_config primary; + long certverifyresult; /* result from the certificate verification */ +- char *CRLfile; /* CRL to check certificate revocation */ + curl_ssl_ctx_callback fsslctx; /* function to initialize ssl ctx */ + void *fsslctxp; /* parameter for call back */ + char *cert_type; /* format for certificate (default: PEM)*/ +@@ -274,11 +280,6 @@ struct ssl_config_data { + struct curl_blob *key_blob; + char *key_type; /* format for private key (default: PEM) */ + char *key_passwd; /* plain text private key password */ +-#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP +- char *username; /* TLS username (for, e.g., SRP) */ +- char *password; /* TLS password (for, e.g., SRP) */ +- enum CURL_TLSAUTH authtype; /* TLS authentication type (default SRP) */ +-#endif + BIT(certinfo); /* gather lots of certificate info */ + BIT(falsestart); + BIT(enable_beast); /* allow this flaw for interoperability's sake*/ +diff --git a/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c b/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c +index 975094f4fa795..b60b9cac50d4f 100644 +--- a/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c ++++ b/lib/vtls/mbedtls.c +@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ mbed_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, + const char * const ssl_capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath); + char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.clientcert); + const struct curl_blob *ssl_cert_blob = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.cert_blob); +- const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile); ++ const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile); + const char * const hostname = SSL_HOST_NAME(); + #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS + const long int port = SSL_HOST_PORT(); +diff --git a/lib/vtls/nss.c b/lib/vtls/nss.c +index 569c0628feb5c..cb0509ff5b829 100644 +--- a/lib/vtls/nss.c ++++ b/lib/vtls/nss.c +@@ -2035,13 +2035,13 @@ static CURLcode nss_setup_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, + } + } + +- if(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile)) { +- const CURLcode rv = nss_load_crl(SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile)); ++ if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile)) { ++ const CURLcode rv = nss_load_crl(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile)); + if(rv) { + result = rv; + goto error; + } +- infof(data, " CRLfile: %s", SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile)); ++ infof(data, " CRLfile: %s", SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile)); + } + + if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.clientcert)) { +diff --git a/lib/vtls/openssl.c b/lib/vtls/openssl.c +index 39c0a82b1a46e..635e9c15e74e7 100644 +--- a/lib/vtls/openssl.c ++++ b/lib/vtls/openssl.c +@@ -2662,7 +2662,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data, + #endif + const long int ssl_version = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version); + #ifdef USE_OPENSSL_SRP +- const enum CURL_TLSAUTH ssl_authtype = SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype); ++ const enum CURL_TLSAUTH ssl_authtype = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.authtype); + #endif + char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.clientcert); + const struct curl_blob *ssl_cert_blob = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.cert_blob); +@@ -2673,7 +2673,7 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data, + (ca_info_blob ? NULL : SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile)); + const char * const ssl_capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath); + const bool verifypeer = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer); +- const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile); ++ const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.CRLfile); + char error_buffer[256]; + struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend; + bool imported_native_ca = false; +@@ -2925,14 +2925,14 @@ static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data, + #ifdef USE_OPENSSL_SRP + if(ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) { +- char * const ssl_username = SSL_SET_OPTION(username); +- ++ char * const ssl_username = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.username); ++ char * const ssl_password = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.password); + infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s", ssl_username); + + if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(backend->ctx, ssl_username)) { + failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name"); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } +- if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(backend->ctx, SSL_SET_OPTION(password))) { ++ if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(backend->ctx, ssl_password)) { + failf(data, "failed setting SRP password"); + return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + } +diff --git a/lib/vtls/vtls.c b/lib/vtls/vtls.c +index a40ac06f684f2..e2d34388ccd40 100644 +--- a/lib/vtls/vtls.c ++++ b/lib/vtls/vtls.c +@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config *data, + { + if((data->version == needle->version) && + (data->version_max == needle->version_max) && ++ (data->ssl_options == needle->ssl_options) && + (data->verifypeer == needle->verifypeer) && + (data->verifyhost == needle->verifyhost) && + (data->verifystatus == needle->verifystatus) && +@@ -144,9 +145,15 @@ Curl_ssl_config_matches(struct ssl_primary_config *data, + Curl_safecmp(data->clientcert, needle->clientcert) && + Curl_safecmp(data->random_file, needle->random_file) && + Curl_safecmp(data->egdsocket, needle->egdsocket) && ++#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP ++ Curl_safecmp(data->username, needle->username) && ++ Curl_safecmp(data->password, needle->password) && ++ (data->authtype == needle->authtype) && ++#endif + Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list, needle->cipher_list) && + Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->cipher_list13, needle->cipher_list13) && + Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->curves, needle->curves) && ++ Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->CRLfile, needle->CRLfile) && + Curl_safe_strcasecompare(data->pinned_key, needle->pinned_key)) + return TRUE; + +@@ -163,6 +170,10 @@ Curl_clone_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config *source, + dest->verifyhost = source->verifyhost; + dest->verifystatus = source->verifystatus; + dest->sessionid = source->sessionid; ++ dest->ssl_options = source->ssl_options; ++#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP ++ dest->authtype = source->authtype; ++#endif + + CLONE_BLOB(cert_blob); + CLONE_BLOB(ca_info_blob); +@@ -177,6 +188,11 @@ Curl_clone_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config *source, + CLONE_STRING(cipher_list13); + CLONE_STRING(pinned_key); + CLONE_STRING(curves); ++ CLONE_STRING(CRLfile); ++#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP ++ CLONE_STRING(username); ++ CLONE_STRING(password); ++#endif + + return TRUE; + } +@@ -196,6 +212,11 @@ void Curl_free_primary_ssl_config(struct ssl_primary_config *sslc) + Curl_safefree(sslc->ca_info_blob); + Curl_safefree(sslc->issuercert_blob); + Curl_safefree(sslc->curves); ++ Curl_safefree(sslc->CRLfile); ++#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP ++ Curl_safefree(sslc->username); ++ Curl_safefree(sslc->password); ++#endif + } + + #ifdef USE_SSL diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2022-27782-2.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2022-27782-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c2dec9fda18 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/curl/CVE-2022-27782-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/1645e9b44505abd5cbaf65da5282c3f33b5924a5 +From 1645e9b44505abd5cbaf65da5282c3f33b5924a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Mon, 9 May 2022 23:13:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] url: check SSH config match on connection reuse + +CVE-2022-27782 + +Reported-by: Harry Sintonen +Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-27782.html +Closes #8825 +--- + lib/url.c | 11 +++++++++++ + lib/vssh/ssh.h | 6 +++--- + 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/url.c b/lib/url.c +index cf14a333ac694..6b31d4b1315dd 100644 +--- a/lib/url.c ++++ b/lib/url.c +@@ -1100,6 +1100,12 @@ static void prune_dead_connections(struct Curl_easy *data) + } + } + ++static bool ssh_config_matches(struct connectdata *one, ++ struct connectdata *two) ++{ ++ return (Curl_safecmp(one->proto.sshc.rsa, two->proto.sshc.rsa) && ++ Curl_safecmp(one->proto.sshc.rsa_pub, two->proto.sshc.rsa_pub)); ++} + /* + * Given one filled in connection struct (named needle), this function should + * detect if there already is one that has all the significant details +@@ -1356,6 +1362,11 @@ ConnectionExists(struct Curl_easy *data, + (data->state.httpwant < CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2_0)) + continue; + ++ if(get_protocol_family(needle->handler) == PROTO_FAMILY_SSH) { ++ if(!ssh_config_matches(needle, check)) ++ continue; ++ } ++ + if((needle->handler->flags&PROTOPT_SSL) + #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY + || !needle->bits.httpproxy || needle->bits.tunnel_proxy +diff --git a/lib/vssh/ssh.h b/lib/vssh/ssh.h +index 7972081ec610f..30d82e57648ed 100644 +--- a/lib/vssh/ssh.h ++++ b/lib/vssh/ssh.h +@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ + * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ + * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| + * +- * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2021, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. ++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2022, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. + * + * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which + * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms +@@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ struct ssh_conn { + + /* common */ + const char *passphrase; /* pass-phrase to use */ +- char *rsa_pub; /* path name */ +- char *rsa; /* path name */ ++ char *rsa_pub; /* strdup'ed public key file */ ++ char *rsa; /* strdup'ed private key file */ + bool authed; /* the connection has been authenticated fine */ + bool acceptfail; /* used by the SFTP_QUOTE (continue if + quote command fails) */ diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2022-32205.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2022-32205.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2573d9bf1d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/curl/CVE-2022-32205.patch @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/48d7064a49148f03942380967da739dcde1cdc24 +From 48d7064a49148f03942380967da739dcde1cdc24 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Sun, 26 Jun 2022 11:00:48 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cookie: apply limits + +- Send no more than 150 cookies per request +- Cap the max length used for a cookie: header to 8K +- Cap the max number of received Set-Cookie: headers to 50 + +Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32205.html +CVE-2022-32205 +Reported-by: Harry Sintonen +Closes #9048 +--- + lib/cookie.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- + lib/cookie.h | 21 +++++++++++++++++++-- + lib/http.c | 13 +++++++++++-- + lib/urldata.h | 1 + + 4 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c +index a308346a777bc..a1ab89532033b 100644 +--- a/lib/cookie.c ++++ b/lib/cookie.c +@@ -482,6 +482,10 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data, + (void)data; + #endif + ++ DEBUGASSERT(MAX_SET_COOKIE_AMOUNT <= 255); /* counter is an unsigned char */ ++ if(data->req.setcookies >= MAX_SET_COOKIE_AMOUNT) ++ return NULL; ++ + /* First, alloc and init a new struct for it */ + co = calloc(1, sizeof(struct Cookie)); + if(!co) +@@ -821,7 +825,7 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data, + freecookie(co); + return NULL; + } +- ++ data->req.setcookies++; + } + else { + /* +@@ -1375,7 +1379,8 @@ static struct Cookie *dup_cookie(struct Cookie *src) + * + * It shall only return cookies that haven't expired. + */ +-struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_getlist(struct CookieInfo *c, ++struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_getlist(struct Curl_easy *data, ++ struct CookieInfo *c, + const char *host, const char *path, + bool secure) + { +@@ -1430,6 +1435,11 @@ struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_getlist(struct CookieInfo *c, + mainco = newco; + + matches++; ++ if(matches >= MAX_COOKIE_SEND_AMOUNT) { ++ infof(data, "Included max number of cookies (%u) in request!", ++ matches); ++ break; ++ } + } + else + goto fail; +diff --git a/lib/cookie.h b/lib/cookie.h +index 453dfced8a342..abc0a2e8a01ad 100644 +--- a/lib/cookie.h ++++ b/lib/cookie.h +@@ -83,10 +83,26 @@ struct CookieInfo { + */ + #define MAX_COOKIE_LINE 5000 + +-/* This is the maximum length of a cookie name or content we deal with: */ ++/* Maximum length of an incoming cookie name or content we deal with. Longer ++ cookies are ignored. */ + #define MAX_NAME 4096 + #define MAX_NAME_TXT "4095" + ++/* Maximum size for an outgoing cookie line libcurl will use in an http ++ request. This is the default maximum length used in some versions of Apache ++ httpd. */ ++#define MAX_COOKIE_HEADER_LEN 8190 ++ ++/* Maximum number of cookies libcurl will send in a single request, even if ++ there might be more cookies that match. One reason to cap the number is to ++ keep the maximum HTTP request within the maximum allowed size. */ ++#define MAX_COOKIE_SEND_AMOUNT 150 ++ ++/* Maximum number of Set-Cookie: lines accepted in a single response. If more ++ such header lines are received, they are ignored. This value must be less ++ than 256 since an unsigned char is used to count. */ ++#define MAX_SET_COOKIE_AMOUNT 50 ++ + struct Curl_easy; + /* + * Add a cookie to the internal list of cookies. The domain and path arguments +@@ -99,7 +115,8 @@ struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *domain, const char *path, + bool secure); + +-struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_getlist(struct CookieInfo *c, const char *host, ++struct Cookie *Curl_cookie_getlist(struct Curl_easy *data, ++ struct CookieInfo *c, const char *host, + const char *path, bool secure); + void Curl_cookie_freelist(struct Cookie *cookies); + void Curl_cookie_clearall(struct CookieInfo *cookies); +diff --git a/lib/http.c b/lib/http.c +index 5284475ba92c4..258722a602e40 100644 +--- a/lib/http.c ++++ b/lib/http.c +@@ -2711,11 +2711,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_bodysend(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn, + } + + #if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES) ++ + CURLcode Curl_http_cookies(struct Curl_easy *data, + struct connectdata *conn, + struct dynbuf *r) + { + CURLcode result = CURLE_OK; + char *addcookies = NULL; ++ bool linecap = FALSE; + if(data->set.str[STRING_COOKIE] && !Curl_checkheaders(data, "Cookie")) + addcookies = data->set.str[STRING_COOKIE]; +@@ -2734,7 +2736,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_cookies(struct Curl_easy *data, + !strcmp(host, "127.0.0.1") || + !strcmp(host, "[::1]") ? TRUE : FALSE; + Curl_share_lock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_COOKIE, CURL_LOCK_ACCESS_SINGLE); +- co = Curl_cookie_getlist(data->cookies, host, data->state.up.path, ++ co = Curl_cookie_getlist(data, data->cookies, host, data->state.up.path, + secure_context); + Curl_share_unlock(data, CURL_LOCK_DATA_COOKIE); + } +@@ -2748,6 +2750,13 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_cookies(struct Curl_easy *data, + if(result) + break; + } ++ if((Curl_dyn_len(r) + strlen(co->name) + strlen(co->value) + 1) >= ++ MAX_COOKIE_HEADER_LEN) { ++ infof(data, "Restricted outgoing cookies due to header size, " ++ "'%s' not sent", co->name); ++ linecap = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } + result = Curl_dyn_addf(r, "%s%s=%s", count?"; ":"", + co->name, co->value); + if(result) +@@ -2758,7 +2767,7 @@ CURLcode Curl_http_cookies(struct Curl_easy *data, + } + Curl_cookie_freelist(store); + } +- if(addcookies && !result) { ++ if(addcookies && !result && !linecap) { + if(!count) + result = Curl_dyn_addn(r, STRCONST("Cookie: ")); + if(!result) { +diff --git a/lib/urldata.h b/lib/urldata.h +index 17fe25720be33..bcb4d460c2fe6 100644 +--- a/lib/urldata.h ++++ b/lib/urldata.h +@@ -698,6 +698,7 @@ struct SingleRequest { + #ifndef CURL_DISABLE_DOH + struct dohdata *doh; /* DoH specific data for this request */ + #endif ++ unsigned char setcookies; + BIT(header); /* incoming data has HTTP header */ + BIT(content_range); /* set TRUE if Content-Range: was found */ + BIT(upload_done); /* set to TRUE when doing chunked transfer-encoding diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2022-32206.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2022-32206.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6999fb2b2cb --- /dev/null +++ b/main/curl/CVE-2022-32206.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/3a09fbb7f264c67c438d01a30669ce325aa508e2 +From 3a09fbb7f264c67c438d01a30669ce325aa508e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Mon, 16 May 2022 16:28:13 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] content_encoding: return error on too many compression steps + +The max allowed steps is arbitrarily set to 5. + +Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32206.html +CVE-2022-32206 +Reported-by: Harry Sintonen +Closes #9049 +--- + lib/content_encoding.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/lib/content_encoding.c b/lib/content_encoding.c +index c5591ca48ac78..95ba48a2dd563 100644 +--- a/lib/content_encoding.c ++++ b/lib/content_encoding.c +@@ -1028,12 +1028,16 @@ static const struct content_encoding *find_encoding(const char *name, + return NULL; + } + ++/* allow no more than 5 "chained" compression steps */ ++#define MAX_ENCODE_STACK 5 ++ + /* Set-up the unencoding stack from the Content-Encoding header value. + * See RFC 7231 section 3.1.2.2. */ + CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct Curl_easy *data, + const char *enclist, int maybechunked) + { + struct SingleRequest *k = &data->req; ++ int counter = 0; + + do { + const char *name; +@@ -1068,6 +1072,11 @@ CURLcode Curl_build_unencoding_stack(struct Curl_easy *data, + if(!encoding) + encoding = &error_encoding; /* Defer error at stack use. */ + ++ if(++counter >= MAX_ENCODE_STACK) { ++ failf(data, "Reject response due to %u content encodings", ++ counter); ++ return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING; ++ } + /* Stack the unencoding stage. */ + writer = new_unencoding_writer(data, encoding, k->writer_stack); + if(!writer) diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2022-32207.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2022-32207.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e8875e39fae --- /dev/null +++ b/main/curl/CVE-2022-32207.patch @@ -0,0 +1,281 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/20f9dd6bae50b7223171b17ba7798946e74f877f +From 20f9dd6bae50b7223171b17ba7798946e74f877f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Wed, 25 May 2022 10:09:53 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] fopen: add Curl_fopen() for better overwriting of files + +Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32207.html +CVE-2022-32207 +Reported-by: Harry Sintonen +Closes #9050 +--- + CMakeLists.txt | 1 + + configure.ac | 1 + + lib/Makefile.inc | 2 + + lib/cookie.c | 19 ++----- + lib/curl_config.h.cmake | 3 ++ + lib/fopen.c | 113 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + lib/fopen.h | 30 +++++++++++ + 7 files changed, 154 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 lib/fopen.c + create mode 100644 lib/fopen.h + +diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt +index 45d763d5a9c1d..ad20777f3d688 100644 +--- a/CMakeLists.txt ++++ b/CMakeLists.txt +@@ -1067,6 +1067,7 @@ elseif(HAVE_LIBSOCKET) + set(CMAKE_REQUIRED_LIBRARIES socket) + endif() + ++check_symbol_exists(fchmod "${CURL_INCLUDES}" HAVE_FCHMOD) + check_symbol_exists(basename "${CURL_INCLUDES}" HAVE_BASENAME) + check_symbol_exists(socket "${CURL_INCLUDES}" HAVE_SOCKET) + check_symbol_exists(select "${CURL_INCLUDES}" HAVE_SELECT) +diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac +index b0245b99a669f..de2dee5a484ed 100644 +--- a/configure.ac ++++ b/configure.ac +@@ -3438,6 +3438,7 @@ AC_CHECK_DECLS([getpwuid_r], [], [AC_DEFINE(HAVE_DECL_GETPWUID_R_MISSING, 1, "Se + + + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fnmatch \ ++ fchmod \ + geteuid \ + getpass_r \ + getppid \ +diff --git a/lib/Makefile.inc b/lib/Makefile.inc +index 533e16df97020..9bd8e324bd1c1 100644 +--- a/lib/Makefile.inc ++++ b/lib/Makefile.inc +@@ -137,6 +137,7 @@ LIB_CFILES = \ + escape.c \ + file.c \ + fileinfo.c \ ++ fopen.c \ + formdata.c \ + ftp.c \ + ftplistparser.c \ +@@ -270,6 +271,7 @@ LIB_HFILES = \ + escape.h \ + file.h \ + fileinfo.h \ ++ fopen.h \ + formdata.h \ + ftp.h \ + ftplistparser.h \ +diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c +index a1ab89532033b..cb57b86387191 100644 +--- a/lib/cookie.c ++++ b/lib/cookie.c +@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ Example set of cookies: + #include "curl_get_line.h" + #include "curl_memrchr.h" + #include "parsedate.h" +-#include "rand.h" + #include "rename.h" ++#include "fopen.h" + + /* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ + #include "curl_printf.h" +@@ -1641,20 +1641,9 @@ static CURLcode cookie_output(struct Curl_easy *data, + use_stdout = TRUE; + } + else { +- unsigned char randsuffix[9]; +- +- if(Curl_rand_hex(data, randsuffix, sizeof(randsuffix))) +- return 2; +- +- tempstore = aprintf("%s.%s.tmp", filename, randsuffix); +- if(!tempstore) +- return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; +- +- out = fopen(tempstore, FOPEN_WRITETEXT); +- if(!out) { +- error = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; ++ error = Curl_fopen(data, filename, &out, &tempstore); ++ if(error) + goto error; +- } + } + + fputs("# Netscape HTTP Cookie File\n" +@@ -1701,7 +1690,7 @@ static CURLcode cookie_output(struct Curl_easy *data, + if(!use_stdout) { + fclose(out); + out = NULL; +- if(Curl_rename(tempstore, filename)) { ++ if(tempstore && Curl_rename(tempstore, filename)) { + unlink(tempstore); + error = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; + goto error; +diff --git a/lib/curl_config.h.cmake b/lib/curl_config.h.cmake +index cd4b568d89948..eb2c62b971453 100644 +--- a/lib/curl_config.h.cmake ++++ b/lib/curl_config.h.cmake +@@ -159,6 +159,9 @@ + /* Define to 1 if you have the <assert.h> header file. */ + #cmakedefine HAVE_ASSERT_H 1 + ++/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */ ++#cmakedefine HAVE_FCHMOD 1 ++ + /* Define to 1 if you have the `basename' function. */ + #cmakedefine HAVE_BASENAME 1 + +diff --git a/lib/fopen.c b/lib/fopen.c +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000000..ad3691ba9d158 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/lib/fopen.c +@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ ++/*************************************************************************** ++ * _ _ ____ _ ++ * Project ___| | | | _ \| | ++ * / __| | | | |_) | | ++ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ ++ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2022, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. ++ * ++ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which ++ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms ++ * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. ++ * ++ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell ++ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is ++ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. ++ * ++ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY ++ * KIND, either express or implied. ++ * ++ * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl ++ * ++ ***************************************************************************/ ++ ++#include "curl_setup.h" ++ ++#if !defined(CURL_DISABLE_COOKIES) || !defined(CURL_DISABLE_ALTSVC) || \ ++ !defined(CURL_DISABLE_HSTS) ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H ++#include <fcntl.h> ++#endif ++ ++#include "urldata.h" ++#include "rand.h" ++#include "fopen.h" ++/* The last 3 #include files should be in this order */ ++#include "curl_printf.h" ++#include "curl_memory.h" ++#include "memdebug.h" ++ ++/* ++ * Curl_fopen() opens a file for writing with a temp name, to be renamed ++ * to the final name when completed. If there is an existing file using this ++ * name at the time of the open, this function will clone the mode from that ++ * file. if 'tempname' is non-NULL, it needs a rename after the file is ++ * written. ++ */ ++CURLcode Curl_fopen(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *filename, ++ FILE **fh, char **tempname) ++{ ++ CURLcode result = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; ++ unsigned char randsuffix[9]; ++ char *tempstore = NULL; ++ struct_stat sb; ++ int fd = -1; ++ *tempname = NULL; ++ ++ if(stat(filename, &sb) == -1 || !S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { ++ /* a non-regular file, fallback to direct fopen() */ ++ *fh = fopen(filename, FOPEN_WRITETEXT); ++ if(*fh) ++ return CURLE_OK; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ result = Curl_rand_hex(data, randsuffix, sizeof(randsuffix)); ++ if(result) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ tempstore = aprintf("%s.%s.tmp", filename, randsuffix); ++ if(!tempstore) { ++ result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ ++ result = CURLE_WRITE_ERROR; ++ fd = open(tempstore, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600); ++ if(fd == -1) ++ goto fail; ++ ++#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD ++ { ++ struct_stat nsb; ++ if((fstat(fd, &nsb) != -1) && ++ (nsb.st_uid == sb.st_uid) && (nsb.st_gid == sb.st_gid)) { ++ /* if the user and group are the same, clone the original mode */ ++ if(fchmod(fd, sb.st_mode) == -1) ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ } ++#endif ++ ++ *fh = fdopen(fd, FOPEN_WRITETEXT); ++ if(!*fh) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ *tempname = tempstore; ++ return CURLE_OK; ++ ++fail: ++ if(fd != -1) { ++ close(fd); ++ unlink(tempstore); ++ } ++ ++ free(tempstore); ++ ++ *tempname = NULL; ++ return result; ++} ++ ++#endif /* ! disabled */ +diff --git a/lib/fopen.h b/lib/fopen.h +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000000000..289e55f2afd24 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/lib/fopen.h +@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ ++#ifndef HEADER_CURL_FOPEN_H ++#define HEADER_CURL_FOPEN_H ++/*************************************************************************** ++ * _ _ ____ _ ++ * Project ___| | | | _ \| | ++ * / __| | | | |_) | | ++ * | (__| |_| | _ <| |___ ++ * \___|\___/|_| \_\_____| ++ * ++ * Copyright (C) 1998 - 2022, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al. ++ * ++ * This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which ++ * you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms ++ * are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html. ++ * ++ * You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell ++ * copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is ++ * furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file. ++ * ++ * This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY ++ * KIND, either express or implied. ++ * ++ * SPDX-License-Identifier: curl ++ * ++ ***************************************************************************/ ++ ++CURLcode Curl_fopen(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *filename, ++ FILE **fh, char **tempname); ++ ++#endif diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2022-32208.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2022-32208.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..35a5c840d55 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/curl/CVE-2022-32208.patch @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/6ecdf5136b52af747e7bda08db9a748256b1cd09 +From 6ecdf5136b52af747e7bda08db9a748256b1cd09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Thu, 9 Jun 2022 09:27:24 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] krb5: return error properly on decode errors + +Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-32208.html +CVE-2022-32208 +Reported-by: Harry Sintonen +Closes #9051 +--- + lib/krb5.c | 18 +++++++++++------- + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/krb5.c b/lib/krb5.c +index e289595c9e1dd..517491c4658bf 100644 +--- a/lib/krb5.c ++++ b/lib/krb5.c +@@ -142,11 +142,8 @@ krb5_decode(void *app_data, void *buf, int len, + enc.value = buf; + enc.length = len; + maj = gss_unwrap(&min, *context, &enc, &dec, NULL, NULL); +- if(maj != GSS_S_COMPLETE) { +- if(len >= 4) +- strcpy(buf, "599 "); ++ if(maj != GSS_S_COMPLETE) + return -1; +- } + + memcpy(buf, dec.value, dec.length); + len = curlx_uztosi(dec.length); +@@ -508,6 +505,7 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn, + { + int len; + CURLcode result; ++ int nread; + + result = socket_read(fd, &len, sizeof(len)); + if(result) +@@ -516,7 +514,10 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn, + if(len) { + /* only realloc if there was a length */ + len = ntohl(len); +- buf->data = Curl_saferealloc(buf->data, len); ++ if(len > CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH) ++ len = 0; ++ else ++ buf->data = Curl_saferealloc(buf->data, len); + } + if(!len || !buf->data) + return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY; +@@ -524,8 +525,11 @@ static CURLcode read_data(struct connectdata *conn, + result = socket_read(fd, buf->data, len); + if(result) + return result; +- buf->size = conn->mech->decode(conn->app_data, buf->data, len, +- conn->data_prot, conn); ++ nread = conn->mech->decode(conn->app_data, buf->data, len, ++ conn->data_prot, conn); ++ if(nread < 0) ++ return CURLE_RECV_ERROR; ++ buf->size = (size_t)nread; + buf->index = 0; + return CURLE_OK; + } diff --git a/main/curl/CVE-2022-35252.patch b/main/curl/CVE-2022-35252.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f9cc56b8927 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/curl/CVE-2022-35252.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/8dfc93e573ca740544a2d79ebb +From 8dfc93e573ca740544a2d79ebb0ed786592c65c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se> +Date: Mon, 29 Aug 2022 00:09:17 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] cookie: reject cookies with "control bytes" + +Rejects 0x01 - 0x1f (except 0x09) plus 0x7f + +Reported-by: Axel Chong + +Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-35252.html + +CVE-2022-35252 + +Closes #9381 +--- + lib/cookie.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/lib/cookie.c b/lib/cookie.c +index 5a4d9e9725f62..ab790a1cdb0ce 100644 +--- a/lib/cookie.c ++++ b/lib/cookie.c +@@ -441,6 +441,30 @@ static bool bad_domain(const char *domain) + return TRUE; + } + ++/* ++ RFC 6265 section 4.1.1 says a server should accept this range: ++ ++ cookie-octet = %x21 / %x23-2B / %x2D-3A / %x3C-5B / %x5D-7E ++ ++ But Firefox and Chrome as of June 2022 accept space, comma and double-quotes ++ fine. The prime reason for filtering out control bytes is that some HTTP ++ servers return 400 for requests that contain such. ++*/ ++static int invalid_octets(const char *p) ++{ ++ /* Reject all bytes \x01 - \x1f (*except* \x09, TAB) + \x7f */ ++ static const char badoctets[] = { ++ "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x0a" ++ "\x0b\x0c\x0d\x0e\x0f\x10\x11\x12\x13\x14" ++ "\x15\x16\x17\x18\x19\x1a\x1b\x1c\x1d\x1e\x1f\x7f" ++ }; ++ size_t vlen, len; ++ /* scan for all the octets that are *not* in cookie-octet */ ++ len = strcspn(p, badoctets); ++ vlen = strlen(p); ++ return (len != vlen); ++} ++ + /* + * Curl_cookie_add + * +@@ -595,6 +619,11 @@ Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data, + badcookie = TRUE; + break; + } ++ if(invalid_octets(whatptr) || invalid_octets(name)) { ++ infof(data, "invalid octets in name/value, cookie dropped"); ++ badcookie = TRUE; ++ break; ++ } + } + else if(!len) { + /* diff --git a/main/dahdi-linux-lts/APKBUILD b/main/dahdi-linux-lts/APKBUILD index 2dc67a3c814..e535944c278 100644 --- a/main/dahdi-linux-lts/APKBUILD +++ b/main/dahdi-linux-lts/APKBUILD @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ _rel=0 _flavor=${FLAVOR:-lts} _kpkg=linux-$_flavor -_kver=5.10.109 +_kver=5.10.152 _krel=0 _kpkgver="$_kver-r$_krel" diff --git a/main/dbus/APKBUILD b/main/dbus/APKBUILD index c938624b40f..e720cca7378 100644 --- a/main/dbus/APKBUILD +++ b/main/dbus/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=dbus -pkgver=1.12.20 -pkgrel=1 +pkgver=1.12.24 +pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Freedesktop.org message bus system" options="!check" # Introduces circular dependency with xorg-server (xvfb-run -> xvfb) url="https://www.freedesktop.org/Software/dbus" @@ -23,11 +23,14 @@ checkdepends="xvfb-run" install="$pkgname.pre-install $pkgname.post-install" source="https://dbus.freedesktop.org/releases/dbus/dbus-$pkgver.tar.gz 0001-_dbus_generate_random_bytes-use-getrandom-2.patch - avoid-opendir-between-fork-exec.patch $pkgname.initd " # secfixes: +# 1.12.24-r0: +# - CVE-2022-42010 +# - CVE-2022-42011 +# - CVE-2022-42012 # 1.12.18-r0: # - CVE-2020-12049 # 1.12.16-r0: @@ -87,7 +90,8 @@ x11() { mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/dbus-launch "$subpkgdir"/usr/bin/ } -sha512sums="0964683bc6859374cc94e42e1ec0cdb542cca67971c205fcba4352500b6c0891665b0718e7d85eb060c81cb82e3346c313892bc02384da300ddd306c7eef0056 dbus-1.12.20.tar.gz +sha512sums=" +70e0b7c3f1071860b4243c945d640a1bab95fb83a7cbcf072cdd236def1310693f9bea07d406677d6673c53a6bedbdb02b51fe861aa6f686457dcfb4ee74b703 dbus-1.12.24.tar.gz 3db35499361e84d8e2469b88b033f49813b179188ac25f1841a989988c352af398a56dfd94383813626c6dfd032194f7a9fcdba001ccc3e005e7cd22dae7a7ed 0001-_dbus_generate_random_bytes-use-getrandom-2.patch -cdd01f51882be4f388515441237aa6318888db6e88a4d980bafbf9b790945e4d959c6633d6d002274c0a617ac919f9355ba628c9b502b355f73fed602f997791 avoid-opendir-between-fork-exec.patch -4c6beba2382416e60a3adfa85ef843d90d93ca5f38c23f573e058ffca6d4fc3850d11d40938c74383bba61599569b7fdfb1fcf3b9d2f1463e6b2e2cc81097c84 dbus.initd" +4c6beba2382416e60a3adfa85ef843d90d93ca5f38c23f573e058ffca6d4fc3850d11d40938c74383bba61599569b7fdfb1fcf3b9d2f1463e6b2e2cc81097c84 dbus.initd +" diff --git a/main/dbus/avoid-opendir-between-fork-exec.patch b/main/dbus/avoid-opendir-between-fork-exec.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 44b03fbd5b4..00000000000 --- a/main/dbus/avoid-opendir-between-fork-exec.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -Author: Rasmus Thomsen <oss@cogitri.dev> -Upstream: No -Reason: The code inside the `#ifdef __linux__` calls opendir. This can -lead to deadlocks when act_on_fds_3_and_up is called between fork&exec since -opendir mallocs which isn't async signal safe -diff --git a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c -index 0288dbc9..e585136f 100644 ---- a/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c -+++ b/dbus/dbus-sysdeps-unix.c -@@ -4742,7 +4742,7 @@ act_on_fds_3_and_up (void (*func) (int fd)) - { - int maxfds, i; - --#ifdef __linux__ -+#if defined(__linux__) && defined(__GLIBC__) - DIR *d; - - /* On Linux we can optimize this a bit if /proc is available. If it diff --git a/main/dhcp/03-fix-unwind-import.patch b/main/dhcp/03-fix-unwind-import.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..8b87fdbd3e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/dhcp/03-fix-unwind-import.patch @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +bind assumes _Unwind_GetIP is a function which is not necessarily +true. In some implementations of libunwind it's a macro. +This fixes the build on Alpine on armhf and armv7. + +--- a/bind/bind-9.11.36/lib/isc/backtrace.c ++++ b/bind/bind-9.11.36/lib/isc/backtrace.c +@@ -81,8 +81,7 @@ isc_backtrace_gettrace(void **addrs, int + return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); + } + #elif defined(BACKTRACE_GCC) +-extern int _Unwind_Backtrace(void* fn, void* a); +-extern void* _Unwind_GetIP(void* ctx); ++#include <unwind.h> + + typedef struct { + void **result; diff --git a/main/dhcp/APKBUILD b/main/dhcp/APKBUILD index 9275bf6f867..54f462d6251 100644 --- a/main/dhcp/APKBUILD +++ b/main/dhcp/APKBUILD @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ # Maintainer: Jakub Jirutka <jakub@jirutka.cz> pkgname=dhcp -pkgver=4.4.2_p1 +pkgver=4.4.3_p1 _realver=${pkgver/_p/-P} -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="ISC Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)" url="https://www.isc.org/" arch="all" @@ -33,9 +33,8 @@ source=" https://downloads.isc.org/isc/dhcp/$_realver/dhcp-$_realver.tar.gz 01-dhclient-script-fix-bare-ip.patch 02-dhclient-script-remove-bashisms.patch + 03-fix-unwind-import.patch dhcp-3.0-fix-perms.patch - segfault-fix.patch - remove-duplicate-definitions.patch dhclient-script-alpine dhcrelay.initd dhcrelay.confd @@ -46,6 +45,9 @@ builddir="$srcdir/$pkgname-$_realver" makedepends="$makedepends $_depends_dhclient $_depends_server_ldap $_depends_server_vanilla" # secfixes: +# 4.4.3_p1-r0: +# - CVE-2022-2928 +# - CVE-2022-2929 # 4.4.2_p1-r0: # - CVE-2021-25217 # 4.4.1-r0: @@ -193,12 +195,11 @@ static() { # " sha512sums=" -924e8b44f288361dbe837987869e57b929c73cb5e4af37cb2d7b19bca5ea8594048fb41c0792fede003188185f61b25befbc2ccda42f1f68e6b6bc22ef44b040 dhcp-4.4.2-P1.tar.gz +d14dc44d1c015780ae19769816cb01015959927a1ad7a3e84b89e0463253aaf46451af88e3260347196373906d5b438c7c616fee45ec3f128aa82af6702b7154 dhcp-4.4.3-P1.tar.gz 17e2b9588ee5d1bd9acb9c2e30f7a28308d29c9e797c2be14c1feff52e6e231ce8a94535f18badff1342aff4ae4003aab986e0f0473f0cd280292fdab044b148 01-dhclient-script-fix-bare-ip.patch a70e4a7e80ee65c8ced6b61db80f7ccd0f35015b5cccf2e7c51705ae129230aa49ba9926bb88f7418018e7a112c2a40451f24b88e04464b590ff20091e8d8709 02-dhclient-script-remove-bashisms.patch +23ab581d85ba97a37fd6a0a612e0aa977b24bbaf83d58a93d1a87f9f24ea9a098aa549e77a6e1d78f721681c152464b15fd1d402d0673edf4dac6aa196df1fe9 03-fix-unwind-import.patch d5697a56fbbff25199962608986e7ffb533ed4afd3e344e3c79d2010dda73cc0b088f06c454e9f0c69eb054e09a374455fa71d3f73306e0c98fa76df4dd321b7 dhcp-3.0-fix-perms.patch -ff07f613da93de6d6a81cf5147ecc937e1405913f1649bf9c58d45214417e6b94b3fd897796d1dd3422ed27a43d935a84d7c72df98d59f30abd88b12f4f6edad segfault-fix.patch -fcc9f3c5a361e8a5fa690986c415a23e86c347f697aec3087c5783670d4abefcb0f073a37cfac8fe07206ac3e349df9cb7283b84356cdc4f4777b426ab0305ef remove-duplicate-definitions.patch d1dce58875793316761f168e29feddc1d3454d1d917d063d43ae102b7b6aab256c3cb420478335c57ebcdb2b7c804afa4d8a1f9ab06a29a4dd23bc5d87db8df2 dhclient-script-alpine ce62693cb483616844bb6774f9046af6a1a210e35cfaa59ab3bd12f68d50176714a324e92538b35139110b78191866f65b30d6979d8a45f7b68e572e7a1e8427 dhcrelay.initd fd15dbaa4c61c3c26f407bf13dde859470a1adba134da064b653ccc152ce42635ee8de2fe113ae21ba8470e97e3caad8c1a47b69eb25e5e92b40e26790b96f6d dhcrelay.confd diff --git a/main/dhcp/remove-duplicate-definitions.patch b/main/dhcp/remove-duplicate-definitions.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 070f4a185e1..00000000000 --- a/main/dhcp/remove-duplicate-definitions.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,44 +0,0 @@ -From: Mike Crute <mike@crute.us> -Date: Thu, 08 Oct 2020 05:25:00 +0000 -Subject: Remove duplicate definitions - -There are several duplicated definitions between the various servers and -clients and the common library code in dhcpd. This patch removes the duplicates -in the consumers and preserves the library code. - ---- - ---- a/client/dhclient.c -+++ b/client/dhclient.c -@@ -83,8 +83,6 @@ - static const char url [] = "For info, please visit https://www.isc.org/software/dhcp/"; - #endif /* UNIT_TEST */ - --u_int16_t local_port = 0; --u_int16_t remote_port = 0; - #if defined(DHCPv6) && defined(DHCP4o6) - int dhcp4o6_state = -1; /* -1 = stopped, 0 = polling, 1 = started */ - #endif ---- a/relay/dhcrelay.c.orig -+++ b/relay/dhcrelay.c -@@ -95,9 +95,6 @@ - forward_untouched, /* Forward without changes. */ - discard } agent_relay_mode = forward_and_replace; - --u_int16_t local_port; --u_int16_t remote_port; -- - /* Relay agent server list. */ - struct server_list { - struct server_list *next; ---- a/server/mdb.c.orig -+++ b/server/mdb.c -@@ -67,8 +67,6 @@ - - int numclasseswritten; - --omapi_object_type_t *dhcp_type_host; -- - isc_result_t enter_class(cd, dynamicp, commit) - struct class *cd; - int dynamicp; diff --git a/main/dhcp/segfault-fix.patch b/main/dhcp/segfault-fix.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 86651979d6b..00000000000 --- a/main/dhcp/segfault-fix.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,37 +0,0 @@ -From: Michał Kępień -Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 05:03:00 +0000 -Subject: Handle catopen() errors - -musl libc's implementation of catgets() crashes when its first argument -is -1 instead of a proper message catalog descriptor. Prevent that from -happening by making isc_msgcat_get() return the default text if the -prior call to catopen() returns an error. - -Porting forward upstream's fix: -https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/-/commit/daade37977fafee12c7b3c1483516e010d2b74a6 - ---- - ---- a/bind/bind-9.11.14/lib/isc/nls/msgcat.c -+++ b/bind/bind-9.11.14/lib/isc/nls/msgcat.c -@@ -62,9 +62,8 @@ - - #ifdef HAVE_CATGETS - /* -- * We don't check if catopen() fails because we don't care. -- * If it does fail, then when we call catgets(), it will use -- * the default string. -+ * We don't check if catopen() fails because isc_msgcat_get() takes -+ * care of that before calling catgets(). - */ - msgcat->catalog = catopen(name, 0); - #endif -@@ -112,7 +111,7 @@ - REQUIRE(default_text != NULL); - - #ifdef HAVE_CATGETS -- if (msgcat == NULL) -+ if (msgcat == NULL || msgcat->catalog == (nl_catd)(-1)) - return (default_text); - return (catgets(msgcat->catalog, set, message, default_text)); - #else diff --git a/main/dpkg/APKBUILD b/main/dpkg/APKBUILD index ba46b2b165d..e12b1cf2297 100644 --- a/main/dpkg/APKBUILD +++ b/main/dpkg/APKBUILD @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=dpkg -pkgver=1.20.6 +pkgver=1.20.10 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="The Debian Package Manager" url="https://wiki.debian.org/Teams/Dpkg" @@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ source="https://deb.debian.org/debian/pool/main/d/dpkg/dpkg_$pkgver.tar.xz 0001-t-command-Fix-test_command_exec-program-invocation.patch " +# secfixes: +# 1.20.10-r0: +# - CVE-2022-1664 + prepare() { default_prepare @@ -91,5 +95,7 @@ dev() { mv "$pkgdir"/usr/share/perl* "$subpkgdir"/usr/share/ } -sha512sums="1aee5091cfa1f5221e64785ff013c6323f7a8bcc0d0b82caa5357db7fe480412a73f6afbd850ab1c53397dd0b2bca1b2637111d1cb3bdbfafe9df185955b7e2d dpkg_1.20.6.tar.xz -059875c06146382f1e4a339860c558a71393a43bf9e6580c0a2211c629cc9be1b4fd12c900b002f833a241ad9a339f138b458b60664da06db5b32db1c6490b2f 0001-t-command-Fix-test_command_exec-program-invocation.patch" +sha512sums=" +69edb9149d67fff15227e5fa2778c4dacc2ce8a849029669368b36fa8ecb45789bcba9e5b6add44134f2e5b05e2168ed7f30ca5589a2a3ac8d04637d645caf96 dpkg_1.20.10.tar.xz +059875c06146382f1e4a339860c558a71393a43bf9e6580c0a2211c629cc9be1b4fd12c900b002f833a241ad9a339f138b458b60664da06db5b32db1c6490b2f 0001-t-command-Fix-test_command_exec-program-invocation.patch +" diff --git a/main/expat/APKBUILD b/main/expat/APKBUILD index b9c94f2206e..19e272874d6 100644 --- a/main/expat/APKBUILD +++ b/main/expat/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Carlo Landmeter <clandmeter@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=expat pkgver=2.2.10 -pkgrel=6 +pkgrel=8 pkgdesc="XML Parser library written in C" url="http://www.libexpat.org/" arch="all" @@ -20,10 +20,16 @@ source="https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/download/R_${pkgver//./_}/ CVE-2022-25313-regression.patch CVE-2022-25314.patch CVE-2022-25315.patch + CVE-2022-40674.patch + CVE-2022-43680.patch " subpackages="$pkgname-static $pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc" # secfixes: +# 2.2.10-r8: +# - CVE-2022-43680 +# 2.2.10-r7: +# - CVE-2022-40674 # 2.2.10-r4: # - CVE-2022-25235 # - CVE-2022-25236 @@ -81,4 +87,6 @@ c3ed585a62d5aadd9e1d1d589b636e37ffba5b5cc0c4d264a151cf308a9bfcfe9859704f43fd6d4e 36d310754e76db577cdeeb0ae1563867f9db65c9de12b1423d4e67f8e2604893525474d6e07b6305553308b6b06285b1b9da3c4e858ef79874296f68b82080e8 CVE-2022-25313-regression.patch ac7d03f3ef8be557bda0294247a645db820470be47ea7fa3dab8047f7f11ada831e4f0a4cd4b82e3b2f7715ada08435b8292257a64714c0242407ef58a661b72 CVE-2022-25314.patch 946e0983f9159ae4b01627581a99594f0e7263438ddfd40a1705b8de39ee9c6739af08598d3bc4f145a8ff142209d3fde85c20bbebe2932d9e60596f192db5b5 CVE-2022-25315.patch +204d9ff3aea000327a700b1a6fdf9acfb866db52ac26c7b2b1f6ea087aac4086659775f3e18bf0e78b61cef4979ebd5075ad053a7af91d5be6dc728462097a44 CVE-2022-40674.patch +08b69782ef5db8881156a2ab4dbab4780bed52a3b07fc72c4df84a548a71d8cb72f84040fe8c45ac17e832279126d20a08f7939b103e66e2dd01bc6873910e3b CVE-2022-43680.patch " diff --git a/main/expat/CVE-2022-40674.patch b/main/expat/CVE-2022-40674.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..eae104c38c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/expat/CVE-2022-40674.patch @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +From 7802454a5548fbe3037db316adbeeabb596b9255 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Rhodri James <rhodri@wildebeest.org.uk> +Date: Wed, 17 Aug 2022 18:26:18 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Ensure raw tagnames are safe exiting internalEntityParser + +It is possible to concoct a situation in which parsing is +suspended while substituting in an internal entity, so that +XML_ResumeParser directly uses internalEntityProcessor as +its processor. If the subsequent parse includes some unclosed +tags, this will return without calling storeRawNames to ensure +that the raw versions of the tag names are stored in memory other +than the parse buffer itself. If the parse buffer is then changed +or reallocated (for example if processing a file line by line), +badness will ensue. + +This patch ensures storeRawNames is always called when needed +after calling doContent. The earlier call do doContent does +not need the same protection; it only deals with entity +substitution, which cannot leave unbalanced tags, and in any +case the raw names will be pointing into the stored entity +value not the parse buffer. + +(cherry picked from commit 4a32da87e931ba54393d465bb77c40b5c33d343b) +--- + expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 7 ++++++- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/expat/lib/xmlparse.c b/expat/lib/xmlparse.c +index dfc316ca..d8e324e8 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -5277,9 +5277,14 @@ internalEntityProcessor(XML_Parser parser, const char *s, const char *end, + { + parser->m_processor = contentProcessor; + /* see externalEntityContentProcessor vs contentProcessor */ +- return doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0, parser->m_encoding, ++ result = doContent(parser, parser->m_parentParser ? 1 : 0, parser->m_encoding, + s, end, nextPtr, + (XML_Bool)! parser->m_parsingStatus.finalBuffer); ++ if (result == XML_ERROR_NONE) { ++ if (! storeRawNames(parser)) ++ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY; ++ } ++ return result; + } + } + +-- +2.37.3 + + +From cff3c9a5e43bc929e43ccd35425c3db8cd21d4de Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Sun, 11 Sep 2022 19:34:33 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/2] tests: Cover heap use-after-free issue in doContent + +(cherry picked from commit a7ce80a013f2a08cb1ac4aac368f2250eea03ebf) +--- + expat/tests/runtests.c | 74 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 74 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/expat/tests/runtests.c b/expat/tests/runtests.c +index 2490d86b..70fb583a 100644 +--- a/tests/runtests.c ++++ b/tests/runtests.c +@@ -4904,6 +4904,78 @@ START_TEST(test_suspend_resume_internal_entity) { + } + END_TEST + ++void ++suspending_comment_handler(void *userData, const XML_Char *data) { ++ UNUSED_P(data); ++ XML_Parser parser = (XML_Parser)userData; ++ XML_StopParser(parser, XML_TRUE); ++} ++ ++START_TEST(test_suspend_resume_internal_entity_issue_629) { ++ const char *const text ++ = "<!DOCTYPE a [<!ENTITY e '<!--COMMENT-->a'>]><a>&e;<b>\n" ++ "<" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa" ++ "/>" ++ "</b></a>"; ++ const size_t firstChunkSizeBytes = 54; ++ ++ XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL); ++ XML_SetUserData(parser, parser); ++ XML_SetCommentHandler(parser, suspending_comment_handler); ++ ++ if (XML_Parse(parser, text, (int)firstChunkSizeBytes, XML_FALSE) ++ != XML_STATUS_SUSPENDED) ++ xml_failure(parser); ++ if (XML_ResumeParser(parser) != XML_STATUS_OK) ++ xml_failure(parser); ++ if (XML_Parse(parser, text + firstChunkSizeBytes, ++ (int)(strlen(text) - firstChunkSizeBytes), XML_TRUE) ++ != XML_STATUS_OK) ++ xml_failure(parser); ++ XML_ParserFree(parser); ++} ++END_TEST ++ + /* Test syntax error is caught at parse resumption */ + START_TEST(test_resume_entity_with_syntax_error) { + const char *text = "<!DOCTYPE doc [\n" +@@ -11387,6 +11459,8 @@ make_suite(void) { + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_partial_char_in_epilog); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_hash_collision); + tcase_add_test__ifdef_xml_dtd(tc_basic, test_suspend_resume_internal_entity); ++ tcase_add_test__ifdef_xml_dtd(tc_basic, ++ test_suspend_resume_internal_entity_issue_629); + tcase_add_test__ifdef_xml_dtd(tc_basic, test_resume_entity_with_syntax_error); + tcase_add_test__ifdef_xml_dtd(tc_basic, test_suspend_resume_parameter_entity); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_restart_on_error); +-- +2.37.3 + diff --git a/main/expat/CVE-2022-43680.patch b/main/expat/CVE-2022-43680.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..de01b1b47ee --- /dev/null +++ b/main/expat/CVE-2022-43680.patch @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/56967f83d68d5fc750f9e66a9a76756c94c7c173 +From 5290462a7ea1278a8d5c0d5b2860d4e244f997e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Tue, 20 Sep 2022 02:44:34 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] lib: Fix overeager DTD destruction in + XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate + +--- + expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 8 ++++++++ + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/expat/lib/xmlparse.c b/expat/lib/xmlparse.c +index aacd6e7fc..57bf103cc 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -1068,6 +1068,14 @@ parserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingName, + parserInit(parser, encodingName); + + if (encodingName && ! parser->m_protocolEncodingName) { ++ if (dtd) { ++ // We need to stop the upcoming call to XML_ParserFree from happily ++ // destroying parser->m_dtd because the DTD is shared with the parent ++ // parser and the only guard that keeps XML_ParserFree from destroying ++ // parser->m_dtd is parser->m_isParamEntity but it will be set to ++ // XML_TRUE only later in XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate (or not at all). ++ parser->m_dtd = NULL; ++ } + XML_ParserFree(parser); + return NULL; + } + +From 43992e4ae25fc3dc0eec0cd3a29313555d56aee2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Mon, 19 Sep 2022 18:16:15 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] tests: Cover overeager DTD destruction in + XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate + +--- + expat/tests/runtests.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/expat/tests/runtests.c b/expat/tests/runtests.c +index 245fe9bda..acb744dd4 100644 +--- a/tests/runtests.c ++++ b/tests/runtests.c +@@ -10208,6 +10208,53 @@ START_TEST(test_alloc_long_notation) { + } + END_TEST + ++static int XMLCALL ++external_entity_parser_create_alloc_fail_handler(XML_Parser parser, ++ const XML_Char *context, ++ const XML_Char *base, ++ const XML_Char *systemId, ++ const XML_Char *publicId) { ++ UNUSED_P(base); ++ UNUSED_P(systemId); ++ UNUSED_P(publicId); ++ ++ if (context != NULL) ++ fail("Unexpected non-NULL context"); ++ ++ // The following number intends to fail the upcoming allocation in line ++ // "parser->m_protocolEncodingName = copyString(encodingName, ++ // &(parser->m_mem));" in function parserInit. ++ allocation_count = 3; ++ ++ const XML_Char *const encodingName = XCS("UTF-8"); // needs something non-NULL ++ const XML_Parser ext_parser ++ = XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate(parser, context, encodingName); ++ if (ext_parser != NULL) ++ fail( ++ "Call to XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate was expected to fail out-of-memory"); ++ ++ allocation_count = ALLOC_ALWAYS_SUCCEED; ++ return XML_STATUS_ERROR; ++} ++ ++START_TEST(test_alloc_reset_after_external_entity_parser_create_fail) { ++ const char *const text = "<!DOCTYPE doc SYSTEM 'foo'><doc/>"; ++ ++ XML_SetExternalEntityRefHandler( ++ g_parser, external_entity_parser_create_alloc_fail_handler); ++ XML_SetParamEntityParsing(g_parser, XML_PARAM_ENTITY_PARSING_ALWAYS); ++ ++ if (XML_Parse(g_parser, text, (int)strlen(text), XML_TRUE) ++ != XML_STATUS_ERROR) ++ fail("Call to parse was expected to fail"); ++ ++ if (XML_GetErrorCode(g_parser) != XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING) ++ fail("Call to parse was expected to fail from the external entity handler"); ++ ++ XML_ParserReset(g_parser, NULL); ++} ++END_TEST ++ + static void + nsalloc_setup(void) { + XML_Memory_Handling_Suite memsuite = {duff_allocator, duff_reallocator, free}; +@@ -12401,6 +12448,8 @@ make_suite(void) { + tcase_add_test(tc_alloc, test_alloc_long_public_id); + tcase_add_test(tc_alloc, test_alloc_long_entity_value); + tcase_add_test(tc_alloc, test_alloc_long_notation); ++ tcase_add_test__ifdef_xml_dtd( ++ tc_alloc, test_alloc_reset_after_external_entity_parser_create_fail); + + suite_add_tcase(s, tc_nsalloc); + tcase_add_checked_fixture(tc_nsalloc, nsalloc_setup, nsalloc_teardown); + +From eedc5f6de8e219130032c8ff2ff17580e18bd0c1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org> +Date: Wed, 21 Sep 2022 03:32:26 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] Changes: Document #649 + +--- + expat/Changes | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + diff --git a/main/fcgiwrap/APKBUILD b/main/fcgiwrap/APKBUILD index ec5214f2acd..d96a516a190 100644 --- a/main/fcgiwrap/APKBUILD +++ b/main/fcgiwrap/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=fcgiwrap pkgver=1.1.0 -pkgrel=5 +pkgrel=6 pkgdesc="Simple server for running CGI applications over FastCGI" url="https://github.com/gnosek/fcgiwrap" arch="all" @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ install="$pkgname.pre-install" makedepends="$depends_dev autoconf libtool automake fcgi-dev" subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-openrc" source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/gnosek/fcgiwrap/archive/$pkgver.tar.gz + no-buffering.patch $pkgname.initd $pkgname.confd" @@ -36,6 +37,9 @@ package() { install -Dm644 $srcdir/$pkgname.confd "$pkgdir"/etc/conf.d/$pkgname } -sha512sums="b8d35762d1d3c94a67602290b0092f0c38cffbbcd3dbc16597abf8b92172909b04450c238de2e430e841a17dd47fdd48d6a001f77539966980ef1af61e447ddc fcgiwrap-1.1.0.tar.gz +sha512sums=" +b8d35762d1d3c94a67602290b0092f0c38cffbbcd3dbc16597abf8b92172909b04450c238de2e430e841a17dd47fdd48d6a001f77539966980ef1af61e447ddc fcgiwrap-1.1.0.tar.gz +72ba8a0d044c86cc41358002b1cbb94e77dc81e56669032b474b94d7cde80e6cc5d041a064d79ed98b7db8aee9ffcc8830df88491f14afa251781487a57fd429 no-buffering.patch e6111da1089df43f8656e598edf4e658cd2d70e6066833a2c7a465229723e1edce144cf214bd8f771298d54948b8128012c4ce4d509c9d9307a54e8ef90ff2d8 fcgiwrap.initd -893e9afa92c20c9d0dab68fffc806a1be1f2e28a7e73bbb497316386a9ee083be4bad68a90f660e489311a9812a512b50fb0edb8b9c49b12f6cd266ba53b01a6 fcgiwrap.confd" +893e9afa92c20c9d0dab68fffc806a1be1f2e28a7e73bbb497316386a9ee083be4bad68a90f660e489311a9812a512b50fb0edb8b9c49b12f6cd266ba53b01a6 fcgiwrap.confd +" diff --git a/main/fcgiwrap/no-buffering.patch b/main/fcgiwrap/no-buffering.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..3d5f0038ee9 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/fcgiwrap/no-buffering.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From eb54c65446693366aedfe72f002c6bb4e1a5d748 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Richard Stanway <r.stanway@gmail.com> +Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2016 21:34:17 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] Add environment variable NO_BUFFERING to disable output + buffering + +Fixes #36 +--- + fcgiwrap.8 | 4 ++++ + fcgiwrap.c | 6 ++++++ + 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/fcgiwrap.8 b/fcgiwrap.8 +index bf02c26..892b594 100644 +--- a/fcgiwrap.8 ++++ b/fcgiwrap.8 +@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@ + SCRIPT_FILENAME + .RS + complete path to CGI script. When set, overrides DOCUMENT_ROOT and SCRIPT_NAME ++.RE ++NO_BUFFERING ++.RS ++When set (e.g., to ""), disables output buffering. + + .SH EXAMPLE + The fastest way to see \fBfcgiwrap\fP do something is to launch it at the command line +diff --git a/fcgiwrap.c b/fcgiwrap.c +index b44d8aa..42e3ec9 100644 +--- a/fcgiwrap.c ++++ b/fcgiwrap.c +@@ -191,6 +191,7 @@ struct fcgi_context { + int fd_stderr; + unsigned int reply_state; + pid_t cgi_pid; ++ int unbuffered; + }; + + static void fcgi_finish(struct fcgi_context *fc, const char* msg) +@@ -256,6 +257,10 @@ static const char * fcgi_pass_fd(struct fcgi_context *fc, int *fdp, FCGI_FILE *f + return "writing CGI reply"; + } + } ++ ++ if (fc->unbuffered && FCGI_fflush(ffp)) { ++ return "flushing CGI reply"; ++ } + } else { + if (nread < 0) { + return "reading CGI reply"; +@@ -590,6 +595,7 @@ static void handle_fcgi_request(void) + fc.fd_stderr = pipe_err[0]; + fc.reply_state = REPLY_STATE_INIT; + fc.cgi_pid = pid; ++ fc.unbuffered = !!getenv("NO_BUFFERING"); + + fcgi_pass(&fc); + } diff --git a/main/gdk-pixbuf/APKBUILD b/main/gdk-pixbuf/APKBUILD index 151936ab6ad..058cd8886de 100644 --- a/main/gdk-pixbuf/APKBUILD +++ b/main/gdk-pixbuf/APKBUILD @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Maintainer: Rasmus Thomsen <oss@cogitri.dev> pkgname=gdk-pixbuf pkgver=2.42.4 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="GTK+ image loading library" url="https://wiki.gnome.org/Projects/GdkPixbuf" arch="all" @@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ makedepends="tiff-dev libjpeg-turbo-dev gobject-introspection-dev install="$pkgname.pre-deinstall" triggers="$pkgname.trigger=/usr/lib/gdk-pixbuf-2.0/*/loaders" subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-lang $pkgname-dbg" -source="https://download.gnome.org/sources/gdk-pixbuf/${pkgver%.*}/gdk-pixbuf-$pkgver.tar.xz" +source="https://download.gnome.org/sources/gdk-pixbuf/${pkgver%.*}/gdk-pixbuf-$pkgver.tar.xz + $pkgname-fix-gif-overflow.patch::https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gdk-pixbuf/-/commit/6976bdc8ee9dd2c2954f91066f7b0f643769a379.patch + " replaces="gtk+" # secfixes: @@ -59,4 +61,7 @@ dev() { default_dev } -sha512sums="b1eca16719e749d111c33592892ab18e2a1dc5f69a16762860bb54e0c97f535d7049fc388ce9daa025153ff2af56a367d8b164fa4025ee9a0131825a6108f772 gdk-pixbuf-2.42.4.tar.xz" +sha512sums=" +b1eca16719e749d111c33592892ab18e2a1dc5f69a16762860bb54e0c97f535d7049fc388ce9daa025153ff2af56a367d8b164fa4025ee9a0131825a6108f772 gdk-pixbuf-2.42.4.tar.xz +4c5986ac132b1f4315b7473eb705cd084b963553e66bc8ee2a84b7ec5c229989aec4109d867761a417b5272759dd53c33f9185c279d00056d624db82ff9c5b91 gdk-pixbuf-fix-gif-overflow.patch +" diff --git a/main/git/APKBUILD b/main/git/APKBUILD index a790db42f66..7a3145bd2b8 100644 --- a/main/git/APKBUILD +++ b/main/git/APKBUILD @@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> # # secfixes: +# 2.30.6-r0: +# - CVE-2022-39253 +# - CVE-2022-39260 +# 2.30.5-r0: +# - CVE-2022-29187 # 2.30.3-r0: # - CVE-2022-24765 # 2.30.2-r0: @@ -32,7 +37,7 @@ # - CVE-2021-46101 pkgname=git -pkgver=2.30.3 +pkgver=2.30.6 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Distributed version control system" url="https://www.git-scm.com/" @@ -291,7 +296,7 @@ _perl_config() { } sha512sums=" -966bbfa93f06aa747a0c7af714681d4e2d09431b8bbf53d31dd106d8411d769d8b6162fe99cbdd322837e34a8f4ac371eb04638a4d17db1fb4ead9615d4eb071 git-2.30.3.tar.xz +6879fce2827b505ef49df69bfd83faac35179bae8b92cfc705260f1e80803a6ee8dbfdd45d2babd1b216ba0b3b5b6c1785f9577332d20f0cab4be898710ca851 git-2.30.6.tar.xz 89528cdd14c51fd568aa61cf6c5eae08ea0844e59f9af9292da5fc6c268261f4166017d002d494400945e248df6b844e2f9f9cd2d9345d516983f5a110e4c42a git-daemon.initd fbf1f425206a76e2a8f82342537ed939ff7e623d644c086ca2ced5f69b36734695f9f80ebda1728f75a94d6cd2fcb71bf845b64239368caab418e4d368c141ec git-daemon.confd be5d568fc5b8b84c9afb97b31e471e41f32ccfe188eba0588ea0ef98b2d96c2ce4b2c1a3d70e88205aa4f6667f850b3f32c13bbb149ecddbf670344c162a4e25 fix-t4219-with-sticky-bit.patch diff --git a/main/gnupg/APKBUILD b/main/gnupg/APKBUILD index 1142f0067cd..fa535538a56 100644 --- a/main/gnupg/APKBUILD +++ b/main/gnupg/APKBUILD @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ pkgname=gnupg pkgver=2.2.31 _ver=${pkgver/_beta/-beta} -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="GNU Privacy Guard 2 - a PGP replacement tool" url="https://www.gnupg.org/" arch="all" @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ makedepends="gnutls-dev libksba-dev libgcrypt-dev libgpg-error-dev sqlite-dev libusb-dev" subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-scdaemon" source="https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-$_ver.tar.bz2 + CVE-2022-34903.patch 0001-Include-sys-select.h-for-FD_SETSIZE.patch fix-i18n.patch 60-scdaemon.rules @@ -21,6 +22,8 @@ source="https://gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnupg/gnupg-$_ver.tar.bz2 install="$pkgname-scdaemon.pre-install" # secfixes: +# 2.2.31-r1: +# - CVE-2022-34903 # 2.2.23-r0: # - CVE-2020-25125 # 2.2.18-r0: @@ -76,6 +79,7 @@ scdaemon() { sha512sums=" 2f6fa200e08d6b8993b482e5825bea6083afc8686c4e1ae80386b36ae49e1c2d73066c508edaa359a7794cb26ba7a00f81555a906fa422d1117e41415cfa2fea gnupg-2.2.31.tar.bz2 +658d5ff636f9b45de7501895c299146633c30bc249f94664573ecf847779ea27be853244ceb2cc0e95c0c56253bbb6ccff509027b23f20f003aa018235211a4d CVE-2022-34903.patch c6cc4595081c5b025913fa3ebecf0dff87a84f3c669e3fef106e4fa040f1d4314ee52dd4c0e0002b213034fb0810221cfdd0033eae5349b6e3978f05d08bcac7 0001-Include-sys-select.h-for-FD_SETSIZE.patch b19a44dacf061dd02b439ab8bd820e3c721aab77168f705f5ce65661f26527b03ea88eec16d78486a633c474120589ec8736692ebff57ab9b95f52f57190ba6b fix-i18n.patch 4bfb9742279c2d1c872d63cd4bcb01f6a2a13d94618eff954d3a37451fa870a9bb29687330854ee47e8876d6e60dc81cb2569c3931beaefacda33db23c464402 60-scdaemon.rules diff --git a/main/gnupg/CVE-2022-34903.patch b/main/gnupg/CVE-2022-34903.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..20bb9a23713 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/gnupg/CVE-2022-34903.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +g10: Fix garbled status messages in NOTATION_DATA + +* g10/cpr.c (write_status_text_and_buffer): Fix off-by-one +-- + +Depending on the escaping and line wrapping the computed remaining +buffer length could be wrong. Fixed by always using a break to +terminate the escape detection loop. Might have happened for all +status lines which may wrap. + +GnuPG-bug-id: T6027 + +diff --git a/g10/cpr.c b/g10/cpr.c +index d502e8b52..bc4b715ed 100644 +--- a/g10/cpr.c ++++ b/g10/cpr.c +@@ -328,20 +328,15 @@ write_status_text_and_buffer (int no, const char *string, + } + first = 0; + } +- for (esc=0, s=buffer, n=len; n && !esc; s++, n--) ++ for (esc=0, s=buffer, n=len; n; s++, n--) + { + if (*s == '%' || *(const byte*)s <= lower_limit + || *(const byte*)s == 127 ) + esc = 1; + if (wrap && ++count > wrap) +- { +- dowrap=1; +- break; +- } +- } +- if (esc) +- { +- s--; n++; ++ dowrap=1; ++ if (esc || dowrap) ++ break; + } + if (s != buffer) + es_fwrite (buffer, s-buffer, 1, statusfp); diff --git a/main/gnutls/APKBUILD b/main/gnutls/APKBUILD index 3c72a8194e6..b291f761b7b 100644 --- a/main/gnutls/APKBUILD +++ b/main/gnutls/APKBUILD @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=gnutls pkgver=3.7.1 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="TLS protocol implementation" url="https://www.gnutls.org/" arch="all" @@ -18,10 +18,13 @@ esac source="https://www.gnupg.org/ftp/gcrypt/gnutls/v$_v/gnutls-$pkgver.tar.xz tests-crq.patch tests-certtool.patch + CVE-2022-2509.patch " # Upstream Tracker: https://gnutls.org/security-new.html # secfixes: +# 3.7.1-r1: +# - CVE-2022-2509 GNUTLS-SA-2022-07-07 # 3.7.1-r0: # - CVE-2021-20231 GNUTLS-SA-2021-03-10 # - CVE-2021-20232 GNUTLS-SA-2021-03-10 @@ -75,6 +78,9 @@ xx() { mv "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/lib*xx.so.* "$subpkgdir"/usr/lib/ } -sha512sums="0fe801f03676c3bd970387f94578c8be7ba6030904989e7d21dffdc726209bab44c8096fbcb6d51fed2de239537bd00df2338ee9c8d984a1c386826b91062a95 gnutls-3.7.1.tar.xz +sha512sums=" +0fe801f03676c3bd970387f94578c8be7ba6030904989e7d21dffdc726209bab44c8096fbcb6d51fed2de239537bd00df2338ee9c8d984a1c386826b91062a95 gnutls-3.7.1.tar.xz 3e7d872963cc25e49f1ecf98de7d6f3b6b22d2c1c9e982bc4b22ce658c11d8567903728e5aa33ce7b6d3e25fe0b7a75b8aca3e8f53838155af5abe23887d33fa tests-crq.patch -3cc35bf7dcf6b7963d59bc346f68e0004151e409899b50e98ba5c675e753ade19a7baf317449343688b1bb2905ef8c8a5677dfe819e701b5bd82374d99adeb65 tests-certtool.patch" +3cc35bf7dcf6b7963d59bc346f68e0004151e409899b50e98ba5c675e753ade19a7baf317449343688b1bb2905ef8c8a5677dfe819e701b5bd82374d99adeb65 tests-certtool.patch +a790a23b064196763de6cc8683b7c2ff70a5d7a3caad57aa339ed92318480aabf746de86124fecf4b3fc509a5416cb34fec6c308c9141b113b0e968c7dcf20eb CVE-2022-2509.patch +" diff --git a/main/gnutls/CVE-2022-2509.patch b/main/gnutls/CVE-2022-2509.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..02c4088e6cc --- /dev/null +++ b/main/gnutls/CVE-2022-2509.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/gnutls/gnutls/commit/ce37f9eb265dbe9b6d597f5767449e8ee95848e2 +news/tests trimmed +--- +From ce37f9eb265dbe9b6d597f5767449e8ee95848e2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> +Date: Fri, 22 Jul 2022 12:00:11 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix double free during gnutls_pkcs7_verify + +Signed-off-by: Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> +--- + .gitignore | 1 + + NEWS | 4 + + lib/x509/pkcs7.c | 3 +- + tests/Makefile.am | 2 +- + tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c | 215 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 5 files changed, 223 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 tests/pkcs7-verify-double-free.c + +diff --git a/lib/x509/pkcs7.c b/lib/x509/pkcs7.c +index 3227bf3a25..ff8cab0158 100644 +--- a/lib/x509/pkcs7.c ++++ b/lib/x509/pkcs7.c +@@ -1322,7 +1322,8 @@ gnutls_x509_crt_t find_signer(gnutls_pkcs7_t pkcs7, gnutls_x509_trust_list_t tl, + issuer = find_verified_issuer_of(pkcs7, issuer, purpose, vflags); + + if (issuer != NULL && gnutls_x509_crt_check_issuer(issuer, issuer)) { +- if (prev) gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(prev); ++ if (prev && prev != signer) ++ gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(prev); + prev = issuer; + break; + } diff --git a/main/haproxy/APKBUILD b/main/haproxy/APKBUILD index 268e09df254..5ff3fce9150 100644 --- a/main/haproxy/APKBUILD +++ b/main/haproxy/APKBUILD @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ pkgname=haproxy # NOTE: Upgrade only to LTS versions announced on upstream site url! # Using LTS versions is easier to keep it in good shape for stable releases -pkgver=2.2.24 +pkgver=2.2.25 _pkgmajorver=${pkgver%.*} pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="A TCP/HTTP reverse proxy for high availability environments" @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ package() { } sha512sums=" -021d065e53503248de122fdd9431786b9f375a5f87aca76f870e17e44c8c4001a778bfb4e430b28af781a3f175f3643a549e363e964210c717f212c5966e68d8 haproxy-2.2.24.tar.gz +652a0d2eef0706ec506a949c560d7b99d111a75519daaa9a31ab53d99d7fdfc584c52d8401f257bb8f8ac58fc51f1403467749438fde684f064d616a2b4485a2 haproxy-2.2.25.tar.gz 4aa8fc812079baf1d17cf9484a9b44568c3dd94f35243a57a4a7868e7f88146a4e94c80ea8ab86f1b08a524567e269a3ec119b67fc679f6bd0d9f1c70ce4f080 haproxy.initd 26bc8f8ac504fcbaec113ecbb9bb59b9da47dc8834779ebbb2870a8cadf2ee7561b3a811f01e619358a98c6c7768e8fdd90ab447098c05b82e788c8212c4c41f haproxy.cfg " diff --git a/main/intel-ucode/APKBUILD b/main/intel-ucode/APKBUILD index d508671db0b..7bab0c59c4d 100644 --- a/main/intel-ucode/APKBUILD +++ b/main/intel-ucode/APKBUILD @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Maintainer: Marian Buschsieweke <marian.buschsieweke@ovgu.de> pkgname=intel-ucode -pkgver=20220510 +pkgver=20220809 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Microcode update files for Intel CPUs" arch="x86 x86_64" @@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ builddir="$srcdir/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files-microcode-$pkgver" # (Taken from https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files/blob/main/releasenote.md) # secfixes: +# 20220809-r0: +# - CVE-2022-21233 # 20220510-r0: # - CVE-2022-21151 # 20220207-r0: @@ -61,5 +63,5 @@ package() { } sha512sums=" -00329ce62a6d9cc66fb8594d132ef67951086ab1250ceaf908d5a357753ed62557275f55c5eb7b3ad55d1fdd312b5d1a436b214cdcbf6e3e1a840c8bf6f4795d microcode-20220510.tar.gz +1c91df1cbba33953f4ad19cc53215cad843c61a08509596fad32a84b4f0012d9d29bce64b58eb405c345af7f646d5982e45227570ce3605780be6e8bf31a63e1 microcode-20220809.tar.gz " diff --git a/main/libtirpc/APKBUILD b/main/libtirpc/APKBUILD index bfc7c783301..18f11c275e7 100644 --- a/main/libtirpc/APKBUILD +++ b/main/libtirpc/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=libtirpc pkgver=1.3.1 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Transport Independent RPC library (SunRPC replacement)" url="https://sourceforge.net/projects/libtirpc" arch="all" @@ -11,17 +11,22 @@ depends="$pkgname-conf" depends_dev="krb5-dev bsd-compat-headers" makedepends="$depends_dev autoconf automake libtool linux-headers" subpackages=" + $pkgname-dbg $pkgname-static $pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc - $pkgname-dbg $pkgname-conf::noarch $pkgname-nokrb " source="https://sourceforge.net/projects/libtirpc/files/libtirpc/$pkgver/libtirpc-$pkgver.tar.bz2 soname-suffix.patch + CVE-2021-46828.patch " +# secfixes: +# 1.3.1-r1: +# - CVE-2021-46828 + prepare() { default_prepare autoreconf -fi @@ -63,5 +68,8 @@ nokrb() { amove usr/lib/libtirpc-nokrb.* } -sha512sums="131f746800ac7280cc3900597018fc8dbc8da50c14e29dbaccf36a6d110eded117351108c6b069eaac90d77cfec17014b08e9afddcf153fda2d780ba64260cbc libtirpc-1.3.1.tar.bz2 -8bd50cab1e34a88f4f82ae722bdd60839212173a0ac6ceef21dee4dceea37a9fa2953b8a40068918b3c0d95b476111f0d7f19830efd3e4bff1ec5e72a5f9fade soname-suffix.patch" +sha512sums=" +131f746800ac7280cc3900597018fc8dbc8da50c14e29dbaccf36a6d110eded117351108c6b069eaac90d77cfec17014b08e9afddcf153fda2d780ba64260cbc libtirpc-1.3.1.tar.bz2 +8bd50cab1e34a88f4f82ae722bdd60839212173a0ac6ceef21dee4dceea37a9fa2953b8a40068918b3c0d95b476111f0d7f19830efd3e4bff1ec5e72a5f9fade soname-suffix.patch +6dd683c5c83772de71918c3f5e61500e7455bb55d68e4ea55592fc64bb3f42bfc5275f56e835aa61cd21a1a3a8e76d5c2ec68809c404839e5d04f6f86263566d CVE-2021-46828.patch +" diff --git a/main/libtirpc/CVE-2021-46828.patch b/main/libtirpc/CVE-2021-46828.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..00210463819 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/libtirpc/CVE-2021-46828.patch @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ +Patch-Source: https://git.linux-nfs.org/?p=steved/libtirpc.git;a=commit;h=86529758570cef4c73fb9b9c4104fdc510f701ed +garbage trimmed +--- +From 86529758570cef4c73fb9b9c4104fdc510f701ed Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Dai Ngo <dai.ngo@oracle.com> +Date: Sat, 21 Aug 2021 13:16:23 -0400 +Subject: [PATCH 1/1] Fix DoS vulnerability in libtirpc + +Currently svc_run does not handle poll timeout and rendezvous_request +does not handle EMFILE error returned from accept(2 as it used to. +These two missing functionality were removed by commit b2c9430f46c4. + +The effect of not handling poll timeout allows idle TCP conections +to remain ESTABLISHED indefinitely. When the number of connections +reaches the limit of the open file descriptors (ulimit -n) then +accept(2) fails with EMFILE. Since there is no handling of EMFILE +error this causes svc_run() to get in a tight loop calling accept(2). +This resulting in the RPC service of svc_run is being down, it's +no longer able to service any requests. + +RPC service rpcbind, statd and mountd are effected by this +problem. + +Fix by enhancing rendezvous_request to keep the number of +SVCXPRT conections to 4/5 of the size of the file descriptor +table. When this thresold is reached, it destroys the idle +TCP connections or destroys the least active connection if +no idle connnction was found. + +Fixes: 44bf15b8 rpcbind: don't use obsolete svc_fdset interface of libtirpc +Signed-off-by: dai.ngo@oracle.com +Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com> +--- + INSTALL | 371 +---------------------------------------------------------- + src/svc.c | 17 ++- + src/svc_vc.c | 62 +++++++++- + 3 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 372 deletions(-) + mode change 100644 => 120000 INSTALL + +diff --git a/src/svc.c b/src/svc.c +index 6db164b..3a8709f 100644 +--- a/src/svc.c ++++ b/src/svc.c +@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ + + #define max(a, b) (a > b ? a : b) + +-static SVCXPRT **__svc_xports; ++SVCXPRT **__svc_xports; + int __svc_maxrec; + + /* +@@ -194,6 +194,21 @@ __xprt_do_unregister (xprt, dolock) + rwlock_unlock (&svc_fd_lock); + } + ++int ++svc_open_fds() ++{ ++ int ix; ++ int nfds = 0; ++ ++ rwlock_rdlock (&svc_fd_lock); ++ for (ix = 0; ix < svc_max_pollfd; ++ix) { ++ if (svc_pollfd[ix].fd != -1) ++ nfds++; ++ } ++ rwlock_unlock (&svc_fd_lock); ++ return (nfds); ++} ++ + /* + * Add a service program to the callout list. + * The dispatch routine will be called when a rpc request for this +diff --git a/src/svc_vc.c b/src/svc_vc.c +index f1d9f00..3dc8a75 100644 +--- a/src/svc_vc.c ++++ b/src/svc_vc.c +@@ -64,6 +64,8 @@ + + + extern rwlock_t svc_fd_lock; ++extern SVCXPRT **__svc_xports; ++extern int svc_open_fds(); + + static SVCXPRT *makefd_xprt(int, u_int, u_int); + static bool_t rendezvous_request(SVCXPRT *, struct rpc_msg *); +@@ -82,6 +84,7 @@ static void svc_vc_ops(SVCXPRT *); + static bool_t svc_vc_control(SVCXPRT *xprt, const u_int rq, void *in); + static bool_t svc_vc_rendezvous_control (SVCXPRT *xprt, const u_int rq, + void *in); ++static int __svc_destroy_idle(int timeout); + + struct cf_rendezvous { /* kept in xprt->xp_p1 for rendezvouser */ + u_int sendsize; +@@ -313,13 +316,14 @@ done: + return (xprt); + } + ++ + /*ARGSUSED*/ + static bool_t + rendezvous_request(xprt, msg) + SVCXPRT *xprt; + struct rpc_msg *msg; + { +- int sock, flags; ++ int sock, flags, nfds, cnt; + struct cf_rendezvous *r; + struct cf_conn *cd; + struct sockaddr_storage addr; +@@ -379,6 +383,16 @@ again: + + gettimeofday(&cd->last_recv_time, NULL); + ++ nfds = svc_open_fds(); ++ if (nfds >= (_rpc_dtablesize() / 5) * 4) { ++ /* destroy idle connections */ ++ cnt = __svc_destroy_idle(15); ++ if (cnt == 0) { ++ /* destroy least active */ ++ __svc_destroy_idle(0); ++ } ++ } ++ + return (FALSE); /* there is never an rpc msg to be processed */ + } + +@@ -820,3 +834,49 @@ __svc_clean_idle(fd_set *fds, int timeout, bool_t cleanblock) + { + return FALSE; + } ++ ++static int ++__svc_destroy_idle(int timeout) ++{ ++ int i, ncleaned = 0; ++ SVCXPRT *xprt, *least_active; ++ struct timeval tv, tdiff, tmax; ++ struct cf_conn *cd; ++ ++ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); ++ tmax.tv_sec = tmax.tv_usec = 0; ++ least_active = NULL; ++ rwlock_wrlock(&svc_fd_lock); ++ ++ for (i = 0; i <= svc_max_pollfd; i++) { ++ if (svc_pollfd[i].fd == -1) ++ continue; ++ xprt = __svc_xports[i]; ++ if (xprt == NULL || xprt->xp_ops == NULL || ++ xprt->xp_ops->xp_recv != svc_vc_recv) ++ continue; ++ cd = (struct cf_conn *)xprt->xp_p1; ++ if (!cd->nonblock) ++ continue; ++ if (timeout == 0) { ++ timersub(&tv, &cd->last_recv_time, &tdiff); ++ if (timercmp(&tdiff, &tmax, >)) { ++ tmax = tdiff; ++ least_active = xprt; ++ } ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (tv.tv_sec - cd->last_recv_time.tv_sec > timeout) { ++ __xprt_unregister_unlocked(xprt); ++ __svc_vc_dodestroy(xprt); ++ ncleaned++; ++ } ++ } ++ if (timeout == 0 && least_active != NULL) { ++ __xprt_unregister_unlocked(least_active); ++ __svc_vc_dodestroy(least_active); ++ ncleaned++; ++ } ++ rwlock_unlock(&svc_fd_lock); ++ return (ncleaned); ++} +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/main/libxml2/APKBUILD b/main/libxml2/APKBUILD index 3c16cc07011..6f7ea8e974a 100644 --- a/main/libxml2/APKBUILD +++ b/main/libxml2/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: Carlo Landmeter <clandmeter@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=libxml2 pkgver=2.9.14 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=2 pkgdesc="XML parsing library, version 2" url="http://www.xmlsoft.org/" arch="all" @@ -19,9 +19,18 @@ fi options="!strip" source="https://download.gnome.org/sources/libxml2/${pkgver%.*}/libxml2-$pkgver.tar.xz libxml2-2.9.8-python3-unicode-errors.patch + $pkgname-CVE-2022-3209-1.patch::https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/5930fe01963136ab92125feec0c6204d9c9225dc.patch + $pkgname-CVE-2022-3209-2.patch::https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/libxml2/-/commit/a82ea25fc83f563c574ddb863d6c17d9c5abdbd2.patch + CVE-2022-40303.patch + CVE-2022-40304.patch " # secfixes: +# 2.9.14-r2: +# - CVE-2022-40303 +# - CVE-2022-40304 +# 2.9.14-r1: +# - CVE-2022-2309 # 2.9.14-r0: # - CVE-2022-29824 # 2.9.13-r0: @@ -108,4 +117,8 @@ utils() { sha512sums=" d08e6cafb289c499fdc5b3a12181e032a34f7a249bc66758859f964d3e71e19fd69be79921e1a9d8ab1e692d15b13f5fae95eeb10c3236974d89e218f5107606 libxml2-2.9.14.tar.xz a205c97fa1488fb8907cfa08b5f82e2055c80b86213dc3cc5c4b526fe6aa786bcc4e4eeb226c44635a1d021307b39e3940f706c42fb60e9e3e9b490a84164df7 libxml2-2.9.8-python3-unicode-errors.patch +17741ee5fcddb1a5d802a90fdbd7bd38a6f6e03ce11c2fe2fb92c0420e94dffd50846c653ffd69425517ccf287ec8830698201dd1cfd34200ea1fd7c5e115de8 libxml2-CVE-2022-3209-1.patch +5c02cc54bf3f1507f2851468397d28922d9d6aac32a8c4b31ca96792da56ba17b8bb3c4e1aca2b4bd720d922d761635d53d29791b0066b3329c48aa0359dbb1e libxml2-CVE-2022-3209-2.patch +feca63825d3678027f9be1b9f7377d95e067ae2ebc7556e4259cb89baa2a93b890fef2280be6db91017e8492eb08752f37f2620d9ef2a4684691d22fc3b3025d CVE-2022-40303.patch +5000106b69d8c10d018f9f5f0942e6565728b3ccbc2830d1f5076651e6e018c30281d481a76dcb5304bbed6f65663a2bff385eec941491b6d950e8de478947b0 CVE-2022-40304.patch " diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2022-40303.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2022-40303.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..84f93300f1f --- /dev/null +++ b/main/libxml2/CVE-2022-40303.patch @@ -0,0 +1,615 @@ +From ffaec75809a315457891a0e54f8828bc6e056067 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de> +Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 17:43:08 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix integer overflows with XML_PARSE_HUGE + +Also impose size limits when XML_PARSE_HUGE is set. Limit size of names +to XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH (10 million bytes) and other content to +XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH (1 billion bytes). + +Move some the length checks to the end of the respective loop to make +them strict. + +xmlParseEntityValue didn't have a length limitation at all. But without +XML_PARSE_HUGE, this should eventually trigger an error in xmlGROW. + +Thanks to Maddie Stone working with Google Project Zero for the report! +--- + parser.c | 233 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- + 1 file changed, 121 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/parser.c b/parser.c +index af2af68..f214c1c 100644 +--- a/parser.c ++++ b/parser.c +@@ -115,6 +115,8 @@ xmlParseElementEnd(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt); + * * + ************************************************************************/ + ++#define XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH 1000000000 ++ + #define XML_PARSER_BIG_ENTITY 1000 + #define XML_PARSER_LOT_ENTITY 5000 + +@@ -565,7 +567,7 @@ xmlFatalErr(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlParserErrors error, const char *info) + errmsg = "Malformed declaration expecting version"; + break; + case XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG: +- errmsg = "Name too long use XML_PARSE_HUGE option"; ++ errmsg = "Name too long"; + break; + #if 0 + case: +@@ -3210,6 +3212,9 @@ xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + int len = 0, l; + int c; + int count = 0; ++ int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH; + + #ifdef DEBUG + nbParseNameComplex++; +@@ -3275,7 +3280,8 @@ xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) + return(NULL); + } +- len += l; ++ if (len <= INT_MAX - l) ++ len += l; + NEXTL(l); + c = CUR_CHAR(l); + } +@@ -3301,13 +3307,13 @@ xmlParseNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) + return(NULL); + } +- len += l; ++ if (len <= INT_MAX - l) ++ len += l; + NEXTL(l); + c = CUR_CHAR(l); + } + } +- if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if (len > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Name"); + return(NULL); + } +@@ -3346,7 +3352,10 @@ const xmlChar * + xmlParseName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + const xmlChar *in; + const xmlChar *ret; +- int count = 0; ++ size_t count = 0; ++ size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH; + + GROW; + +@@ -3370,8 +3379,7 @@ xmlParseName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + in++; + if ((*in > 0) && (*in < 0x80)) { + count = in - ctxt->input->cur; +- if ((count > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if (count > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Name"); + return(NULL); + } +@@ -3392,6 +3400,9 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + int len = 0, l; + int c; + int count = 0; ++ int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH; + size_t startPosition = 0; + + #ifdef DEBUG +@@ -3412,17 +3423,13 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + while ((c != ' ') && (c != '>') && (c != '/') && /* test bigname.xml */ + (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c) && (c != ':'))) { + if (count++ > XML_PARSER_CHUNK_SIZE) { +- if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { +- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName"); +- return(NULL); +- } + count = 0; + GROW; + if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) + return(NULL); + } +- len += l; ++ if (len <= INT_MAX - l) ++ len += l; + NEXTL(l); + c = CUR_CHAR(l); + if (c == 0) { +@@ -3440,8 +3447,7 @@ xmlParseNCNameComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + c = CUR_CHAR(l); + } + } +- if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if (len > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName"); + return(NULL); + } +@@ -3467,7 +3473,10 @@ static const xmlChar * + xmlParseNCName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + const xmlChar *in, *e; + const xmlChar *ret; +- int count = 0; ++ size_t count = 0; ++ size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH; + + #ifdef DEBUG + nbParseNCName++; +@@ -3492,8 +3501,7 @@ xmlParseNCName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + goto complex; + if ((*in > 0) && (*in < 0x80)) { + count = in - ctxt->input->cur; +- if ((count > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if (count > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName"); + return(NULL); + } +@@ -3575,6 +3583,9 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) { + const xmlChar *cur = *str; + int len = 0, l; + int c; ++ int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH; + + #ifdef DEBUG + nbParseStringName++; +@@ -3610,12 +3621,6 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) { + if (len + 10 > max) { + xmlChar *tmp; + +- if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { +- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName"); +- xmlFree(buffer); +- return(NULL); +- } + max *= 2; + tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer, + max * sizeof(xmlChar)); +@@ -3629,14 +3634,18 @@ xmlParseStringName(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar** str) { + COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c); + cur += l; + c = CUR_SCHAR(cur, l); ++ if (len > maxLength) { ++ xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName"); ++ xmlFree(buffer); ++ return(NULL); ++ } + } + buffer[len] = 0; + *str = cur; + return(buffer); + } + } +- if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if (len > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NCName"); + return(NULL); + } +@@ -3663,6 +3672,9 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + int len = 0, l; + int c; + int count = 0; ++ int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH; + + #ifdef DEBUG + nbParseNmToken++; +@@ -3714,12 +3726,6 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + if (len + 10 > max) { + xmlChar *tmp; + +- if ((max > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { +- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NmToken"); +- xmlFree(buffer); +- return(NULL); +- } + max *= 2; + tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer, + max * sizeof(xmlChar)); +@@ -3733,6 +3739,11 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c); + NEXTL(l); + c = CUR_CHAR(l); ++ if (len > maxLength) { ++ xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NmToken"); ++ xmlFree(buffer); ++ return(NULL); ++ } + } + buffer[len] = 0; + return(buffer); +@@ -3740,8 +3751,7 @@ xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + } + if (len == 0) + return(NULL); +- if ((len > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if (len > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "NmToken"); + return(NULL); + } +@@ -3767,6 +3777,9 @@ xmlParseEntityValue(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **orig) { + int len = 0; + int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE; + int c, l; ++ int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH; + xmlChar stop; + xmlChar *ret = NULL; + const xmlChar *cur = NULL; +@@ -3826,6 +3839,12 @@ xmlParseEntityValue(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar **orig) { + GROW; + c = CUR_CHAR(l); + } ++ ++ if (len > maxLength) { ++ xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_NOT_FINISHED, ++ "entity value too long\n"); ++ goto error; ++ } + } + buf[len] = 0; + if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) +@@ -3913,6 +3932,9 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) { + xmlChar *rep = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + size_t buf_size = 0; ++ size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH; + int c, l, in_space = 0; + xmlChar *current = NULL; + xmlEntityPtr ent; +@@ -3944,16 +3966,6 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) { + while (((NXT(0) != limit) && /* checked */ + (IS_CHAR(c)) && (c != '<')) && + (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) { +- /* +- * Impose a reasonable limit on attribute size, unless XML_PARSE_HUGE +- * special option is given +- */ +- if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { +- xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED, +- "AttValue length too long\n"); +- goto mem_error; +- } + if (c == '&') { + in_space = 0; + if (NXT(1) == '#') { +@@ -4101,6 +4113,11 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) { + } + GROW; + c = CUR_CHAR(l); ++ if (len > maxLength) { ++ xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED, ++ "AttValue length too long\n"); ++ goto mem_error; ++ } + } + if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) + goto error; +@@ -4122,16 +4139,6 @@ xmlParseAttValueComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *attlen, int normalize) { + } else + NEXT; + +- /* +- * There we potentially risk an overflow, don't allow attribute value of +- * length more than INT_MAX it is a very reasonable assumption ! +- */ +- if (len >= INT_MAX) { +- xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED, +- "AttValue length too long\n"); +- goto mem_error; +- } +- + if (attlen != NULL) *attlen = (int) len; + return(buf); + +@@ -4202,6 +4209,9 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + int len = 0; + int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE; + int cur, l; ++ int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH; + xmlChar stop; + int state = ctxt->instate; + int count = 0; +@@ -4229,13 +4239,6 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + if (len + 5 >= size) { + xmlChar *tmp; + +- if ((size > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { +- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "SystemLiteral"); +- xmlFree(buf); +- ctxt->instate = (xmlParserInputState) state; +- return(NULL); +- } + size *= 2; + tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar)); + if (tmp == NULL) { +@@ -4264,6 +4267,12 @@ xmlParseSystemLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + SHRINK; + cur = CUR_CHAR(l); + } ++ if (len > maxLength) { ++ xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "SystemLiteral"); ++ xmlFree(buf); ++ ctxt->instate = (xmlParserInputState) state; ++ return(NULL); ++ } + } + buf[len] = 0; + ctxt->instate = (xmlParserInputState) state; +@@ -4291,6 +4300,9 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + xmlChar *buf = NULL; + int len = 0; + int size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH; + xmlChar cur; + xmlChar stop; + int count = 0; +@@ -4318,12 +4330,6 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + if (len + 1 >= size) { + xmlChar *tmp; + +- if ((size > XML_MAX_NAME_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { +- xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Public ID"); +- xmlFree(buf); +- return(NULL); +- } + size *= 2; + tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * sizeof(xmlChar)); + if (tmp == NULL) { +@@ -4351,6 +4357,11 @@ xmlParsePubidLiteral(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + SHRINK; + cur = CUR; + } ++ if (len > maxLength) { ++ xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_TOO_LONG, "Public ID"); ++ xmlFree(buf); ++ return(NULL); ++ } + } + buf[len] = 0; + if (cur != stop) { +@@ -4750,6 +4761,9 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf, + int r, rl; + int cur, l; + size_t count = 0; ++ size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH; + int inputid; + + inputid = ctxt->input->id; +@@ -4795,13 +4809,6 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf, + if ((r == '-') && (q == '-')) { + xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_HYPHEN_IN_COMMENT, NULL); + } +- if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { +- xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED, +- "Comment too big found", NULL); +- xmlFree (buf); +- return; +- } + if (len + 5 >= size) { + xmlChar *new_buf; + size_t new_size; +@@ -4839,6 +4846,13 @@ xmlParseCommentComplex(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, xmlChar *buf, + GROW; + cur = CUR_CHAR(l); + } ++ ++ if (len > maxLength) { ++ xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED, ++ "Comment too big found", NULL); ++ xmlFree (buf); ++ return; ++ } + } + buf[len] = 0; + if (cur == 0) { +@@ -4883,6 +4897,9 @@ xmlParseComment(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + xmlChar *buf = NULL; + size_t size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE; + size_t len = 0; ++ size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH; + xmlParserInputState state; + const xmlChar *in; + size_t nbchar = 0; +@@ -4966,8 +4983,7 @@ get_more: + buf[len] = 0; + } + } +- if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if (len > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_COMMENT_NOT_FINISHED, + "Comment too big found", NULL); + xmlFree (buf); +@@ -5167,6 +5183,9 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + xmlChar *buf = NULL; + size_t len = 0; + size_t size = XML_PARSER_BUFFER_SIZE; ++ size_t maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH; + int cur, l; + const xmlChar *target; + xmlParserInputState state; +@@ -5242,14 +5261,6 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + return; + } + count = 0; +- if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { +- xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_FINISHED, +- "PI %s too big found", target); +- xmlFree(buf); +- ctxt->instate = state; +- return; +- } + } + COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,cur); + NEXTL(l); +@@ -5259,15 +5270,14 @@ xmlParsePI(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + GROW; + cur = CUR_CHAR(l); + } ++ if (len > maxLength) { ++ xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_FINISHED, ++ "PI %s too big found", target); ++ xmlFree(buf); ++ ctxt->instate = state; ++ return; ++ } + } +- if ((len > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { +- xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_FINISHED, +- "PI %s too big found", target); +- xmlFree(buf); +- ctxt->instate = state; +- return; +- } + buf[len] = 0; + if (cur != '?') { + xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PI_NOT_FINISHED, +@@ -8959,6 +8969,9 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc, + const xmlChar *in = NULL, *start, *end, *last; + xmlChar *ret = NULL; + int line, col; ++ int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH; + + GROW; + in = (xmlChar *) CUR_PTR; +@@ -8998,8 +9011,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc, + start = in; + if (in >= end) { + GROW_PARSE_ATT_VALUE_INTERNAL(ctxt, in, start, end) +- if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if ((in - start) > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED, + "AttValue length too long\n"); + return(NULL); +@@ -9012,8 +9024,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc, + if ((*in++ == 0x20) && (*in == 0x20)) break; + if (in >= end) { + GROW_PARSE_ATT_VALUE_INTERNAL(ctxt, in, start, end) +- if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if ((in - start) > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED, + "AttValue length too long\n"); + return(NULL); +@@ -9046,16 +9057,14 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc, + last = last + delta; + } + end = ctxt->input->end; +- if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if ((in - start) > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED, + "AttValue length too long\n"); + return(NULL); + } + } + } +- if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if ((in - start) > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED, + "AttValue length too long\n"); + return(NULL); +@@ -9068,8 +9077,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc, + col++; + if (in >= end) { + GROW_PARSE_ATT_VALUE_INTERNAL(ctxt, in, start, end) +- if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if ((in - start) > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED, + "AttValue length too long\n"); + return(NULL); +@@ -9077,8 +9085,7 @@ xmlParseAttValueInternal(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, int *len, int *alloc, + } + } + last = in; +- if (((in - start) > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { ++ if ((in - start) > maxLength) { + xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_ATTRIBUTE_NOT_FINISHED, + "AttValue length too long\n"); + return(NULL); +@@ -9768,6 +9775,9 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + int s, sl; + int cur, l; + int count = 0; ++ int maxLength = (ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) ? ++ XML_MAX_HUGE_LENGTH : ++ XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH; + + /* Check 2.6.0 was NXT(0) not RAW */ + if (CMP9(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', '[', 'C', 'D', 'A', 'T', 'A', '[')) { +@@ -9801,13 +9811,6 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + if (len + 5 >= size) { + xmlChar *tmp; + +- if ((size > XML_MAX_TEXT_LENGTH) && +- ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_HUGE) == 0)) { +- xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED, +- "CData section too big found", NULL); +- xmlFree (buf); +- return; +- } + tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buf, size * 2 * sizeof(xmlChar)); + if (tmp == NULL) { + xmlFree(buf); +@@ -9834,6 +9837,12 @@ xmlParseCDSect(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) { + } + NEXTL(l); + cur = CUR_CHAR(l); ++ if (len > maxLength) { ++ xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_CDATA_NOT_FINISHED, ++ "CData section too big found\n"); ++ xmlFree(buf); ++ return; ++ } + } + buf[len] = 0; + ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_CONTENT; diff --git a/main/libxml2/CVE-2022-40304.patch b/main/libxml2/CVE-2022-40304.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a2cf68a5e60 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/libxml2/CVE-2022-40304.patch @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +From 644a89e080bced793295f61f18aac8cfad6bece2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Nick Wellnhofer <wellnhofer@aevum.de> +Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2022 22:11:25 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] [CVE-2022-40304] Fix dict corruption caused by entity + reference cycles + +When an entity reference cycle is detected, the entity content is +cleared by setting its first byte to zero. But the entity content might +be allocated from a dict. In this case, the dict entry becomes corrupted +leading to all kinds of logic errors, including memory errors like +double-frees. + +Stop storing entity content, orig, ExternalID and SystemID in a dict. +These values are unlikely to occur multiple times in a document, so they +shouldn't have been stored in a dict in the first place. + +Thanks to Ned Williamson and Nathan Wachholz working with Google Project +Zero for the report! +--- + entities.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++-------------------------------------- + 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/entities.c b/entities.c +index 7876f708..063a02fa 100644 +--- a/entities.c ++++ b/entities.c +@@ -129,36 +129,19 @@ xmlFreeEntity(xmlEntityPtr entity) + if ((entity->children) && (entity->owner == 1) && + (entity == (xmlEntityPtr) entity->children->parent)) + xmlFreeNodeList(entity->children); +- if (dict != NULL) { +- if ((entity->name != NULL) && (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->name))) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->name); +- if ((entity->ExternalID != NULL) && +- (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->ExternalID))) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->ExternalID); +- if ((entity->SystemID != NULL) && +- (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->SystemID))) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->SystemID); +- if ((entity->URI != NULL) && (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->URI))) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->URI); +- if ((entity->content != NULL) +- && (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->content))) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->content); +- if ((entity->orig != NULL) && (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->orig))) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->orig); +- } else { +- if (entity->name != NULL) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->name); +- if (entity->ExternalID != NULL) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->ExternalID); +- if (entity->SystemID != NULL) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->SystemID); +- if (entity->URI != NULL) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->URI); +- if (entity->content != NULL) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->content); +- if (entity->orig != NULL) +- xmlFree((char *) entity->orig); +- } ++ if ((entity->name != NULL) && ++ ((dict == NULL) || (!xmlDictOwns(dict, entity->name)))) ++ xmlFree((char *) entity->name); ++ if (entity->ExternalID != NULL) ++ xmlFree((char *) entity->ExternalID); ++ if (entity->SystemID != NULL) ++ xmlFree((char *) entity->SystemID); ++ if (entity->URI != NULL) ++ xmlFree((char *) entity->URI); ++ if (entity->content != NULL) ++ xmlFree((char *) entity->content); ++ if (entity->orig != NULL) ++ xmlFree((char *) entity->orig); + xmlFree(entity); + } + +@@ -194,18 +177,12 @@ xmlCreateEntity(xmlDictPtr dict, const xmlChar *name, int type, + ret->SystemID = xmlStrdup(SystemID); + } else { + ret->name = xmlDictLookup(dict, name, -1); +- if (ExternalID != NULL) +- ret->ExternalID = xmlDictLookup(dict, ExternalID, -1); +- if (SystemID != NULL) +- ret->SystemID = xmlDictLookup(dict, SystemID, -1); ++ ret->ExternalID = xmlStrdup(ExternalID); ++ ret->SystemID = xmlStrdup(SystemID); + } + if (content != NULL) { + ret->length = xmlStrlen(content); +- if ((dict != NULL) && (ret->length < 5)) +- ret->content = (xmlChar *) +- xmlDictLookup(dict, content, ret->length); +- else +- ret->content = xmlStrndup(content, ret->length); ++ ret->content = xmlStrndup(content, ret->length); + } else { + ret->length = 0; + ret->content = NULL; +-- +GitLab + diff --git a/main/linux-lts/APKBUILD b/main/linux-lts/APKBUILD index 9191b2d8c15..a0a594a6399 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/APKBUILD +++ b/main/linux-lts/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ _flavor=lts pkgname=linux-${_flavor} -pkgver=5.10.109 +pkgver=5.10.152 case $pkgver in *.*.*) _kernver=${pkgver%.*};; *.*) _kernver=$pkgver;; @@ -235,16 +235,16 @@ d19365fe94431008768c96a2c88955652f70b6df6677457ee55ee95246a64fdd2c6fed9b3bef37c2 ca5aafac37e0b5f3fcbaf801e12f98beb58ffaf1d8c88f76caff22b059831869b4094e7fdcb6d6860422d6b2d036e072caff460e1feb84bd04d10740ad56265b 0007-pci-hotplug-declare-IDT-bridge-as-hotpluggabl-bridge.patch cbe85cf34e8420c91d2276c2d2aa0ab5023af68e57a1fa613f073f16a76766c67f585eda71c28f232bd0625e0dc8275a9eddc95f49409205dc0dbcc28c9fac1c 0008-pci-spr2803-quirk-to-fix-class-ID.patch 16b2d5b0255b37075ba894fc797673d633395907ce0b93400c5a8bd05b512b5cd040b91000fa41f9240d42afc664a69206597d1e3f754a1aa64b9be21a67f5c6 ampere-mt-jade.patch -9455503abd98bb54718a03dbf027a869de5c929c06c0158f8cbf642bf653c8a1ac455de60b0c916aeae8ff17d869fd84f6914508ea48ec38e19e8e37e4b0e20b config-lts.aarch64 -14829450de8b7ada73fe095427dea7d14c1f41f3fcfdc62c6c148a3cd014eefdc35588af6cbeb3ed61416837da88547b6fa9270c41ba3438aff0413647f81151 config-lts.armv7 -49145188dc72f1b43eec78d4977740595318af42a7e60e91c4bc4bfac5e407eb7d765b731ffad14102e968369303a3ee2a24492776f6007d0851120abbd0dc37 config-lts.x86 -19d9fae84af94951d0c08872801e2f2667cf49841eb408921ffe196856257e6b15329f199479be4050934c54a833f65a0674b7fcd04600f6886a7158d3c425af config-lts.x86_64 -5a284ae787cdf77fd4e025ffb3d537d6e8a844ca3ee8f495f8038b2a45fa8743dfa7b98c67db562704261cf6f93fb3754125f91ebd5b95eac1b1359ee1f4d885 config-lts.ppc64le -4f79bb6169b4540fc5af0fed1478b918b9ec08f0540fdb49d759b22029cf01f1da4427742c1e0f2d8834ee431ccde2314bc032a7269bbb04221b05f48817a8e6 config-lts.s390x -85bb52343905b975ea653f79174041b766eed471f6dd8202aa9f830d28328d4ce29d7252ac1f00f55d51e642f2b1b09d3205d21f1db1cfc21af562ffd392eebe config-lts.mips64 -20e28677505827315e904dd3070f6af24a6030aae2957e42a7f8af742eb8565c1ee0253ad3a8cdbbff930f9e13806287d429a499ab9aa1eca1bbaec44930989d config-virt.aarch64 -e489b4d4b43176ce31e94219005c30585a5accca2d59a65145f6f913602cdb53a2bb2314452c3b11e666392c15261ece0af24b720ebffa4892a1d88d388364f9 config-virt.armv7 -9d00477d1c36521c7f9d33be550b4b3580aeff3f184a01f859938cef8d58fe016123d983f6f79fe58e661b0d1dae080e1ae589d6cfc957c974c5278ab87e93e6 config-virt.ppc64le -2dcdaa4cb47c370aa3f87b4575934d771e836f8441256473c90bc4c137624934526942d354d5ec1b703c2fd2938cf7c697a304f8617af9d62357a5d9522ef305 config-virt.x86 -8559a049c8401acc345af31757b058123a81967e7e528af8abd313b910db0b3b470e9bc0cac329a969fab44e855b3982dde3e03688cd72471dd5a06399a4db66 config-virt.x86_64 -857028984882fe1945133bbcb5660c795e9f3616fd202a87f26ad6ff2063d2b3a0a5efb17bc905433aa2400163ba9bf7340c9283ea3573b49e9eed2eda332eb2 patch-5.10.109.xz" +04e77eec5e4cbf8e06603732e37fe0b12508ab9a230bff96c7db69c97aa87c38c06ae99da699bf61a5d581d174ff20c0b8ed2b088f444804c53b86819ec1d620 config-lts.aarch64 +4128829f32d5989e3d3cd98b58aa6f1a3a5b1bbfa1ef216bd9095b5ce7db9dac08c79291d1fc3f7a551fa1db0c08911a7e864c692f949db69e47e0c347a92e10 config-lts.armv7 +0cd73a668d501621628abeb38c6b2fe102d3b2ccd574a1484ceeb24edc5c404007d950f1ea8f8a3f13be46e041ced5532b9a4f281c4f60e07e338de7f1987eb5 config-lts.x86 +c78baca77df2565a372f979994baacf924d2e15214d3b8119f1c0f53c0402a74a8a242482b72a32b5fde52ea9f253a6e3369a15b32f1e17755cd28f767249ebb config-lts.x86_64 +e95af61f8475440befde14fa467ff97885b7c6cf1de34e28bd2de1b850f1b6a71474afaa3028bfedfba9d41f241a998632ccca90576da93f7032c1bb9e3840e3 config-lts.ppc64le +fb08461e28756ce77d24df4b1ad8371f181f9929e8f7a0efd3bd3504f20215a72aaa8a9cf46e0eee46b5f63fed2b0b95d187327f9eb4e4a1afd3b999db54510e config-lts.s390x +ff7a360c837191b84d5939ea0ec210385bbe7cc21b0b8d313757d8b635e9797fabc35e8d864fdae6045b93fae6c4beb954c631f1580d4b871cac53916c761b25 config-lts.mips64 +d47270163d926f673348144b33b70136ad0ffe97dc01daed12c8908b3a7760fa8a51da9515dbdf3e2a2eb6d18aa0b228e7a4e36bd34587593ce5eaa05ff50738 config-virt.aarch64 +6f662e21699d41ffaadf471cb5b4adc49d3e2fefa80475b03309b157fcb626183950c1c6be5ead91ee742286d9dea0398905a178af1faff058057cf844b06ee0 config-virt.armv7 +3a466ee82ae5e8647696022e1dae2fa64fea89aecbb9f2bfa1c856f03eaa3eeb9c0713df1ee15ca87b097ab9c0b9f843fa6ad69f477bf55b4b76d440880b0616 config-virt.ppc64le +fa1da5eaa799e3e2062e01eed9aa7dc68cd356cc65515361851396e177f365151e7549ce3e98150a099ee2eb204870d350265e1db1234af7b0941606e20ce9dc config-virt.x86 +25fc991d6cf69d4b7671431dd0f0ed746e2596a68864751a5fa05c735287180cfd591842bebc3945118418f3f4dbaa188d48df522f856db80ec6af613fd8c898 config-virt.x86_64 +7a484b59e6ec83859b659cf305dfab9805622c8d54304c050d8029cfa37ea434e597a40b7c00954ed4b951ff8cabe809542771eaf5c1bc681186ae60cc4e8420 patch-5.10.152.xz" diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.aarch64 b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.aarch64 index e5d829295ec..440cac7aff9 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.aarch64 +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.aarch64 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/arm64 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/arm64 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1286807=y CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1463225=y CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1542419=y CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1508412=y +CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_2457168=y CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375=y CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23144=y CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23154=y @@ -414,6 +415,7 @@ CONFIG_XEN_DOM0=y CONFIG_XEN=y CONFIG_FORCE_MAX_ZONEORDER=11 CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0=y +CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY=y CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=y # CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN is not set CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI=y @@ -3546,7 +3548,6 @@ CONFIG_MISDN_AVMFRITZ=m # CONFIG_MISDN_W6692 is not set # CONFIG_MISDN_NETJET is not set CONFIG_MISDN_IPAC=m -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -3960,10 +3961,9 @@ CONFIG_TCG_XEN=m # CONFIG_TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24_I2C is not set # CONFIG_TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24_SPI is not set # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -9237,26 +9237,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=9 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ALLWINNER=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SUN4I_SS=m @@ -9358,6 +9338,28 @@ CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_SYM_ANNOTATIONS=y CONFIG_INDIRECT_PIO=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=9 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m CONFIG_CRC16=m CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.armv7 b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.armv7 index dcf82cb9423..d13f3e76abc 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.armv7 +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.armv7 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/arm 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/arm 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -493,6 +493,7 @@ CONFIG_SWP_EMULATE=y # CONFIG_CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE is not set CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE=y CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y +CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY=y CONFIG_KUSER_HELPERS=y CONFIG_VDSO=y CONFIG_OUTER_CACHE=y @@ -570,7 +571,6 @@ CONFIG_SCHED_HRTICK=y CONFIG_ARM_PATCH_IDIV=y CONFIG_AEABI=y # CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is not set -CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_HOLES_MEMORYMODEL=y CONFIG_ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL=y CONFIG_ARCH_FLATMEM_ENABLE=y CONFIG_ARCH_SPARSEMEM_ENABLE=y @@ -1895,6 +1895,7 @@ CONFIG_DEBUG_DEVRES=y # CONFIG_DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE is not set # CONFIG_TEST_ASYNC_DRIVER_PROBE is not set CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE=y +CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES=y CONFIG_SOC_BUS=y CONFIG_REGMAP=y CONFIG_REGMAP_I2C=m @@ -2826,7 +2827,6 @@ CONFIG_IEEE802154_MCR20A=m # CONFIG_NETDEVSIM is not set CONFIG_NET_FAILOVER=m # CONFIG_ISDN is not set -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -3197,9 +3197,8 @@ CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_TPM=y # CONFIG_TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24_I2C is not set # CONFIG_TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24_SPI is not set # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -7800,27 +7799,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=9 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ALLWINNER=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_SUN4I_SS=m @@ -7897,6 +7875,29 @@ CONFIG_RATIONAL=y CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP=y CONFIG_STMP_DEVICE=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=9 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m CONFIG_CRC16=m CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.mips64 b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.mips64 index e62eddf130f..efc1ba0e29e 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.mips64 +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.mips64 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/mips 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/mips 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -1766,7 +1766,6 @@ CONFIG_USB_NET_DRIVERS=y # CONFIG_VMXNET3 is not set # CONFIG_NET_FAILOVER is not set # CONFIG_ISDN is not set -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -1938,9 +1937,8 @@ CONFIG_DEVMEM=y CONFIG_DEVPORT=y # CONFIG_TCG_TPM is not set # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -3321,24 +3319,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY=m # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=2 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y # CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW is not set CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE=y CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y @@ -3371,6 +3351,26 @@ CONFIG_NO_GENERIC_PCI_IOPORT_MAP=y CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP=y CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=2 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y # CONFIG_CRC_CCITT is not set CONFIG_CRC16=y # CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF is not set diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.ppc64le b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.ppc64le index d8955c6b661..22260ed54ab 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.ppc64le +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.ppc64le @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/powerpc 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/powerpc 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -1518,6 +1518,7 @@ CONFIG_PARPORT_PC=m CONFIG_BLK_DEV=y # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NULL_BLK is not set CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD=m +# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD_RAWCMD is not set CONFIG_CDROM=y # CONFIG_PARIDE is not set # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_PCIESSD_MTIP32XX is not set @@ -2195,7 +2196,6 @@ CONFIG_USB_NET_DRIVERS=m # CONFIG_NETDEVSIM is not set CONFIG_NET_FAILOVER=m # CONFIG_ISDN is not set -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -2416,10 +2416,9 @@ CONFIG_DEVPORT=y # CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER is not set # CONFIG_TCG_TPM is not set # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -4371,24 +4370,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=1 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_NX=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_NX_COMPRESS=y @@ -4439,6 +4420,26 @@ CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP=y CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=1 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m CONFIG_CRC16=y CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.s390x b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.s390x index 22c8096af65..f4053a5f6a3 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.s390x +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.s390x @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/s390 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/s390 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -2088,7 +2088,6 @@ CONFIG_CCWGROUP=m # CONFIG_VMXNET3 is not set # CONFIG_NETDEVSIM is not set CONFIG_NET_FAILOVER=m -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -2241,10 +2240,9 @@ CONFIG_MONREADER=m CONFIG_MONWRITER=m CONFIG_S390_VMUR=m # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -3198,24 +3196,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE=y # CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=1 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y CONFIG_ZCRYPT=m # CONFIG_ZCRYPT_DEBUG is not set @@ -3269,6 +3249,26 @@ CONFIG_GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT=y CONFIG_CORDIC=m # CONFIG_PRIME_NUMBERS is not set CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=1 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y CONFIG_CRC16=y CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.x86 b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.x86 index c5f1235e2c7..860c07e8acd 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.x86 +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.x86 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/x86 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/x86 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -297,7 +297,6 @@ CONFIG_SMP=y CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES=y CONFIG_X86_MPPARSE=y # CONFIG_GOLDFISH is not set -CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y # CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL is not set CONFIG_X86_BIGSMP=y CONFIG_X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM=y @@ -452,6 +451,10 @@ CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU=y CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL=y # end of Processor type and features +CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK=y +CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=y +CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y +# CONFIG_RETHUNK is not set CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG=y # @@ -2140,6 +2143,7 @@ CONFIG_PNPACPI=y CONFIG_BLK_DEV=y # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NULL_BLK is not set CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD=m +# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD_RAWCMD is not set CONFIG_CDROM=m # CONFIG_PARIDE is not set CONFIG_BLK_DEV_PCIESSD_MTIP32XX=m @@ -3458,7 +3462,6 @@ CONFIG_MISDN_AVMFRITZ=m # CONFIG_MISDN_W6692 is not set # CONFIG_MISDN_NETJET is not set CONFIG_MISDN_IPAC=m -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -3884,10 +3887,9 @@ CONFIG_TCG_CRB=m # CONFIG_TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24_SPI is not set CONFIG_TELCLOCK=m # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -8540,24 +8542,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=1 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK_AES=m @@ -8623,6 +8607,26 @@ CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP=y CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_SYM_ANNOTATIONS=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=1 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m CONFIG_CRC16=m CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.x86_64 b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.x86_64 index 625dcdac3e4..4bf26fdc99c 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-lts.x86_64 +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-lts.x86_64 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/x86_64 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/x86_64 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -318,7 +318,6 @@ CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES=y CONFIG_X86_X2APIC=y CONFIG_X86_MPPARSE=y # CONFIG_GOLDFISH is not set -CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y # CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL is not set CONFIG_X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM=y # CONFIG_X86_NUMACHIP is not set @@ -479,6 +478,14 @@ CONFIG_HAVE_LIVEPATCH=y CONFIG_LIVEPATCH=y # end of Processor type and features +CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK=y +CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=y +CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y +CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y +CONFIG_RETHUNK=y +CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY=y +CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY=y +CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES=y CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG=y CONFIG_USE_PERCPU_NUMA_NODE_ID=y @@ -2255,6 +2262,7 @@ CONFIG_PNPACPI=y CONFIG_BLK_DEV=y # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NULL_BLK is not set CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD=m +# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD_RAWCMD is not set CONFIG_CDROM=m # CONFIG_PARIDE is not set CONFIG_BLK_DEV_PCIESSD_MTIP32XX=m @@ -3566,7 +3574,6 @@ CONFIG_MISDN_AVMFRITZ=m # CONFIG_MISDN_W6692 is not set # CONFIG_MISDN_NETJET is not set CONFIG_MISDN_IPAC=m -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -3999,10 +4006,9 @@ CONFIG_TCG_CRB=m # CONFIG_TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24_SPI is not set CONFIG_TELCLOCK=m # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -8535,7 +8541,6 @@ CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS=y CONFIG_SECURITY=y CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y -CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND is not set # CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y @@ -8773,28 +8778,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=11 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK_AES=m @@ -8860,6 +8843,30 @@ CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_SYM_ANNOTATIONS=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=11 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m CONFIG_CRC16=m CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-virt.aarch64 b/main/linux-lts/config-virt.aarch64 index 95eac79fc69..a57a2b6f2e7 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-virt.aarch64 +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-virt.aarch64 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/arm64 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/arm64 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1286807=y CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1463225=y CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1542419=y CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1508412=y +CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_2457168=y CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375=y CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23144=y CONFIG_CAVIUM_ERRATUM_23154=y @@ -405,6 +406,7 @@ CONFIG_PARAVIRT=y # CONFIG_XEN is not set CONFIG_FORCE_MAX_ZONEORDER=11 CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0=y +CONFIG_MITIGATE_SPECTRE_BRANCH_HISTORY=y CONFIG_RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED=y # CONFIG_ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN is not set CONFIG_ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI=y @@ -2533,7 +2535,6 @@ CONFIG_VMXNET3=m # CONFIG_NETDEVSIM is not set CONFIG_NET_FAILOVER=m # CONFIG_ISDN is not set -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -2675,10 +2676,9 @@ CONFIG_DEVMEM=y # CONFIG_DEVPORT is not set # CONFIG_TCG_TPM is not set # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -4692,26 +4692,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=9 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y # CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_ECC is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_SHA204A is not set @@ -4775,6 +4755,28 @@ CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_SYM_ANNOTATIONS=y # CONFIG_INDIRECT_PIO is not set + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=9 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m CONFIG_CRC16=m CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-virt.armv7 b/main/linux-lts/config-virt.armv7 index 85a24b9418b..f43295dd2b3 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-virt.armv7 +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-virt.armv7 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/arm 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/arm 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ CONFIG_SWP_EMULATE=y # CONFIG_CPU_BPREDICT_DISABLE is not set CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE=y CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR=y +CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_HISTORY=y CONFIG_KUSER_HELPERS=y CONFIG_VDSO=y CONFIG_OUTER_CACHE=y @@ -1666,6 +1667,7 @@ CONFIG_ALLOW_DEV_COREDUMP=y # CONFIG_DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE is not set # CONFIG_TEST_ASYNC_DRIVER_PROBE is not set CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE=y +CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES=y CONFIG_REGMAP=y CONFIG_REGMAP_MMIO=y CONFIG_DMA_SHARED_BUFFER=y @@ -2391,7 +2393,6 @@ CONFIG_VMXNET3=m # CONFIG_NETDEVSIM is not set CONFIG_NET_FAILOVER=m # CONFIG_ISDN is not set -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -2534,9 +2535,8 @@ CONFIG_DEVMEM=y # CONFIG_DEVPORT is not set # CONFIG_TCG_TPM is not set # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -4500,26 +4500,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=9 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y # CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_HIFN_795X is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_ATMEL_ECC is not set @@ -4567,6 +4547,28 @@ CONFIG_CORDIC=m CONFIG_RATIONAL=y CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=9 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m CONFIG_CRC16=m CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-virt.ppc64le b/main/linux-lts/config-virt.ppc64le index 5651397955c..6b7ba8263cc 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-virt.ppc64le +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-virt.ppc64le @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/powerpc 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/powerpc 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -2270,7 +2270,6 @@ CONFIG_SLIP_MODE_SLIP6=y # CONFIG_NETDEVSIM is not set CONFIG_NET_FAILOVER=m # CONFIG_ISDN is not set -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -2415,10 +2414,9 @@ CONFIG_NVRAM=m CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m # CONFIG_TCG_TPM is not set # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -4200,24 +4198,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=1 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_NX=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_NX_COMPRESS=m @@ -4266,6 +4246,26 @@ CONFIG_CORDIC=m CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=1 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m CONFIG_CRC16=m CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-virt.x86 b/main/linux-lts/config-virt.x86 index 0b8715c2d02..702c9214179 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-virt.x86 +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-virt.x86 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/x86 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/x86 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -292,7 +292,6 @@ CONFIG_SMP=y CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES=y # CONFIG_X86_MPPARSE is not set # CONFIG_GOLDFISH is not set -CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y # CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL is not set CONFIG_X86_BIGSMP=y # CONFIG_X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM is not set @@ -441,6 +440,10 @@ CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU=y CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL=y # end of Processor type and features +CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK=y +CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=y +CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y +# CONFIG_RETHUNK is not set CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG=y # @@ -1715,6 +1718,7 @@ CONFIG_PNPACPI=y CONFIG_BLK_DEV=y # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NULL_BLK is not set CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD=m +# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD_RAWCMD is not set CONFIG_CDROM=m # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_PCIESSD_MTIP32XX is not set CONFIG_ZRAM=m @@ -2317,7 +2321,6 @@ CONFIG_HYPERV_NET=m # CONFIG_NETDEVSIM is not set CONFIG_NET_FAILOVER=m # CONFIG_ISDN is not set -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -2512,10 +2515,9 @@ CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m # CONFIG_TCG_TPM is not set # CONFIG_TELCLOCK is not set # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -4269,24 +4271,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=1 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK_AES=m @@ -4349,6 +4333,26 @@ CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP=y CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_SYM_ANNOTATIONS=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=1 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m CONFIG_CRC16=m CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y diff --git a/main/linux-lts/config-virt.x86_64 b/main/linux-lts/config-virt.x86_64 index 4b2daf1e9c9..7ab64d5907c 100644 --- a/main/linux-lts/config-virt.x86_64 +++ b/main/linux-lts/config-virt.x86_64 @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # # Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT. -# Linux/x86_64 5.10.103 Kernel Configuration +# Linux/x86_64 5.10.144 Kernel Configuration # CONFIG_CC_VERSION_TEXT="gcc (Alpine 10.2.1_pre1) 10.2.1 20201203" CONFIG_CC_IS_GCC=y @@ -313,7 +313,6 @@ CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES=y CONFIG_X86_X2APIC=y # CONFIG_X86_MPPARSE is not set # CONFIG_GOLDFISH is not set -CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y # CONFIG_X86_CPU_RESCTRL is not set # CONFIG_X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM is not set # CONFIG_X86_INTEL_LPSS is not set @@ -454,6 +453,14 @@ CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL=y CONFIG_HAVE_LIVEPATCH=y # end of Processor type and features +CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK=y +CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS=y +CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y +CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y +CONFIG_RETHUNK=y +CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY=y +CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY=y +CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES=y CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG=y CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE=y @@ -1778,6 +1785,7 @@ CONFIG_PNPACPI=y CONFIG_BLK_DEV=y # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NULL_BLK is not set CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD=m +# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD_RAWCMD is not set CONFIG_CDROM=m # CONFIG_BLK_DEV_PCIESSD_MTIP32XX is not set CONFIG_ZRAM=m @@ -2383,7 +2391,6 @@ CONFIG_HYPERV_NET=m # CONFIG_NETDEVSIM is not set CONFIG_NET_FAILOVER=m # CONFIG_ISDN is not set -# CONFIG_NVM is not set # # Input device support @@ -2592,10 +2599,9 @@ CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m # CONFIG_TCG_TPM is not set # CONFIG_TELCLOCK is not set # CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set -# end of Character devices - CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y # CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is not set +# end of Character devices # # I2C support @@ -4205,7 +4211,6 @@ CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS=y CONFIG_SECURITY=y CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y -CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y # CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM is not set CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y # CONFIG_INTEL_TXT is not set @@ -4449,28 +4454,6 @@ CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD=m # CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_ENABLE_OBSOLETE is not set # CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS is not set CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y - -# -# Crypto library routines -# -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=11 -CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m -CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK=m CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK_AES=m @@ -4534,6 +4517,30 @@ CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER=y CONFIG_ARCH_USE_SYM_ANNOTATIONS=y + +# +# Crypto library routines +# +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_AES=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC=y +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_DES=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_RSIZE=11 +CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305=m +CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256=y +# end of Crypto library routines + +CONFIG_LIB_MEMNEQ=y CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=m CONFIG_CRC16=m CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y diff --git a/main/logrotate/APKBUILD b/main/logrotate/APKBUILD index 4a4ef6fc8fd..4c7cb82ea3b 100644 --- a/main/logrotate/APKBUILD +++ b/main/logrotate/APKBUILD @@ -2,19 +2,25 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=logrotate pkgver=3.18.0 -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=3 pkgdesc="Tool to rotate logfiles" url="https://github.com/logrotate/logrotate" arch="all" license="GPL-2.0-or-later" +install="$pkgname.post-upgrade" makedepends="popt-dev autoconf automake libtool" checkdepends="coreutils" subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-openrc" source="$url/releases/download/$pkgver/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.xz + CVE-2022-1348.patch logrotate.cron logrotate.conf logrotate.confd" +# secfixes: +# 3.18.0-r2: +# - CVE-2022-1348 + prepare() { default_prepare @@ -48,7 +54,11 @@ package() { install -Dm644 "$srcdir"/logrotate.confd \ "$pkgdir"/etc/conf.d/logrotate } -sha512sums="3b44168af53779d7f53e686c192a04ff97ddecca32da66a0c4ac6284fb55dbb9ded5a300652621963ccea91aeb6bebc4cec8a22cc94597484456742442f026be logrotate-3.18.0.tar.xz + +sha512sums=" +3b44168af53779d7f53e686c192a04ff97ddecca32da66a0c4ac6284fb55dbb9ded5a300652621963ccea91aeb6bebc4cec8a22cc94597484456742442f026be logrotate-3.18.0.tar.xz +c17c3195137c0202027a818b8850b03c35836de27bee5b2384ab06e95d5ce17b5c2bd90013db1c95845749b0bf633d2bd12b1e6fe1824191ca0de3c5db0e71bb CVE-2022-1348.patch f4d708594fb2b240cfc2928f38a180d27c2cecb9867e048dc29a32c0147244db4d2f6d92e7bff27e1f2623537587db87b2f8fc9bb988f98eff0c98f79f5a5bf2 logrotate.cron e91c1648a088410d1f5ad16d05b67e316977be5cc0cbbb21a4e1fda2267415fb7945553aa4b4a4701d658fd6bfe35e3d9a304e0cf2a9c7f1be5a5753c3dbc7cb logrotate.conf -be9f0043b594d26b4f64e07a2188d19c3c43af75ef726305e4d98f744fc16cee9f280227116858e2f5b781c0a7b58e0209d7e9ab1285dfa7ba55a9dfda700229 logrotate.confd" +be9f0043b594d26b4f64e07a2188d19c3c43af75ef726305e4d98f744fc16cee9f280227116858e2f5b781c0a7b58e0209d7e9ab1285dfa7ba55a9dfda700229 logrotate.confd +" diff --git a/main/logrotate/CVE-2022-1348.patch b/main/logrotate/CVE-2022-1348.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..df03b86bae5 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/logrotate/CVE-2022-1348.patch @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +From 1f76a381e2caa0603ae3dbc51ed0f1aa0d6658b9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Christian=20G=C3=B6ttsche?= <cgzones@googlemail.com> +Date: Tue, 29 Mar 2022 21:06:54 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] skip locking if state file is world-readable + +Fixes: CVE-2022-1348 - potential DoS from unprivileged users via the state file +Bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/CVE-2022-1348 +--- + logrotate.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- + logrotate.spec.in | 3 +-- + test/Makefile.am | 1 + + test/test-0087.sh | 1 + + test/test-0092.sh | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++ + test/test-config.92.in | 4 ++++ + 6 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + create mode 100755 test/test-0092.sh + create mode 100644 test/test-config.92.in + +diff --git a/logrotate.c b/logrotate.c +index e72543c4..b57b64be 100644 +--- a/logrotate.c ++++ b/logrotate.c +@@ -2664,6 +2664,9 @@ static int writeState(const char *stateFilename) + + close(fdcurr); + ++ /* drop world-readable flag to prevent others from locking */ ++ sb.st_mode &= ~(mode_t)S_IROTH; ++ + fdsave = createOutputFile(tmpFilename, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, &sb, prev_acl, 0); + #ifdef WITH_ACL + if (prev_acl) { +@@ -3004,6 +3004,8 @@ + static int lockState(const char *stateFilename, int skip_state_lock) + { + int lockFd = open(stateFilename, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC); ++ struct stat sb; ++ + if (lockFd == -1) { + if (errno == ENOENT) { + message(MESS_DEBUG, "Creating stub state file: %s\n", +@@ -3012,9 +3016,9 @@ static int lockState(const char *stateFilename, int skip_state_lock) + message(MESS_DEBUG, "Creating stub state file: %s\n", + stateFilename); + +- /* create a stub state file with mode 0644 */ ++ /* create a stub state file with mode 0640 */ + lockFd = open(stateFilename, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, +- S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH); ++ S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP); + if (lockFd == -1) { + message(MESS_ERROR, "error creating stub state file %s: %s\n", + stateFilename, strerror(errno)); +@@ -3034,6 +3038,22 @@ static int lockState(const char *stateFilename, int skip_state_lock) + return 0; + } + ++ if (fstat(lockFd, &sb) == -1) { ++ message(MESS_ERROR, "error stat()ing state file %s: %s\n", ++ stateFilename, strerror(errno)); ++ close(lockFd); ++ return 1; ++ } ++ ++ if (sb.st_mode & S_IROTH) { ++ message(MESS_ERROR, "state file %s is world-readable and thus can" ++ " be locked from other unprivileged users." ++ " Skipping lock acquisition...\n", ++ stateFilename); ++ close(lockFd); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + if (flock(lockFd, LOCK_EX | LOCK_NB) == -1) { + if (errno == EWOULDBLOCK) { + message(MESS_ERROR, "state file %s is already locked\n" +diff --git a/logrotate.spec.in b/logrotate.spec.in +index 92e1d97d..3caabf23 100644 +--- a/logrotate.spec.in ++++ b/logrotate.spec.in +@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ install -p -m 644 examples/logrotate.conf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/logrotat + install -p -m 644 examples/btmp $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.d/btmp + install -p -m 644 examples/wtmp $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.d/wtmp + install -p -m 755 examples/logrotate.cron $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/cron.daily/logrotate +-touch $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/lib/logrotate.status + + %clean + rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT +@@ -55,4 +54,4 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT + %attr(0755, root, root) %{_sysconfdir}/cron.daily/logrotate + %attr(0644, root, root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.conf + %attr(0755, root, root) %{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.d +-%attr(0644, root, root) %verify(not size md5 mtime) %config(noreplace) %{_localstatedir}/lib/logrotate.status ++%ghost %attr(0640, root, root) %verify(not size md5 mtime) %{_localstatedir}/lib/logrotate.status +diff --git a/test/test-0087.sh b/test/test-0087.sh +index 91e5266f..aeff2c65 100755 +--- a/test/test-0087.sh ++++ b/test/test-0087.sh +@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ cleanup 87 + preptest test.log 87 1 + + touch state ++chmod 0640 state + + $RLR test-config.87 -f & + diff --git a/main/logrotate/logrotate.post-upgrade b/main/logrotate/logrotate.post-upgrade new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..b2dd6301bb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/logrotate/logrotate.post-upgrade @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +#!/bin/sh + +ver_old=$2 + +if [ "$(apk version -t "$ver_old" '3.18.0-r3')" = '<' ]; then + # need to remove world permissions from status file, to dodge + # error: state file /var/lib/logrotate.status is world-readable + # 640 matches the spec file + chmod 640 /var/lib/logrotate.status +fi + +exit 0 diff --git a/main/lua-mqtt-publish/APKBUILD b/main/lua-mqtt-publish/APKBUILD index 5300d31df19..eecc199bc40 100644 --- a/main/lua-mqtt-publish/APKBUILD +++ b/main/lua-mqtt-publish/APKBUILD @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> _luaversions="5.1 5.2 5.3" pkgname=lua-mqtt-publish -pkgver=0.3 -pkgrel=1 +pkgver=0.4 +pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Lua module for simple MQTT connect, publish and disconnect" url="https://github.com/ncopa/lua-mqtt-publish" arch="all" @@ -40,4 +40,4 @@ _split() { done } -sha512sums="ccbf87c53305e19a2dd04f07ac7b3d1fdae3ce0a6c726b89f357d3d5a68a73c0ce830d0ca47d57eaf1990224fcc97794720bdbc8e4e0caa408003cc33dce3b65 lua-mqtt-publish-0.3.tar.gz" +sha512sums="a4a803002a6dd1af508b5a33296ac2aecdcb26af0a4b6fe11bfe17145e0f4d36c4271591c68e1f1e221cdfe71c3ba00852ae87d7065e0a58e235e8ba48ea0cbb lua-mqtt-publish-0.4.tar.gz" diff --git a/main/mariadb/APKBUILD b/main/mariadb/APKBUILD index 61840717e60..684caa3cbde 100644 --- a/main/mariadb/APKBUILD +++ b/main/mariadb/APKBUILD @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ # Contributor: Jake Buchholz <tomalok@gmail.com> # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=mariadb -pkgver=10.5.16 +pkgver=10.5.17 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="A fast SQL database server" url="https://www.mariadb.org/" @@ -45,6 +45,13 @@ source="https://archive.mariadb.org/mariadb-$pkgver/source/mariadb-$pkgver.tar.g " # secfixes: +# 10.5.17-r0: +# - CVE-2022-32082 +# - CVE-2022-32089 +# - CVE-2022-32081 +# - CVE-2018-25032 +# - CVE-2022-32091 +# - CVE-2022-32084 # 10.5.16-r0: # - CVE-2022-27376 # - CVE-2022-27377 @@ -243,7 +250,7 @@ build() { check() { # exclude test-connect which seems to be buggy. testsuite does not set port env var - ctest -E '(test-connect)' + ctest -E '(test-connect|aes)' } package() { @@ -496,7 +503,7 @@ _plugin_rocksdb() { } sha512sums=" -28cea63cc3c5e1b236fb13593285e5d4b9aac5eaf259784e760def42bca8b09954510d39014a7a7c9e8656d61f5995a356df2f2ebb0df2696dd739ff3de5865d mariadb-10.5.16.tar.gz +5a68126aac7072bed549404c89f7215bc47dede8f72559076988469372b96523a800fd6bbf11ff3003a277ee30788ca99a21507b7d7e2b7e98437ca70b5ca0fc mariadb-10.5.17.tar.gz c352969f6665b0ffa387f7b185a5dea7751f4b16c12c809627857b27321efa09159369d7dd5c852d6159a9f173cb895fb601f0c52a1fa6e3527899520030964c mariadb.initd b15d5cbe4e1547ad18cd1ce5a2d5a75d8dd8e017ca725154abdf28d3d1cae8403e0c3e93745441872f72e1ba9f2fef587f596231a231e374bd5a61ba3d8945ea ppc-remove-glibc-dep.patch 598490b4bb45c9f7be46086d25c2b6c601d417c45f11aa519c2290065e7d6e98a7519f9860b823e67a8fd3e6ce3b4728af73ec3a2c66eec32b42fd4ad7cc07f7 disable-failing-test.patch diff --git a/main/mqtt-exec/0001-Let-library-generate-client-id-when-unset.patch b/main/mqtt-exec/0001-Let-library-generate-client-id-when-unset.patch deleted file mode 100644 index bd6411e5e31..00000000000 --- a/main/mqtt-exec/0001-Let-library-generate-client-id-when-unset.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -From 5ba6139990373e77d638f4dd903281673e145e7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> -Date: Wed, 9 Oct 2019 15:00:51 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Let library generate client id when unset - ---- - mqtt-exec.c | 17 ++++------------- - 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/mqtt-exec.c b/mqtt-exec.c -index 5c69325..ca585f9 100644 ---- a/mqtt-exec.c -+++ b/mqtt-exec.c -@@ -151,8 +151,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - int keepalive = 60; - int i, c, rc = 1; - struct userdata ud; -- char hostname[256]; -- static char id[MOSQ_MQTT_ID_MAX_LENGTH+1]; -+ char *id = NULL; - struct mosquitto *mosq = NULL; - char *username = NULL; - char *password = NULL; -@@ -174,9 +173,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - - memset(&ud, 0, sizeof(ud)); - -- memset(hostname, 0, sizeof(hostname)); -- memset(id, 0, sizeof(id)); -- - while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "cdh:i:k:p:P:q:t:u:v", opts, &i)) != -1) { - switch(c) { - case 'c': -@@ -194,7 +190,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - MOSQ_MQTT_ID_MAX_LENGTH); - return 1; - } -- strncpy(id, optarg, sizeof(id)-1); -+ id = optarg; - break; - case 'k': - keepalive = atoi(optarg); -@@ -276,12 +272,6 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - for (i=0; i <= ud.command_argc; i++) - ud.command_argv[i] = optind+i < argc ? argv[optind+i] : NULL; - -- if (id[0] == '\0') { -- /* generate an id */ -- gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)-1); -- snprintf(id, sizeof(id), "mqttexe/%x-%s", getpid(), hostname); -- } -- - mosquitto_lib_init(); - mosq = mosquitto_new(id, clean_session, &ud); - if (mosq == NULL) -@@ -289,7 +279,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - - if (debug) { - printf("host=%s:%d\nid=%s\ntopic_count=%zu\ncommand=%s\n", -- host, port, id, ud.topic_count, ud.command_argv[0]); -+ host, port, id ? id : "(null)", ud.topic_count, -+ ud.command_argv[0]); - mosquitto_log_callback_set(mosq, log_cb); - } - --- -2.23.0 - diff --git a/main/mqtt-exec/0001-authentication-expose-authentication-with-credential.patch b/main/mqtt-exec/0001-authentication-expose-authentication-with-credential.patch deleted file mode 100644 index aba1cee9fa5..00000000000 --- a/main/mqtt-exec/0001-authentication-expose-authentication-with-credential.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,89 +0,0 @@ -From 5ee7377172dc0f30a64d009210db7efbf5d2219f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Kevin Daudt <me@ikke.info> -Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2018 22:50:28 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] authentication: expose authentication with credentials - -libmosquitto supports authentication with credentials, so allow settings -credentials through parameters. ---- - mqtt-exec.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++++- - 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/mqtt-exec.c b/mqtt-exec.c -index fc5ab03..28251fb 100644 ---- a/mqtt-exec.c -+++ b/mqtt-exec.c -@@ -71,8 +71,10 @@ int usage(int retcode) - " -i,--id ID The id to use for this client\n" - " -k,--keepalive SEC Set keepalive to SEC. Default is 60\n" - " -p,--port PORT Set TCP port to PORT. Default is 1883\n" -+" -P,--password PASSWORD Set password for authentication\n" - " -q,--qos QOS Set Quality of Serive to level. Default is 0\n" - " -t,--topic TOPIC Set MQTT topic to TOPIC. May be repeated\n" -+" -u,--username USERNAME Set username for authentication\n" - " -v,--verbose Pass over the topic to application as firs arg\n" - " --will-topic TOPIC Set the client Will topic to TOPIC\n" - " --will-payload MSG Set the client Will message to MSG\n" -@@ -119,6 +121,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - {"qos", required_argument, 0, 'q' }, - {"topic", required_argument, 0, 't' }, - {"verbose", no_argument, 0, 'v' }, -+ {"username", required_argument, 0, 'u' }, -+ {"password", required_argument, 0, 'P' }, - {"will-topic", required_argument, 0, 0x1001 }, - {"will-payload", required_argument, 0, 0x1002 }, - {"will-qos", required_argument, 0, 0x1003 }, -@@ -145,6 +149,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - char hostname[256]; - static char id[MOSQ_MQTT_ID_MAX_LENGTH+1]; - struct mosquitto *mosq = NULL; -+ char *username = NULL; -+ char *password = NULL; - - char *will_payload = NULL; - int will_qos = 0; -@@ -166,7 +172,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - memset(hostname, 0, sizeof(hostname)); - memset(id, 0, sizeof(id)); - -- while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "cdh:i:k:p:q:t:v", opts, &i)) != -1) { -+ while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "cdh:i:k:p:P:q:t:u:v", opts, &i)) != -1) { - switch(c) { - case 'c': - clean_session = false; -@@ -191,6 +197,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - case 'p': - port = atoi(optarg); - break; -+ case 'P': -+ password = optarg; - case 'q': - ud.qos = atoi(optarg); - if (!valid_qos_range(ud.qos, "QoS")) -@@ -202,6 +210,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - sizeof(char *) * ud.topic_count); - ud.topics[ud.topic_count-1] = optarg; - break; -+ case 'u': -+ username = optarg; - case 'v': - ud.verbose = 1; - break; -@@ -286,6 +296,14 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[]) - goto cleanup; - } - -+ if (!username != !password) { -+ fprintf(stderr, "Need to set both username and password\n"); -+ goto cleanup; -+ } -+ -+ if (username && password) -+ mosquitto_username_pw_set(mosq, username, password); -+ - #ifdef WITH_TLS - if ((cafile || capath) && mosquitto_tls_set(mosq, cafile, capath, certfile, - keyfile, NULL)) { --- -2.18.0 - diff --git a/main/mqtt-exec/APKBUILD b/main/mqtt-exec/APKBUILD index 98f35288f43..4d312cbc718 100644 --- a/main/mqtt-exec/APKBUILD +++ b/main/mqtt-exec/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=mqtt-exec -pkgver=0.4 -pkgrel=5 +pkgver=0.5 +pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="simple MQTT client that executes a command on messages" url="https://github.com/ncopa/mqtt-exec" arch="all" @@ -12,9 +12,8 @@ makedepends="$depends_dev mosquitto-dev" options="!check" # no checks available. subpackages="$pkgname-dbg $pkgname-openrc" source="mqtt-exec-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/ncopa/mqtt-exec/archive/v$pkgver.tar.gz - 0001-authentication-expose-authentication-with-credential.patch - 0001-Let-library-generate-client-id-when-unset.patch mqtt-exec.initd + mqtt-exec.confd " builddir="$srcdir"/mqtt-exec-$pkgver @@ -31,7 +30,8 @@ package() { "$pkgdir"/etc/init.d/mqtt-exec || return 1 } -sha512sums="1448b2dda0f27a5275c113331ea2bc073ec1740797c1bb5b472ee3e0fd4d3ef4bcdfa6dc42e7540ee154b291c3d70df89f0646899ebb1bfe585d1384797de5e7 mqtt-exec-0.4.tar.gz -418058ecc05922df186d0dcbfeab7656977256a143f0346406598d1cf7331d3ba95a9b004bf3b6581be2e3cb2fbf5e69d7954b4c7ac488863f0318506c7f1c7c 0001-authentication-expose-authentication-with-credential.patch -7007ad1afcba6b5c0e6224a30e3a6c1b9ce178603b27f575bb76d7b979b8e7f4c4c1226afa3ff8cf1f217fff832d0a69cff1cfbc205203dcb8a98afbf6f345ed 0001-Let-library-generate-client-id-when-unset.patch -7e0c461d5ed73fb8bac1da5f78bb7d8204f692fc3980ee916057c19c3673591d4143a71cc846f863566abfcc9ada22281bb690bc146e9ae37f43896248e5ed4a mqtt-exec.initd" +sha512sums=" +55746aabe17d47153c01549a65f0db9278a39dc642e355b8416e905934a3abe233eb0ad763ae8add08bf6c3ad8ccaa97e9bac4372c8af6fea522f6670378acd7 mqtt-exec-0.5.tar.gz +f8cab7fe709fc80b3a75f1d65d55e10c05a4b27e319a9190d3ee78050fea86d8c6512e3d624b8b413dab01b2043bed5f672453090251b93d261d79125f9f0d17 mqtt-exec.initd +e5cce69f5ad1f0fcf0eb0be7675c2f4ca4ba5518e8303adb16673b7e402dbe8d48b57c4b4512a0d3aba4541241d2ddeca68b88354d089606f67a5549508b44b5 mqtt-exec.confd +" diff --git a/main/mqtt-exec/mqtt-exec.confd b/main/mqtt-exec/mqtt-exec.confd new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..10a14760bbb --- /dev/null +++ b/main/mqtt-exec/mqtt-exec.confd @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +# The MQTT broker to connect to +#mqtt_broker=msg.alpinelinux.org + +# The topics to subscribe to. Separate topics by whitespace. +#mqtt_topics= + +# Set the topic for the Will +#will_topic= + +# Whether the Will should be retained or not +#will_retain=yes + +# The message in the Will +#will_payload= + +# QOS level for the Will +#will_qos= + +# Optional username to authenticate as +#mqtt_user= + +# Password for the user +#export MQTT_EXEC_PASSWORD= diff --git a/main/mqtt-exec/mqtt-exec.initd b/main/mqtt-exec/mqtt-exec.initd index ff94d01d449..c9d4e941cb9 100644 --- a/main/mqtt-exec/mqtt-exec.initd +++ b/main/mqtt-exec/mqtt-exec.initd @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ start_pre() { if [ -n "$will_qos" ]; then set -- "$@" --will-qos "$will_qos" fi + if [ -n "$mqtt_user" ]; then + set -- "$@" --username "$mqtt_user" + fi set -- "$@" -- ${exec_command} diff --git a/main/musl/APKBUILD b/main/musl/APKBUILD index b6f28b12021..ec41b411722 100644 --- a/main/musl/APKBUILD +++ b/main/musl/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: Timo Teräs <timo.teras@iki.fi> pkgname=musl pkgver=1.2.2 -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=2 pkgdesc="the musl c library (libc) implementation" url="https://musl.libc.org/" arch="all" @@ -26,6 +26,10 @@ source="musl-$commit.tar.gz::https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/snapshot/$commi revert-faccessat2.patch syscall-cp-epoll.patch + relr-1.patch + relr-2.patch + relr-3.patch + relr-4.patch ldconfig __stack_chk_fail_local.c @@ -174,6 +178,10 @@ sha512sums=" a76f79b801497ad994746cf82bb6eaf86f9e1ae646e6819fbae8532a7f4eee53a96ac1d4e789ec8f66aea2a68027b0597f7a579b3369e01258da8accfce41370 handle-aux-at_base.patch 76de7511fa1ae44aa513a11d306a691172342c04cdd524bcc2f70d0e646744de832ef3254cdd3d409efa4581d601eee7e02a70af11f5530f6bacd59f1e65a979 revert-faccessat2.patch d256ba7857c98d39b86aa73674eda5d45ab8134dde3fac2bc48ebb6ba9a824c20c43f2cdc6af54d2a45c162d1e4ec6517c36400992bba10496bcc51b374cbcd0 syscall-cp-epoll.patch +8ebcde1e07819de208ab89ed0a71fdcc67a5b1cecec5aa19a92bc9f4f3c2708a9ff1528370089de0b71e9ec3b2e08dfa49694db433ac190ba055aa112ae12bde relr-1.patch +38b40ebedf57ba05ba14807a55a26261eeca8b6226a90a7aaebaaa31bae0bb7f5b98e0ce3ed727b704b828c9e509a21745f3e089585f8dea7092be164ec9d908 relr-2.patch +9dc41f682887ef9a7b00253f576d0b738936c20d9bc5a54fa96552a82a2f056f0111936ad9778b96745befd6a660276618b4e05bef3c7f52d8c2a9e6d41e386c relr-3.patch +ee6ec5943df10597af0df3d6f792720a22d2070debb6933656a10a906725d1170c28c32ba8ad53efc72e77bd1d97efdbd3c80e91eddb856f377e917ff14ae8f3 relr-4.patch 8d3a2d5315fc56fee7da9abb8b89bb38c6046c33d154c10d168fb35bfde6b0cf9f13042a3bceee34daf091bc409d699223735dcf19f382eeee1f6be34154f26f ldconfig 062bb49fa54839010acd4af113e20f7263dde1c8a2ca359b5fb2661ef9ed9d84a0f7c3bc10c25dcfa10bb3c5a4874588dff636ac43d5dbb3d748d75400756d0b __stack_chk_fail_local.c 0d80f37b34a35e3d14b012257c50862dfeb9d2c81139ea2dfa101d981d093b009b9fa450ba27a708ac59377a48626971dfc58e20a3799084a65777a0c32cbc7d getconf.c diff --git a/main/musl/relr-1.patch b/main/musl/relr-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..f7b4b9084f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/musl/relr-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +From d32dadd60efb9d3b255351a3b532f8e4c3dd0db1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Fangrui Song <i@maskray.me> +Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2022 17:24:47 -0400 +Subject: ldso: support DT_RELR relative relocation format + +this resolves DT_RELR relocations in non-ldso, dynamic-linked objects. +--- + include/elf.h | 8 ++++++-- + ldso/dynlink.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++++- + src/internal/dynlink.h | 2 +- + 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/elf.h b/include/elf.h +index 86e2f0bb..9e980a29 100644 +--- a/include/elf.h ++++ b/include/elf.h +@@ -385,7 +385,8 @@ typedef struct { + #define SHT_PREINIT_ARRAY 16 + #define SHT_GROUP 17 + #define SHT_SYMTAB_SHNDX 18 +-#define SHT_NUM 19 ++#define SHT_RELR 19 ++#define SHT_NUM 20 + #define SHT_LOOS 0x60000000 + #define SHT_GNU_ATTRIBUTES 0x6ffffff5 + #define SHT_GNU_HASH 0x6ffffff6 +@@ -754,7 +755,10 @@ typedef struct { + #define DT_PREINIT_ARRAY 32 + #define DT_PREINIT_ARRAYSZ 33 + #define DT_SYMTAB_SHNDX 34 +-#define DT_NUM 35 ++#define DT_RELRSZ 35 ++#define DT_RELR 36 ++#define DT_RELRENT 37 ++#define DT_NUM 38 + #define DT_LOOS 0x6000000d + #define DT_HIOS 0x6ffff000 + #define DT_LOPROC 0x70000000 +diff --git a/ldso/dynlink.c b/ldso/dynlink.c +index cc677952..e92f03cb 100644 +--- a/ldso/dynlink.c ++++ b/ldso/dynlink.c +@@ -210,7 +210,8 @@ static void decode_vec(size_t *v, size_t *a, size_t cnt) + size_t i; + for (i=0; i<cnt; i++) a[i] = 0; + for (; v[0]; v+=2) if (v[0]-1<cnt-1) { +- a[0] |= 1UL<<v[0]; ++ if (v[0] < 8*sizeof(long)) ++ a[0] |= 1UL<<v[0]; + a[v[0]] = v[1]; + } + } +@@ -515,6 +516,23 @@ static void do_relocs(struct dso *dso, size_t *rel, size_t rel_size, size_t stri + } + } + ++static void do_relr_relocs(struct dso *dso, size_t *relr, size_t relr_size) ++{ ++ unsigned char *base = dso->base; ++ size_t *reloc_addr; ++ for (; relr_size; relr++, relr_size-=sizeof(size_t)) ++ if ((relr[0]&1) == 0) { ++ reloc_addr = laddr(dso, relr[0]); ++ *reloc_addr++ += (size_t)base; ++ } else { ++ int i = 0; ++ for (size_t bitmap=relr[0]; (bitmap>>=1); i++) ++ if (bitmap&1) ++ reloc_addr[i] += (size_t)base; ++ reloc_addr += 8*sizeof(size_t)-1; ++ } ++} ++ + static void redo_lazy_relocs() + { + struct dso *p = lazy_head, *next; +@@ -1357,6 +1375,7 @@ static void reloc_all(struct dso *p) + 2+(dyn[DT_PLTREL]==DT_RELA)); + do_relocs(p, laddr(p, dyn[DT_REL]), dyn[DT_RELSZ], 2); + do_relocs(p, laddr(p, dyn[DT_RELA]), dyn[DT_RELASZ], 3); ++ do_relr_relocs(p, laddr(p, dyn[DT_RELR]), dyn[DT_RELRSZ]); + + if (head != &ldso && p->relro_start != p->relro_end) { + long ret = __syscall(SYS_mprotect, laddr(p, p->relro_start), +diff --git a/src/internal/dynlink.h b/src/internal/dynlink.h +index 51c0639f..830354eb 100644 +--- a/src/internal/dynlink.h ++++ b/src/internal/dynlink.h +@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ struct fdpic_dummy_loadmap { + #endif + + #define AUX_CNT 32 +-#define DYN_CNT 32 ++#define DYN_CNT 37 + + typedef void (*stage2_func)(unsigned char *, size_t *); + +-- +cgit v1.2.1 + diff --git a/main/musl/relr-2.patch b/main/musl/relr-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0bbf8128e71 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/musl/relr-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From bf99258564fd5b58974d93201ab61506eb8cb03e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx> +Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2022 17:29:01 -0400 +Subject: ldso: process RELR only for non-FDPIC archs + +the way RELR is applied is not a meaningful operation for FDPIC (there +is no single "base" address). it seems unlikely RELR would ever be +added for FDPIC, but if it ever is, the behavior and possibly data +format will need to be different, so guard against calling the +non-FDPIC code. +--- + ldso/dynlink.c | 3 ++- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/ldso/dynlink.c b/ldso/dynlink.c +index e92f03cb..fd09ca69 100644 +--- a/ldso/dynlink.c ++++ b/ldso/dynlink.c +@@ -1375,7 +1375,8 @@ static void reloc_all(struct dso *p) + 2+(dyn[DT_PLTREL]==DT_RELA)); + do_relocs(p, laddr(p, dyn[DT_REL]), dyn[DT_RELSZ], 2); + do_relocs(p, laddr(p, dyn[DT_RELA]), dyn[DT_RELASZ], 3); +- do_relr_relocs(p, laddr(p, dyn[DT_RELR]), dyn[DT_RELRSZ]); ++ if (!DL_FDPIC) ++ do_relr_relocs(p, laddr(p, dyn[DT_RELR]), dyn[DT_RELRSZ]); + + if (head != &ldso && p->relro_start != p->relro_end) { + long ret = __syscall(SYS_mprotect, laddr(p, p->relro_start), +-- +cgit v1.2.1 + diff --git a/main/musl/relr-3.patch b/main/musl/relr-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4094d3fbac1 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/musl/relr-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 6f3ead0ae16deb9f0004b275e29a276c9712ee3c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Rich Felker <dalias@aerifal.cx> +Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2022 08:30:36 -0400 +Subject: process DT_RELR relocations in ldso-startup/static-pie + +commit d32dadd60efb9d3b255351a3b532f8e4c3dd0db1 added DT_RELR +processing for programs and shared libraries processed by the dynamic +linker, but left them unsupported in the dynamic linker itseld and in +static pie binaries, which self-relocate via code in dlstart.c. + +add the equivalent processing to this code path so that there are not +arbitrary restrictions on where the new packed relative relocation +form can be used. +--- + ldso/dlstart.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/ldso/dlstart.c b/ldso/dlstart.c +index 20d50f2c..259f5e18 100644 +--- a/ldso/dlstart.c ++++ b/ldso/dlstart.c +@@ -140,6 +140,21 @@ hidden void _dlstart_c(size_t *sp, size_t *dynv) + size_t *rel_addr = (void *)(base + rel[0]); + *rel_addr = base + rel[2]; + } ++ ++ rel = (void *)(base+dyn[DT_RELR]); ++ rel_size = dyn[DT_RELRSZ]; ++ size_t *relr_addr = 0; ++ for (; rel_size; rel++, rel_size-=sizeof(size_t)) { ++ if ((rel[0]&1) == 0) { ++ relr_addr = (void *)(base + rel[0]); ++ *relr_addr++ += base; ++ } else { ++ for (size_t i=0, bitmap=rel[0]; bitmap>>=1; i++) ++ if (bitmap&1) ++ relr_addr[i] += base; ++ relr_addr += 8*sizeof(size_t)-1; ++ } ++ } + #endif + + stage2_func dls2; +-- +cgit v1.2.1 + diff --git a/main/musl/relr-4.patch b/main/musl/relr-4.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..68c5446b880 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/musl/relr-4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +diff --git a/ldso/dynlink.c b/ldso/dynlink.c +index 7b47b163..753de91d 100644 +--- a/ldso/dynlink.c ++++ b/ldso/dynlink.c +@@ -552,6 +552,7 @@ static void do_relocs(struct dso *dso, size_t *rel, size_t rel_size, size_t stri + + static void do_relr_relocs(struct dso *dso, size_t *relr, size_t relr_size) + { ++ if (dso == &ldso) return; // self-relocation already done a entry point + unsigned char *base = dso->base; + size_t *reloc_addr; + for (; relr_size; relr++, relr_size-=sizeof(size_t)) diff --git a/main/ncurses/APKBUILD b/main/ncurses/APKBUILD index 42c2215b4fd..97fb181398c 100644 --- a/main/ncurses/APKBUILD +++ b/main/ncurses/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ pkgname=ncurses pkgver=6.2_p20210109 _ver=${pkgver/_p/-} -pkgrel=0 +_mirror_commit=152c5a605234b7ea36ba3a03ec07e124bb6aac75 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Console display library" url="https://invisible-island.net/ncurses/" arch="all" @@ -11,10 +12,14 @@ license="MIT" makedepends_build="ncurses" subpackages="$pkgname-static $pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-libs $pkgname-terminfo-base:base:noarch $pkgname-terminfo:terminfo:noarch" -source="https://invisible-mirror.net/archives/ncurses/current/ncurses-$_ver.tgz" -builddir="$srcdir"/ncurses-$_ver +source="$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://github.com/mirror/ncurses/archive/$_mirror_commit.tar.gz + CVE-2022-29458.patch + " +builddir="$srcdir"/ncurses-$_mirror_commit # secfixes: +# 6.2_p20210109-r1: +# - CVE-2022-29458 # 6.2_p20200530-r0: # - CVE-2021-39537 # 6.1_p20180414-r0: @@ -112,4 +117,7 @@ static() { mv "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/*.a "$subpkgdir"/usr/lib/ } -sha512sums="a4adb1000632261f5e42e768051bb4d2cae47d994b13d8e7416ffca048445b09fa96155cb3690000b2725e500b469cce051efc74fe0bcde72b91005586db3c47 ncurses-6.2-20210109.tgz" +sha512sums=" +889c014b6fc393c91b2803653c31ece553782afadf9d485345bb81c05ee4865297aad2cca6f3f02b6c8403210e87ac7d3979c6b81aade34c19617a873b8cf5c1 ncurses-6.2_p20210109.tar.gz +b7904866af8afc7a163151a803ca506981d87f58ce9a720a28c27aa6fa1ac1cf43dad8916a8265779ff2253d2dbacb2793733cadf44dbe10f6cf894944042708 CVE-2022-29458.patch +" diff --git a/main/ncurses/CVE-2022-29458.patch b/main/ncurses/CVE-2022-29458.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9481a99a310 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/ncurses/CVE-2022-29458.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +--- a/ncurses/tinfo/read_entry.c ++++ b/ncurses/tinfo/read_entry.c +@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ convert_strings(char *buf, char **Strings, int count, int size, char *table) + { + int i; + char *p; ++ bool corrupt = FALSE; + + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { + if (IS_NEG1(buf + 2 * i)) { +@@ -154,8 +155,20 @@ convert_strings(char *buf, char **Strings, int count, int size, char *table) + } else if (MyNumber(buf + 2 * i) > size) { + Strings[i] = ABSENT_STRING; + } else { +- Strings[i] = (MyNumber(buf + 2 * i) + table); +- TR(TRACE_DATABASE, ("Strings[%d] = %s", i, _nc_visbuf(Strings[i]))); ++ int nn = MyNumber(buf + 2 * i); ++ if (nn >= 0 && nn < size) { ++ Strings[i] = (nn + table); ++ TR(TRACE_DATABASE, ("Strings[%d] = %s", i, ++ _nc_visbuf(Strings[i]))); ++ } else { ++ if (!corrupt) { ++ corrupt = TRUE; ++ TR(TRACE_DATABASE, ++ ("ignore out-of-range index %d to Strings[]", nn)); ++ _nc_warning("corrupt data found in convert_strings"); ++ } ++ Strings[i] = ABSENT_STRING; ++ } + } + + /* make sure all strings are NUL terminated */ diff --git a/main/net-snmp/APKBUILD b/main/net-snmp/APKBUILD index e4f0432961f..dc55859e858 100644 --- a/main/net-snmp/APKBUILD +++ b/main/net-snmp/APKBUILD @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ # Contributor: Carlo Landmeter <clandmeter@alpinelinux.org> # Maintainer: Carlo Landmeter <clandmeter@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=net-snmp -pkgver=5.9 -pkgrel=3 +pkgver=5.9.3 +pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Simple Network Management Protocol" url="http://www.net-snmp.org/" arch="all" @@ -17,14 +17,20 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-dbg $pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev $pkgname-libs $pkgname-agent source="https://downloads.sourceforge.net/$pkgname/$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz netsnmp-swinst-crash.patch fix-includes.patch - Prevent-parsing-IP-address-twice.patch snmpd.initd snmpd.confd snmptrapd.confd " -builddir="$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver" +# secfixes: +# 5.9.3-r0: +# - CVE-2022-24805 +# - CVE-2022-24806 +# - CVE-2022-24807 +# - CVE-2022-24808 +# - CVE-2022-24809 +# - CVE-2022-24810 prepare() { update_config_sub @@ -144,10 +150,9 @@ tools() { } sha512sums=" -df3273f03065ea5cb7d63398308ada06bcd186e0bc48929e81ba647f392b646ab81ddc241aebcd75408ec29231377375af62edf2835e9c3eb01d0a6856b79434 net-snmp-5.9.tar.gz +a476df4967029a2eb03d27b0e250170785d0a8c143d49b900ee958c3cbdfaccd415b70af40f6fbed9cb8819d522c35a6073a431091d908ccc7c018fa0aaa2abc net-snmp-5.9.3.tar.gz 4ad92f50b14d5e27ba86256cc532a2dd055502f4d5fbb1700434f9f01f881fd09bb1eadb94e727554e1470f036707558314c64a66d0376b54e71ab31d5e4baa3 netsnmp-swinst-crash.patch 87a552bd2e41684bba6e87fbcf6454a85ee912d7a339411fda24cebddf7661f0856729e076a917920a542cf84b687ffd90a091daa15f2c48f0ff64f3a53c0ddb fix-includes.patch -0a2d255019292e8d7780fe629e418def5a3e2f2807796567d0c25e6217257f2d51f289414e87f8ac2d3bc70c4019c0815e61a27c55fc00476bf46d23d30b68d9 Prevent-parsing-IP-address-twice.patch 896ef65a6f420073746470cdbd0de8f356c5b936d35e131754905b3d4323c24dcd3a09e0cc8bd90b12e3402f01e478f927f0e4163cb85cb0cc03db3c2e0491f4 snmpd.initd fb101aa758d741ed3ea88b11f1cd49cfd04bd03ce62435f3acb17724748131c57f00b71fd45cb7e7871d65a1aab576652cd6e158b6406aa6d0998582b8235ef5 snmpd.confd 073fd2b83eedd6eda1f7345350268ce7946ef6d67a8f26f7c232e46feb75babf68272ae12071a2f9ea76ede71393b3ae4672d3cd47cfd14ab77e3a6482f2e124 snmptrapd.confd diff --git a/main/net-snmp/Prevent-parsing-IP-address-twice.patch b/main/net-snmp/Prevent-parsing-IP-address-twice.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 0de70c1d8c0..00000000000 --- a/main/net-snmp/Prevent-parsing-IP-address-twice.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,47 +0,0 @@ -From eb1b11bb7f3ac3281dc6e92d94e8fa749cac44e0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: =?UTF-8?q?Josef=20=C5=98=C3=ADdk=C3=BD?= <jridky@redhat.com> -Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2021 10:15:30 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] Prevent parsing IP address twice (#199) - -This fixes issue, that is caused by parsing IP address twice. -First as IPv4 and as IPv6 at second, even thow the address was -properly parsed as a valid IPv4 address. ---- - snmplib/transports/snmpUDPDomain.c | 2 +- - snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c | 10 +++++++++- - 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPDomain.c b/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPDomain.c -index 46c818753..eea5840d0 100644 ---- a/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPDomain.c -+++ b/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPDomain.c -@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ netsnmp_udp_parse_security(const char *token, char *param) - /* Nope, wasn't a dotted quad. Must be a hostname. */ - int ret = netsnmp_gethostbyname_v4(sourcep, &network.s_addr); - if (ret < 0) { -- config_perror("cannot resolve source hostname"); -+ config_perror("cannot resolve IPv4 source hostname"); - return; - } - } -diff --git a/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c b/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c -index a6ee2dec3..e612bf2de 100644 ---- a/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c -+++ b/snmplib/transports/snmpUDPIPv6Domain.c -@@ -735,7 +735,15 @@ netsnmp_udp6_parse_security(const char *token, char *param) - memset(&pton_addr.sin6_addr.s6_addr, '\0', - sizeof(struct in6_addr)); - } else if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, sourcep, &pton_addr.sin6_addr) != 1) { -- /* Nope, wasn't a numeric address. Must be a hostname. */ -+ /* Nope, wasn't a numeric IPv6 address. Must be IPv4 or a hostname. */ -+ -+ /* Try interpreting as dotted quad - IPv4 */ -+ struct in_addr network; -+ if (inet_pton(AF_INET, sourcep, &network) > 0){ -+ /* Yes, it's IPv4 - so it's already parsed and we can return. */ -+ DEBUGMSGTL(("com2sec6", "IPv4 detected for IPv6 parser. Skipping.\n")); -+ return; -+ } - #if HAVE_GETADDRINFO - int gai_error; - diff --git a/main/nodejs/APKBUILD b/main/nodejs/APKBUILD index 4abe5907caf..07135e8dce2 100644 --- a/main/nodejs/APKBUILD +++ b/main/nodejs/APKBUILD @@ -6,6 +6,11 @@ # Maintainer: Jakub Jirutka <jakub@jirutka.cz> # # secfixes: +# 14.20.1-r0: +# - CVE-2022-32213 +# - CVE-2022-32214 +# - CVE-2022-32215 +# - CVE-2022-35256 # 14.19.0-r0: # - CVE-2022-21824 # - CVE-2021-44533 @@ -87,11 +92,14 @@ # - CVE-2017-14919 # 6.11.1-r0: # - CVE-2017-1000381 +# 0: +# - CVE-2022-32212 +# - CVE-2022-32223 # pkgname=nodejs # Note: Update only to even-numbered versions (e.g. 6.y.z, 8.y.z)! # Odd-numbered versions are supported only for 9 months by upstream. -pkgver=14.19.0 +pkgver=14.20.1 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="JavaScript runtime built on V8 engine - LTS version" url="https://nodejs.org/" @@ -208,7 +216,7 @@ npm() { } sha512sums=" -2973947c60fea08fa6e5a4adfd0b8e419fdeb69261e2e1df4d80cc75ee482115494040733a278f873d6402343f8424e80ea5151d85b99f2fc49c85d1dcb9135e node-v14.19.0.tar.gz +955a393506a11a288e4eb86de3b1cb42aa0668b1837e2a34b92ce6743be0ac7a4d50a62d1a909c7eaf8d864fd900b69f7c6aef0d5c33d26b126adf1e6ce483b2 node-v14.20.1.tar.gz dbe8167b61518f8f59176759d69834d57bf3e6a5a5fd3dfc2359cafe0325da08b27f8220d278ed77f50c9f63a03313eabbbb0eaca3e592e5bb4e0d5be0ced373 disable-running-gyp-on-shared-deps.patch 44e81fbf254bd79e38b813f7f5a1336df854588939cba50aaec600660495f9b7745a7049a99eb59d15a51100b3a44f66892a902d7fc32e1399b51883ad4c02cf link-with-libatomic-on-mips32.patch 30ca1ce7f9512c943950b8eec98bca99d24c740ebaa14619292fe5ed931dcf603ca90afb1d704ca7f545e421752ba4dde81c0c5bbb5242eb1726739ca627e15f fix-build-with-system-c-ares.patch diff --git a/main/openssl/APKBUILD b/main/openssl/APKBUILD index 172790ccef3..329257b3e54 100644 --- a/main/openssl/APKBUILD +++ b/main/openssl/APKBUILD @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Maintainer: Timo Teras <timo.teras@iki.fi> pkgname=openssl -pkgver=1.1.1o +pkgver=1.1.1s _abiver=${pkgver%.*} pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Toolkit for Transport Layer Security (TLS)" @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ source="https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-$pkgver.tar.gz " # secfixes: +# 1.1.1q-r0: +# - CVE-2022-2097 # 1.1.1n-r0: # - CVE-2022-0778 # 1.1.1l-r0: @@ -48,6 +50,7 @@ source="https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-$pkgver.tar.gz # - CVE-2018-0735 # 0: # - CVE-2022-1292 +# - CVE-2022-2068 build() { local _target _optflags @@ -129,7 +132,7 @@ _libssl() { } sha512sums=" -75b2f1499cb4640229eb6cd35d85cbff2e19db17b959ac4d04b60f1b395b73567f9003521452a0fcfeea9b31b26de0a7bccf476ecf9caae02298f3647cfb7e23 openssl-1.1.1o.tar.gz +2ef983f166b5e1bf456ca37938e7e39d58d4cd85e9fc4b5174a05f5c37cc5ad89c3a9af97a6919bcaab128a8a92e4bdc8a045e5d9156d90768da8f73ac67c5b9 openssl-1.1.1s.tar.gz 43c3255118db6f5f340dc865c0f25ccbcafe5bf7507585244ca59b4d27daf533d6c3171aa32a8685cbb6200104bec535894b633de13feaadff87ab86739a445a man-section.patch e040f23770d52b988578f7ff84d77563340f37c026db7643db8e4ef18e795e27d10cb42cb8656da4d9c57a28283a2828729d70f940edc950c3422a54fea55509 ppc64.patch " diff --git a/main/pcre2/APKBUILD b/main/pcre2/APKBUILD index 57fc26b6bc9..52c91e484ab 100644 --- a/main/pcre2/APKBUILD +++ b/main/pcre2/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: Jakub Jirutka <jakub@jirutka.cz> pkgname=pcre2 pkgver=10.36 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Perl-compatible regular expression library" url="https://pcre.org/" arch="all" @@ -11,7 +11,14 @@ depends_dev="libedit-dev zlib-dev" makedepends="$depends_dev" subpackages="$pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc $pkgname-tools libpcre2-16:_libpcre libpcre2-32:_libpcre" -source="https://ftp.pcre.org/pub/pcre/pcre2-$pkgver.tar.gz" +source="https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/releases/download/pcre2-$pkgver/pcre2-$pkgver.tar.gz + CVE-2022-1586.patch + CVE-2022-1587.patch + " +# secfixes: +# 10.36-r1: +# - CVE-2022-1586 +# - CVE-2022-1587 case "$CARCH" in s390x) _enable_jit="";; # https://bugs.exim.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2468 @@ -70,4 +77,6 @@ tools() { mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin "$subpkgdir"/usr/ } -sha512sums="a776cda406aea4a30f5072b24fc41bafd580d92e6d7c782b3c5468570f58fb085184ff707d90d8e83662f578c4327178f5ff4236222d0b3ca07244ef70528aa8 pcre2-10.36.tar.gz" +sha512sums="a776cda406aea4a30f5072b24fc41bafd580d92e6d7c782b3c5468570f58fb085184ff707d90d8e83662f578c4327178f5ff4236222d0b3ca07244ef70528aa8 pcre2-10.36.tar.gz +b4dedf83b4bde5350d2e7830df60d229e8c00ad00f8182396dd890e8a4474eabb4d794e6de8893ab8c5921859fa39101ac7418d1a0d2bfcaa4010973a2415fa8 CVE-2022-1586.patch +67707353a4a6b5b7a63da304d827b66bbd6befda0c92dc9ca01d57f0dc214166c7564ccab2253334fbf3b222c73c2750a77fe3e7c11e0addab7c6347547e824e CVE-2022-1587.patch" diff --git a/main/pcre2/CVE-2022-1586.patch b/main/pcre2/CVE-2022-1586.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..9dded3558d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/pcre2/CVE-2022-1586.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/50a51cb7e67268e6ad417eb07c9de9bfea5cc55a (modified) +-- +From 50a51cb7e67268e6ad417eb07c9de9bfea5cc55a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zoltan Herczeg <hzmester@freemail.hu> +Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 07:53:25 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fixed a unicode properrty matching issue in JIT + +diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c +index e7dd26c5..94f6a588 100644 +--- a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c ++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c +@@ -7473,7 +7473,7 @@ + { + SLJIT_ASSERT(*cc == XCL_PROP || *cc == XCL_NOTPROP); + cc++; +- if (*cc == PT_CLIST) ++ if (*cc == PT_CLIST && *cc == XCL_PROP) + { + other_cases = PRIV(ucd_caseless_sets) + cc[1]; + while (*other_cases != NOTACHAR) +diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_test.c b/src/pcre2_jit_test.c +index 3b57ce29..8450f0b6 100644 +--- a/src/pcre2_jit_test.c ++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_test.c +@@ -410,6 +410,7 @@ + { MUP, A, 0, 0 | F_PROPERTY, "[\\P{L&}]{2}[^\xc2\x85-\xc2\x89\\p{Ll}\\p{Lu}]{2}", "\xc3\xa9\xe6\x92\xad.a\xe6\x92\xad|\xc2\x8a#" }, + { PCRE2_UCP, 0, 0, 0 | F_PROPERTY, "[a-b\\s]{2,5}[^a]", "AB baaa" }, + { MUP, 0, 0, 0 | F_NOMATCH, "[^\\p{Hangul}\\p{Z}]", " " }, ++ { CMUP, 0, 0, 0, "[^S]\\B", "\xe2\x80\x8a" }, + + /* Possible empty brackets. */ + { MU, A, 0, 0, "(?:|ab||bc|a)+d", "abcxabcabd" }, + diff --git a/main/pcre2/CVE-2022-1587.patch b/main/pcre2/CVE-2022-1587.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..339e5c16420 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/pcre2/CVE-2022-1587.patch @@ -0,0 +1,636 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/PCRE2Project/pcre2/commit/03654e751e7f0700693526b67dfcadda6b42c9d0 (modified) +-- +From 03654e751e7f0700693526b67dfcadda6b42c9d0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Zoltan Herczeg <hzmester@freemail.hu> +Date: Sat, 26 Mar 2022 07:55:50 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Fixed an issue affecting recursions in JIT + +diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c +index 7fcdac86..bf71d158 100644 +--- a/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c ++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_compile.c +@@ -413,6 +413,9 @@ + /* Locals used by fast fail optimization. */ + sljit_s32 early_fail_start_ptr; + sljit_s32 early_fail_end_ptr; ++ /* Variables used by recursive call generator. */ ++ sljit_s32 recurse_bitset_size; ++ uint8_t *recurse_bitset; + + /* Flipped and lower case tables. */ + const sljit_u8 *fcc; +@@ -2316,19 +2319,39 @@ + + #undef RECURSE_TMP_REG_COUNT + ++static BOOL recurse_check_bit(compiler_common *common, sljit_sw bit_index) ++{ ++uint8_t *byte; ++uint8_t mask; ++ ++SLJIT_ASSERT((bit_index & (sizeof(sljit_sw) - 1)) == 0); ++ ++bit_index >>= SLJIT_WORD_SHIFT; ++ ++mask = 1 << (bit_index & 0x7); ++byte = common->recurse_bitset + (bit_index >> 3); ++ ++if (*byte & mask) ++ return FALSE; ++ ++*byte |= mask; ++return TRUE; ++} ++ + static int get_recurse_data_length(compiler_common *common, PCRE2_SPTR cc, PCRE2_SPTR ccend, + BOOL *needs_control_head, BOOL *has_quit, BOOL *has_accept) + { + int length = 1; +-int size; ++int size, offset; + PCRE2_SPTR alternative; + BOOL quit_found = FALSE; + BOOL accept_found = FALSE; + BOOL setsom_found = FALSE; + BOOL setmark_found = FALSE; +-BOOL capture_last_found = FALSE; + BOOL control_head_found = FALSE; + ++memset(common->recurse_bitset, 0, common->recurse_bitset_size); ++ + #if defined DEBUG_FORCE_CONTROL_HEAD && DEBUG_FORCE_CONTROL_HEAD + SLJIT_ASSERT(common->control_head_ptr != 0); + control_head_found = TRUE; +@@ -2351,15 +2374,17 @@ + setsom_found = TRUE; + if (common->mark_ptr != 0) + setmark_found = TRUE; +- if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0) +- capture_last_found = TRUE; ++ if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr)) ++ length++; + cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE; + break; + + case OP_KET: +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0) ++ offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (offset != 0) + { +- length++; ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, offset)) ++ length++; + SLJIT_ASSERT(PRIVATE_DATA(cc + 1) != 0); + cc += PRIVATE_DATA(cc + 1); + } +@@ -2378,39 +2403,55 @@ + case OP_SBRA: + case OP_SBRAPOS: + case OP_SCOND: +- length++; + SLJIT_ASSERT(PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, PRIVATE_DATA(cc))) ++ length++; + cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE; + break; + + case OP_CBRA: + case OP_SCBRA: +- length += 2; +- if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0) +- capture_last_found = TRUE; +- if (common->optimized_cbracket[GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE)] == 0) ++ offset = GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR(offset << 1))) ++ { ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR((offset << 1) + 1))); ++ length += 2; ++ } ++ if (common->optimized_cbracket[offset] == 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR_PRIV(offset))) + length++; ++ if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr)) ++ length++; + cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE + IMM2_SIZE; + break; + + case OP_CBRAPOS: + case OP_SCBRAPOS: +- length += 2 + 2; +- if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0) +- capture_last_found = TRUE; ++ offset = GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR(offset << 1))) ++ { ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR((offset << 1) + 1))); ++ length += 2; ++ } ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR_PRIV(offset))) ++ length++; ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, PRIVATE_DATA(cc))) ++ length++; ++ if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr)) ++ length++; + cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE + IMM2_SIZE; + break; + + case OP_COND: + /* Might be a hidden SCOND. */ + alternative = cc + GET(cc, 1); +- if (*alternative == OP_KETRMAX || *alternative == OP_KETRMIN) ++ if ((*alternative == OP_KETRMAX || *alternative == OP_KETRMIN) && recurse_check_bit(common, PRIVATE_DATA(cc))) + length++; + cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE; + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_1 +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0) ++ offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset)) + length++; + cc += 2; + #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE +@@ -2419,8 +2460,12 @@ + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_2A +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0) ++ offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset)) ++ { ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, offset + sizeof(sljit_sw))); + length += 2; ++ } + cc += 2; + #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE + if (common->utf && HAS_EXTRALEN(cc[-1])) cc += GET_EXTRALEN(cc[-1]); +@@ -2428,8 +2473,12 @@ + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_2B +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0) ++ offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset)) ++ { ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, offset + sizeof(sljit_sw))); + length += 2; ++ } + cc += 2 + IMM2_SIZE; + #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE + if (common->utf && HAS_EXTRALEN(cc[-1])) cc += GET_EXTRALEN(cc[-1]); +@@ -2437,20 +2486,29 @@ + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_1 +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0) ++ offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset)) + length++; + cc += 1; + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_2A +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0) ++ offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset)) ++ { ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, offset + sizeof(sljit_sw))); + length += 2; ++ } + cc += 1; + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_2B +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0) ++ offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset)) ++ { ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, offset + sizeof(sljit_sw))); + length += 2; ++ } + cc += 1 + IMM2_SIZE; + break; + +@@ -2462,7 +2520,9 @@ + #else + size = 1 + 32 / (int)sizeof(PCRE2_UCHAR); + #endif +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0) ++ ++ offset = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (offset != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, offset)) + length += get_class_iterator_size(cc + size); + cc += size; + break; +@@ -2497,8 +2557,7 @@ + case OP_THEN: + SLJIT_ASSERT(common->control_head_ptr != 0); + quit_found = TRUE; +- if (!control_head_found) +- control_head_found = TRUE; ++ control_head_found = TRUE; + cc++; + break; + +@@ -2518,8 +2577,6 @@ + + if (control_head_found) + length++; +-if (capture_last_found) +- length++; + if (quit_found) + { + if (setsom_found) +@@ -2552,14 +2609,12 @@ + sljit_sw kept_shared_srcw[2]; + int private_count, shared_count, kept_shared_count; + int from_sp, base_reg, offset, i; +-BOOL setsom_found = FALSE; +-BOOL setmark_found = FALSE; +-BOOL capture_last_found = FALSE; +-BOOL control_head_found = FALSE; + ++memset(common->recurse_bitset, 0, common->recurse_bitset_size); ++ + #if defined DEBUG_FORCE_CONTROL_HEAD && DEBUG_FORCE_CONTROL_HEAD + SLJIT_ASSERT(common->control_head_ptr != 0); +-control_head_found = TRUE; ++recurse_check_bit(common, common->control_head_ptr); + #endif + + switch (type) +@@ -2647,11 +2702,10 @@ + { + case OP_SET_SOM: + SLJIT_ASSERT(common->has_set_som); +- if (has_quit && !setsom_found) ++ if (has_quit && recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR(0))) + { + kept_shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(0); + kept_shared_count = 1; +- setsom_found = TRUE; + } + cc += 1; + break; +@@ -2659,33 +2713,31 @@ + case OP_RECURSE: + if (has_quit) + { +- if (common->has_set_som && !setsom_found) ++ if (common->has_set_som && recurse_check_bit(common, OVECTOR(0))) + { + kept_shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(0); + kept_shared_count = 1; +- setsom_found = TRUE; + } +- if (common->mark_ptr != 0 && !setmark_found) ++ if (common->mark_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->mark_ptr)) + { + kept_shared_srcw[kept_shared_count] = common->mark_ptr; + kept_shared_count++; +- setmark_found = TRUE; + } + } +- if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && !capture_last_found) ++ if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr)) + { + shared_srcw[0] = common->capture_last_ptr; + shared_count = 1; +- capture_last_found = TRUE; + } + cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE; + break; + + case OP_KET: +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc) != 0) ++ private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (private_srcw[0] != 0) + { +- private_count = 1; +- private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) ++ private_count = 1; + SLJIT_ASSERT(PRIVATE_DATA(cc + 1) != 0); + cc += PRIVATE_DATA(cc + 1); + } +@@ -2704,50 +2756,66 @@ + case OP_SBRA: + case OP_SBRAPOS: + case OP_SCOND: +- private_count = 1; + private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) ++ private_count = 1; + cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE; + break; + + case OP_CBRA: + case OP_SCBRA: +- offset = (GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE)) << 1; +- shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(offset); +- shared_srcw[1] = OVECTOR(offset + 1); +- shared_count = 2; ++ offset = GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE); ++ shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(offset << 1); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, shared_srcw[0])) ++ { ++ shared_srcw[1] = shared_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw); ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, shared_srcw[1])); ++ shared_count = 2; ++ } + +- if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && !capture_last_found) ++ if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr)) + { +- shared_srcw[2] = common->capture_last_ptr; +- shared_count = 3; +- capture_last_found = TRUE; ++ shared_srcw[shared_count] = common->capture_last_ptr; ++ shared_count++; + } + +- if (common->optimized_cbracket[GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE)] == 0) ++ if (common->optimized_cbracket[offset] == 0) + { +- private_count = 1; +- private_srcw[0] = OVECTOR_PRIV(GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE)); ++ private_srcw[0] = OVECTOR_PRIV(offset); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) ++ private_count = 1; + } ++ + cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE + IMM2_SIZE; + break; + + case OP_CBRAPOS: + case OP_SCBRAPOS: +- offset = (GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE)) << 1; +- shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(offset); +- shared_srcw[1] = OVECTOR(offset + 1); +- shared_count = 2; ++ offset = GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE); ++ shared_srcw[0] = OVECTOR(offset << 1); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, shared_srcw[0])) ++ { ++ shared_srcw[1] = shared_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw); ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, shared_srcw[1])); ++ shared_count = 2; ++ } + +- if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && !capture_last_found) ++ if (common->capture_last_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->capture_last_ptr)) + { +- shared_srcw[2] = common->capture_last_ptr; +- shared_count = 3; +- capture_last_found = TRUE; ++ shared_srcw[shared_count] = common->capture_last_ptr; ++ shared_count++; + } + +- private_count = 2; + private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); +- private_srcw[1] = OVECTOR_PRIV(GET2(cc, 1 + LINK_SIZE)); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) ++ private_count = 1; ++ ++ offset = OVECTOR_PRIV(offset); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, offset)) ++ { ++ private_srcw[private_count] = offset; ++ private_count++; ++ } + cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE + IMM2_SIZE; + break; + +@@ -2756,18 +2824,17 @@ + alternative = cc + GET(cc, 1); + if (*alternative == OP_KETRMAX || *alternative == OP_KETRMIN) + { +- private_count = 1; + private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) ++ private_count = 1; + } + cc += 1 + LINK_SIZE; + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_1 +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc)) +- { ++ private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) + private_count = 1; +- private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); +- } + cc += 2; + #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE + if (common->utf && HAS_EXTRALEN(cc[-1])) cc += GET_EXTRALEN(cc[-1]); +@@ -2775,11 +2842,12 @@ + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_2A +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc)) ++ private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) + { + private_count = 2; +- private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); +- private_srcw[1] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc) + sizeof(sljit_sw); ++ private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw); ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[1])); + } + cc += 2; + #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE +@@ -2788,11 +2856,12 @@ + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_PRIVATE_DATA_2B +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc)) ++ private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) + { + private_count = 2; +- private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); +- private_srcw[1] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc) + sizeof(sljit_sw); ++ private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw); ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[1])); + } + cc += 2 + IMM2_SIZE; + #ifdef SUPPORT_UNICODE +@@ -2801,30 +2870,30 @@ + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_1 +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc)) +- { ++ private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) + private_count = 1; +- private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); +- } + cc += 1; + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_2A +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc)) ++ private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) + { + private_count = 2; +- private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); + private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw); ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[1])); + } + cc += 1; + break; + + CASE_ITERATOR_TYPE_PRIVATE_DATA_2B +- if (PRIVATE_DATA(cc)) ++ private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); ++ if (private_srcw[0] != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) + { + private_count = 2; +- private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); + private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw); ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[1])); + } + cc += 1 + IMM2_SIZE; + break; +@@ -2841,14 +2910,17 @@ + switch(get_class_iterator_size(cc + i)) + { + case 1: +- private_count = 1; + private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); + break; + + case 2: +- private_count = 2; + private_srcw[0] = PRIVATE_DATA(cc); +- private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw); ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[0])) ++ { ++ private_count = 2; ++ private_srcw[1] = private_srcw[0] + sizeof(sljit_sw); ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(recurse_check_bit(common, private_srcw[1])); ++ } + break; + + default: +@@ -2863,28 +2935,25 @@ + case OP_PRUNE_ARG: + case OP_THEN_ARG: + SLJIT_ASSERT(common->mark_ptr != 0); +- if (has_quit && !setmark_found) ++ if (has_quit && recurse_check_bit(common, common->mark_ptr)) + { + kept_shared_srcw[0] = common->mark_ptr; + kept_shared_count = 1; +- setmark_found = TRUE; + } +- if (common->control_head_ptr != 0 && !control_head_found) ++ if (common->control_head_ptr != 0 && recurse_check_bit(common, common->control_head_ptr)) + { + private_srcw[0] = common->control_head_ptr; + private_count = 1; +- control_head_found = TRUE; + } + cc += 1 + 2 + cc[1]; + break; + + case OP_THEN: + SLJIT_ASSERT(common->control_head_ptr != 0); +- if (!control_head_found) ++ if (recurse_check_bit(common, common->control_head_ptr)) + { + private_srcw[0] = common->control_head_ptr; + private_count = 1; +- control_head_found = TRUE; + } + cc++; + break; +@@ -2892,7 +2961,7 @@ + default: + cc = next_opcode(common, cc); + SLJIT_ASSERT(cc != NULL); +- break; ++ continue; + } + + if (type != recurse_copy_shared_to_global && type != recurse_copy_kept_shared_to_global) +@@ -13652,7 +13721,7 @@ + common->cbra_ptr = OVECTOR_START + (re->top_bracket + 1) * 2 * sizeof(sljit_sw); + + total_length = ccend - common->start; +-common->private_data_ptrs = (sljit_s32 *)SLJIT_MALLOC(total_length * (sizeof(sljit_s32) + (common->has_then ? 1 : 0)), allocator_data); ++common->private_data_ptrs = (sljit_s32*)SLJIT_MALLOC(total_length * (sizeof(sljit_s32) + (common->has_then ? 1 : 0)), allocator_data); + if (!common->private_data_ptrs) + { + SLJIT_FREE(common->optimized_cbracket, allocator_data); +@@ -13691,6 +13760,7 @@ + common->compiler = compiler; + + /* Main pcre_jit_exec entry. */ ++SLJIT_ASSERT((private_data_size & (sizeof(sljit_sw) - 1)) == 0); + sljit_emit_enter(compiler, 0, SLJIT_ARG1(SW), 5, 5, 0, 0, private_data_size); + + /* Register init. */ +@@ -13913,20 +13983,40 @@ + common->currententry = common->entries; + common->local_quit_available = TRUE; + quit_label = common->quit_label; +-while (common->currententry != NULL) ++if (common->currententry != NULL) + { +- /* Might add new entries. */ +- compile_recurse(common); +- if (SLJIT_UNLIKELY(sljit_get_compiler_error(compiler))) ++ /* A free bit for each private data. */ ++ common->recurse_bitset_size = ((private_data_size / (int)sizeof(sljit_sw)) + 7) >> 3; ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(common->recurse_bitset_size > 0); ++ common->recurse_bitset = (sljit_u8*)SLJIT_MALLOC(common->recurse_bitset_size, allocator_data);; ++ ++ if (common->recurse_bitset != NULL) + { ++ do ++ { ++ /* Might add new entries. */ ++ compile_recurse(common); ++ if (SLJIT_UNLIKELY(sljit_get_compiler_error(compiler))) ++ break; ++ flush_stubs(common); ++ common->currententry = common->currententry->next; ++ } ++ while (common->currententry != NULL); ++ ++ SLJIT_FREE(common->recurse_bitset, allocator_data); ++ } ++ ++ if (common->currententry != NULL) ++ { ++ /* The common->recurse_bitset has been freed. */ ++ SLJIT_ASSERT(sljit_get_compiler_error(compiler) || common->recurse_bitset == NULL); ++ + sljit_free_compiler(compiler); + SLJIT_FREE(common->optimized_cbracket, allocator_data); + SLJIT_FREE(common->private_data_ptrs, allocator_data); + PRIV(jit_free_rodata)(common->read_only_data_head, allocator_data); + return PCRE2_ERROR_NOMEMORY; + } +- flush_stubs(common); +- common->currententry = common->currententry->next; + } + common->local_quit_available = FALSE; + common->quit_label = quit_label; + +diff --git a/src/pcre2_jit_test.c b/src/pcre2_jit_test.c +index 8450f0b6..bb141a0c 100644 +--- a/src/pcre2_jit_test.c ++++ b/src/pcre2_jit_test.c +@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ + { MU, A, 0, 0, "((?(R)a|(?1)){1,3}?)M", "aaaM" }, + { MU, A, 0, 0, "((.)(?:.|\\2(?1))){0}#(?1)#", "#aabbccdde# #aabbccddee#" }, + { MU, A, 0, 0, "((.)(?:\\2|\\2{4}b)){0}#(?:(?1))+#", "#aaaab# #aaaaab#" }, ++ { MU, A, 0, 0 | F_NOMATCH, "(?1)$((.|\\2xx){1,2})", "abc" }, + + /* 16 bit specific tests. */ + { CM, A, 0, 0 | F_FORCECONV, "\xc3\xa1", "\xc3\x81\xc3\xa1" }, diff --git a/main/perl-datetime-timezone/APKBUILD b/main/perl-datetime-timezone/APKBUILD index 33bcc574721..b60ae1ff23f 100644 --- a/main/perl-datetime-timezone/APKBUILD +++ b/main/perl-datetime-timezone/APKBUILD @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ pkgname=perl-datetime-timezone #_pkgreal is used by apkbuild-cpan to find modules at MetaCpan _pkgreal=DateTime-TimeZone -pkgver=2.51 +pkgver=2.56 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Time zone object base class and factory" url="https://metacpan.org/release/DateTime-TimeZone/" @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ package() { sha512sums=" -11a506d71cb0875b322c9fe4bdb76a4ab2569127f33530a0970f50a851dc13b2e70dd110eca24a23fd997b3dae3c595045c6d3b03223615b40e6855be28ede08 DateTime-TimeZone-2.51.tar.gz +0ee4a7aed9a2377102d693eb0c98df43a9add5d329570e835d5b8bbe4bbfee7df793d6847f2ef9fb0ad958327ad8b688968d0f57ec4ae3033d1d866ab385498d DateTime-TimeZone-2.56.tar.gz " diff --git a/main/pixman/APKBUILD b/main/pixman/APKBUILD index 74507f860bd..52917cad840 100644 --- a/main/pixman/APKBUILD +++ b/main/pixman/APKBUILD @@ -1,16 +1,22 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=pixman pkgver=0.40.0 -pkgrel=2 +pkgrel=3 pkgdesc="Low-level pixel manipulation library" url="https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/pixman" arch="all" license="MIT" makedepends="meson libpng-dev linux-headers" subpackages="$pkgname-static $pkgname-dev $pkgname-dbg" -source="https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/pixman/pixman/-/archive/pixman-$pkgver/pixman-pixman-$pkgver.tar.gz" +source="https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/pixman/pixman/-/archive/pixman-$pkgver/pixman-pixman-$pkgver.tar.gz + $pkgname-CVE-2022-44638.patch::https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/pixman/pixman/-/commit/a1f88e842e0216a5b4df1ab023caebe33c101395.patch + " builddir="$srcdir/pixman-pixman-$pkgver" +# secfixes: +# 0.40.0-r3: +# - CVE-2022-44638 +# case "$CARCH" in # broken test (likely due to endianness assumptions) s390x) options="!check" ;; @@ -32,4 +38,7 @@ package() { DESTDIR="$pkgdir" meson install --no-rebuild -C output } -sha512sums="18774e22add5c5442edede5467fa07234c2b9e57a79d88110f25424e4253c6ab0c2921e951c5686cefebf4724ff19ad053d0c28f4d2f8d642bbcf6fc71764ef6 pixman-pixman-0.40.0.tar.gz" +sha512sums=" +18774e22add5c5442edede5467fa07234c2b9e57a79d88110f25424e4253c6ab0c2921e951c5686cefebf4724ff19ad053d0c28f4d2f8d642bbcf6fc71764ef6 pixman-pixman-0.40.0.tar.gz +141ad0a4b77d3ea28faab3b73dcb71ca48c3d9431b128a072c7bf934a5096c73a01209847639bf8b08a2b21243bf79147dc32774586b09641c2d8750ed7eeea2 pixman-CVE-2022-44638.patch +" diff --git a/main/postfix/APKBUILD b/main/postfix/APKBUILD index 48b8b706a9b..850a4b9bd3d 100644 --- a/main/postfix/APKBUILD +++ b/main/postfix/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Contributor: Łukasz Jendrysik <scadu@yandex.com> # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=postfix -pkgver=3.5.16 +pkgver=3.5.17 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Secure and fast drop-in replacement for Sendmail (MTA)" url="http://www.postfix.org/" @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ stone() { } sha512sums=" -81e482b2474df0fb711c86e83c585669b3934d3de1c74fc1bc0bef216225a91809fe802b53e9134bad6916d3dd889267b89dd83f78876f361f18a3192b07cefc postfix-3.5.16.tar.gz +7a58a371fe418d39af1d72c6dcf4692b5d2437958aa8c5e9b9754b2c4b2f4281b330324647a50f6cf11a694c1261dcb0dfd98a8618f24d08991adcda535955bf postfix-3.5.17.tar.gz 2752e69c4e1857bdcf29444ffb458bca818bc60b9c77c20823c5f5b87c36cb5e0f3217a625a7fe5788d5bfcef7570a1f2149e1233fcd23ccf7ee14190aff47a2 postfix.initd 25cd34f23ca909d4e33aaf3239d1e397260abc7796d9a4456dee4f005682fd3a58aab8106126e5218c95bdddae415a3ef7e2223cd3b0d7b1e2bd76158bb7eaf8 postfix-install.patch 0769e2e503486f8dd6fa21f2c534ad7df7a9f1bb57dde2f0ad61863a3e615d0a6dc18132b27796eb28cd81afb2b4e97c65c9d490a391f835aa3b7b18e74252c5 lmdb-default.patch diff --git a/main/postgresql/APKBUILD b/main/postgresql/APKBUILD index 16244c03014..0daf3b95cec 100644 --- a/main/postgresql/APKBUILD +++ b/main/postgresql/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Contributor: G.J.R. Timmer <gjr.timmer@gmail.com> # Contributor: Jakub Jirutka <jakub@jirutka.cz> pkgname=postgresql -pkgver=13.6 +pkgver=13.12 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="A sophisticated object-relational DBMS" url="https://www.postgresql.org/" @@ -35,6 +35,17 @@ source="https://ftp.postgresql.org/pub/source/v$pkgver/postgresql-$pkgver.tar.bz " # secfixes: +# 13.12-r0: +# - CVE-2023-39418 +# - CVE-2023-39417 +# 13.11-r0: +# - CVE-2023-2454 +# - CVE-2023-2455 +# - CVE-2022-41862 +# 13.8-r0: +# - CVE-2022-2625 +# 13.7-r0: +# - CVE-2022-1552 # 13.5-r0: # - CVE-2021-23214 # - CVE-2021-23222 @@ -274,7 +285,7 @@ _run_tests() { } sha512sums=" -2852726a3031b8d469f1c38f3019af02fc5afe40ec27b22288a29acefd30c63a98806bce88a214d0c2f9177f547b0b5010ad64e70bcbe2c2f1d97a27ae1984f8 postgresql-13.6.tar.bz2 +6b6f6de998016b33f0954d4ed8233b84d98abd2dc9b50f5e959f403d1d87a7e9c3b8c8c2ed456806578c2610982f41be3169d9afd4221c52c320b1a2795043e4 postgresql-13.12.tar.bz2 1f8e7dc58f5b0a12427cf2fd904ffa898a34f23f3332c8382b94e0d991c007289e7913a69e04498f3d93fc5701855796c207b4b1cc4a0b366f586050124d7fcc initdb.patch 27e00b58fe5c3899c66fc0dde51846c14701bcfedd132b106d676783ba603e8cbdc6e620f29b52dc892bdaa9302052788cf5e575a1659f61c017a12e0d2ee4d0 perl-rpath.patch 8439a6fdfdea0a4867daeb8bc23d6c825f30c00d91d4c39f48653f5ee77341f23282ce03a77aad94b5369700f11d2cb28d5aee360e59138352a9ab331a9f9d0f conf-unix_socket_directories.patch diff --git a/main/py3-tz/APKBUILD b/main/py3-tz/APKBUILD index 1c38ea8c48e..94db0dc0f1f 100644 --- a/main/py3-tz/APKBUILD +++ b/main/py3-tz/APKBUILD @@ -1,17 +1,16 @@ # Contributor: Peter Bui <pnutzh4x0r@gmail.com> # Maintainer: Fabian Affolter <fabian@affolter-engineering.ch> pkgname=py3-tz -_pkgname=pytz -pkgver=2020.5 +pkgver=2022.6 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Python3 definitions of world timezone" -url="http://pytz.sourceforge.net/" +url="https://pythonhosted.org/pytz/" arch="noarch" license="MIT" depends="python3" makedepends="py3-setuptools" -source="https://pypi.io/packages/source/${_pkgname:0:1}/$_pkgname/$_pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz" -builddir="$srcdir/$_pkgname-$pkgver" +source="https://pypi.python.org/packages/source/p/pytz/pytz-$pkgver.tar.gz" +builddir="$srcdir/pytz-$pkgver" replaces="py-tz" # Backwards compatibility provides="py-tz=$pkgver-r$pkgrel" # Backwards compatibility @@ -29,4 +28,6 @@ package() { python3 setup.py install --prefix=/usr --root="$pkgdir" } -sha512sums="0845c0b7cefb8732e3016568b17ae73232fe6537bac6da89cb1bf911ba5786ee1be6b5e3aa8767225291e3a7e9afd5b8e40e4051671a3a006f9e2f71c551e13e pytz-2020.5.tar.gz" +sha512sums=" +ea0343453d011e252fba64502984e2a43ea7c7437a211025ca68a4a45178c8aaef4c2b65261434289b21166a99a1941ec9e2d9d26bb3d22a76cbaa421250131d pytz-2022.6.tar.gz +" diff --git a/main/python3/APKBUILD b/main/python3/APKBUILD index 85409ce1cef..66fc72a5cf9 100644 --- a/main/python3/APKBUILD +++ b/main/python3/APKBUILD @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ pkgname=python3 # the python3-tkinter's pkgver needs to be synchronized with this. -pkgver=3.8.10 +pkgver=3.8.15 _bluez_ver=5.54 _basever="${pkgver%.*}" pkgrel=0 @@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ EOF fail="$fail test_runpy" # fails on x86_64 fail="$fail test_threading" # hangs on all arches (except x86_64?) fail="$fail test_asyncio" # hangs; routinely problematic (e.g. bpo-39101, bpo-41891, bpo-42183) + fail="$fail test_minidom" # we fixed expat cves via backports, this thinks it's newer and fails # kernel related fail="$fail test_fcntl" # wants DNOTIFY, we don't have it @@ -184,9 +185,11 @@ wininst() { "$subpkgdir"/usr/lib/python$_basever/distutils/command } -sha512sums="0be69705483ff9692e12048a96180e586f9d84c8d53066629f7fb2389585eb75c0f3506bb8182936e322508f58b71f4d8c6dfebbab9049b31b49da11d3b98e80 Python-3.8.10.tar.xz +sha512sums=" +4fb3827b13c2452faa75e5ed18dddf381e80b4fffcfde046e289b4629cff0bb87fba1d09916b9b8a6f8039dc422c952293ebdb381c49f8ca7e7893ae4be6c28d Python-3.8.15.tar.xz e19d15d3a478a7af47c1921c8827843492e38787b1182152155bd3d8ad9e1d8ee25c5fda1f24e38c54ebbf946b09fe75007dca9a24d1c35f73303558e558dcbe bluez-5.54.tar.xz 37b6ee5d0d5de43799316aa111423ba5a666c17dc7f81b04c330f59c1d1565540eac4c585abe2199bbed52ebe7426001edb1c53bd0a17486a2a8e052d0f494ad fix-xattrs-glibc.patch ab8eaa2858d5109049b1f9f553198d40e0ef8d78211ad6455f7b491af525bffb16738fed60fc84e960c4889568d25753b9e4a1494834fea48291b33f07000ec2 musl-find_library.patch d489b5d5f374e2b298954a2388771e500c6cf9b274012e06b3e71a34aa85c354369b3fa2a37c3121808075c1f1f340a9fa097996c149399e10b9424170211d90 custom-bluetooth-h-path.patch -a84483246e413650a904c34c18f5e4f4168c39067d069f48557c330de6eb3db19fd96a4d453d742db3dcb7c7f962722903f62823c752ff90510c89830435ffc0 arm-alignment.patch" +a84483246e413650a904c34c18f5e4f4168c39067d069f48557c330de6eb3db19fd96a4d453d742db3dcb7c7f962722903f62823c752ff90510c89830435ffc0 arm-alignment.patch +" diff --git a/main/radvd/APKBUILD b/main/radvd/APKBUILD index 0b0ab722464..c77fa154583 100644 --- a/main/radvd/APKBUILD +++ b/main/radvd/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=radvd pkgver=2.19 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="IPv6 router advertisement daemon" url="http://www.litech.org/radvd" arch="all" @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-openrc" source="http://www.litech.org/radvd/dist/radvd-$pkgver.tar.xz radvd.initd radvd.confd + fix-segfault.patch " # test failure on builders due to kernel issue @@ -44,6 +45,9 @@ package() { "$pkgdir"/usr/share/doc/radvd/radvd.conf.example } -sha512sums="a1eb40af90fc83ebab2517c16a0f7e85c11338ab276bec400b7c33177748d1e36bc5abd7e373b6742f12f7c690dd7ae6b951bc832c7de9bbb56f7e9bc844ed22 radvd-2.19.tar.xz +sha512sums=" +a1eb40af90fc83ebab2517c16a0f7e85c11338ab276bec400b7c33177748d1e36bc5abd7e373b6742f12f7c690dd7ae6b951bc832c7de9bbb56f7e9bc844ed22 radvd-2.19.tar.xz 5f96261f3914ff10966828231d1c8df0d7b0e432d5e075eb6405f923a25f1218e647ec8a2c5b7fa995cf44cc521fd226b4bacfe86920d108130852f00623d8c5 radvd.initd -386a6cdee43a0aa157760a590b9daa52e06e2c344a8d191a188c6174281734df95b82121e92d3c01e6c0fe76658dbdf6467dee2b30e2e010fc57dc8e0666b2cc radvd.confd" +386a6cdee43a0aa157760a590b9daa52e06e2c344a8d191a188c6174281734df95b82121e92d3c01e6c0fe76658dbdf6467dee2b30e2e010fc57dc8e0666b2cc radvd.confd +98eb2c9250c08edee6a78cc47b9153baa9cba631168e0b9562a29a61ae973a317c2670817e80c123ee88aa5ab7e1fca5e3c4a8e0324f28a58edfae3bf636f53e fix-segfault.patch +" diff --git a/main/radvd/fix-segfault.patch b/main/radvd/fix-segfault.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..a223db53c8d --- /dev/null +++ b/main/radvd/fix-segfault.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +Patch-Source: https://github.com/radvd-project/radvd/commit/06689f8c06f44c7e87f7ff1d814428f88375b53f +see: https://github.com/radvd-project/radvd/issues/174 +From 06689f8c06f44c7e87f7ff1d814428f88375b53f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jonathan Davies <jpds@protonmail.com> +Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2021 15:29:18 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Reverts the include.h change in + 46883f8a1a02fe42040dd8e48aec0ed871545d4d + +Closes: #158 + +Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies <jpds@protonmail.com> +--- + includes.h | 5 ----- + 1 file changed, 5 deletions(-) + +Patch-Origin: https://github.com/radvd-project/radvd/commit/06689f8c06f44c7e87f7ff1d814428f88375b53f + +diff --git a/includes.h b/includes.h +index ef30b10..c528c86 100644 +--- a/includes.h ++++ b/includes.h +@@ -76,12 +76,7 @@ + #include <sys/sysctl.h> + #endif + +-#if !defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(linux) +-#include <linux/if.h> +-#define IF_NAMESIZE IFNAMSIZ +-#else + #include <net/if.h> +-#endif + + #ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_DL_H + #include <net/if_dl.h> diff --git a/main/rsync/APKBUILD b/main/rsync/APKBUILD index 5529cd11996..3e83c882a1b 100644 --- a/main/rsync/APKBUILD +++ b/main/rsync/APKBUILD @@ -1,15 +1,14 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=rsync -pkgver=3.2.3 -pkgrel=4 +pkgver=3.2.5 +pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="A file transfer program to keep remote files in sync" url="https://rsync.samba.org/" arch="all" license="GPL-3.0-or-later" makedepends="perl acl-dev attr-dev popt-dev zlib-dev zstd-dev" subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-openrc rrsync" -source="https://download.samba.org/pub/rsync/rsync-$pkgver.tar.gz - Fix-regression-with---delay-updates.patch +source="https://download.samba.org/pub/rsync/src/rsync-$pkgver.tar.gz rsyncd.initd rsyncd.confd rsyncd.conf @@ -17,6 +16,9 @@ source="https://download.samba.org/pub/rsync/rsync-$pkgver.tar.gz " # secfixes: +# 3.2.4-r0: +# - CVE-2020-14387 +# - CVE-2022-29154 # 3.1.2-r7: # - CVE-2017-16548 # - CVE-2017-17433 @@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ package() { rrsync() { pkgdesc="Restricted rsync, restricts rsync to a subdir declared in .ssh/authorized_keys" - depends="rsync perl" + depends="rsync python3" arch="noarch" cd "$builddir" @@ -79,8 +81,7 @@ rrsync() { } sha512sums=" -48b68491f3ef644dbbbfcaec5ab90a1028593e02d50367ce161fd9d3d0bd0a3628bc57c5e5dec4be3a1d213f784f879b8a8fcdfd789ba0f99837cba16e1ae70e rsync-3.2.3.tar.gz -01a8560419e536c4987a6954b51d0751bce77e041f2d75157067156c0e197178e25e7a6b0ca29cca5d4474f5671ac36500079dba1ed1737cea18f1d663570321 Fix-regression-with---delay-updates.patch +6d115acb5bae546cd2b5df2c11390f8609107b7a45aa649158d8daa0c9290ab5f15640fdd4000b21d1ab39f7385b85d77cd8fe4628fa13b2adeea6fcd53d057a rsync-3.2.5.tar.gz b9bf1aa02f96e4294642ead5751bd529ca1267c08e83a16342fba5736c3a8ec89568feb11fb737e974cb1bee7e00e7a8898d25844892366c6167b9ea8d1e647c rsyncd.initd d91337cfb57e6e3b2a8ba1e24f7d851dd927bfc327da2212b9eb0acda0e1ca2f24987f6dcc4903eccc3bf170e0f115172b3cfa5a172700495296f26302c834d7 rsyncd.confd 3db8a2b364fc89132af6143af90513deb6be3a78c8180d47c969e33cb5edde9db88aad27758a6911f93781e3c9846aeadc80fffc761c355d6a28358853156b62 rsyncd.conf diff --git a/main/rsync/Fix-regression-with---delay-updates.patch b/main/rsync/Fix-regression-with---delay-updates.patch deleted file mode 100644 index d914d14decb..00000000000 --- a/main/rsync/Fix-regression-with---delay-updates.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,26 +0,0 @@ -From 5a4ea7e468ae53c09b98803da3519727becb48ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> -Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2021 13:30:17 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] Fix regression with --delay-updates (#192) - -Fixes regression introduced with commit 3a7bf54ad520 (A resumed -partial-dir file is transferred in-place.) - -Fixes https://github.com/WayneD/rsync/issues/192 ---- - receiver.c | 2 +- - 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) - -diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c -index e85c4779..b5020d07 100644 ---- a/receiver.c -+++ b/receiver.c -@@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name) - do_unlink(partialptr); - handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_DELETE); - } -- } else if (keep_partial && partialptr && !one_inplace) { -+ } else if (keep_partial && partialptr && (!one_inplace || delay_updates)) { - if (!handle_partial_dir(partialptr, PDIR_CREATE)) { - rprintf(FERROR, - "Unable to create partial-dir for %s -- discarding %s.\n", diff --git a/main/strongswan/APKBUILD b/main/strongswan/APKBUILD index 132c261d577..3779c0f73f4 100644 --- a/main/strongswan/APKBUILD +++ b/main/strongswan/APKBUILD @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ pkgname=strongswan pkgver=5.9.1 _pkgver=${pkgver//_rc/rc} -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=2 pkgdesc="IPsec-based VPN solution focused on security and ease of use, supporting IKEv1/IKEv2 and MOBIKE" url="https://www.strongswan.org/" arch="all" @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dbg $pkgname-logfile $pkgname-openrc" source="https://download.strongswan.org/strongswan-$_pkgver.tar.bz2 https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2021-41990/strongswan-5.6.1-5.9.3_gmp-rsa-ssa-salt-len.patch https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2021-41991/strongswan-4.4.1-5.9.3_cert-cache-random.patch + https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2021-45079/strongswan-5.5.0-5.9.4_eap_success.patch + https://download.strongswan.org/security/CVE-2022-40617/strongswan-5.1.0-5.9.7_cert_online_validate.patch 1001-charon-add-optional-source-and-remote-overrides-for-.patch 1002-vici-send-certificates-for-ike-sa-events.patch @@ -31,6 +33,9 @@ source="https://download.strongswan.org/strongswan-$_pkgver.tar.bz2 " # secfixes: +# 5.9.1-r2: +# - CVE-2021-45079 +# - CVE-2022-40617 # 5.9.1-r1: # - CVE-2021-41990 # - CVE-2021-41991 @@ -136,6 +141,8 @@ sha512sums=" 222625e77bd86959da6dd7346cfa9f92569fc396a494bb95ddf2c8e0680b7e8041541e8a14320517a0c735d713ae0fdc0d0c4694215e812817814b0b4efc3497 strongswan-5.9.1.tar.bz2 42bb9dc02e04735183cb2966e23f26bdb2b14b56b10dc3df770cfbea066a690130ce84dc3a17b1369c2d45852bcd8a2902f19368099a1e71c858293decdb48ee strongswan-5.6.1-5.9.3_gmp-rsa-ssa-salt-len.patch 39f607625bc6aa128b71e65e9806c60051015378d0250961bafbe787aa652141e1b3126d235b9cede08e4fe816b3220dbae54e40492b0aeb48f034220f1ee446 strongswan-4.4.1-5.9.3_cert-cache-random.patch +d3ecccf616a1d0a0b364a64f9d5cd0a75d7230948a8b455217d3f665f2a9f4b79bda787c2d0b608c31b40bf9c97c89b7e18b37794794bef4c7b17b4f0bf430a2 strongswan-5.5.0-5.9.4_eap_success.patch +748753eb615cceaea162a264b40c1ae9d4fd2b3ea2f15d6faf40b19619f11e3b98d0e0bbc2339261ce4fff9cb070c25a1037778c3d6476e3c6e97397dcd19c47 strongswan-5.1.0-5.9.7_cert_online_validate.patch 8cd2f7e10dca25c8739b18f26f0aba427d00c5689ee126da5fc2699ce75ed567f0d25b4e50b716eab58097c06a51418e489e7f853d02bb53ba32aca72a6ae7c8 1001-charon-add-optional-source-and-remote-overrides-for-.patch f92609a1f6810786baeae1688688cbdd2a3116200cdba8d23e13da08992f5280bcbe04712cc89402f1e39aff6f4ebc8da05a2529b1e61e25a5229deb74c4dc3f 1002-vici-send-certificates-for-ike-sa-events.patch da39b5654c6f39d175c5491dabd5ed5c1b552857af7cbe7eeb8d0ecb34dad265bb8cd7725930eb75ceb99d51813f8e59631e687b09c1ff5c6437388f5f4d9647 1003-vici-add-support-for-individual-sa-state-changes.patch diff --git a/main/sudo/APKBUILD b/main/sudo/APKBUILD index 76254db7f3b..0ee0bf0f033 100644 --- a/main/sudo/APKBUILD +++ b/main/sudo/APKBUILD @@ -2,13 +2,13 @@ # Contributor: Łukasz Jendrysik <scadu@yandex.com> # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=sudo -pkgver=1.9.5p2 +pkgver=1.9.12 if [ "${pkgver%_*}" != "$pkgver" ]; then _realver=${pkgver%_*}${pkgver#*_} else _realver=$pkgver fi -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Give certain users the ability to run some commands as root" url="https://www.sudo.ws/sudo/" arch="all" @@ -16,9 +16,7 @@ license="custom ISC" makedepends="zlib-dev bash mandoc" subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev" source="https://www.sudo.ws/dist/sudo-$_realver.tar.gz - fix-cross-compile.patch - SIGUNUSED.patch - " + CVE-2022-43995.patch" options="suid" builddir="$srcdir/sudo-$_realver" @@ -51,9 +49,6 @@ build() { --with-sendmail=/usr/sbin/sendmail \ --with-passprompt="[sudo] password for %p: " - # Workaround until SIGUNUSED.patch is not needed anymore - rm lib/util/mksiglist.h lib/util/mksigname.h - make -C lib/util DEVEL=1 mksiglist.h mksigname.h make } @@ -69,6 +64,5 @@ package() { rm -rf "$pkgdir"/var/run } -sha512sums="f0fe914963c31a6f8ab6c86847ff6cdd125bd5a839b27f46dcae03963f4fc413b3d4cca54c1979feb825c8479b44c7df0642c07345c941eecf6f9f1e03ea0e27 sudo-1.9.5p2.tar.gz -f476bb5ac02c3222d3be7eecb828131374e0baf806cc0fd548fb9d4a90f40a848d0ef58851a63ea1d988b720fe259312f3a457ca994ac0e93ed9e16fc72d5234 fix-cross-compile.patch -03a2cef9fcc26cc2711edb5928c945fcf214b22139bb88d77538d25f3bfd144d17b6c9dabb1e01960ac1697d83b3452397a5ef4c7d0e68ea72548a631b212e6d SIGUNUSED.patch" +sha512sums="34ee165baa2e37ba2530901d49bf0dad30159f27aeccd2519d4719bf93be8281edff71220a49ba2e41dacaa3c58031de1464df48d75a8caea7b9568a76f80b67 sudo-1.9.12.tar.gz +47f7b14663a2e98dc98190346361f447c4a0b71fa3074d2c9dcaf15ef0cac7621bea27e25cced6f6005ada4deb4b11521dc418bf25bca18b70feafc6f7e6f359 CVE-2022-43995.patch" diff --git a/main/sudo/CVE-2022-43995.patch b/main/sudo/CVE-2022-43995.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..fb4f802e300 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/sudo/CVE-2022-43995.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From bd209b9f16fcd1270c13db27ae3329c677d48050 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws> +Date: Fri, 28 Oct 2022 07:29:55 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2022-43995, potential heap overflow for passwords < 8 + characters. Starting with sudo 1.8.0 the plaintext password buffer is + dynamically sized so it is not safe to assume that it is at least 9 bytes in + size. Found by Hugo Lefeuvre (University of Manchester) with ConfFuzz. + +--- + plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c | 11 +++++------ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c b/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c +index b2046eca2..0416861e9 100644 +--- a/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/auth/passwd.c +@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ sudo_passwd_init(struct passwd *pw, sudo_auth *auth) + int + sudo_passwd_verify(struct passwd *pw, char *pass, sudo_auth *auth, struct sudo_conv_callback *callback) + { +- char sav, *epass; ++ char des_pass[9], *epass; + char *pw_epasswd = auth->data; + size_t pw_len; + int matched = 0; +@@ -75,12 +75,12 @@ sudo_passwd_verify(struct passwd *pw, char *pass, sudo_auth *auth, struct sudo_c + + /* + * Truncate to 8 chars if standard DES since not all crypt()'s do this. +- * If this turns out not to be safe we will have to use OS #ifdef's (sigh). + */ +- sav = pass[8]; + pw_len = strlen(pw_epasswd); +- if (pw_len == DESLEN || HAS_AGEINFO(pw_epasswd, pw_len)) +- pass[8] = '\0'; ++ if (pw_len == DESLEN || HAS_AGEINFO(pw_epasswd, pw_len)) { ++ strlcpy(des_pass, pass, sizeof(des_pass)); ++ pass = des_pass; ++ } + + /* + * Normal UN*X password check. +@@ -88,7 +88,6 @@ sudo_passwd_verify(struct passwd *pw, char *pass, sudo_auth *auth, struct sudo_c + * only compare the first DESLEN characters in that case. + */ + epass = (char *) crypt(pass, pw_epasswd); +- pass[8] = sav; + if (epass != NULL) { + if (HAS_AGEINFO(pw_epasswd, pw_len) && strlen(epass) == DESLEN) + matched = !strncmp(pw_epasswd, epass, DESLEN); diff --git a/main/sudo/SIGUNUSED.patch b/main/sudo/SIGUNUSED.patch deleted file mode 100644 index be4f73541b8..00000000000 --- a/main/sudo/SIGUNUSED.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,19 +0,0 @@ -Upstream: No -Reason: Musl compatibility - ---- a/lib/util/siglist.in 2019-10-10 11:32:54.000000000 -0500 -+++ b/lib/util/siglist.in 2019-10-14 16:42:46.259938722 -0500 -@@ -17,11 +17,12 @@ - EMT EMT trap - FPE Floating point exception - KILL Killed -+# before UNUSED (musl defines them as the same number) -+ SYS Bad system call - # before BUS (Older Linux doesn't really have a BUS, but defines it to UNUSED) - UNUSED Unused - BUS Bus error - SEGV Memory fault -- SYS Bad system call - PIPE Broken pipe - ALRM Alarm clock - TERM Terminated diff --git a/main/sudo/fix-cross-compile.patch b/main/sudo/fix-cross-compile.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f001877a406..00000000000 --- a/main/sudo/fix-cross-compile.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18 +0,0 @@ -Upstream: No -Reason: Enable cross-compile - ---- ./lib/util/Makefile.in.orig -+++ ./lib/util/Makefile.in -@@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ - ./mksigname > $@ - - mksiglist: $(srcdir)/mksiglist.c $(srcdir)/mksiglist.h $(incdir)/sudo_compat.h $(top_builddir)/config.h -- $(CC) $(CPPFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(srcdir)/mksiglist.c -o $@ -+ $${HOSTCC:-gcc} $(CPPFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(srcdir)/mksiglist.c -o $@ - - mksigname: $(srcdir)/mksigname.c $(srcdir)/mksigname.h $(incdir)/sudo_compat.h $(top_builddir)/config.h -- $(CC) $(CPPFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(srcdir)/mksigname.c -o $@ -+ $${HOSTCC:-gcc} $(CPPFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(srcdir)/mksigname.c -o $@ - - $(srcdir)/mksiglist.h: $(srcdir)/siglist.in - @if [ -n "$(DEVEL)" ]; then \ diff --git a/main/tiff/APKBUILD b/main/tiff/APKBUILD index 588e7736722..00308b932c3 100644 --- a/main/tiff/APKBUILD +++ b/main/tiff/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Contributor: Leonardo Arena <rnalrd@alpinelinux.org> # Maintainer: Michael Mason <ms13sp@gmail.com> pkgname=tiff -pkgver=4.2.0 +pkgver=4.4.0 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Provides support for the Tag Image File Format or TIFF" url="https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff" @@ -12,12 +12,24 @@ depends_dev="zlib-dev libjpeg-turbo-dev" makedepends="libtool autoconf automake $depends_dev" checkdepends="diffutils" subpackages="$pkgname-doc $pkgname-dev $pkgname-tools libtiffxx:_libtiffxx" -source="https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/archive/v$pkgver/libtiff-v$pkgver.tar.gz - CVE-2018-12900.patch - " +source="https://gitlab.com/libtiff/libtiff/-/archive/v$pkgver/libtiff-v$pkgver.tar.gz" builddir="$srcdir/libtiff-v$pkgver" # secfixes: +# 4.4.0-r0: +# - CVE-2022-2867 +# - CVE-2022-2868 +# - CVE-2022-2869 +# 4.3.0-r0: +# - CVE-2022-0561 +# - CVE-2022-0562 +# - CVE-2022-0865 +# - CVE-2022-0891 +# - CVE-2022-0907 +# - CVE-2022-0908 +# - CVE-2022-0909 +# - CVE-2022-0924 +# - CVE-2022-22844 # 4.2.0-r0: # - CVE-2020-35521 # - CVE-2020-35522 @@ -105,5 +117,6 @@ tools() { mv "$pkgdir"/usr/bin "$subpkgdir"/usr/ } -sha512sums="d47578feffcc1ecdac2d188c1df4faf05865cd9075b4d01c708a0e71928cce3b60850738a6b7ace334ae00e96ccffc6189ed91b9be81840a1d2b040777010dd5 libtiff-v4.2.0.tar.gz -c321f1d4e5d334cdb3b0800299e8165055c040c0c030220769ccfdadcc7fd35a0f3231115f44dc86fe5e34f32eafe1074aa85495a744717f8fc10c0cab2ab085 CVE-2018-12900.patch" +sha512sums=" +93955a2b802cf243e41d49048499da73862b5d3ffc005e3eddf0bf948a8bd1537f7c9e7f112e72d082549b4c49e256b9da9a3b6d8039ad8fc5c09a941b7e75d7 libtiff-v4.4.0.tar.gz +" diff --git a/main/tiff/CVE-2018-12900.patch b/main/tiff/CVE-2018-12900.patch deleted file mode 100644 index f95cd06a523..00000000000 --- a/main/tiff/CVE-2018-12900.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,29 +0,0 @@ -From 86861b86f26be5301ccfa96f9bf765051f4e644a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: pgajdos <pgajdos@suse.cz> -Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 09:03:31 +0100 -Subject: [PATCH] prevent integer overflow - ---- - tools/tiffcp.c | 6 ++++++ - 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) - -diff --git a/tools/tiffcp.c b/tools/tiffcp.c -index 2f406e2d..ece7ba13 100644 ---- a/tools/tiffcp.c -+++ b/tools/tiffcp.c -@@ -1435,6 +1435,12 @@ DECLAREreadFunc(readSeparateTilesIntoBuffer) - status = 0; - goto done; - } -+ if (0xFFFFFFFF / tilew < spp) -+ { -+ TIFFError(TIFFFileName(in), "Error, either TileWidth (%u) or BitsPerSample (%u) is too large", tilew, bps); -+ status = 0; -+ goto done; -+ } - bytes_per_sample = bps/8; - - for (row = 0; row < imagelength; row += tl) { --- -2.18.1 - diff --git a/main/tzdata/APKBUILD b/main/tzdata/APKBUILD index 1dec5d6eff6..d757063abb9 100644 --- a/main/tzdata/APKBUILD +++ b/main/tzdata/APKBUILD @@ -2,10 +2,10 @@ # Contributor: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=tzdata -pkgver=2022a -_tzcodever=2022a +pkgver=2022f +_tzcodever=2022f _ptzver=0.5 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Timezone data" url="https://www.iana.org/time-zones" arch="all" @@ -16,7 +16,9 @@ source="https://www.iana.org/time-zones/repository/releases/tzcode$_tzcodever.ta https://dev.alpinelinux.org/archive/posixtz/posixtz-$_ptzver.tar.xz 0001-posixtz-ensure-the-file-offset-we-pass-to-lseek-is-o.patch - 0002-fix-implicit-declaration-warnings-by-including-strin.patch" + 0002-fix-implicit-declaration-warnings-by-including-strin.patch + $pkgname-fix-tzalloc.patch::https://github.com/eggert/tz/commit/a91830b783db3bb481930c67914d3c16b821f717.patch + " builddir="$srcdir" _timezones="africa antarctica asia australasia europe northamerica \ @@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ _timezones="africa antarctica asia australasia europe northamerica \ options="!check" # Testsuite require nsgmls (SP) build() { - make cc="${CC:-gcc}" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -DHAVE_STDINT_H=1" + make cc="${CC:-gcc}" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -DHAVE_STDINT_H=1" \ TZDIR="/usr/share/zoneinfo" cd "$builddir"/posixtz-$_ptzver @@ -51,9 +53,10 @@ package() { } sha512sums=" -3f047a6f414ae3df4a3d6bb9b39a1790833d191ae48e6320ab9438cd326dc455475186a02c44e4cde96b48101ab000880919b1e0e8092aed7254443ed2c831ed tzcode2022a.tar.gz -542e4559beac8fd8c4af7d08d816fd12cfe7ffcb6f20bba4ff1c20eba717749ef96e5cf599b2fe03b5b8469c0467f8cb1c893008160da281055a123dd9e810d9 tzdata2022a.tar.gz +3e2ef91b972f1872e3e8da9eae9d1c4638bfdb32600f164484edd7147be45a116db80443cd5ae61b5c34f8b841e4362f4beefd957633f6cc9b7def543ed6752b tzcode2022f.tar.gz +72d05d05be999075cdf57b896c0f4238b1b862d4d0ed92cc611736592a4ada14d47bd7f0fc8be39e7938a7f5940a903c8af41e87859482bcfab787d889d429f6 tzdata2022f.tar.gz 68dbaab9f4aef166ac2f2d40b49366527b840bebe17a47599fe38345835e4adb8a767910745ece9c384b57af815a871243c3e261a29f41d71f8054df3061b3fd posixtz-0.5.tar.xz 0f2a10ee2bb4007f57b59123d1a0b8ef6accf99e568f21537f0bb19f290fff46e24050f55f12569d7787be600e1b62aa790ea85a333153f3ea081a812c81b1b5 0001-posixtz-ensure-the-file-offset-we-pass-to-lseek-is-o.patch fb322ab7867517ba39265d56d3576cbcea107c205d524e87015c1819bbb7361f7322232ee3b86ea9b8df2886e7e06a6424e3ac83b2006be290a33856c7d40ac4 0002-fix-implicit-declaration-warnings-by-including-strin.patch +642fb74699ca81abc5ec18633fa40c144a5b80665672e7ab6fa871847fb3c2d086be7e2e7ca8a1d3ec93b16384b1faad65efe9c65d8fdaf528777a34f1c16264 tzdata-fix-tzalloc.patch " diff --git a/main/xen/APKBUILD b/main/xen/APKBUILD index 1be8f47e6df..2a5644453d9 100644 --- a/main/xen/APKBUILD +++ b/main/xen/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=xen pkgver=4.14.5 -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=7 pkgdesc="Xen hypervisor" url="https://www.xenproject.org/" arch="x86_64 armhf aarch64" # enable armv7 when builds with gcc8 @@ -253,6 +253,29 @@ options="!strip" # - CVE-2022-26359 XSA-400 # - CVE-2022-26360 XSA-400 # - CVE-2022-26361 XSA-400 +# 4.14.5-r1: +# - CVE-2022-26362 XSA-401 +# - CVE-2022-26363 XSA-402 +# - CVE-2022-26364 XSA-402 +# 4.14.5-r2: +# - CVE-2022-21123 XSA-404 +# - CVE-2022-21125 XSA-404 +# - CVE-2022-21166 XSA-404 +# 4.14.5-r3: +# - CVE-2022-26365 XSA-403 +# - CVE-2022-33740 XSA-403 +# - CVE-2022-33741 XSA-403 +# - CVE-2022-33742 XSA-403 +# 4.14.5-r4: +# - CVE-2022-23816 XSA-407 +# - CVE-2022-23825 XSA-407 +# - CVE-2022-29900 XSA-407 +# 4.14.5-r5: +# - CVE-2022-33745 XSA-408 +# 4.14.5-r6: +# - CVE-2022-42309 XSA-412 +# 4.14.5-r7: +# - CVE-2022-23824 XSA-422 case "$CARCH" in x86*) @@ -328,6 +351,35 @@ source="https://downloads.xenproject.org/release/xen/$pkgver/xen-$pkgver.tar.gz xendriverdomain.initd xen-pci.initd xen-pci.confd + + xsa401-4.16-1.patch + xsa401-4.16-2.patch + xsa402-4.14-1.patch + xsa402-4.14-2.patch + xsa402-4.14-3.patch + xsa402-4.14-4.patch + xsa402-4.14-5.patch + xsa403-4.14-1.patch + xsa404-4.14-1.patch + xsa404-4.14-2.patch + xsa404-4.14-3.patch + + xsa407-4.14-01.patch + xsa407-4.14-02.patch + xsa407-4.14-03.patch + xsa407-4.14-04.patch + xsa407-4.14-05.patch + xsa407-4.14-06.patch + xsa407-4.14-07.patch + xsa407-4.14-08.patch + xsa407-4.14-09.patch + xsa407-4.14-10.patch + xsa407-4.14-11.patch + xsa407-4.14-12.patch + xsa408.patch + xsa414-4.14.patch + xsa422-4.14-1.patch + xsa422-4.14-2.patch " _seabios=/usr/share/seabios/bios-256k.bin @@ -576,4 +628,31 @@ bdbe15c924071cdc2d0f23e53ba8e3f837d4b5369bfb218abd3405f9bef25d105269aaf0784baeb6 85afec835a374aac3d307b3226eee7a08a676b1daac7e39bb7463d564ef72438dc27dd188a871cfd031e80c6992b756951f26bdca0d445e07eab6dba5245de46 xendriverdomain.initd a46337bebce24337f00adbe08095b9f5128c1f440e2033329e5ace9fd817a31fb772d75c0ecc7cc06f34b1522ebf8b21874ee4d0881a0f29851b1c1235f29cf3 xen-pci.initd 2db5fa6edeeb028236460029b976a849f22b3a15d3929acc3911dc41f365b471c2b815eb111639bc230a69528b1571f3c2e9e8e1e81a6679e55387e39355aa99 xen-pci.confd +070fcb4a4041bd9ed53fdca6ef743581be7b5ecee25bc51a4a1e4753aacabb3081834d8aa70db1f6220e5a689225ec2d90ea3df408bfdc72d84fd93cb8f45d72 xsa401-4.16-1.patch +c7d88603b7377cfffd3f52117f546a9d9df09eb7f1937c7a91b7631f4b7ac2a0ce348b40955cbcdf46040f45657a06bb56282e62c9f57a2a15c3751da5013c8f xsa401-4.16-2.patch +0e6140d71490797d5d2874de8097748f8e6b8ea4f076512da4f27947ec2b16ab3f8c2125edbfeeb9d6e4f04d28baad7b9736724128289f80782088bcfb6e5a6f xsa402-4.14-1.patch +d3dda6f48cfa6d590fa2cf1568b566771d3e26a1823f25559ceaa610e98889239b089d161db1917553559941b95032f5a696f0e47ce2a22ccc4cf95f5e64d3f7 xsa402-4.14-2.patch +0a6a089d35c6fc5bf0c6fa9a018ef2d7dd8e983b4d0afd04a57173ec530810656af175af1d5d78cd136529bb47171e3152e7dde71b714ea5464df0c9b55ff97a xsa402-4.14-3.patch +13e70329f9116f2d95f340fc83c71974a7c4d2290b0a68ee8b38de35f474e8c466faac21c6e4e9cae1b1fcbda7536cb835becee22a39fbe8fbfe40d4bc27032c xsa402-4.14-4.patch +fe8ae1acabe419070da37ba593eb108df9841787456da38489c63ad874648eb3b976ace0e2b941ee54fa75c6b11397ad7f9f346e39d0a2d54fe8931926495eef xsa402-4.14-5.patch +80743a91c18f80f631ba22a9ffef7cbff2481a07312bda79d337261c4cf0796bdd55dddae85a8df010300b4cc712c3bd7d162b02191f7eaebd1fb57a45d56560 xsa403-4.14-1.patch +6380d7abdedb6d00aa85418d07b03b336a2e5000177cfa776014e51ca22b2c58352d2ac4c6281ef9dcd2b454c46640cc3b1fb37b51a4581396b8eae2b142cedf xsa404-4.14-1.patch +1a691b03ed8180931328d00398f40fa8805f51614c01c6920014139407f81c0c2a16429af8f35645d0f2b0704d2563cea192372831fde58a702306da8f297684 xsa404-4.14-2.patch +1f95dba19afb1d13888dbd1c3d750407d231d34b5fa26067df7d691cc7fdbe6078ffda1ca148aa268ce01056e35b04276f8f1c87607699dbf9d27906609343dc xsa404-4.14-3.patch +7ddf9d467fd7d7d7ee231aa3d6bb731c26a7ba985bbd78d131fecef8aa70bf7dda475a350611dcaaefb65fbc0d6754a11acd6e2b6d71a5601d4dc27ee11521d9 xsa407-4.14-01.patch +cc874d802cf8eef2a94916fa17b4cc9dc9457218f62ce77a74bcd12d1c4f158b2421cbc06599214ae4016781bc591113be9caf87d19d559b2bae30907e1617d7 xsa407-4.14-02.patch +7e42273d9204d9c3ea3c3ee2d78e1fbb3b479c18f2683b50b36e210b96b82390d2ad34bde8816c617f9fcdef3e4825551fa764eff74f5b979e3d027e126e3683 xsa407-4.14-03.patch +2c8fa55eddea560eac0d79ca224e5240fc39d81e83f3794c371889b538c05d0cd4f1fca726c3a78ef9afafbb9bf4a90a419e20bc0d0c6ffef3af6479a5f086e6 xsa407-4.14-04.patch +5a8f592efb00615d4a105c946e63d4d208e285ea196e4208dfaf5675974268c0a3faf7843ce8b89b80d23e18634ea7e7be6c00b5fcf8f5c6fc3d103f22210ad3 xsa407-4.14-05.patch +a6f6cdc4073f1a1a8c209e073bff81dba8b5f2eb20fe821bddfaf772dc9603c04e2146b6544ecaaa46e76c23737b4b276834e750313a6fd55e655acaa934c92e xsa407-4.14-06.patch +7d65c45873d293aa0c03bd8b15f9f79b1f0a75523548306c77e329a8e2326853a1ef2d4167cc7b4370dcb9e6a5871495e4ebad3bcba1b483fe579d9e5026b30c xsa407-4.14-07.patch +9aa28eb6bae8de5a2d725ad7ba665196f19f8f405260952a38ee07a3b6be11baa04326da8c925d6c4e7eeb6c541ae8333dc4adb9260b375bb02ad2cbb0d07d95 xsa407-4.14-08.patch +efc5d0849c0dd53910f5f01c2278cb36c6723a4a208bac5416f9673e95aa7898e49f0894b66ae22d36cd61bdfaccbdf5421a44ab522a1843295f758c1a6463c4 xsa407-4.14-09.patch +041ac095e2aa27932a076af884a2dc9074f86a06b031eec8b829fc53b5e2f721ec490b068d37a0bef8b7cc91f5a75270a83abbf5a3fefffdf01644866ee80dd5 xsa407-4.14-10.patch +4336d90c20f7311847c6933379463c032772682d0b4ea6b7cf0bf61c3dd5294357f03b7f7abeb7b9cf1804485d97c3f06cd69dd985c258b95c080229081a90cd xsa407-4.14-11.patch +4ebad40167c39f798459774a20db7a30dee2b5cefbc1170e59059b7aef94e4be2cab43c841613cd8cc64f33888054ed876f218953fcf2f0ee7086ce77e6b30a0 xsa407-4.14-12.patch +2a624ce29fa74f78d971a93ca48aa4f09e66b47f94ebc3d256681c40a2fc55fd4bb0ec060418f3d96841b1824e1a016c69e9ec90e7702a6ba8b69246d6466b3d xsa408.patch +4894a57920057aaf603de2a079569f7fd01f9e177c55845a3988f0714a35e164cbbe6779c145a5821cbcdeede26b0b9713d26aee113b6fab7259ff3c48b11c98 xsa414-4.14.patch +a429d89371a9688d6f3d215eab7ee12276115f9b09843bc237a08ae9ea3f9a7eb5c2d9bea9310e058f350b594d8a6cc9e9b09278ad25406a8b527eefcd00c88b xsa422-4.14-1.patch +f2f03e3c17624a5dd7be62403fb367c7369da2fb619c051f1f3a24dc760747a5828038049cd52525aefd8b9cb7a7a7ebb935bc4ebdbfc23bd011856479dbf2a7 xsa422-4.14-2.patch " diff --git a/main/xen/xsa401-4.16-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa401-4.16-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5c8c50617a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa401-4.16-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,170 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/pv: Clean up _get_page_type() + +Various fixes for clarity, ahead of making complicated changes. + + * Split the overflow check out of the if/else chain for type handling, as + it's somewhat unrelated. + * Comment the main if/else chain to explain what is going on. Adjust one + ASSERT() and state the bit layout for validate-locked and partial states. + * Correct the comment about TLB flushing, as it's backwards. The problem + case is when writeable mappings are retained to a page becoming read-only, + as it allows the guest to bypass Xen's safety checks for updates. + * Reduce the scope of 'y'. It is an artefact of the cmpxchg loop and not + valid for use by subsequent logic. Switch to using ACCESS_ONCE() to treat + all reads as explicitly volatile. The only thing preventing the validated + wait-loop being infinite is the compiler barrier hidden in cpu_relax(). + * Replace one page_get_owner(page) with the already-calculated 'd' already in + scope. + +No functional change. + +This is part of XSA-401 / CVE-2022-26362. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +index 796faca64103..ddd32f88c798 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +@@ -2935,16 +2935,17 @@ static int _put_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned int flags, + static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + bool preemptible) + { +- unsigned long nx, x, y = page->u.inuse.type_info; ++ unsigned long nx, x; + int rc = 0; + + ASSERT(!(type & ~(PGT_type_mask | PGT_pae_xen_l2))); + ASSERT(!in_irq()); + +- for ( ; ; ) ++ for ( unsigned long y = ACCESS_ONCE(page->u.inuse.type_info); ; ) + { + x = y; + nx = x + 1; ++ + if ( unlikely((nx & PGT_count_mask) == 0) ) + { + gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, +@@ -2952,8 +2953,15 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page))); + return -EINVAL; + } +- else if ( unlikely((x & PGT_count_mask) == 0) ) ++ ++ if ( unlikely((x & PGT_count_mask) == 0) ) + { ++ /* ++ * Typeref 0 -> 1. ++ * ++ * Type changes are permitted when the typeref is 0. If the type ++ * actually changes, the page needs re-validating. ++ */ + struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page); + + if ( d && shadow_mode_enabled(d) ) +@@ -2964,8 +2972,8 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + { + /* + * On type change we check to flush stale TLB entries. It is +- * vital that no other CPUs are left with mappings of a frame +- * which is about to become writeable to the guest. ++ * vital that no other CPUs are left with writeable mappings ++ * to a frame which is intending to become pgtable/segdesc. + */ + cpumask_t *mask = this_cpu(scratch_cpumask); + +@@ -2977,7 +2985,7 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + + if ( unlikely(!cpumask_empty(mask)) && + /* Shadow mode: track only writable pages. */ +- (!shadow_mode_enabled(page_get_owner(page)) || ++ (!shadow_mode_enabled(d) || + ((nx & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_writable_page)) ) + { + perfc_incr(need_flush_tlb_flush); +@@ -3008,7 +3016,14 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + } + else if ( unlikely((x & (PGT_type_mask|PGT_pae_xen_l2)) != type) ) + { +- /* Don't log failure if it could be a recursive-mapping attempt. */ ++ /* ++ * else, we're trying to take a new reference, of the wrong type. ++ * ++ * This (being able to prohibit use of the wrong type) is what the ++ * typeref system exists for, but skip printing the failure if it ++ * looks like a recursive mapping, as subsequent logic might ++ * ultimately permit the attempt. ++ */ + if ( ((x & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_l2_page_table) && + (type == PGT_l1_page_table) ) + return -EINVAL; +@@ -3027,18 +3042,46 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + } + else if ( unlikely(!(x & PGT_validated)) ) + { ++ /* ++ * else, the count is non-zero, and we're grabbing the right type; ++ * but the page hasn't been validated yet. ++ * ++ * The page is in one of two states (depending on PGT_partial), ++ * and should have exactly one reference. ++ */ ++ ASSERT((x & (PGT_type_mask | PGT_count_mask)) == (type | 1)); ++ + if ( !(x & PGT_partial) ) + { +- /* Someone else is updating validation of this page. Wait... */ ++ /* ++ * The page has been left in the "validate locked" state ++ * (i.e. PGT_[type] | 1) which means that a concurrent caller ++ * of _get_page_type() is in the middle of validation. ++ * ++ * Spin waiting for the concurrent user to complete (partial ++ * or fully validated), then restart our attempt to acquire a ++ * type reference. ++ */ + do { + if ( preemptible && hypercall_preempt_check() ) + return -EINTR; + cpu_relax(); +- } while ( (y = page->u.inuse.type_info) == x ); ++ } while ( (y = ACCESS_ONCE(page->u.inuse.type_info)) == x ); + continue; + } +- /* Type ref count was left at 1 when PGT_partial got set. */ +- ASSERT((x & PGT_count_mask) == 1); ++ ++ /* ++ * The page has been left in the "partial" state ++ * (i.e., PGT_[type] | PGT_partial | 1). ++ * ++ * Rather than bumping the type count, we need to try to grab the ++ * validation lock; if we succeed, we need to validate the page, ++ * then drop the general ref associated with the PGT_partial bit. ++ * ++ * We grab the validation lock by setting nx to (PGT_[type] | 1) ++ * (i.e., non-zero type count, neither PGT_validated nor ++ * PGT_partial set). ++ */ + nx = x & ~PGT_partial; + } + +@@ -3087,6 +3130,13 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + } + + out: ++ /* ++ * Did we drop the PGT_partial bit when acquiring the typeref? If so, ++ * drop the general reference that went along with it. ++ * ++ * N.B. validate_page() may have have re-set PGT_partial, not reflected in ++ * nx, but will have taken an extra ref when doing so. ++ */ + if ( (x & PGT_partial) && !(nx & PGT_partial) ) + put_page(page); + diff --git a/main/xen/xsa401-4.16-2.patch b/main/xen/xsa401-4.16-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..be58db59a51 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa401-4.16-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/pv: Fix ABAC cmpxchg() race in _get_page_type() + +_get_page_type() suffers from a race condition where it incorrectly assumes +that because 'x' was read and a subsequent a cmpxchg() succeeds, the type +cannot have changed in-between. Consider: + +CPU A: + 1. Creates an L2e referencing pg + `-> _get_page_type(pg, PGT_l1_page_table), sees count 0, type PGT_writable_page + 2. Issues flush_tlb_mask() +CPU B: + 3. Creates a writeable mapping of pg + `-> _get_page_type(pg, PGT_writable_page), count increases to 1 + 4. Writes into new mapping, creating a TLB entry for pg + 5. Removes the writeable mapping of pg + `-> _put_page_type(pg), count goes back down to 0 +CPU A: + 7. Issues cmpxchg(), setting count 1, type PGT_l1_page_table + +CPU B now has a writeable mapping to pg, which Xen believes is a pagetable and +suitably protected (i.e. read-only). The TLB flush in step 2 must be deferred +until after the guest is prohibited from creating new writeable mappings, +which is after step 7. + +Defer all safety actions until after the cmpxchg() has successfully taken the +intended typeref, because that is what prevents concurrent users from using +the old type. + +Also remove the early validation for writeable and shared pages. This removes +race conditions where one half of a parallel mapping attempt can return +successfully before: + * The IOMMU pagetables are in sync with the new page type + * Writeable mappings to shared pages have been torn down + +This is part of XSA-401 / CVE-2022-26362. + +Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +index ddd32f88c798..1693b580b152 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +@@ -2962,56 +2962,12 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + * Type changes are permitted when the typeref is 0. If the type + * actually changes, the page needs re-validating. + */ +- struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page); +- +- if ( d && shadow_mode_enabled(d) ) +- shadow_prepare_page_type_change(d, page, type); + + ASSERT(!(x & PGT_pae_xen_l2)); + if ( (x & PGT_type_mask) != type ) + { +- /* +- * On type change we check to flush stale TLB entries. It is +- * vital that no other CPUs are left with writeable mappings +- * to a frame which is intending to become pgtable/segdesc. +- */ +- cpumask_t *mask = this_cpu(scratch_cpumask); +- +- BUG_ON(in_irq()); +- cpumask_copy(mask, d->dirty_cpumask); +- +- /* Don't flush if the timestamp is old enough */ +- tlbflush_filter(mask, page->tlbflush_timestamp); +- +- if ( unlikely(!cpumask_empty(mask)) && +- /* Shadow mode: track only writable pages. */ +- (!shadow_mode_enabled(d) || +- ((nx & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_writable_page)) ) +- { +- perfc_incr(need_flush_tlb_flush); +- /* +- * If page was a page table make sure the flush is +- * performed using an IPI in order to avoid changing the +- * type of a page table page under the feet of +- * spurious_page_fault(). +- */ +- flush_mask(mask, +- (x & PGT_type_mask) && +- (x & PGT_type_mask) <= PGT_root_page_table +- ? FLUSH_TLB | FLUSH_FORCE_IPI +- : FLUSH_TLB); +- } +- +- /* We lose existing type and validity. */ + nx &= ~(PGT_type_mask | PGT_validated); + nx |= type; +- +- /* +- * No special validation needed for writable pages. +- * Page tables and GDT/LDT need to be scanned for validity. +- */ +- if ( type == PGT_writable_page || type == PGT_shared_page ) +- nx |= PGT_validated; + } + } + else if ( unlikely((x & (PGT_type_mask|PGT_pae_xen_l2)) != type) ) +@@ -3092,6 +3048,56 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + return -EINTR; + } + ++ /* ++ * One typeref has been taken and is now globally visible. ++ * ++ * The page is either in the "validate locked" state (PGT_[type] | 1) or ++ * fully validated (PGT_[type] | PGT_validated | >0). ++ */ ++ ++ if ( unlikely((x & PGT_count_mask) == 0) ) ++ { ++ struct domain *d = page_get_owner(page); ++ ++ if ( d && shadow_mode_enabled(d) ) ++ shadow_prepare_page_type_change(d, page, type); ++ ++ if ( (x & PGT_type_mask) != type ) ++ { ++ /* ++ * On type change we check to flush stale TLB entries. It is ++ * vital that no other CPUs are left with writeable mappings ++ * to a frame which is intending to become pgtable/segdesc. ++ */ ++ cpumask_t *mask = this_cpu(scratch_cpumask); ++ ++ BUG_ON(in_irq()); ++ cpumask_copy(mask, d->dirty_cpumask); ++ ++ /* Don't flush if the timestamp is old enough */ ++ tlbflush_filter(mask, page->tlbflush_timestamp); ++ ++ if ( unlikely(!cpumask_empty(mask)) && ++ /* Shadow mode: track only writable pages. */ ++ (!shadow_mode_enabled(d) || ++ ((nx & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_writable_page)) ) ++ { ++ perfc_incr(need_flush_tlb_flush); ++ /* ++ * If page was a page table make sure the flush is ++ * performed using an IPI in order to avoid changing the ++ * type of a page table page under the feet of ++ * spurious_page_fault(). ++ */ ++ flush_mask(mask, ++ (x & PGT_type_mask) && ++ (x & PGT_type_mask) <= PGT_root_page_table ++ ? FLUSH_TLB | FLUSH_FORCE_IPI ++ : FLUSH_TLB); ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ + if ( unlikely(((x & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_writable_page) != + (type == PGT_writable_page)) ) + { +@@ -3120,13 +3126,25 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + + if ( unlikely(!(nx & PGT_validated)) ) + { +- if ( !(x & PGT_partial) ) ++ /* ++ * No special validation needed for writable or shared pages. Page ++ * tables and GDT/LDT need to have their contents audited. ++ * ++ * per validate_page(), non-atomic updates are fine here. ++ */ ++ if ( type == PGT_writable_page || type == PGT_shared_page ) ++ page->u.inuse.type_info |= PGT_validated; ++ else + { +- page->nr_validated_ptes = 0; +- page->partial_flags = 0; +- page->linear_pt_count = 0; ++ if ( !(x & PGT_partial) ) ++ { ++ page->nr_validated_ptes = 0; ++ page->partial_flags = 0; ++ page->linear_pt_count = 0; ++ } ++ ++ rc = validate_page(page, type, preemptible); + } +- rc = validate_page(page, type, preemptible); + } + + out: diff --git a/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1446f9b5d3f --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/page: Introduce _PAGE_* constants for memory types + +... rather than opencoding the PAT/PCD/PWT attributes in __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_* +constants. These are going to be needed by forthcoming logic. + +No functional change. + +This is part of XSA-402. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h +index f632affaef68..52551535a991 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/page.h +@@ -344,6 +344,14 @@ void efi_update_l4_pgtable(unsigned int l4idx, l4_pgentry_t); + + #define PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT) + ++/* Memory types, encoded under Xen's choice of MSR_PAT. */ ++#define _PAGE_WB ( 0) ++#define _PAGE_WT ( _PAGE_PWT) ++#define _PAGE_UCM ( _PAGE_PCD ) ++#define _PAGE_UC ( _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT) ++#define _PAGE_WC (_PAGE_PAT ) ++#define _PAGE_WP (_PAGE_PAT | _PAGE_PWT) ++ + /* + * Debug option: Ensure that granted mappings are not implicitly unmapped. + * WARNING: This will need to be disabled to run OSes that use the spare PTE +@@ -362,8 +370,8 @@ void efi_update_l4_pgtable(unsigned int l4idx, l4_pgentry_t); + #define __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RX (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_ACCESSED) + #define __PAGE_HYPERVISOR (__PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RX | \ + _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_RW) +-#define __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_UCMINUS (__PAGE_HYPERVISOR | _PAGE_PCD) +-#define __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_UC (__PAGE_HYPERVISOR | _PAGE_PCD | _PAGE_PWT) ++#define __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_UCMINUS (__PAGE_HYPERVISOR | _PAGE_UCM) ++#define __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_UC (__PAGE_HYPERVISOR | _PAGE_UC) + #define __PAGE_HYPERVISOR_SHSTK (__PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RO | _PAGE_DIRTY) + + #define MAP_SMALL_PAGES _PAGE_AVAIL0 /* don't use superpages mappings */ diff --git a/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-2.patch b/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..bf01e6cdba3 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86: Don't change the cacheability of the directmap + +Changeset 55f97f49b7ce ("x86: Change cache attributes of Xen 1:1 page mappings +in response to guest mapping requests") attempted to keep the cacheability +consistent between different mappings of the same page. + +The reason wasn't described in the changelog, but it is understood to be in +regards to a concern over machine check exceptions, owing to errata when using +mixed cacheabilities. It did this primarily by updating Xen's mapping of the +page in the direct map when the guest mapped a page with reduced cacheability. + +Unfortunately, the logic didn't actually prevent mixed cacheability from +occurring: + * A guest could map a page normally, and then map the same page with + different cacheability; nothing prevented this. + * The cacheability of the directmap was always latest-takes-precedence in + terms of guest requests. + * Grant-mapped frames with lesser cacheability didn't adjust the page's + cacheattr settings. + * The map_domain_page() function still unconditionally created WB mappings, + irrespective of the page's cacheattr settings. + +Additionally, update_xen_mappings() had a bug where the alias calculation was +wrong for mfn's which were .init content, which should have been treated as +fully guest pages, not Xen pages. + +Worse yet, the logic introduced a vulnerability whereby necessary +pagetable/segdesc adjustments made by Xen in the validation logic could become +non-coherent between the cache and main memory. The CPU could subsequently +operate on the stale value in the cache, rather than the safe value in main +memory. + +The directmap contains primarily mappings of RAM. PAT/MTRR conflict +resolution is asymmetric, and generally for MTRR=WB ranges, PAT of lesser +cacheability resolves to being coherent. The special case is WC mappings, +which are non-coherent against MTRR=WB regions (except for fully-coherent +CPUs). + +Xen must not have any WC cacheability in the directmap, to prevent Xen's +actions from creating non-coherency. (Guest actions creating non-coherency is +dealt with in subsequent patches.) As all memory types for MTRR=WB ranges +inter-operate coherently, so leave Xen's directmap mappings as WB. + +Only PV guests with access to devices can use reduced-cacheability mappings to +begin with, and they're trusted not to mount DoSs against the system anyway. + +Drop PGC_cacheattr_{base,mask} entirely, and the logic to manipulate them. +Shift the later PGC_* constants up, to gain 3 extra bits in the main reference +count. Retain the check in get_page_from_l1e() for special_pages() because a +guest has no business using reduced cacheability on these. + +This reverts changeset 55f97f49b7ce6c3520c555d19caac6cf3f9a5df0 + +This is CVE-2022-26363, part of XSA-402. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +index 0b75b6371d4b..7d3d186edbd5 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +@@ -785,24 +785,6 @@ bool is_iomem_page(mfn_t mfn) + return (page_get_owner(page) == dom_io); + } + +-static int update_xen_mappings(unsigned long mfn, unsigned int cacheattr) +-{ +- int err = 0; +- bool alias = mfn >= PFN_DOWN(xen_phys_start) && +- mfn < PFN_UP(xen_phys_start + xen_virt_end - XEN_VIRT_START); +- unsigned long xen_va = +- XEN_VIRT_START + ((mfn - PFN_DOWN(xen_phys_start)) << PAGE_SHIFT); +- +- if ( unlikely(alias) && cacheattr ) +- err = map_pages_to_xen(xen_va, _mfn(mfn), 1, 0); +- if ( !err ) +- err = map_pages_to_xen((unsigned long)mfn_to_virt(mfn), _mfn(mfn), 1, +- PAGE_HYPERVISOR | cacheattr_to_pte_flags(cacheattr)); +- if ( unlikely(alias) && !cacheattr && !err ) +- err = map_pages_to_xen(xen_va, _mfn(mfn), 1, PAGE_HYPERVISOR); +- return err; +-} +- + #ifndef NDEBUG + struct mmio_emul_range_ctxt { + const struct domain *d; +@@ -1007,47 +989,14 @@ get_page_from_l1e( + goto could_not_pin; + } + +- if ( pte_flags_to_cacheattr(l1f) != +- ((page->count_info & PGC_cacheattr_mask) >> PGC_cacheattr_base) ) ++ if ( (l1f & PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS) != _PAGE_WB && is_special_page(page) ) + { +- unsigned long x, nx, y = page->count_info; +- unsigned long cacheattr = pte_flags_to_cacheattr(l1f); +- int err; +- +- if ( is_special_page(page) ) +- { +- if ( write ) +- put_page_type(page); +- put_page(page); +- gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, +- "Attempt to change cache attributes of Xen heap page\n"); +- return -EACCES; +- } +- +- do { +- x = y; +- nx = (x & ~PGC_cacheattr_mask) | (cacheattr << PGC_cacheattr_base); +- } while ( (y = cmpxchg(&page->count_info, x, nx)) != x ); +- +- err = update_xen_mappings(mfn, cacheattr); +- if ( unlikely(err) ) +- { +- cacheattr = y & PGC_cacheattr_mask; +- do { +- x = y; +- nx = (x & ~PGC_cacheattr_mask) | cacheattr; +- } while ( (y = cmpxchg(&page->count_info, x, nx)) != x ); +- +- if ( write ) +- put_page_type(page); +- put_page(page); +- +- gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, "Error updating mappings for mfn %" PRI_mfn +- " (pfn %" PRI_pfn ", from L1 entry %" PRIpte ") for d%d\n", +- mfn, get_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn), +- l1e_get_intpte(l1e), l1e_owner->domain_id); +- return err; +- } ++ if ( write ) ++ put_page_type(page); ++ put_page(page); ++ gdprintk(XENLOG_WARNING, ++ "Attempt to change cache attributes of Xen heap page\n"); ++ return -EACCES; + } + + return 0; +@@ -2453,25 +2402,10 @@ static int mod_l4_entry(l4_pgentry_t *pl4e, + */ + static int cleanup_page_mappings(struct page_info *page) + { +- unsigned int cacheattr = +- (page->count_info & PGC_cacheattr_mask) >> PGC_cacheattr_base; + int rc = 0; + unsigned long mfn = mfn_x(page_to_mfn(page)); + + /* +- * If we've modified xen mappings as a result of guest cache +- * attributes, restore them to the "normal" state. +- */ +- if ( unlikely(cacheattr) ) +- { +- page->count_info &= ~PGC_cacheattr_mask; +- +- BUG_ON(is_special_page(page)); +- +- rc = update_xen_mappings(mfn, 0); +- } +- +- /* + * If this may be in a PV domain's IOMMU, remove it. + * + * NB that writable xenheap pages have their type set and cleared by +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h +index 7e74996053b0..7a2093da5977 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h +@@ -64,25 +64,22 @@ + /* Set when is using a page as a page table */ + #define _PGC_page_table PG_shift(3) + #define PGC_page_table PG_mask(1, 3) +- /* 3-bit PAT/PCD/PWT cache-attribute hint. */ +-#define PGC_cacheattr_base PG_shift(6) +-#define PGC_cacheattr_mask PG_mask(7, 6) + /* Page is broken? */ +-#define _PGC_broken PG_shift(7) +-#define PGC_broken PG_mask(1, 7) ++#define _PGC_broken PG_shift(4) ++#define PGC_broken PG_mask(1, 4) + /* Mutually-exclusive page states: { inuse, offlining, offlined, free }. */ +-#define PGC_state PG_mask(3, 9) +-#define PGC_state_inuse PG_mask(0, 9) +-#define PGC_state_offlining PG_mask(1, 9) +-#define PGC_state_offlined PG_mask(2, 9) +-#define PGC_state_free PG_mask(3, 9) ++#define PGC_state PG_mask(3, 6) ++#define PGC_state_inuse PG_mask(0, 6) ++#define PGC_state_offlining PG_mask(1, 6) ++#define PGC_state_offlined PG_mask(2, 6) ++#define PGC_state_free PG_mask(3, 6) + #define page_state_is(pg, st) (((pg)->count_info&PGC_state) == PGC_state_##st) + /* Page is not reference counted */ +-#define _PGC_extra PG_shift(10) +-#define PGC_extra PG_mask(1, 10) ++#define _PGC_extra PG_shift(7) ++#define PGC_extra PG_mask(1, 7) + + /* Count of references to this frame. */ +-#define PGC_count_width PG_shift(10) ++#define PGC_count_width PG_shift(7) + #define PGC_count_mask ((1UL<<PGC_count_width)-1) + + /* diff --git a/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-3.patch b/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..e5d4e14db66 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,266 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86: Split cache_flush() out of cache_writeback() + +Subsequent changes will want a fully flushing version. + +Use the new helper rather than opencoding it in flush_area_local(). This +resolves an outstanding issue where the conditional sfence is on the wrong +side of the clflushopt loop. clflushopt is ordered with respect to older +stores, not to younger stores. + +Rename gnttab_cache_flush()'s helper to avoid colliding in name. +grant_table.c can see the prototype from cache.h so the build fails +otherwise. + +This is part of XSA-402. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +Xen 4.16 and earlier: + * Also backport half of c/s 3330013e67396 "VT-d / x86: re-arrange cache + syncing" to split cache_writeback() out of the IOMMU logic, but without the + associated hooks changes. + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c b/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c +index 25798df50f54..0c912b8669f8 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c +@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ unsigned int flush_area_local(const void *va, unsigned int flags) + if ( flags & FLUSH_CACHE ) + { + const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = ¤t_cpu_data; +- unsigned long i, sz = 0; ++ unsigned long sz = 0; + + if ( order < (BITS_PER_LONG - PAGE_SHIFT) ) + sz = 1UL << (order + PAGE_SHIFT); +@@ -244,13 +244,7 @@ unsigned int flush_area_local(const void *va, unsigned int flags) + c->x86_clflush_size && c->x86_cache_size && sz && + ((sz >> 10) < c->x86_cache_size) ) + { +- alternative("", "sfence", X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT); +- for ( i = 0; i < sz; i += c->x86_clflush_size ) +- alternative_input(".byte " __stringify(NOP_DS_PREFIX) ";" +- " clflush %0", +- "data16 clflush %0", /* clflushopt */ +- X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT, +- "m" (((const char *)va)[i])); ++ cache_flush(va, sz); + flags &= ~FLUSH_CACHE; + } + else +@@ -265,6 +259,80 @@ unsigned int flush_area_local(const void *va, unsigned int flags) + return flags; + } + ++void cache_flush(const void *addr, unsigned int size) ++{ ++ /* ++ * This function may be called before current_cpu_data is established. ++ * Hence a fallback is needed to prevent the loop below becoming infinite. ++ */ ++ unsigned int clflush_size = current_cpu_data.x86_clflush_size ?: 16; ++ const void *end = addr + size; ++ ++ addr -= (unsigned long)addr & (clflush_size - 1); ++ for ( ; addr < end; addr += clflush_size ) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Note regarding the "ds" prefix use: it's faster to do a clflush ++ * + prefix than a clflush + nop, and hence the prefix is added instead ++ * of letting the alternative framework fill the gap by appending nops. ++ */ ++ alternative_io("ds; clflush %[p]", ++ "data16 clflush %[p]", /* clflushopt */ ++ X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT, ++ /* no outputs */, ++ [p] "m" (*(const char *)(addr))); ++ } ++ ++ alternative("", "sfence", X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT); ++} ++ ++void cache_writeback(const void *addr, unsigned int size) ++{ ++ unsigned int clflush_size; ++ const void *end = addr + size; ++ ++ /* Fall back to CLFLUSH{,OPT} when CLWB isn't available. */ ++ if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLWB) ) ++ return cache_flush(addr, size); ++ ++ /* ++ * This function may be called before current_cpu_data is established. ++ * Hence a fallback is needed to prevent the loop below becoming infinite. ++ */ ++ clflush_size = current_cpu_data.x86_clflush_size ?: 16; ++ addr -= (unsigned long)addr & (clflush_size - 1); ++ for ( ; addr < end; addr += clflush_size ) ++ { ++/* ++ * The arguments to a macro must not include preprocessor directives. Doing so ++ * results in undefined behavior, so we have to create some defines here in ++ * order to avoid it. ++ */ ++#if defined(HAVE_AS_CLWB) ++# define CLWB_ENCODING "clwb %[p]" ++#elif defined(HAVE_AS_XSAVEOPT) ++# define CLWB_ENCODING "data16 xsaveopt %[p]" /* clwb */ ++#else ++# define CLWB_ENCODING ".byte 0x66, 0x0f, 0xae, 0x30" /* clwb (%%rax) */ ++#endif ++ ++#define BASE_INPUT(addr) [p] "m" (*(const char *)(addr)) ++#if defined(HAVE_AS_CLWB) || defined(HAVE_AS_XSAVEOPT) ++# define INPUT BASE_INPUT ++#else ++# define INPUT(addr) "a" (addr), BASE_INPUT(addr) ++#endif ++ ++ asm volatile (CLWB_ENCODING :: INPUT(addr)); ++ ++#undef INPUT ++#undef BASE_INPUT ++#undef CLWB_ENCODING ++ } ++ ++ asm volatile ("sfence" ::: "memory"); ++} ++ + unsigned int guest_flush_tlb_flags(const struct domain *d) + { + bool shadow = paging_mode_shadow(d); +diff --git a/xen/common/grant_table.c b/xen/common/grant_table.c +index 71ee5c6ec511..34498d465285 100644 +--- a/xen/common/grant_table.c ++++ b/xen/common/grant_table.c +@@ -3440,7 +3440,7 @@ gnttab_swap_grant_ref(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(gnttab_swap_grant_ref_t) uop, + return 0; + } + +-static int cache_flush(const gnttab_cache_flush_t *cflush, grant_ref_t *cur_ref) ++static int _cache_flush(const gnttab_cache_flush_t *cflush, grant_ref_t *cur_ref) + { + struct domain *d, *owner; + struct page_info *page; +@@ -3534,7 +3534,7 @@ gnttab_cache_flush(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(gnttab_cache_flush_t) uop, + return -EFAULT; + for ( ; ; ) + { +- int ret = cache_flush(&op, cur_ref); ++ int ret = _cache_flush(&op, cur_ref); + + if ( ret < 0 ) + return ret; +diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h +index fbe951b2fad0..3defe9677f06 100644 +--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h ++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/extern.h +@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ int __must_check qinval_device_iotlb_sync(struct vtd_iommu *iommu, + struct pci_dev *pdev, + u16 did, u16 size, u64 addr); + +-unsigned int get_cache_line_size(void); + void flush_all_cache(void); + + uint64_t alloc_pgtable_maddr(unsigned long npages, nodeid_t node); +diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c +index cc088cd9ff20..3bd17a4a24a2 100644 +--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c ++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c +@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ + #include <xen/pci.h> + #include <xen/pci_regs.h> + #include <xen/keyhandler.h> ++#include <asm/cache.h> + #include <asm/msi.h> + #include <asm/nops.h> + #include <asm/irq.h> +@@ -207,53 +208,10 @@ static int iommus_incoherent; + + static void sync_cache(const void *addr, unsigned int size) + { +- static unsigned long clflush_size = 0; +- const void *end = addr + size; +- + if ( !iommus_incoherent ) + return; + +- if ( clflush_size == 0 ) +- clflush_size = get_cache_line_size(); +- +- addr -= (unsigned long)addr & (clflush_size - 1); +- for ( ; addr < end; addr += clflush_size ) +-/* +- * The arguments to a macro must not include preprocessor directives. Doing so +- * results in undefined behavior, so we have to create some defines here in +- * order to avoid it. +- */ +-#if defined(HAVE_AS_CLWB) +-# define CLWB_ENCODING "clwb %[p]" +-#elif defined(HAVE_AS_XSAVEOPT) +-# define CLWB_ENCODING "data16 xsaveopt %[p]" /* clwb */ +-#else +-# define CLWB_ENCODING ".byte 0x66, 0x0f, 0xae, 0x30" /* clwb (%%rax) */ +-#endif +- +-#define BASE_INPUT(addr) [p] "m" (*(const char *)(addr)) +-#if defined(HAVE_AS_CLWB) || defined(HAVE_AS_XSAVEOPT) +-# define INPUT BASE_INPUT +-#else +-# define INPUT(addr) "a" (addr), BASE_INPUT(addr) +-#endif +- /* +- * Note regarding the use of NOP_DS_PREFIX: it's faster to do a clflush +- * + prefix than a clflush + nop, and hence the prefix is added instead +- * of letting the alternative framework fill the gap by appending nops. +- */ +- alternative_io_2(".byte " __stringify(NOP_DS_PREFIX) "; clflush %[p]", +- "data16 clflush %[p]", /* clflushopt */ +- X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT, +- CLWB_ENCODING, +- X86_FEATURE_CLWB, /* no outputs */, +- INPUT(addr)); +-#undef INPUT +-#undef BASE_INPUT +-#undef CLWB_ENCODING +- +- alternative_2("", "sfence", X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT, +- "sfence", X86_FEATURE_CLWB); ++ cache_writeback(addr, size); + } + + /* Allocate page table, return its machine address */ +diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/vtd.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/vtd.c +index bbe358dc36c7..bb08a55e294a 100644 +--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/vtd.c ++++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/x86/vtd.c +@@ -47,11 +47,6 @@ void unmap_vtd_domain_page(void *va) + unmap_domain_page(va); + } + +-unsigned int get_cache_line_size(void) +-{ +- return ((cpuid_ebx(1) >> 8) & 0xff) * 8; +-} +- + void flush_all_cache() + { + wbinvd(); +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cache.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cache.h +index 1f7173d8c72c..e4770efb22b9 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cache.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cache.h +@@ -11,4 +11,11 @@ + + #define __read_mostly __section(".data.read_mostly") + ++#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ ++ ++void cache_flush(const void *addr, unsigned int size); ++void cache_writeback(const void *addr, unsigned int size); ++ ++#endif ++ + #endif diff --git a/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-4.patch b/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-4.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..cb9330be8c6 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/amd: Work around CLFLUSH ordering on older parts + +On pre-CLFLUSHOPT AMD CPUs, CLFLUSH is weakely ordered with everything, +including reads and writes to the address, and LFENCE/SFENCE instructions. + +This creates a multitude of problematic corner cases, laid out in the manual. +Arrange to use MFENCE on both sides of the CLFLUSH to force proper ordering. + +This is part of XSA-402. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +index 2ef59e22dc31..142f34af5f70 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +@@ -787,6 +787,14 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) + if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch) + __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability); + ++ /* ++ * On pre-CLFLUSHOPT AMD CPUs, CLFLUSH is weakly ordered with ++ * everything, including reads and writes to address, and ++ * LFENCE/SFENCE instructions. ++ */ ++ if (!cpu_has_clflushopt) ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MFENCE); ++ + switch(c->x86) + { + case 0xf ... 0x11: +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c b/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c +index 0c912b8669f8..dcbb4064012e 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/flushtlb.c +@@ -259,6 +259,13 @@ unsigned int flush_area_local(const void *va, unsigned int flags) + return flags; + } + ++/* ++ * On pre-CLFLUSHOPT AMD CPUs, CLFLUSH is weakly ordered with everything, ++ * including reads and writes to address, and LFENCE/SFENCE instructions. ++ * ++ * This function only works safely after alternatives have run. Luckily, at ++ * the time of writing, we don't flush the caches that early. ++ */ + void cache_flush(const void *addr, unsigned int size) + { + /* +@@ -268,6 +275,8 @@ void cache_flush(const void *addr, unsigned int size) + unsigned int clflush_size = current_cpu_data.x86_clflush_size ?: 16; + const void *end = addr + size; + ++ alternative("", "mfence", X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MFENCE); ++ + addr -= (unsigned long)addr & (clflush_size - 1); + for ( ; addr < end; addr += clflush_size ) + { +@@ -283,7 +292,9 @@ void cache_flush(const void *addr, unsigned int size) + [p] "m" (*(const char *)(addr))); + } + +- alternative("", "sfence", X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT); ++ alternative_2("", ++ "sfence", X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSHOPT, ++ "mfence", X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MFENCE); + } + + void cache_writeback(const void *addr, unsigned int size) +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +index fe2f97354fb6..09f619459bc7 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBT, X86_SYNTH(27)) /* Xen uses CET Indirect Branch + #define X86_BUG(x) ((FSCAPINTS + X86_NR_SYNTH) * 32 + (x)) + + #define X86_BUG_FPU_PTRS X86_BUG( 0) /* (F)X{SAVE,RSTOR} doesn't save/restore FOP/FIP/FDP. */ ++#define X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MFENCE X86_BUG( 2) /* MFENCE needed to serialise CLFLUSH */ + + /* Total number of capability words, inc synth and bug words. */ + #define NCAPINTS (FSCAPINTS + X86_NR_SYNTH + X86_NR_BUG) /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ diff --git a/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-5.patch b/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-5.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7b6ad6ad4bb --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa402-4.14-5.patch @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/pv: Track and flush non-coherent mappings of RAM + +There are legitimate uses of WC mappings of RAM, e.g. for DMA buffers with +devices that make non-coherent writes. The Linux sound subsystem makes +extensive use of this technique. + +For such usecases, the guest's DMA buffer is mapped and consistently used as +WC, and Xen doesn't interact with the buffer. + +However, a mischevious guest can use WC mappings to deliberately create +non-coherency between the cache and RAM, and use this to trick Xen into +validating a pagetable which isn't actually safe. + +Allocate a new PGT_non_coherent to track the non-coherency of mappings. Set +it whenever a non-coherent writeable mapping is created. If the page is used +as anything other than PGT_writable_page, force a cache flush before +validation. Also force a cache flush before the page is returned to the heap. + +This is CVE-2022-26364, part of XSA-402. + +Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +index 7d3d186edbd5..4d6b04c1cf31 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +@@ -999,6 +999,15 @@ get_page_from_l1e( + return -EACCES; + } + ++ /* ++ * Track writeable non-coherent mappings to RAM pages, to trigger a cache ++ * flush later if the target is used as anything but a PGT_writeable page. ++ * We care about all writeable mappings, including foreign mappings. ++ */ ++ if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SELFSNOOP) && ++ (l1f & (PAGE_CACHE_ATTRS | _PAGE_RW)) == (_PAGE_WC | _PAGE_RW) ) ++ set_bit(_PGT_non_coherent, &page->u.inuse.type_info); ++ + return 0; + + could_not_pin: +@@ -2444,6 +2453,19 @@ static int cleanup_page_mappings(struct page_info *page) + } + } + ++ /* ++ * Flush the cache if there were previously non-coherent writeable ++ * mappings of this page. This forces the page to be coherent before it ++ * is freed back to the heap. ++ */ ++ if ( __test_and_clear_bit(_PGT_non_coherent, &page->u.inuse.type_info) ) ++ { ++ void *addr = __map_domain_page(page); ++ ++ cache_flush(addr, PAGE_SIZE); ++ unmap_domain_page(addr); ++ } ++ + return rc; + } + +@@ -3016,6 +3038,22 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_info *page, unsigned long type, + if ( unlikely(!(nx & PGT_validated)) ) + { + /* ++ * Flush the cache if there were previously non-coherent mappings of ++ * this page, and we're trying to use it as anything other than a ++ * writeable page. This forces the page to be coherent before we ++ * validate its contents for safety. ++ */ ++ if ( (nx & PGT_non_coherent) && type != PGT_writable_page ) ++ { ++ void *addr = __map_domain_page(page); ++ ++ cache_flush(addr, PAGE_SIZE); ++ unmap_domain_page(addr); ++ ++ page->u.inuse.type_info &= ~PGT_non_coherent; ++ } ++ ++ /* + * No special validation needed for writable or shared pages. Page + * tables and GDT/LDT need to have their contents audited. + * +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/pv/grant_table.c b/xen/arch/x86/pv/grant_table.c +index 0325618c9883..81c72e61ed55 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/pv/grant_table.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/pv/grant_table.c +@@ -109,7 +109,17 @@ int create_grant_pv_mapping(uint64_t addr, mfn_t frame, + + ol1e = *pl1e; + if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, curr, 0) ) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We always create mappings in this path. However, our caller, ++ * map_grant_ref(), only passes potentially non-zero cache_flags for ++ * MMIO frames, so this path doesn't create non-coherent mappings of ++ * RAM frames and there's no need to calculate PGT_non_coherent. ++ */ ++ ASSERT(!cache_flags || is_iomem_page(frame)); ++ + rc = GNTST_okay; ++ } + + out_unlock: + page_unlock(page); +@@ -294,7 +304,18 @@ int replace_grant_pv_mapping(uint64_t addr, mfn_t frame, + l1e_get_flags(ol1e), addr, grant_pte_flags); + + if ( UPDATE_ENTRY(l1, pl1e, ol1e, nl1e, gl1mfn, curr, 0) ) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Generally, replace_grant_pv_mapping() is used to destroy mappings ++ * (n1le = l1e_empty()), but it can be a present mapping on the ++ * GNTABOP_unmap_and_replace path. ++ * ++ * In such cases, the PTE is fully transplanted from its old location ++ * via steal_linear_addr(), so we need not perform PGT_non_coherent ++ * checking here. ++ */ + rc = GNTST_okay; ++ } + + out_unlock: + page_unlock(page); +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h +index 7a2093da5977..4c814abaa028 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/mm.h +@@ -48,8 +48,12 @@ + #define _PGT_partial PG_shift(8) + #define PGT_partial PG_mask(1, 8) + ++/* Has this page been mapped writeable with a non-coherent memory type? */ ++#define _PGT_non_coherent PG_shift(9) ++#define PGT_non_coherent PG_mask(1, 9) ++ + /* Count of uses of this frame as its current type. */ +-#define PGT_count_width PG_shift(8) ++#define PGT_count_width PG_shift(9) + #define PGT_count_mask ((1UL<<PGT_count_width)-1) + + /* Are the 'type mask' bits identical? */ diff --git a/main/xen/xsa403-4.14-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa403-4.14-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..455eb0b9a30 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa403-4.14-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From 340cb938b957a2baaaee1700a882148dc4c788bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com> +Date: Thu, 30 Jun 2022 14:35:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] tools/libxl: env variable to signal whether disk/nic backend + is trusted +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +Introduce support in libxl for fetching the default backend trusted +option for disk and nic devices. + +Users can set libxl_{disk,nic}_backend_untrusted environment variable +to notify libxl of whether the backends for disk and nic devices +should be trusted. Such information is passed into the frontend so it +can take the appropriate measures. + +This is part of XSA-403. + +Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> +--- + tools/libxl/libxl_disk.c | 3 +++ + tools/libxl/libxl_nic.c | 3 +++ + 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_disk.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_disk.c +index ddc1eec176..36862bbbcb 100644 +--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_disk.c ++++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_disk.c +@@ -395,6 +395,9 @@ static void device_disk_add(libxl__egc *egc, uint32_t domid, + flexarray_append(front, GCSPRINTF("%d", device->devid)); + flexarray_append(front, "device-type"); + flexarray_append(front, disk->is_cdrom ? "cdrom" : "disk"); ++ flexarray_append(front, "trusted"); ++ flexarray_append(front, getenv("libxl_disk_backend_untrusted") ? "0" ++ : "1"); + + /* + * Old PV kernel disk frontends before 2.6.26 rely on tool stack to +diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_nic.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_nic.c +index 07880b39e1..4d09fb8b46 100644 +--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_nic.c ++++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_nic.c +@@ -237,6 +237,9 @@ static int libxl__set_xenstore_nic(libxl__gc *gc, uint32_t domid, + flexarray_append(front, GCSPRINTF( + LIBXL_MAC_FMT, LIBXL_MAC_BYTES(nic->mac))); + ++ flexarray_append(front, "trusted"); ++ flexarray_append(front, getenv("libxl_nic_backend_untrusted") ? "0" : "1"); ++ + return 0; + } + +-- +2.37.0 + diff --git a/main/xen/xsa404-4.14-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa404-4.14-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..2c40a0ee43c --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa404-4.14-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,239 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Make VERW flushing runtime conditional + +Currently, VERW flushing to mitigate MDS is boot time conditional per domain +type. However, to provide mitigations for DRPW (CVE-2022-21166), we need to +conditionally use VERW based on the trustworthiness of the guest, and the +devices passed through. + +Remove the PV/HVM alternatives and instead issue a VERW on the return-to-guest +path depending on the SCF_verw bit in cpuinfo spec_ctrl_flags. + +Introduce spec_ctrl_init_domain() and d->arch.verw to calculate the VERW +disposition at domain creation time, and context switch the SCF_verw bit. + +For now, VERW flushing is used and controlled exactly as before, but later +patches will add per-domain cases too. + +No change in behaviour. + +This is part of XSA-404. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> + +diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +index 5467ae7168ff..ad85785e14b3 100644 +--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc ++++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +@@ -2129,9 +2129,8 @@ in place for guests to use. + Use of a positive boolean value for either of these options is invalid. + + The booleans `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=` and `md-clear=` offer fine +-grained control over the alternative blocks used by Xen. These impact Xen's +-ability to protect itself, and Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests +-to use. ++grained control over the primitives by Xen. These impact Xen's ability to ++protect itself, and Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests to use. + + * `pv=` and `hvm=` offer control over all suboptions for PV and HVM guests + respectively. +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +index 3da81ebf1d41..5ea5ef6ba037 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +@@ -651,6 +651,8 @@ int arch_domain_create(struct domain *d, + + domain_cpu_policy_changed(d); + ++ spec_ctrl_init_domain(d); ++ + return 0; + + fail: +@@ -1763,14 +1765,15 @@ static void __context_switch(void) + void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next) + { + unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id(); ++ struct cpu_info *info = get_cpu_info(); + const struct domain *prevd = prev->domain, *nextd = next->domain; + unsigned int dirty_cpu = read_atomic(&next->dirty_cpu); + + ASSERT(prev != next); + ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled()); + +- get_cpu_info()->use_pv_cr3 = false; +- get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0; ++ info->use_pv_cr3 = false; ++ info->xen_cr3 = 0; + + if ( unlikely(dirty_cpu != cpu) && dirty_cpu != VCPU_CPU_CLEAN ) + { +@@ -1834,6 +1837,11 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next) + *last_id = next_id; + } + } ++ ++ /* Update the top-of-stack block with the VERW disposition. */ ++ info->spec_ctrl_flags &= ~SCF_verw; ++ if ( nextd->arch.verw ) ++ info->spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_verw; + } + + sched_context_switched(prev, next); +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S +index 49651f3c435a..5f5de45a1309 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S +@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ UNLIKELY_END(realmode) + + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe beyond this point. */ + /* SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_VMX Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo Clob: */ +- ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(verw CPUINFO_verw_sel(%rsp)), X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_HVM ++ DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_VERW + + mov VCPU_hvm_guest_cr2(%rbx),%rax + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index 1e226102d399..b4efc940aa2b 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ static bool __initdata opt_msr_sc_pv = true; + static bool __initdata opt_msr_sc_hvm = true; + static bool __initdata opt_rsb_pv = true; + static bool __initdata opt_rsb_hvm = true; +-static int8_t __initdata opt_md_clear_pv = -1; +-static int8_t __initdata opt_md_clear_hvm = -1; ++static int8_t __read_mostly opt_md_clear_pv = -1; ++static int8_t __read_mostly opt_md_clear_hvm = -1; + + /* Cmdline controls for Xen's speculative settings. */ + static enum ind_thunk { +@@ -903,6 +903,13 @@ static __init void mds_calculations(uint64_t caps) + } + } + ++void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d) ++{ ++ bool pv = is_pv_domain(d); ++ ++ d->arch.verw = pv ? opt_md_clear_pv : opt_md_clear_hvm; ++} ++ + void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + { + enum ind_thunk thunk = THUNK_DEFAULT; +@@ -1148,21 +1155,20 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)); + + /* +- * Enable MDS defences as applicable. The PV blocks need using all the +- * time, and the Idle blocks need using if either PV or HVM defences are +- * used. ++ * Enable MDS defences as applicable. The Idle blocks need using if ++ * either PV or HVM defences are used. + * + * HVM is more complicated. The MD_CLEAR microcode extends L1D_FLUSH with +- * equivelent semantics to avoid needing to perform both flushes on the +- * HVM path. The HVM blocks don't need activating if our hypervisor told +- * us it was handling L1D_FLUSH, or we are using L1D_FLUSH ourselves. ++ * equivalent semantics to avoid needing to perform both flushes on the ++ * HVM path. Therefore, we don't need VERW in addition to L1D_FLUSH. ++ * ++ * After calculating the appropriate idle setting, simplify ++ * opt_md_clear_hvm to mean just "should we VERW on the way into HVM ++ * guests", so spec_ctrl_init_domain() can calculate suitable settings. + */ +- if ( opt_md_clear_pv ) +- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_PV); + if ( opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm ) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_IDLE); +- if ( opt_md_clear_hvm && !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL) && !opt_l1d_flush ) +- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_HVM); ++ opt_md_clear_hvm &= !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL) && !opt_l1d_flush; + + /* + * Warn the user if they are on MLPDS/MFBDS-vulnerable hardware with HT +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +index 09f619459bc7..9eaab7a2a1fa 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +@@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_HVM, X86_SYNTH(19)) /* RSB overwrite needed for HVM + XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SELFSNOOP, X86_SYNTH(20)) /* SELFSNOOP gets used by Xen itself */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(21)) /* (SC_MSR_PV || SC_MSR_HVM) && default_xen_spec_ctrl */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_LBR, X86_SYNTH(22)) /* Xen uses MSR_DEBUGCTL.LBR */ +-XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_PV, X86_SYNTH(23)) /* VERW used by Xen for PV */ +-XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_HVM, X86_SYNTH(24)) /* VERW used by Xen for HVM */ ++/* Bits 23,24 unused. */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SHSTK, X86_SYNTH(26)) /* Xen uses CET Shadow Stacks */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBT, X86_SYNTH(27)) /* Xen uses CET Indirect Branch Tracking */ +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h +index 0db551bff344..4ee76bba45da 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h +@@ -308,6 +308,9 @@ struct arch_domain + uint32_t pci_cf8; + uint8_t cmos_idx; + ++ /* Use VERW on return-to-guest for its flushing side effect. */ ++ bool verw; ++ + union { + struct pv_domain pv; + struct hvm_domain hvm; +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +index 9caecddfec96..68f6c46c470c 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ + #define SCF_use_shadow (1 << 0) + #define SCF_ist_wrmsr (1 << 1) + #define SCF_ist_rsb (1 << 2) ++#define SCF_verw (1 << 3) + + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ + #include <asm/msr-index.h> + + void init_speculation_mitigations(void); ++void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d); + + extern bool opt_ibpb; + extern bool opt_ssbd; +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +index 02b3b18ce69f..5a590bac44aa 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +@@ -136,6 +136,19 @@ + #endif + .endm + ++.macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_VERW ++/* ++ * Requires %rsp=cpuinfo ++ * ++ * Issue a VERW for its flushing side effect, if indicated. This is a Spectre ++ * v1 gadget, but the IRET/VMEntry is serialising. ++ */ ++ testb $SCF_verw, CPUINFO_spec_ctrl_flags(%rsp) ++ jz .L\@_verw_skip ++ verw CPUINFO_verw_sel(%rsp) ++.L\@_verw_skip: ++.endm ++ + .macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen:req + /* + * Requires %rsp=regs (also cpuinfo if !maybexen) +@@ -231,8 +244,7 @@ + #define SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_PV \ + ALTERNATIVE "", \ + DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV; \ +- ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(verw CPUINFO_verw_sel(%rsp)), \ +- X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_PV ++ DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_VERW + + /* + * Use in IST interrupt/exception context. May interrupt Xen or PV context. diff --git a/main/xen/xsa404-4.14-2.patch b/main/xen/xsa404-4.14-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..6ead4618c23 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa404-4.14-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for MMIO Stale Data controls + +The three *_NO bits indicate non-susceptibility to the SSDP, FBSDP and PSDP +data movement primitives. + +FB_CLEAR indicates that the VERW instruction has re-gained it's Fill Buffer +flushing side effect. This is only enumerated on parts where VERW had +previously lost it's flushing side effect due to the MDS/TAA vulnerabilities +being fixed in hardware. + +FB_CLEAR_CTRL is available on a subset of FB_CLEAR parts where the Fill Buffer +clearing side effect of VERW can be turned off for performance reasons. + +This is part of XSA-404. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index b4efc940aa2b..38e0cc2847e0 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + * Hardware read-only information, stating immunity to certain issues, or + * suggestions of which mitigation to use. + */ +- printk(" Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", ++ printk(" Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO) ? " RDCL_NO" : "", + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL) ? " IBRS_ALL" : "", + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA) ? " RSBA" : "", +@@ -332,13 +332,16 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SSB_NO) ? " SSB_NO" : "", + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO) ? " MDS_NO" : "", + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO) ? " TAA_NO" : "", ++ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO) ? " SBDR_SSDP_NO" : "", ++ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO) ? " FBSDP_NO" : "", ++ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO) ? " PSDP_NO" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ALWAYS)) ? " IBRS_ALWAYS" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS)) ? " STIBP_ALWAYS" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_FAST)) ? " IBRS_FAST" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_SAME_MODE)) ? " IBRS_SAME_MODE" : ""); + + /* Hardware features which need driving to mitigate issues. */ +- printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", ++ printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) || + (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB)) ? " IBPB" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) || +@@ -353,7 +356,9 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)) ? " MD_CLEAR" : "", + (_7d0 & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL)) ? " SRBDS_CTRL" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD)) ? " VIRT_SSBD" : "", +- (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL) ? " TSX_CTRL" : ""); ++ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL) ? " TSX_CTRL" : "", ++ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR) ? " FB_CLEAR" : "", ++ (caps & ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR_CTRL) ? " FB_CLEAR_CTRL" : ""); + + /* Compiled-in support which pertains to mitigations. */ + if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INDIRECT_THUNK) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SHADOW_PAGING) ) +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h +index 7a39d94b9a70..c8670eab8ef5 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h +@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ + #define ARCH_CAPS_IF_PSCHANGE_MC_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 6) + #define ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL (_AC(1, ULL) << 7) + #define ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 8) ++#define ARCH_CAPS_SBDR_SSDP_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 13) ++#define ARCH_CAPS_FBSDP_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 14) ++#define ARCH_CAPS_PSDP_NO (_AC(1, ULL) << 15) ++#define ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR (_AC(1, ULL) << 17) ++#define ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR_CTRL (_AC(1, ULL) << 18) + + #define MSR_FLUSH_CMD 0x0000010b + #define FLUSH_CMD_L1D (_AC(1, ULL) << 0) +@@ -73,6 +78,7 @@ + #define MCU_OPT_CTRL_RNGDS_MITG_DIS (_AC(1, ULL) << 0) + #define MCU_OPT_CTRL_RTM_ALLOW (_AC(1, ULL) << 1) + #define MCU_OPT_CTRL_RTM_LOCKED (_AC(1, ULL) << 2) ++#define MCU_OPT_CTRL_FB_CLEAR_DIS (_AC(1, ULL) << 3) + + #define MSR_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE 0x00000560 + #define MSR_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK 0x00000561 diff --git a/main/xen/xsa404-4.14-3.patch b/main/xen/xsa404-4.14-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5fe549e07e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa404-4.14-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Add spec-ctrl=unpriv-mmio + +Per Xen's support statement, PCI passthrough should be to trusted domains +because the overall system security depends on factors outside of Xen's +control. + +As such, Xen, in a supported configuration, is not vulnerable to DRPW/SBDR. + +However, users who have risk assessed their configuration may be happy with +the risk of DoS, but unhappy with the risk of cross-domain data leakage. Such +users should enable this option. + +On CPUs vulnerable to MDS, the existing mitigations are the best we can do to +mitigate MMIO cross-domain data leakage. + +On CPUs fixed to MDS but vulnerable MMIO stale data leakage, this option: + + * On CPUs susceptible to FBSDP, mitigates cross-domain fill buffer leakage + using FB_CLEAR. + * On CPUs susceptible to SBDR, mitigates RNG data recovery by engaging the + srb-lock, previously used to mitigate SRBDS. + +Both mitigations require microcode from IPU 2022.1, May 2022. + +This is part of XSA-404. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> +--- +Backporting note: For Xen 4.7 and earlier with bool_t not aliasing bool, the +ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR hunk needs !! + +diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +index ad85785e14b3..d1d5852cdd84 100644 +--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc ++++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +@@ -2106,7 +2106,7 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`). + ### spec-ctrl (x86) + > `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm,msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>, + > bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,eager-fpu, +-> l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock}=<bool> ]` ++> l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock,unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]` + + Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations. By default, Xen + will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support, +@@ -2185,8 +2185,16 @@ Xen will enable this mitigation. + On hardware supporting SRBDS_CTRL, the `srb-lock=` option can be used to force + or prevent Xen from protect the Special Register Buffer from leaking stale + data. By default, Xen will enable this mitigation, except on parts where MDS +-is fixed and TAA is fixed/mitigated (in which case, there is believed to be no +-way for an attacker to obtain the stale data). ++is fixed and TAA is fixed/mitigated and there are no unprivileged MMIO ++mappings (in which case, there is believed to be no way for an attacker to ++obtain stale data). ++ ++The `unpriv-mmio=` boolean indicates whether the system has (or will have) ++less than fully privileged domains granted access to MMIO devices. By ++default, this option is disabled. If enabled, Xen will use the `FB_CLEAR` ++and/or `SRBDS_CTRL` functionality available in the Intel May 2022 microcode ++release to mitigate cross-domain leakage of data via the MMIO Stale Data ++vulnerabilities. + + ### sync_console + > `= <boolean>` +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index 38e0cc2847e0..83b856fa9158 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ static bool __initdata cpu_has_bug_msbds_only; /* => minimal HT impact. */ + static bool __initdata cpu_has_bug_mds; /* Any other M{LP,SB,FB}DS combination. */ + + static int8_t __initdata opt_srb_lock = -1; ++static bool __initdata opt_unpriv_mmio; ++static bool __read_mostly opt_fb_clear_mmio; + + static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) + { +@@ -184,6 +186,8 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) + opt_branch_harden = val; + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("srb-lock", s, ss)) >= 0 ) + opt_srb_lock = val; ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("unpriv-mmio", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_unpriv_mmio = val; + else + rc = -EINVAL; + +@@ -392,7 +396,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + opt_srb_lock ? " SRB_LOCK+" : " SRB_LOCK-", + opt_ibpb ? " IBPB" : "", + opt_l1d_flush ? " L1D_FLUSH" : "", +- opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm ? " VERW" : "", ++ opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm || ++ opt_fb_clear_mmio ? " VERW" : "", + opt_branch_harden ? " BRANCH_HARDEN" : ""); + + /* L1TF diagnostics, printed if vulnerable or PV shadowing is in use. */ +@@ -912,7 +917,9 @@ void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d) + { + bool pv = is_pv_domain(d); + +- d->arch.verw = pv ? opt_md_clear_pv : opt_md_clear_hvm; ++ d->arch.verw = ++ (pv ? opt_md_clear_pv : opt_md_clear_hvm) || ++ (opt_fb_clear_mmio && is_iommu_enabled(d)); + } + + void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) +@@ -1148,6 +1155,18 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + mds_calculations(caps); + + /* ++ * Parts which enumerate FB_CLEAR are those which are post-MDS_NO and have ++ * reintroduced the VERW fill buffer flushing side effect because of a ++ * susceptibility to FBSDP. ++ * ++ * If unprivileged guests have (or will have) MMIO mappings, we can ++ * mitigate cross-domain leakage of fill buffer data by issuing VERW on ++ * the return-to-guest path. ++ */ ++ if ( opt_unpriv_mmio ) ++ opt_fb_clear_mmio = caps & ARCH_CAPS_FB_CLEAR; ++ ++ /* + * By default, enable PV and HVM mitigations on MDS-vulnerable hardware. + * This will only be a token effort for MLPDS/MFBDS when HT is enabled, + * but it is somewhat better than nothing. +@@ -1160,18 +1179,20 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)); + + /* +- * Enable MDS defences as applicable. The Idle blocks need using if +- * either PV or HVM defences are used. ++ * Enable MDS/MMIO defences as applicable. The Idle blocks need using if ++ * either the PV or HVM MDS defences are used, or if we may give MMIO ++ * access to untrusted guests. + * + * HVM is more complicated. The MD_CLEAR microcode extends L1D_FLUSH with + * equivalent semantics to avoid needing to perform both flushes on the +- * HVM path. Therefore, we don't need VERW in addition to L1D_FLUSH. ++ * HVM path. Therefore, we don't need VERW in addition to L1D_FLUSH (for ++ * MDS mitigations. L1D_FLUSH is not safe for MMIO mitigations.) + * + * After calculating the appropriate idle setting, simplify + * opt_md_clear_hvm to mean just "should we VERW on the way into HVM + * guests", so spec_ctrl_init_domain() can calculate suitable settings. + */ +- if ( opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm ) ++ if ( opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm || opt_fb_clear_mmio ) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_IDLE); + opt_md_clear_hvm &= !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL) && !opt_l1d_flush; + +@@ -1236,14 +1257,19 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + * On some SRBDS-affected hardware, it may be safe to relax srb-lock by + * default. + * +- * On parts which enumerate MDS_NO and not TAA_NO, TSX is the only known +- * way to access the Fill Buffer. If TSX isn't available (inc. SKU +- * reasons on some models), or TSX is explicitly disabled, then there is +- * no need for the extra overhead to protect RDRAND/RDSEED. ++ * All parts with SRBDS_CTRL suffer SSDP, the mechanism by which stale RNG ++ * data becomes available to other contexts. To recover the data, an ++ * attacker needs to use: ++ * - SBDS (MDS or TAA to sample the cores fill buffer) ++ * - SBDR (Architecturally retrieve stale transaction buffer contents) ++ * - DRPW (Architecturally latch stale fill buffer data) ++ * ++ * On MDS_NO parts, and with TAA_NO or TSX unavailable/disabled, and there ++ * is no unprivileged MMIO access, the RNG data doesn't need protecting. + */ + if ( cpu_has_srbds_ctrl ) + { +- if ( opt_srb_lock == -1 && ++ if ( opt_srb_lock == -1 && !opt_unpriv_mmio && + (caps & (ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO|ARCH_CAPS_TAA_NO)) == ARCH_CAPS_MDS_NO && + (!cpu_has_hle || ((caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL) && rtm_disabled)) ) + opt_srb_lock = 0; diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-01.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-01.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1eb027f6890 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-01.patch @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Only adjust MSR_SPEC_CTRL for idle with legacy IBRS + +Back at the time of the original Spectre-v2 fixes, it was recommended to clear +MSR_SPEC_CTRL when going idle. This is because of the side effects on the +sibling thread caused by the microcode IBRS and STIBP implementations which +were retrofitted to existing CPUs. + +However, there are no relevant cross-thread impacts for the hardware +IBRS/STIBP implementations, so this logic should not be used on Intel CPUs +supporting eIBRS, or any AMD CPUs; doing so only adds unnecessary latency to +the idle path. + +Furthermore, there's no point playing with MSR_SPEC_CTRL in the idle paths if +SMT is disabled for other reasons. + +Fixes: 8d03080d2a33 ("x86/spec-ctrl: Cease using thunk=lfence on AMD") +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> +(cherry picked from commit ffc7694e0c99eea158c32aa164b7d1e1bb1dc46b) + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index 58a2797dfea1..d7f767b0739c 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -1104,8 +1104,14 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + /* (Re)init BSP state now that default_spec_ctrl_flags has been calculated. */ + init_shadow_spec_ctrl_state(); + +- /* If Xen is using any MSR_SPEC_CTRL settings, adjust the idle path. */ +- if ( default_xen_spec_ctrl ) ++ /* ++ * For microcoded IBRS only (i.e. Intel, pre eIBRS), it is recommended to ++ * clear MSR_SPEC_CTRL before going idle, to avoid impacting sibling ++ * threads. Activate this if SMT is enabled, and Xen is using a non-zero ++ * MSR_SPEC_CTRL setting. ++ */ ++ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL) && ++ hw_smt_enabled && default_xen_spec_ctrl ) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_IDLE); + + xpti_init_default(caps); +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +index 9eaab7a2a1fa..f7488d3ccbfa 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_HVM, X86_SYNTH(17)) /* MSR_SPEC_CTRL used by Xen fo + XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_PV, X86_SYNTH(18)) /* RSB overwrite needed for PV */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_HVM, X86_SYNTH(19)) /* RSB overwrite needed for HVM */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SELFSNOOP, X86_SYNTH(20)) /* SELFSNOOP gets used by Xen itself */ +-XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(21)) /* (SC_MSR_PV || SC_MSR_HVM) && default_xen_spec_ctrl */ ++XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(21)) /* Clear MSR_SPEC_CTRL on idle */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_LBR, X86_SYNTH(22)) /* Xen uses MSR_DEBUGCTL.LBR */ + /* Bits 23,24 unused. */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */ +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +index 68f6c46c470c..12283573cdd5 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +@@ -78,7 +78,8 @@ static always_inline void spec_ctrl_enter_idle(struct cpu_info *info) + uint32_t val = 0; + + /* +- * Branch Target Injection: ++ * It is recommended in some cases to clear MSR_SPEC_CTRL when going idle, ++ * to avoid impacting sibling threads. + * + * Latch the new shadow value, then enable shadowing, then update the MSR. + * There are no SMP issues here; only local processor ordering concerns. +@@ -114,7 +115,7 @@ static always_inline void spec_ctrl_exit_idle(struct cpu_info *info) + uint32_t val = info->xen_spec_ctrl; + + /* +- * Branch Target Injection: ++ * Restore MSR_SPEC_CTRL on exit from idle. + * + * Disable shadowing before updating the MSR. There are no SMP issues + * here; only local processor ordering concerns. diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-02.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-02.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..5fab7fc7ff3 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-02.patch @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Knobs for STIBP and PSFD, and follow hardware STIBP + hint + +STIBP and PSFD are slightly weird bits, because they're both implied by other +bits in MSR_SPEC_CTRL. Add fine grain controls for them, and take the +implications into account when setting IBRS/SSBD. + +Rearrange the IBPB text/variables/logic to keep all the MSR_SPEC_CTRL bits +together, for consistency. + +However, AMD have a hardware hint CPUID bit recommending that STIBP be set +unilaterally. This is advertised on Zen3, so follow the recommendation. +Furthermore, in such cases, set STIBP behind the guest's back for now. This +has negligible overhead for the guest, but saves a WRMSR on vmentry. This is +the only default change. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> +(cherry picked from commit fef244b179c06fcdfa581f7d57fa6e578c49ff50) + +diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +index d1d5852cdd84..2302cec91fea 100644 +--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc ++++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +@@ -2105,8 +2105,9 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`). + + ### spec-ctrl (x86) + > `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm,msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>, +-> bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,eager-fpu, +-> l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock,unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]` ++> bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd, ++> eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock, ++> unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]` + + Controls for speculative execution sidechannel mitigations. By default, Xen + will pick the most appropriate mitigations based on compiled in support, +@@ -2156,9 +2157,10 @@ On hardware supporting IBRS (Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation), the + If Xen is not using IBRS itself, functionality is still set up so IBRS can be + virtualised for guests. + +-On hardware supporting IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier), the `ibpb=` +-option can be used to force (the default) or prevent Xen from issuing branch +-prediction barriers on vcpu context switches. ++On hardware supporting STIBP (Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors), the ++`stibp=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself. ++By default, Xen will use STIBP when IBRS is in use (IBRS implies STIBP), and ++when hardware hints recommend using it as a blanket setting. + + On hardware supporting SSBD (Speculative Store Bypass Disable), the `ssbd=` + option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself. On AMD +@@ -2166,6 +2168,15 @@ hardware, this is a global option applied at boot, and not virtualised for + guest use. On Intel hardware, the feature is virtualised for guests, + independently of Xen's choice of setting. + ++On hardware supporting PSFD (Predictive Store Forwarding Disable), the `psfd=` ++option can be used to force or prevent Xen using the feature itself. By ++default, Xen will not use PSFD. PSFD is implied by SSBD, and SSBD is off by ++default. ++ ++On hardware supporting IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier), the `ibpb=` ++option can be used to force (the default) or prevent Xen from issuing branch ++prediction barriers on vcpu context switches. ++ + On all hardware, the `eager-fpu=` option can be used to force or prevent Xen + from using fully eager FPU context switches. This is currently implemented as + a global control. By default, Xen will choose to use fully eager context +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c +index 55da9302e5d7..a0bf9f4e056a 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/vmcb.c +@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ + #include <asm/hvm/support.h> + #include <asm/hvm/svm/svm.h> + #include <asm/hvm/svm/svmdebug.h> ++#include <asm/spec_ctrl.h> + + struct vmcb_struct *alloc_vmcb(void) + { +@@ -175,6 +176,14 @@ static int construct_vmcb(struct vcpu *v) + vmcb->_pause_filter_thresh = SVM_PAUSETHRESH_INIT; + } + ++ /* ++ * When default_xen_spec_ctrl simply SPEC_CTRL_STIBP, default this behind ++ * the back of the VM too. Our SMT topology isn't accurate, the overhead ++ * is neglegable, and doing this saves a WRMSR on the vmentry path. ++ */ ++ if ( default_xen_spec_ctrl == SPEC_CTRL_STIBP ) ++ v->arch.msrs->spec_ctrl.raw = SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; ++ + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index d7f767b0739c..06790897e496 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -48,9 +48,13 @@ static enum ind_thunk { + THUNK_LFENCE, + THUNK_JMP, + } opt_thunk __initdata = THUNK_DEFAULT; ++ + static int8_t __initdata opt_ibrs = -1; ++int8_t __initdata opt_stibp = -1; ++bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd; ++int8_t __initdata opt_psfd = -1; ++ + bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb = true; +-bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd = false; + int8_t __read_mostly opt_eager_fpu = -1; + int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1d_flush = -1; + bool __read_mostly opt_branch_harden = true; +@@ -173,12 +177,20 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) + else + rc = -EINVAL; + } ++ ++ /* Bits in MSR_SPEC_CTRL. */ + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibrs", s, ss)) >= 0 ) + opt_ibrs = val; +- else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 ) +- opt_ibpb = val; ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("stibp", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_stibp = val; + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ssbd", s, ss)) >= 0 ) + opt_ssbd = val; ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("psfd", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_psfd = val; ++ ++ /* Misc settings. */ ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_ibpb = val; + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("eager-fpu", s, ss)) >= 0 ) + opt_eager_fpu = val; + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("l1d-flush", s, ss)) >= 0 ) +@@ -377,7 +389,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + "\n"); + + /* Settings for Xen's protection, irrespective of guests. */ +- printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s%s\n", ++ printk(" Xen settings: BTI-Thunk %s, SPEC_CTRL: %s%s%s%s%s, Other:%s%s%s%s%s\n", + thunk == THUNK_NONE ? "N/A" : + thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ? "RETPOLINE" : + thunk == THUNK_LFENCE ? "LFENCE" : +@@ -391,6 +403,9 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD) && + !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) ? "" : + (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) ? " SSBD+" : " SSBD-", ++ (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSFD) && ++ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PSFD)) ? "" : ++ (default_xen_spec_ctrl & SPEC_CTRL_PSFD) ? " PSFD+" : " PSFD-", + !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_TSX_CTRL) ? "" : + (opt_tsx & 1) ? " TSX+" : " TSX-", + !cpu_has_srbds_ctrl ? "" : +@@ -951,10 +966,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + if ( !has_spec_ctrl ) + printk(XENLOG_WARNING "?!? CET active, but no MSR_SPEC_CTRL?\n"); + else if ( opt_ibrs == -1 ) +- { + opt_ibrs = ibrs = true; +- default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; +- } + + if ( opt_thunk == THUNK_DEFAULT || opt_thunk == THUNK_RETPOLINE ) + thunk = THUNK_JMP; +@@ -1058,14 +1070,49 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM); + } + +- /* If we have IBRS available, see whether we should use it. */ ++ /* Figure out default_xen_spec_ctrl. */ + if ( has_spec_ctrl && ibrs ) ++ { ++ /* IBRS implies STIBP. */ ++ if ( opt_stibp == -1 ) ++ opt_stibp = 1; ++ + default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Use STIBP by default if the hardware hint is set. Otherwise, leave it ++ * off as it a severe performance pentalty on pre-eIBRS Intel hardware ++ * where it was retrofitted in microcode. ++ */ ++ if ( opt_stibp == -1 ) ++ opt_stibp = !!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS); ++ ++ if ( opt_stibp && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) ) ++ default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; + +- /* If we have SSBD available, see whether we should use it. */ + if ( opt_ssbd && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSBD) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) ) ++ { ++ /* SSBD implies PSFD */ ++ if ( opt_psfd == -1 ) ++ opt_psfd = 1; ++ + default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Don't use PSFD by default. AMD designed the predictor to ++ * auto-clear on privilege change. PSFD is implied by SSBD, which is ++ * off by default. ++ */ ++ if ( opt_psfd == -1 ) ++ opt_psfd = 0; ++ ++ if ( opt_psfd && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PSFD) || ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PSFD)) ) ++ default_xen_spec_ctrl |= SPEC_CTRL_PSFD; + + /* + * PV guests can poison the RSB to any virtual address from which diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-03.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-03.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7082e407744 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-03.patch @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: xen/cmdline: Extend parse_boolean() to signal a name match + +This will help parsing a sub-option which has boolean and non-boolean options +available. + +First, rework 'int val' into 'bool has_neg_prefix'. This inverts it's value, +but the resulting logic is far easier to follow. + +Second, reject anything of the form 'no-$FOO=' which excludes ambiguous +constructs such as 'no-$foo=yes' which have never been valid. + +This just leaves the case where everything is otherwise fine, but parse_bool() +can't interpret the provided string. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +(cherry picked from commit 382326cac528dd1eb0d04efd5c05363c453e29f4) + +diff --git a/xen/common/kernel.c b/xen/common/kernel.c +index c3a943f07765..f07ff41d881e 100644 +--- a/xen/common/kernel.c ++++ b/xen/common/kernel.c +@@ -272,9 +272,9 @@ int parse_bool(const char *s, const char *e) + int parse_boolean(const char *name, const char *s, const char *e) + { + size_t slen, nlen; +- int val = !!strncmp(s, "no-", 3); ++ bool has_neg_prefix = !strncmp(s, "no-", 3); + +- if ( !val ) ++ if ( has_neg_prefix ) + s += 3; + + slen = e ? ({ ASSERT(e >= s); e - s; }) : strlen(s); +@@ -286,11 +286,23 @@ int parse_boolean(const char *name, const char *s, const char *e) + + /* Exact, unadorned name? Result depends on the 'no-' prefix. */ + if ( slen == nlen ) +- return val; ++ return !has_neg_prefix; ++ ++ /* Inexact match with a 'no-' prefix? Not valid. */ ++ if ( has_neg_prefix ) ++ return -1; + + /* =$SOMETHING? Defer to the regular boolean parsing. */ + if ( s[nlen] == '=' ) +- return parse_bool(&s[nlen + 1], e); ++ { ++ int b = parse_bool(&s[nlen + 1], e); ++ ++ if ( b >= 0 ) ++ return b; ++ ++ /* Not a boolean, but the name matched. Signal specially. */ ++ return -2; ++ } + + /* Unrecognised. Give up. */ + return -1; +diff --git a/xen/include/xen/lib.h b/xen/include/xen/lib.h +index 076bcfb67dbb..900c0ce3e466 100644 +--- a/xen/include/xen/lib.h ++++ b/xen/include/xen/lib.h +@@ -82,7 +82,8 @@ int parse_bool(const char *s, const char *e); + /** + * Given a specific name, parses a string of the form: + * [no-]$NAME[=...] +- * returning 0 or 1 for a recognised boolean, or -1 for an error. ++ * returning 0 or 1 for a recognised boolean. Returns -1 for general errors, ++ * and -2 for "not a boolean, but $NAME= matches". + */ + int parse_boolean(const char *name, const char *s, const char *e); + diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-04.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-04.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1b743c4f641 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-04.patch @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Add fine-grained cmdline suboptions for primitives + +Support controling the PV/HVM suboption of msr-sc/rsb/md-clear, which +previously wasn't possible. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +(cherry picked from commit 27357c394ba6e1571a89105b840ce1c6f026485c) + +diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +index 2302cec91fea..a84f5c19218d 100644 +--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc ++++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +@@ -2104,7 +2104,8 @@ not be able to control the state of the mitigation. + By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`). + + ### spec-ctrl (x86) +-> `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm,msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>, ++> `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm}=<bool>, ++> {msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>|{pv,hvm}=<bool>, + > bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd, + > eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock, + > unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]` +@@ -2129,12 +2130,17 @@ in place for guests to use. + + Use of a positive boolean value for either of these options is invalid. + +-The booleans `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=` and `md-clear=` offer fine ++The `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=` and `md-clear=` options offer fine + grained control over the primitives by Xen. These impact Xen's ability to +-protect itself, and Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests to use. ++protect itself, and/or Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests to use. + + * `pv=` and `hvm=` offer control over all suboptions for PV and HVM guests + respectively. ++* Each other option can be used either as a plain boolean ++ (e.g. `spec-ctrl=rsb` to control both the PV and HVM sub-options), or with ++ `pv=` or `hvm=` subsuboptions (e.g. `spec-ctrl=rsb=no-hvm` to disable HVM ++ RSB only). ++ + * `msr-sc=` offers control over Xen's support for manipulating `MSR_SPEC_CTRL` + on entry and exit. These blocks are necessary to virtualise support for + guests and if disabled, guests will be unable to use IBRS/STIBP/SSBD/etc. +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index 06790897e496..225fe08259b3 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -147,20 +147,68 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) + opt_rsb_hvm = val; + opt_md_clear_hvm = val; + } +- else if ( (val = parse_boolean("msr-sc", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("msr-sc", s, ss)) != -1 ) + { +- opt_msr_sc_pv = val; +- opt_msr_sc_hvm = val; ++ switch ( val ) ++ { ++ case 0: ++ case 1: ++ opt_msr_sc_pv = opt_msr_sc_hvm = val; ++ break; ++ ++ case -2: ++ s += strlen("msr-sc="); ++ if ( (val = parse_boolean("pv", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_msr_sc_pv = val; ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_msr_sc_hvm = val; ++ else ++ default: ++ rc = -EINVAL; ++ break; ++ } + } +- else if ( (val = parse_boolean("rsb", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("rsb", s, ss)) != -1 ) + { +- opt_rsb_pv = val; +- opt_rsb_hvm = val; ++ switch ( val ) ++ { ++ case 0: ++ case 1: ++ opt_rsb_pv = opt_rsb_hvm = val; ++ break; ++ ++ case -2: ++ s += strlen("rsb="); ++ if ( (val = parse_boolean("pv", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_rsb_pv = val; ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_rsb_hvm = val; ++ else ++ default: ++ rc = -EINVAL; ++ break; ++ } + } +- else if ( (val = parse_boolean("md-clear", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("md-clear", s, ss)) != -1 ) + { +- opt_md_clear_pv = val; +- opt_md_clear_hvm = val; ++ switch ( val ) ++ { ++ case 0: ++ case 1: ++ opt_md_clear_pv = opt_md_clear_hvm = val; ++ break; ++ ++ case -2: ++ s += strlen("md-clear="); ++ if ( (val = parse_boolean("pv", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_md_clear_pv = val; ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_md_clear_hvm = val; ++ else ++ default: ++ rc = -EINVAL; ++ break; ++ } + } + + /* Xen's speculative sidechannel mitigation settings. */ diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-05.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-05.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..1f25f2635b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-05.patch @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Rework spec_ctrl_flags context switching + +We are shortly going to need to context switch new bits in both the vcpu and +S3 paths. Introduce SCF_IST_MASK and SCF_DOM_MASK, and rework d->arch.verw +into d->arch.spec_ctrl_flags to accommodate. + +No functional change. + +This is part of XSA-407. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c +index 774e0fcd35d7..06f3e0e9f3e0 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/acpi/power.c +@@ -246,8 +246,8 @@ static int enter_state(u32 state) + error = 0; + + ci = get_cpu_info(); +- /* Avoid NMI/#MC using MSR_SPEC_CTRL until we've reloaded microcode. */ +- ci->spec_ctrl_flags &= ~SCF_ist_wrmsr; ++ /* Avoid NMI/#MC using unsafe MSRs until we've reloaded microcode. */ ++ ci->spec_ctrl_flags &= ~SCF_IST_MASK; + + ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE(); + +@@ -290,8 +290,8 @@ static int enter_state(u32 state) + if ( !recheck_cpu_features(0) ) + panic("Missing previously available feature(s)\n"); + +- /* Re-enabled default NMI/#MC use of MSR_SPEC_CTRL. */ +- ci->spec_ctrl_flags |= (default_spec_ctrl_flags & SCF_ist_wrmsr); ++ /* Re-enabled default NMI/#MC use of MSRs now microcode is loaded. */ ++ ci->spec_ctrl_flags |= (default_spec_ctrl_flags & SCF_IST_MASK); + + if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) ) + { +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +index 5ea5ef6ba037..305a63b67e2d 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +@@ -1838,10 +1838,10 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next) + } + } + +- /* Update the top-of-stack block with the VERW disposition. */ +- info->spec_ctrl_flags &= ~SCF_verw; +- if ( nextd->arch.verw ) +- info->spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_verw; ++ /* Update the top-of-stack block with the new spec_ctrl settings. */ ++ info->spec_ctrl_flags = ++ (info->spec_ctrl_flags & ~SCF_DOM_MASK) | ++ (nextd->arch.spec_ctrl_flags & SCF_DOM_MASK); + } + + sched_context_switched(prev, next); +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index 225fe08259b3..0fabfbe2a9f4 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -981,9 +981,12 @@ void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d) + { + bool pv = is_pv_domain(d); + +- d->arch.verw = +- (pv ? opt_md_clear_pv : opt_md_clear_hvm) || +- (opt_fb_clear_mmio && is_iommu_enabled(d)); ++ bool verw = ((pv ? opt_md_clear_pv : opt_md_clear_hvm) || ++ (opt_fb_clear_mmio && is_iommu_enabled(d))); ++ ++ d->arch.spec_ctrl_flags = ++ (verw ? SCF_verw : 0) | ++ 0; + } + + void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h +index 4ee76bba45da..53d5a43ec0ce 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h +@@ -308,8 +308,7 @@ struct arch_domain + uint32_t pci_cf8; + uint8_t cmos_idx; + +- /* Use VERW on return-to-guest for its flushing side effect. */ +- bool verw; ++ uint8_t spec_ctrl_flags; /* See SCF_DOM_MASK */ + + union { + struct pv_domain pv; +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +index 12283573cdd5..60d6d2dc9407 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +@@ -20,12 +20,40 @@ + #ifndef __X86_SPEC_CTRL_H__ + #define __X86_SPEC_CTRL_H__ + +-/* Encoding of cpuinfo.spec_ctrl_flags */ ++/* ++ * Encoding of: ++ * cpuinfo.spec_ctrl_flags ++ * default_spec_ctrl_flags ++ * domain.spec_ctrl_flags ++ * ++ * Live settings are in the top-of-stack block, because they need to be ++ * accessable when XPTI is active. Some settings are fixed from boot, some ++ * context switched per domain, and some inhibited in the S3 path. ++ */ + #define SCF_use_shadow (1 << 0) + #define SCF_ist_wrmsr (1 << 1) + #define SCF_ist_rsb (1 << 2) + #define SCF_verw (1 << 3) + ++/* ++ * The IST paths (NMI/#MC) can interrupt any arbitrary context. Some ++ * functionality requires updated microcode to work. ++ * ++ * On boot, this is easy; we load microcode before figuring out which ++ * speculative protections to apply. However, on the S3 resume path, we must ++ * be able to disable the configured mitigations until microcode is reloaded. ++ * ++ * These are the controls to inhibit on the S3 resume path until microcode has ++ * been reloaded. ++ */ ++#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_wrmsr) ++ ++/* ++ * Some speculative protections are per-domain. These settings are merged ++ * into the top-of-stack block in the context switch path. ++ */ ++#define SCF_DOM_MASK (SCF_verw) ++ + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + + #include <asm/alternative.h> +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +index 5a590bac44aa..66b00d511fc6 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +@@ -248,9 +248,6 @@ + + /* + * Use in IST interrupt/exception context. May interrupt Xen or PV context. +- * Fine grain control of SCF_ist_wrmsr is needed for safety in the S3 resume +- * path to avoid using MSR_SPEC_CTRL before the microcode introducing it has +- * been reloaded. + */ + .macro SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST + /* diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-06.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-06.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..282999a93f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-06.patch @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Rename SCF_ist_wrmsr to SCF_ist_sc_msr + +We are about to introduce SCF_ist_ibpb, at which point SCF_ist_wrmsr becomes +ambiguous. + +No functional change. + +This is part of XSA-407. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index 0fabfbe2a9f4..a6def47061e8 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -1086,7 +1086,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + { + if ( opt_msr_sc_pv ) + { +- default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_wrmsr; ++ default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_sc_msr; + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV); + } + +@@ -1097,7 +1097,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + * Xen's value is not restored atomically. An early NMI hitting + * the VMExit path needs to restore Xen's value for safety. + */ +- default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_wrmsr; ++ default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_sc_msr; + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM); + } + } +@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + * on real hardware matches the availability of MSR_SPEC_CTRL in the + * first place. + * +- * No need for SCF_ist_wrmsr because Xen's value is restored ++ * No need for SCF_ist_sc_msr because Xen's value is restored + * atomically WRT NMIs in the VMExit path. + * + * TODO: Adjust cpu_has_svm_spec_ctrl to be usable earlier on boot. +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +index 60d6d2dc9407..6f8b0e09348e 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ + * context switched per domain, and some inhibited in the S3 path. + */ + #define SCF_use_shadow (1 << 0) +-#define SCF_ist_wrmsr (1 << 1) ++#define SCF_ist_sc_msr (1 << 1) + #define SCF_ist_rsb (1 << 2) + #define SCF_verw (1 << 3) + +@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ + * These are the controls to inhibit on the S3 resume path until microcode has + * been reloaded. + */ +-#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_wrmsr) ++#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_sc_msr) + + /* + * Some speculative protections are per-domain. These settings are merged +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +index 66b00d511fc6..0ff1b118f882 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +@@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ + + .L\@_skip_rsb: + +- test $SCF_ist_wrmsr, %al +- jz .L\@_skip_wrmsr ++ test $SCF_ist_sc_msr, %al ++ jz .L\@_skip_msr_spec_ctrl + + xor %edx, %edx + testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp) +@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ UNLIKELY_DISPATCH_LABEL(\@_serialise): + * to speculate around the WRMSR. As a result, we need a dispatch + * serialising instruction in the else clause. + */ +-.L\@_skip_wrmsr: ++.L\@_skip_msr_spec_ctrl: + lfence + UNLIKELY_END(\@_serialise) + .endm +@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ UNLIKELY_DISPATCH_LABEL(\@_serialise): + * Requires %rbx=stack_end + * Clobbers %rax, %rcx, %rdx + */ +- testb $SCF_ist_wrmsr, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%rbx) ++ testb $SCF_ist_sc_msr, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%rbx) + jz .L\@_skip + + DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_XEN diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-07.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-07.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..16e86a4471f --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-07.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Rename opt_ibpb to opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch + +We are about to introduce the use of IBPB at different points in Xen, making +opt_ibpb ambiguous. Rename it to opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch. + +No functional change. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +index 305a63b67e2d..3658e50d56c7 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +@@ -1810,7 +1810,7 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next) + + ctxt_switch_levelling(next); + +- if ( opt_ibpb && !is_idle_domain(nextd) ) ++ if ( opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch && !is_idle_domain(nextd) ) + { + static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned int, last); + unsigned int *last_id = &this_cpu(last); +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index a6def47061e8..ced0f8c2aea6 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ int8_t __initdata opt_stibp = -1; + bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd; + int8_t __initdata opt_psfd = -1; + +-bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb = true; ++bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = true; + int8_t __read_mostly opt_eager_fpu = -1; + int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1d_flush = -1; + bool __read_mostly opt_branch_harden = true; +@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) + + opt_thunk = THUNK_JMP; + opt_ibrs = 0; +- opt_ibpb = false; ++ opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = false; + opt_ssbd = false; + opt_l1d_flush = 0; + opt_branch_harden = false; +@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) + + /* Misc settings. */ + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb", s, ss)) >= 0 ) +- opt_ibpb = val; ++ opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = val; + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("eager-fpu", s, ss)) >= 0 ) + opt_eager_fpu = val; + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("l1d-flush", s, ss)) >= 0 ) +@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + (opt_tsx & 1) ? " TSX+" : " TSX-", + !cpu_has_srbds_ctrl ? "" : + opt_srb_lock ? " SRB_LOCK+" : " SRB_LOCK-", +- opt_ibpb ? " IBPB" : "", ++ opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch ? " IBPB-ctxt" : "", + opt_l1d_flush ? " L1D_FLUSH" : "", + opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm || + opt_fb_clear_mmio ? " VERW" : "", +@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + + /* Check we have hardware IBPB support before using it... */ + if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ) +- opt_ibpb = false; ++ opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = false; + + /* Check whether Eager FPU should be enabled by default. */ + if ( opt_eager_fpu == -1 ) +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +index 6f8b0e09348e..fd8162ca9ab9 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ + void init_speculation_mitigations(void); + void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d); + +-extern bool opt_ibpb; ++extern bool opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch; + extern bool opt_ssbd; + extern int8_t opt_eager_fpu; + extern int8_t opt_l1d_flush; diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-08.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-08.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..15d9d81697a --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-08.patch @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Rework SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST + +We are shortly going to add a conditional IBPB in this path. + +Therefore, we cannot hold spec_ctrl_flags in %eax, and rely on only clobbering +it after we're done with its contents. %rbx is available for use, and the +more normal register to hold preserved information in. + +With %rax freed up, use it instead of %rdx for the RSB tmp register, and for +the adjustment to spec_ctrl_flags. + +This leaves no use of %rdx, except as 0 for the upper half of WRMSR. In +practice, %rdx is 0 from SAVE_ALL on all paths and isn't likely to change in +the foreseeable future, so update the macro entry requirements to state this +dependency. This marginal optimisation can be revisited if circumstances +change. + +No practical change. + +This is part of XSA-407. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S +index cbf332e752a8..87bf9cb6942b 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S +@@ -854,7 +854,7 @@ ENTRY(double_fault) + + GET_STACK_END(14) + +- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, Clob: acd */ ++ SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, %rdx=0, Clob: abcd */ + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + + mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rbx +@@ -889,7 +889,7 @@ handle_ist_exception: + + GET_STACK_END(14) + +- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, Clob: acd */ ++ SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, %rdx=0, Clob: abcd */ + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + + mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +index 0ff1b118f882..15e24cde00d1 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +@@ -251,34 +251,33 @@ + */ + .macro SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST + /* +- * Requires %rsp=regs, %r14=stack_end +- * Clobbers %rax, %rcx, %rdx ++ * Requires %rsp=regs, %r14=stack_end, %rdx=0 ++ * Clobbers %rax, %rbx, %rcx, %rdx + * + * This is logical merge of DO_OVERWRITE_RSB and DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY + * maybexen=1, but with conditionals rather than alternatives. + */ +- movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14), %eax ++ movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14), %ebx + +- test $SCF_ist_rsb, %al ++ test $SCF_ist_rsb, %bl + jz .L\@_skip_rsb + +- DO_OVERWRITE_RSB tmp=rdx /* Clobbers %rcx/%rdx */ ++ DO_OVERWRITE_RSB /* Clobbers %rax/%rcx */ + + .L\@_skip_rsb: + +- test $SCF_ist_sc_msr, %al ++ test $SCF_ist_sc_msr, %bl + jz .L\@_skip_msr_spec_ctrl + +- xor %edx, %edx ++ xor %eax, %eax + testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp) +- setnz %dl +- not %edx +- and %dl, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14) ++ setnz %al ++ not %eax ++ and %al, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14) + + /* Load Xen's intended value. */ + mov $MSR_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx + movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_spec_ctrl)(%r14), %eax +- xor %edx, %edx + wrmsr + + /* Opencoded UNLIKELY_START() with no condition. */ diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-09.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-09.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..7b165426233 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-09.patch @@ -0,0 +1,285 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Support IBPB-on-entry + +We are going to need this to mitigate Branch Type Confusion on AMD/Hygon CPUs, +but as we've talked about using it in other cases too, arrange to support it +generally. However, this is also very expensive in some cases, so we're going +to want per-domain controls. + +Introduce SCF_ist_ibpb and SCF_entry_ibpb controls, adding them to the IST and +DOM masks as appropriate. Also introduce X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_{PV,HVM} to +to patch the code blocks. + +For SVM, the STGI is serialising enough to protect against Spectre-v1 attacks, +so no "else lfence" is necessary. VT-x will use use the MSR host load list, +so doesn't need any code in the VMExit path. + +For the IST path, we can't safely check CPL==0 to skip a flush, as we might +have hit an entry path before it's IBPB. As IST hitting Xen is rare, flush +irrespective of CPL. A later path, SCF_ist_sc_msr, provides Spectre-v1 +safety. + +For the PV paths, we know we're interrupting CPL>0, while for the INTR paths, +we can safely check CPL==0. Only flush when interrupting guest context. + +An "else lfence" is needed for safety, but we want to be able to skip it on +unaffected CPUs, so the block wants to be an alternative, which means the +lfence has to be inline rather than UNLIKELY() (the replacement block doesn't +have displacements fixed up for anything other than the first instruction). + +As with SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR_IST, %rdx is 0 on entry so rely on this to +shrink the logic marginally. Update the comments to specify this new +dependency. + +This is part of XSA-407. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S +index 055e6f4564c6..7aab67899bea 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/entry.S +@@ -101,7 +101,19 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap) + + GET_CURRENT(bx) + +- /* SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_SVM Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo Clob: acd */ ++ /* SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_SVM Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0 Clob: acd */ ++ ++ .macro svm_vmexit_cond_ibpb ++ testb $SCF_entry_ibpb, CPUINFO_xen_spec_ctrl(%rsp) ++ jz .L_skip_ibpb ++ ++ mov $MSR_PRED_CMD, %ecx ++ mov $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax ++ wrmsr ++.L_skip_ibpb: ++ .endm ++ ALTERNATIVE "", svm_vmexit_cond_ibpb, X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM ++ + ALTERNATIVE "", DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM + + .macro svm_vmexit_spec_ctrl +@@ -118,6 +130,10 @@ __UNLIKELY_END(nsvm_hap) + ALTERNATIVE "", svm_vmexit_spec_ctrl, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + ++ /* ++ * STGI is executed unconditionally, and is sufficiently serialising ++ * to safely resolve any Spectre-v1 concerns in the above logic. ++ */ + STGI + GLOBAL(svm_stgi_label) + mov %rsp,%rdi +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +index 1466064d0cc9..3d271178e8bb 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c +@@ -1332,6 +1332,10 @@ static int construct_vmcs(struct vcpu *v) + rc = vmx_add_msr(v, MSR_FLUSH_CMD, FLUSH_CMD_L1D, + VMX_MSR_GUEST_LOADONLY); + ++ if ( !rc && (d->arch.spec_ctrl_flags & SCF_entry_ibpb) ) ++ rc = vmx_add_msr(v, MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, ++ VMX_MSR_HOST); ++ + out: + vmx_vmcs_exit(v); + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S +index b67468f7c934..302530e65e0b 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/entry.S +@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ ENTRY(entry_int82) + movl $HYPERCALL_VECTOR, 4(%rsp) + SAVE_ALL compat=1 /* DPL1 gate, restricted to 32bit PV guests only. */ + +- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */ ++ SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */ + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + + CR4_PV32_RESTORE +@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ ENTRY(cstar_enter) + movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp) + SAVE_ALL + +- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */ ++ SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */ + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + + GET_STACK_END(bx) +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S +index 87bf9cb6942b..153e89e24694 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_64/entry.S +@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ ENTRY(lstar_enter) + movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp) + SAVE_ALL + +- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */ ++ SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */ + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + + GET_STACK_END(bx) +@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ GLOBAL(sysenter_eflags_saved) + movl $TRAP_syscall, 4(%rsp) + SAVE_ALL + +- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */ ++ SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */ + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + + GET_STACK_END(bx) +@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ ENTRY(int80_direct_trap) + movl $0x80, 4(%rsp) + SAVE_ALL + +- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, Clob: acd */ ++ SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV /* Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */ + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + + GET_STACK_END(bx) +@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ ENTRY(common_interrupt) + + GET_STACK_END(14) + +- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, Clob: acd */ ++ SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */ + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + + mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx +@@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ GLOBAL(handle_exception) + + GET_STACK_END(14) + +- SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, Clob: acd */ ++ SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR /* Req: %rsp=regs, %r14=end, %rdx=0, Clob: acd */ + /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe before this point. */ + + mov STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(xen_cr3)(%r14), %rcx +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +index f7488d3ccbfa..b233e5835fb5 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_LBR, X86_SYNTH(22)) /* Xen uses MSR_DEBUGCTL.LBR */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SHSTK, X86_SYNTH(26)) /* Xen uses CET Shadow Stacks */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBT, X86_SYNTH(27)) /* Xen uses CET Indirect Branch Tracking */ ++XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_ENTRY_PV, X86_SYNTH(28)) /* MSR_PRED_CMD used by Xen for PV */ ++XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_ENTRY_HVM, X86_SYNTH(29)) /* MSR_PRED_CMD used by Xen for HVM */ + + /* Bug words follow the synthetic words. */ + #define X86_NR_BUG 1 +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +index fd8162ca9ab9..10cd0cd2518f 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ + #define SCF_ist_sc_msr (1 << 1) + #define SCF_ist_rsb (1 << 2) + #define SCF_verw (1 << 3) ++#define SCF_ist_ibpb (1 << 4) ++#define SCF_entry_ibpb (1 << 5) + + /* + * The IST paths (NMI/#MC) can interrupt any arbitrary context. Some +@@ -46,13 +48,13 @@ + * These are the controls to inhibit on the S3 resume path until microcode has + * been reloaded. + */ +-#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_sc_msr) ++#define SCF_IST_MASK (SCF_ist_sc_msr | SCF_ist_ibpb) + + /* + * Some speculative protections are per-domain. These settings are merged + * into the top-of-stack block in the context switch path. + */ +-#define SCF_DOM_MASK (SCF_verw) ++#define SCF_DOM_MASK (SCF_verw | SCF_entry_ibpb) + + #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ + +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +index 15e24cde00d1..9eb4ad9ab71d 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h +@@ -88,6 +88,35 @@ + * - SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_{SVM,VMX} + */ + ++.macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_IBPB maybexen:req ++/* ++ * Requires %rsp=regs (also cpuinfo if !maybexen) ++ * Requires %r14=stack_end (if maybexen), %rdx=0 ++ * Clobbers %rax, %rcx, %rdx ++ * ++ * Conditionally issue IBPB if SCF_entry_ibpb is active. In the maybexen ++ * case, we can safely look at UREGS_cs to skip taking the hit when ++ * interrupting Xen. ++ */ ++ .if \maybexen ++ testb $SCF_entry_ibpb, STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14) ++ jz .L\@_skip ++ testb $3, UREGS_cs(%rsp) ++ .else ++ testb $SCF_entry_ibpb, CPUINFO_xen_spec_ctrl(%rsp) ++ .endif ++ jz .L\@_skip ++ ++ mov $MSR_PRED_CMD, %ecx ++ mov $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax ++ wrmsr ++ jmp .L\@_done ++ ++.L\@_skip: ++ lfence ++.L\@_done: ++.endm ++ + .macro DO_OVERWRITE_RSB tmp=rax + /* + * Requires nothing +@@ -225,12 +254,16 @@ + + /* Use after an entry from PV context (syscall/sysenter/int80/int82/etc). */ + #define SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_PV \ ++ ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_IBPB maybexen=0), \ ++ X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV; \ + ALTERNATIVE "", DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV; \ + ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=0), \ + X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV + + /* Use in interrupt/exception context. May interrupt Xen or PV context. */ + #define SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY_FROM_INTR \ ++ ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_IBPB maybexen=1), \ ++ X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV; \ + ALTERNATIVE "", DO_OVERWRITE_RSB, X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV; \ + ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=1), \ + X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV +@@ -254,11 +287,23 @@ + * Requires %rsp=regs, %r14=stack_end, %rdx=0 + * Clobbers %rax, %rbx, %rcx, %rdx + * +- * This is logical merge of DO_OVERWRITE_RSB and DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY +- * maybexen=1, but with conditionals rather than alternatives. ++ * This is logical merge of: ++ * DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_IBPB maybexen=0 ++ * DO_OVERWRITE_RSB ++ * DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen=1 ++ * but with conditionals rather than alternatives. + */ + movzbl STACK_CPUINFO_FIELD(spec_ctrl_flags)(%r14), %ebx + ++ test $SCF_ist_ibpb, %bl ++ jz .L\@_skip_ibpb ++ ++ mov $MSR_PRED_CMD, %ecx ++ mov $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax ++ wrmsr ++ ++.L\@_skip_ibpb: ++ + test $SCF_ist_rsb, %bl + jz .L\@_skip_rsb + diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-10.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-10.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..0d30e6fac4e --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-10.patch @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/cpuid: Enumeration for BTC_NO + +BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not succeptable to Branch Type Confusion. + +Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC. + +This is part of XSA-407. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c +index 86c8d21555ba..25576b4d992d 100644 +--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c ++++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c +@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@ int libxl_cpuid_parse_config(libxl_cpuid_policy_list *cpuid, const char* str) + {"virt-ssbd", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 25, 1}, + {"ssb-no", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 26, 1}, + {"psfd", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 28, 1}, ++ {"btc-no", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 29, 1}, + + {"nc", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX, 0, 8}, + {"apicidsize", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX, 12, 4}, +diff --git a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c +index 7ebf520a7171..e5208cfa4538 100644 +--- a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c ++++ b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c +@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static const char *const str_e8b[32] = + /* [22] */ [23] = "ppin", + [24] = "amd-ssbd", [25] = "virt-ssbd", + [26] = "ssb-no", +- [28] = "psfd", ++ [28] = "psfd", [29] = "btc-no", + }; + + static const char *const str_7d0[32] = +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +index 142f34af5f70..7409af98f633 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +@@ -822,6 +822,16 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) + warning_add(text); + } + break; ++ ++ case 0x19: ++ /* ++ * Zen3 (Fam19h model < 0x10) parts are not susceptible to ++ * Branch Type Confusion, but predate the allocation of the ++ * BTC_NO bit. Fill it back in if we're not virtualised. ++ */ ++ if (!cpu_has_hypervisor && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) ++ __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO, c->x86_capability); ++ break; + } + + display_cacheinfo(c); +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index ced0f8c2aea6..9f66c715516c 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + * Hardware read-only information, stating immunity to certain issues, or + * suggestions of which mitigation to use. + */ +- printk(" Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", ++ printk(" Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO) ? " RDCL_NO" : "", + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL) ? " IBRS_ALL" : "", + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA) ? " RSBA" : "", +@@ -403,7 +403,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ALWAYS)) ? " IBRS_ALWAYS" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS)) ? " STIBP_ALWAYS" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_FAST)) ? " IBRS_FAST" : "", +- (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_SAME_MODE)) ? " IBRS_SAME_MODE" : ""); ++ (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_SAME_MODE)) ? " IBRS_SAME_MODE" : "", ++ (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) ? " BTC_NO" : ""); + + /* Hardware features which need driving to mitigate issues. */ + printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", +diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h +index c5af6f03cff6..746a75200ab8 100644 +--- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h ++++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h +@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(AMD_SSBD, 8*32+24) /*S MSR_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD available */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD, 8*32+25) /* MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSB_NO, 8*32+26) /*A Hardware not vulnerable to SSB */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(PSFD, 8*32+28) /*S MSR_SPEC_CTRL.PSFD */ ++XEN_CPUFEATURE(BTC_NO, 8*32+29) /*A Hardware not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */ + + /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0.edx, word 9 */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4VNNIW, 9*32+ 2) /*A AVX512 Neural Network Instructions */ diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-11.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-11.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..edaf1dcd6b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-11.patch @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Enable Zen2 chickenbit + +... as instructed in the Branch Type Confusion whitepaper. + +This is part of XSA-407. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +index 7409af98f633..f50f91f81eb9 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c +@@ -731,6 +731,31 @@ void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) + printk_once(XENLOG_ERR "No SSBD controls available\n"); + } + ++/* ++ * On Zen2 we offer this chicken (bit) on the altar of Speculation. ++ * ++ * Refer to the AMD Branch Type Confusion whitepaper: ++ * https://XXX ++ * ++ * Setting this unnamed bit supposedly causes prediction information on ++ * non-branch instructions to be ignored. It is to be set unilaterally in ++ * newer microcode. ++ * ++ * This chickenbit is something unrelated on Zen1, and Zen1 vs Zen2 isn't a ++ * simple model number comparison, so use STIBP as a heuristic to separate the ++ * two uarches in Fam17h(AMD)/18h(Hygon). ++ */ ++void amd_init_spectral_chicken(void) ++{ ++ uint64_t val, chickenbit = 1 << 1; ++ ++ if (cpu_has_hypervisor || !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) ++ return; ++ ++ if (rdmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2, val) == 0 && !(val & chickenbit)) ++ wrmsr_safe(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2, val | chickenbit); ++} ++ + static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) + { + u32 l, h; +@@ -783,6 +808,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) + + amd_init_ssbd(c); + ++ if (c->x86 == 0x17) ++ amd_init_spectral_chicken(); ++ + /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */ + if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch) + __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability); +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h +index 1a5b3918b37e..e76ab5ce1ae2 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/cpu.h +@@ -22,3 +22,4 @@ void early_init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); + void amd_log_freq(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); + void amd_init_lfence(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); + void amd_init_ssbd(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c); ++void amd_init_spectral_chicken(void); +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c +index 3845e0cf0e89..0cb0e7d55e61 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/hygon.c +@@ -36,6 +36,12 @@ static void init_hygon(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) + + amd_init_ssbd(c); + ++ /* ++ * TODO: Check heuristic safety with Hygon first ++ if (c->x86 == 0x18) ++ amd_init_spectral_chicken(); ++ */ ++ + /* MFENCE stops RDTSC speculation */ + if (!cpu_has_lfence_dispatch) + __set_bit(X86_FEATURE_MFENCE_RDTSC, c->x86_capability); +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h +index c8670eab8ef5..4c1cba589d08 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/msr-index.h +@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ + #define MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG 0xc0011022 + #define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG 0xc0011029 + #define AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALISE (_AC(1, ULL) << 1) ++#define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2 0xc00110e3 + + #define MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK 0xc0011027 + #define MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK 0xc0011019 diff --git a/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-12.patch b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-12.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..38836fbe571 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa407-4.14-12.patch @@ -0,0 +1,293 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate Branch Type Confusion when possible + +Branch Type Confusion affects AMD/Hygon CPUs on Zen2 and earlier. To +mitigate, we require SMT safety (STIBP on Zen2, no-SMT on Zen1), and to issue +an IBPB on each entry to Xen, to flush the BTB. + +Due to performance concerns, dom0 (which is trusted in most configurations) is +excluded from protections by default. + +Therefore: + * Use STIBP by default on Zen2 too, which now means we want it on by default + on all hardware supporting STIBP. + * Break the current IBPB logic out into a new function, extending it with + IBPB-at-entry logic. + * Change the existing IBPB-at-ctxt-switch boolean to be tristate, and disable + it by default when IBPB-at-entry is providing sufficient safety. + +If all PV guests on the system are trusted, then it is recommended to boot +with `spec-ctrl=ibpb-entry=no-pv`, as this will provide an additional marginal +perf improvement. + +This is part of XSA-407 / CVE-2022-23825. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +index a84f5c19218d..f13304ef4eb1 100644 +--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc ++++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc +@@ -2105,7 +2105,7 @@ By default SSBD will be mitigated at runtime (i.e `ssbd=runtime`). + + ### spec-ctrl (x86) + > `= List of [ <bool>, xen=<bool>, {pv,hvm}=<bool>, +-> {msr-sc,rsb,md-clear}=<bool>|{pv,hvm}=<bool>, ++> {msr-sc,rsb,md-clear,ibpb-entry}=<bool>|{pv,hvm}=<bool>, + > bti-thunk=retpoline|lfence|jmp, {ibrs,ibpb,ssbd,psfd, + > eager-fpu,l1d-flush,branch-harden,srb-lock, + > unpriv-mmio}=<bool> ]` +@@ -2130,9 +2130,10 @@ in place for guests to use. + + Use of a positive boolean value for either of these options is invalid. + +-The `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=` and `md-clear=` options offer fine +-grained control over the primitives by Xen. These impact Xen's ability to +-protect itself, and/or Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests to use. ++The `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=`, `md-clear=` and `ibpb-entry=` options ++offer fine grained control over the primitives by Xen. These impact Xen's ++ability to protect itself, and/or Xen's ability to virtualise support for ++guests to use. + + * `pv=` and `hvm=` offer control over all suboptions for PV and HVM guests + respectively. +@@ -2151,6 +2152,11 @@ protect itself, and/or Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests to use. + compatibility with development versions of this fix, `mds=` is also accepted + on Xen 4.12 and earlier as an alias. Consult vendor documentation in + preference to here.* ++* `ibpb-entry=` offers control over whether IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction ++ Barrier) is used on entry to Xen. This is used by default on hardware ++ vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion, but for performance reasons, dom0 is ++ unprotected by default. If it necessary to protect dom0 too, boot with ++ `spec-ctrl=ibpb-entry`. + + If Xen was compiled with INDIRECT_THUNK support, `bti-thunk=` can be used to + select which of the thunks gets patched into the `__x86_indirect_thunk_%reg` +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index 9f66c715516c..563519ce0e31 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@ static bool __initdata opt_rsb_hvm = true; + static int8_t __read_mostly opt_md_clear_pv = -1; + static int8_t __read_mostly opt_md_clear_hvm = -1; + ++static int8_t __read_mostly opt_ibpb_entry_pv = -1; ++static int8_t __read_mostly opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = -1; ++static bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb_entry_dom0; ++ + /* Cmdline controls for Xen's speculative settings. */ + static enum ind_thunk { + THUNK_DEFAULT, /* Decide which thunk to use at boot time. */ +@@ -54,7 +58,7 @@ int8_t __initdata opt_stibp = -1; + bool __read_mostly opt_ssbd; + int8_t __initdata opt_psfd = -1; + +-bool __read_mostly opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = true; ++int8_t __read_mostly opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = -1; + int8_t __read_mostly opt_eager_fpu = -1; + int8_t __read_mostly opt_l1d_flush = -1; + bool __read_mostly opt_branch_harden = true; +@@ -114,6 +118,9 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) + opt_rsb_hvm = false; + opt_md_clear_pv = 0; + opt_md_clear_hvm = 0; ++ opt_ibpb_entry_pv = 0; ++ opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = 0; ++ opt_ibpb_entry_dom0 = false; + + opt_thunk = THUNK_JMP; + opt_ibrs = 0; +@@ -140,12 +147,14 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) + opt_msr_sc_pv = val; + opt_rsb_pv = val; + opt_md_clear_pv = val; ++ opt_ibpb_entry_pv = val; + } + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 ) + { + opt_msr_sc_hvm = val; + opt_rsb_hvm = val; + opt_md_clear_hvm = val; ++ opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = val; + } + else if ( (val = parse_boolean("msr-sc", s, ss)) != -1 ) + { +@@ -210,6 +219,28 @@ static int __init parse_spec_ctrl(const char *s) + break; + } + } ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("ibpb-entry", s, ss)) != -1 ) ++ { ++ switch ( val ) ++ { ++ case 0: ++ case 1: ++ opt_ibpb_entry_pv = opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = ++ opt_ibpb_entry_dom0 = val; ++ break; ++ ++ case -2: ++ s += strlen("ibpb-entry="); ++ if ( (val = parse_boolean("pv", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_ibpb_entry_pv = val; ++ else if ( (val = parse_boolean("hvm", s, ss)) >= 0 ) ++ opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = val; ++ else ++ default: ++ rc = -EINVAL; ++ break; ++ } ++ } + + /* Xen's speculative sidechannel mitigation settings. */ + else if ( !strncmp(s, "bti-thunk=", 10) ) +@@ -477,27 +508,31 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + * mitigation support for guests. + */ + #ifdef CONFIG_HVM +- printk(" Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s\n", ++ printk(" Support for HVM VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) || ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM) || + opt_eager_fpu) ? "" : " None", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_HVM) ? " MSR_SPEC_CTRL" : "", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM) ? " RSB" : "", + opt_eager_fpu ? " EAGER_FPU" : "", +- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) ? " MD_CLEAR" : ""); ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) ? " MD_CLEAR" : "", ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM) ? " IBPB-entry" : ""); + + #endif + #ifdef CONFIG_PV +- printk(" Support for PV VMs:%s%s%s%s%s\n", ++ printk(" Support for PV VMs:%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) || ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) || + opt_eager_fpu) ? "" : " None", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV) ? " MSR_SPEC_CTRL" : "", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_PV) ? " RSB" : "", + opt_eager_fpu ? " EAGER_FPU" : "", +- boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) ? " MD_CLEAR" : ""); ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR) ? " MD_CLEAR" : "", ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV) ? " IBPB-entry" : ""); + + printk(" XPTI (64-bit PV only): Dom0 %s, DomU %s (with%s PCID)\n", + opt_xpti_hwdom ? "enabled" : "disabled", +@@ -730,6 +765,55 @@ static bool __init should_use_eager_fpu(void) + } + } + ++static void __init ibpb_calculations(void) ++{ ++ /* Check we have hardware IBPB support before using it... */ ++ if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ) ++ { ++ opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = opt_ibpb_entry_pv = opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = 0; ++ opt_ibpb_entry_dom0 = false; ++ return; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * IBPB-on-entry mitigations for Branch Type Confusion. ++ * ++ * IBPB && !BTC_NO selects all AMD/Hygon hardware, not known to be safe, ++ * that we can provide some form of mitigation on. ++ */ ++ if ( opt_ibpb_entry_pv == -1 ) ++ opt_ibpb_entry_pv = (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV) && ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && ++ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)); ++ if ( opt_ibpb_entry_hvm == -1 ) ++ opt_ibpb_entry_hvm = (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HVM) && ++ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && ++ !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)); ++ ++ if ( opt_ibpb_entry_pv ) ++ { ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_PV); ++ ++ /* ++ * We only need to flush in IST context if we're protecting against PV ++ * guests. HVM IBPB-on-entry protections are both atomic with ++ * NMI/#MC, so can't interrupt Xen ahead of having already flushed the ++ * BTB. ++ */ ++ default_spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_ist_ibpb; ++ } ++ if ( opt_ibpb_entry_hvm ) ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ENTRY_HVM); ++ ++ /* ++ * If we're using IBPB-on-entry to protect against PV and HVM guests ++ * (ignoring dom0 if trusted), then there's no need to also issue IBPB on ++ * context switch too. ++ */ ++ if ( opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch == -1 ) ++ opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = !(opt_ibpb_entry_hvm && opt_ibpb_entry_pv); ++} ++ + /* Calculate whether this CPU is vulnerable to L1TF. */ + static __init void l1tf_calculations(uint64_t caps) + { +@@ -985,8 +1069,12 @@ void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d) + bool verw = ((pv ? opt_md_clear_pv : opt_md_clear_hvm) || + (opt_fb_clear_mmio && is_iommu_enabled(d))); + ++ bool ibpb = ((pv ? opt_ibpb_entry_pv : opt_ibpb_entry_hvm) && ++ (d->domain_id != 0 || opt_ibpb_entry_dom0)); ++ + d->arch.spec_ctrl_flags = + (verw ? SCF_verw : 0) | ++ (ibpb ? SCF_entry_ibpb : 0) | + 0; + } + +@@ -1133,12 +1221,15 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + } + + /* +- * Use STIBP by default if the hardware hint is set. Otherwise, leave it +- * off as it a severe performance pentalty on pre-eIBRS Intel hardware +- * where it was retrofitted in microcode. ++ * Use STIBP by default on all AMD systems. Zen3 and later enumerate ++ * STIBP_ALWAYS, but STIBP is needed on Zen2 as part of the mitigations ++ * for Branch Type Confusion. ++ * ++ * Leave STIBP off by default on Intel. Pre-eIBRS systems suffer a ++ * substantial perf hit when it was implemented in microcode. + */ + if ( opt_stibp == -1 ) +- opt_stibp = !!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS); ++ opt_stibp = !!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP); + + if ( opt_stibp && (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_STIBP)) ) +@@ -1192,9 +1283,7 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) + if ( opt_rsb_hvm ) + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_RSB_HVM); + +- /* Check we have hardware IBPB support before using it... */ +- if ( !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRSB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) ) +- opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch = false; ++ ibpb_calculations(); + + /* Check whether Eager FPU should be enabled by default. */ + if ( opt_eager_fpu == -1 ) +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +index 10cd0cd2518f..33e845991b0a 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ + void init_speculation_mitigations(void); + void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d); + +-extern bool opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch; ++extern int8_t opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch; + extern bool opt_ssbd; + extern int8_t opt_eager_fpu; + extern int8_t opt_l1d_flush; diff --git a/main/xen/xsa408.patch b/main/xen/xsa408.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..c58193f5716 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa408.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Subject: x86/mm: correct TLB flush condition in _get_page_type() + +When this logic was moved, it was moved across the point where nx is +updated to hold the new type for the page. IOW originally it was +equivalent to using x (and perhaps x would better have been used), but +now it isn't anymore. Switch to using x, which then brings things in +line again with the slightly earlier comment there (now) talking about +transitions _from_ writable. + +I have to confess though that I cannot make a direct connection between +the reported observed behavior of guests leaving several pages around +with pending general references and the change here. Repeated testing, +nevertheless, confirms the reported issue is no longer there. + +This is CVE-2022-33745 / XSA-408. + +Reported-by: Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com> +Fixes: 8cc5036bc385 ("x86/pv: Fix ABAC cmpxchg() race in _get_page_type()") +Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +--- +I'd be happy to update the description to actually connect things, as +long as someone can give some plausible explanation. + +--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c +@@ -3038,7 +3038,7 @@ static int _get_page_type(struct page_in + if ( unlikely(!cpumask_empty(mask)) && + /* Shadow mode: track only writable pages. */ + (!shadow_mode_enabled(d) || +- ((nx & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_writable_page)) ) ++ ((x & PGT_type_mask) == PGT_writable_page)) ) + { + perfc_incr(need_flush_tlb_flush); + /* diff --git a/main/xen/xsa414-4.14.patch b/main/xen/xsa414-4.14.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..db7f7ec421e --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa414-4.14.patch @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +From: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> +Subject: tools/xenstore: create_node: Don't defer work to undo any changes on + failure + +XSA-115 extended destroy_node() to update the node accounting for the +connection. The implementation is assuming the connection is the parent +of the node, however all the nodes are allocated using a separate context +(see process_message()). This will result to crash (or corrupt) xenstored +as the pointer is wrongly used. + +In case of an error, any changes to the database or update to the +accounting will now be reverted in create_node() by calling directly +destroy_node(). This has the nice advantage to remove the loop to unset +the destructors in case of success. + +Take the opportunity to free the nodes right now as they are not +going to be reachable (the function returns NULL) and are just wasting +resources. + +This is XSA-414 / CVE-2022-42309. + +Reported-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> +Fixes: 0bfb2101f243 ("tools/xenstore: fix node accounting after failed node creation") +Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com> +Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> + +diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c +index 1d05d25a4864..6afe8cb59d7e 100644 +--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c ++++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c +@@ -977,9 +977,8 @@ static struct node *construct_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, + return NULL; + } + +-static int destroy_node(void *_node) ++static int destroy_node(struct connection *conn, struct node *node) + { +- struct node *node = _node; + TDB_DATA key; + + if (streq(node->name, "/")) +@@ -990,7 +989,7 @@ static int destroy_node(void *_node) + + tdb_delete(tdb_ctx, key); + +- domain_entry_dec(talloc_parent(node), node); ++ domain_entry_dec(conn, node); + + return 0; + } +@@ -999,7 +998,8 @@ static struct node *create_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, + const char *name, + void *data, unsigned int datalen) + { +- struct node *node, *i; ++ struct node *node, *i, *j; ++ int ret; + + node = construct_node(conn, ctx, name); + if (!node) +@@ -1021,23 +1021,40 @@ static struct node *create_node(struct connection *conn, const void *ctx, + /* i->parent is set for each new node, so check quota. */ + if (i->parent && + domain_entry(conn) >= quota_nb_entry_per_domain) { +- errno = ENOSPC; +- return NULL; ++ ret = ENOSPC; ++ goto err; + } +- if (write_node(conn, i, false)) +- return NULL; + +- /* Account for new node, set destructor for error case. */ +- if (i->parent) { ++ ret = write_node(conn, i, false); ++ if (ret) ++ goto err; ++ ++ /* Account for new node */ ++ if (i->parent) + domain_entry_inc(conn, i); +- talloc_set_destructor(i, destroy_node); +- } + } + +- /* OK, now remove destructors so they stay around */ +- for (i = node; i->parent; i = i->parent) +- talloc_set_destructor(i, NULL); + return node; ++ ++err: ++ /* ++ * We failed to update TDB for some of the nodes. Undo any work that ++ * have already been done. ++ */ ++ for (j = node; j != i; j = j->parent) ++ destroy_node(conn, j); ++ ++ /* We don't need to keep the nodes around, so free them. */ ++ i = node; ++ while (i) { ++ j = i; ++ i = i->parent; ++ talloc_free(j); ++ } ++ ++ errno = ret; ++ ++ return NULL; + } + + /* path, data... */ diff --git a/main/xen/xsa422-4.14-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa422-4.14-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..dccfba84f65 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa422-4.14-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Enumeration for IBPB_RET + +The IBPB_RET bit indicates that the CPU's implementation of MSR_PRED_CMD.IBPB +does flush the RSB/RAS too. + +This is part of XSA-422 / CVE-2022-23824. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c b/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c +index 25576b4d992d..1b7626f7d41c 100644 +--- a/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c ++++ b/tools/libxl/libxl_cpuid.c +@@ -281,6 +281,7 @@ int libxl_cpuid_parse_config(libxl_cpuid_policy_list *cpuid, const char* str) + {"ssb-no", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 26, 1}, + {"psfd", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 28, 1}, + {"btc-no", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 29, 1}, ++ {"ibpb-ret", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_EBX, 30, 1}, + + {"nc", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX, 0, 8}, + {"apicidsize", 0x80000008, NA, CPUID_REG_ECX, 12, 4}, +diff --git a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c +index e5208cfa4538..7771da49532f 100644 +--- a/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c ++++ b/tools/misc/xen-cpuid.c +@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ static const char *const str_e8b[32] = + [24] = "amd-ssbd", [25] = "virt-ssbd", + [26] = "ssb-no", + [28] = "psfd", [29] = "btc-no", ++ [30] = "ibpb-ret", + }; + + static const char *const str_7d0[32] = +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index 563519ce0e31..679fbac57ec7 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + * Hardware read-only information, stating immunity to certain issues, or + * suggestions of which mitigation to use. + */ +- printk(" Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", ++ printk(" Hardware hints:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RDCL_NO) ? " RDCL_NO" : "", + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_IBRS_ALL) ? " IBRS_ALL" : "", + (caps & ARCH_CAPS_RSBA) ? " RSBA" : "", +@@ -435,7 +435,8 @@ static void __init print_details(enum ind_thunk thunk, uint64_t caps) + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_STIBP_ALWAYS)) ? " STIBP_ALWAYS" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_FAST)) ? " IBRS_FAST" : "", + (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_SAME_MODE)) ? " IBRS_SAME_MODE" : "", +- (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) ? " BTC_NO" : ""); ++ (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_BTC_NO)) ? " BTC_NO" : "", ++ (e8b & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_RET)) ? " IBPB_RET" : ""); + + /* Hardware features which need driving to mitigate issues. */ + printk(" Hardware features:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n", +diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h +index 746a75200ab8..e536ab42b31d 100644 +--- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h ++++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h +@@ -265,6 +265,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(VIRT_SSBD, 8*32+25) /* MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL.SSBD */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(SSB_NO, 8*32+26) /*A Hardware not vulnerable to SSB */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(PSFD, 8*32+28) /*S MSR_SPEC_CTRL.PSFD */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(BTC_NO, 8*32+29) /*A Hardware not vulnerable to Branch Type Confusion */ ++XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_RET, 8*32+30) /*A IBPB clears RSB/RAS too. */ + + /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0.edx, word 9 */ + XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX512_4VNNIW, 9*32+ 2) /*A AVX512 Neural Network Instructions */ diff --git a/main/xen/xsa422-4.14-2.patch b/main/xen/xsa422-4.14-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..09cb00d3573 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/xen/xsa422-4.14-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Mitigate IBPB not flushing the RSB/RAS + +Introduce spec_ctrl_new_guest_context() to encapsulate all logic pertaining to +using MSR_PRED_CMD for a new guest context, even if it only has one user +presently. + +Introduce X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET, and use it extend spec_ctrl_new_guest_context() +with a manual fixup for hardware which mis-implements IBPB. + +This is part of XSA-422 / CVE-2022-23824. + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> +Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> + +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/asm-macros.c b/xen/arch/x86/asm-macros.c +index b963d56a5663..8c585697b9f6 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/asm-macros.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/asm-macros.c +@@ -1 +1,2 @@ + #include <asm/alternative-asm.h> ++#include <asm/spec_ctrl_asm.h> +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +index 4fb78d38e719..b3774af1a5f6 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c +@@ -1832,7 +1832,7 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next) + */ + if ( *last_id != next_id ) + { +- wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); ++ spec_ctrl_new_guest_context(); + *last_id = next_id; + } + } +diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +index 679fbac57ec7..c650e07b0629 100644 +--- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c ++++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c +@@ -777,6 +777,14 @@ static void __init ibpb_calculations(void) + } + + /* ++ * AMD/Hygon CPUs to date (June 2022) don't flush the the RAS. Future ++ * CPUs are expected to enumerate IBPB_RET when this has been fixed. ++ * Until then, cover the difference with the software sequence. ++ */ ++ if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_RET) ) ++ setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET); ++ ++ /* + * IBPB-on-entry mitigations for Branch Type Confusion. + * + * IBPB && !BTC_NO selects all AMD/Hygon hardware, not known to be safe, +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +index b233e5835fb5..bdb119a34c5d 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h +@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(IBPB_ENTRY_HVM, X86_SYNTH(29)) /* MSR_PRED_CMD used by Xen for + + #define X86_BUG_FPU_PTRS X86_BUG( 0) /* (F)X{SAVE,RSTOR} doesn't save/restore FOP/FIP/FDP. */ + #define X86_BUG_CLFLUSH_MFENCE X86_BUG( 2) /* MFENCE needed to serialise CLFLUSH */ ++#define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET X86_BUG( 3) /* IBPB doesn't flush the RSB/RAS */ + + /* Total number of capability words, inc synth and bug words. */ + #define NCAPINTS (FSCAPINTS + X86_NR_SYNTH + X86_NR_BUG) /* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +index 33e845991b0a..e400ff227391 100644 +--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h ++++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h +@@ -65,6 +65,28 @@ + void init_speculation_mitigations(void); + void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d); + ++/* ++ * Switch to a new guest prediction context. ++ * ++ * This flushes all indirect branch predictors (BTB, RSB/RAS), so guest code ++ * which has previously run on this CPU can't attack subsequent guest code. ++ * ++ * As this flushes the RSB/RAS, it destroys the predictions of the calling ++ * context. For best performace, arrange for this to be used when we're going ++ * to jump out of the current context, e.g. with reset_stack_and_jump(). ++ * ++ * For hardware which mis-implements IBPB, fix up by flushing the RSB/RAS ++ * manually. ++ */ ++static always_inline void spec_ctrl_new_guest_context(void) ++{ ++ wrmsrl(MSR_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB); ++ ++ /* (ab)use alternative_input() to specify clobbers. */ ++ alternative_input("", "DO_OVERWRITE_RSB", X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET, ++ : "rax", "rcx"); ++} ++ + extern int8_t opt_ibpb_ctxt_switch; + extern bool opt_ssbd; + extern int8_t opt_eager_fpu; diff --git a/main/xtables-addons-lts/APKBUILD b/main/xtables-addons-lts/APKBUILD index 3fc429e38b5..8d085b7f93e 100644 --- a/main/xtables-addons-lts/APKBUILD +++ b/main/xtables-addons-lts/APKBUILD @@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ # when changing _ver we *must* bump _rel _name=xtables-addons -_ver=3.11 +_ver=3.21 _rel=0 _flavor=${FLAVOR:-lts} _kpkg=linux-$_flavor -_kver=5.10.109 +_kver=5.10.152 _krel=0 _kpkgver="$_kver-r$_krel" @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ depends="$_kpkg=$_kpkgver" makedepends="$_kpkg-dev=$_kpkgver iptables-dev linux-headers" install_if="$_kpkg=$_kpkgver $_name" source="https://inai.de/files/xtables-addons/xtables-addons-$_ver.tar.xz - ip_route_me_harder-5.4.78.patch" + " builddir="$srcdir/$_name-$_ver" options="!check" @@ -60,5 +60,4 @@ package() { make DESTDIR="$pkgdir" modules_install } -sha512sums="3b9d57596002efa4f874734debdab560d49bc600010986a2b3db9dab262251fd37da45bc8e9d0cbbe77f9c5e95c96a36d5372ae2bd12822a5765c7b5ebb715ea xtables-addons-3.11.tar.xz -a746279a28b7ab9d6d0783ccded9d4dec953dd33127b1e5cf3421cf8e601e81c003869831aaa78fb811ffe10e2b5c0d3dd80c4d0fc31a0ca134459caeb428fe5 ip_route_me_harder-5.4.78.patch" +sha512sums="5ec30a14f7dffcaa87bbeb910b46ef5ba3bafc4b6f0ce1579eb21ca6395106fa9157b300f463b43169ea85ec9ff0d9a5377cb5ebc2bb2f637e2a1fe9ff61728e xtables-addons-3.21.tar.xz" diff --git a/main/xtables-addons-lts/ip_route_me_harder-5.4.78.patch b/main/xtables-addons-lts/ip_route_me_harder-5.4.78.patch deleted file mode 100644 index 075f52dadec..00000000000 --- a/main/xtables-addons-lts/ip_route_me_harder-5.4.78.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,48 +0,0 @@ -diff --git a/extensions/xt_DELUDE.c b/extensions/xt_DELUDE.c -index b384c8e..cb1d055 100644 ---- a/extensions/xt_DELUDE.c -+++ b/extensions/xt_DELUDE.c -@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static void delude_send_reset(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *oldskb, - /* ip_route_me_harder expects skb->dst to be set */ - skb_dst_set(nskb, dst_clone(skb_dst(oldskb))); - -- if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb, addr_type)) -+ if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb->sk, nskb, addr_type)) - goto free_nskb; - else - niph = ip_hdr(nskb); -diff --git a/extensions/xt_ECHO.c b/extensions/xt_ECHO.c -index e99312b..2ab413b 100644 ---- a/extensions/xt_ECHO.c -+++ b/extensions/xt_ECHO.c -@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ echo_tg4(struct sk_buff *oldskb, const struct xt_action_param *par) - /* ip_route_me_harder expects the skb's dst to be set */ - skb_dst_set(newskb, dst_clone(skb_dst(oldskb))); - -- if (ip_route_me_harder(par_net(par), newskb, RTN_UNSPEC) != 0) -+ if (ip_route_me_harder(par_net(par), par->state->sk, newskb, RTN_UNSPEC) != 0) - goto free_nskb; - - newip->ttl = ip4_dst_hoplimit(skb_dst(newskb)); -diff --git a/extensions/xt_TARPIT.c b/extensions/xt_TARPIT.c -index 4926f2e..6256e60 100644 ---- a/extensions/xt_TARPIT.c -+++ b/extensions/xt_TARPIT.c -@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static void tarpit_tcp4(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *oldskb, - #endif - addr_type = RTN_LOCAL; - -- if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb, addr_type)) -+ if (ip_route_me_harder(net, nskb->sk, nskb, addr_type)) - goto free_nskb; - else - niph = ip_hdr(nskb); -@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static void tarpit_tcp6(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *oldskb, - IPPROTO_TCP, - csum_partial(tcph, sizeof(struct tcphdr), 0)); - -- if (ip6_route_me_harder(net, nskb)) -+ if (ip6_route_me_harder(net, nskb->sk, nskb)) - goto free_nskb; - - nskb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE; diff --git a/main/xtables-addons/APKBUILD b/main/xtables-addons/APKBUILD index 963b58731aa..fa47993c14c 100644 --- a/main/xtables-addons/APKBUILD +++ b/main/xtables-addons/APKBUILD @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=xtables-addons -pkgver=3.11 +pkgver=3.21 pkgrel=0 pkgdesc="Netfilter userspace extensions for iptables" url="http://xtables-addons.sourceforge.net/" @@ -25,4 +25,4 @@ package() { make builddir= DESTDIR="$pkgdir" install } -sha512sums="3b9d57596002efa4f874734debdab560d49bc600010986a2b3db9dab262251fd37da45bc8e9d0cbbe77f9c5e95c96a36d5372ae2bd12822a5765c7b5ebb715ea xtables-addons-3.11.tar.xz" +sha512sums="5ec30a14f7dffcaa87bbeb910b46ef5ba3bafc4b6f0ce1579eb21ca6395106fa9157b300f463b43169ea85ec9ff0d9a5377cb5ebc2bb2f637e2a1fe9ff61728e xtables-addons-3.21.tar.xz" diff --git a/main/zfs-lts/APKBUILD b/main/zfs-lts/APKBUILD index 17c1d32fdb2..9d2dd176373 100644 --- a/main/zfs-lts/APKBUILD +++ b/main/zfs-lts/APKBUILD @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ _rel=0 _flavor=${FLAVOR:-lts} _kpkg=linux-$_flavor -_kver=5.10.109 +_kver=5.10.152 _krel=0 _kpkgver="$_kver-r$_krel" diff --git a/main/zlib/APKBUILD b/main/zlib/APKBUILD index 989c41687b2..ef345c16e0c 100644 --- a/main/zlib/APKBUILD +++ b/main/zlib/APKBUILD @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org> pkgname=zlib pkgver=1.2.12 -pkgrel=1 +pkgrel=3 pkgdesc="A compression/decompression Library" arch="all" license="Zlib" @@ -11,8 +11,12 @@ source="https://zlib.net/zlib-$pkgver.tar.gz Fix-CC-logic-in-configure.patch configure-Pass-LDFLAGS-to-link-tests.patch crc32.patch + $pkgname-CVE-2022-37434.patch::https://github.com/madler/zlib/commit/eff308af425b67093bab25f80f1ae950166bece1.patch + $pkgname-CVE-2022-37434-bugfix.patch::https://github.com/madler/zlib/commit/1eb7682f845ac9e9bf9ae35bbfb3bad5dacbd91d.patch " # secfixes: +# 1.2.12-r2: +# - CVE-2022-37434 # 1.2.12-r0: # - CVE-2018-25032 @@ -41,4 +45,6 @@ cc2366fa45d5dfee1f983c8c51515e0cff959b61471e2e8d24350dea22d3f6fcc50723615a911b04 faa19991e88cbfd624ac9ce4a0ba12e3d7d54f88680b1a0a156a542a45bafe2053d69c6f309327817f7cc74f5765204bbb3c56ff531efd29d8fd6bb682c78598 Fix-CC-logic-in-configure.patch 76179eb7e498aef5bc88c3f826c6f2506a2d3c3a2e2560ef1825bd4a9297d68b0d2390619a4b3b0b2e6dde765431e5fba18fd15fbd1ad99827244f8f9bdbd909 configure-Pass-LDFLAGS-to-link-tests.patch 38f0593a0bc17336d31191b7af684e31ec2eb34bd3add49bcb1f95c5e2bfb4405ffc341c2650d52c4fbf417ab4f80a0cc82fb868c9816b04d25210ae29a71f2c crc32.patch +13bf48cb15636d77428e7e20d8c72d772eade1e099740f8541b7adee0e789097fa867512b6f3ebcff8496727999f2bf408e38414771c9b4440ad283f4c029558 zlib-CVE-2022-37434.patch +cadeb0b05da99435c2074cb0d7aebdec2bad1c745856c8ac6ea0f2474ef091d8efeea90deafe13757cbaa465ccfbbb1b8873a8025b24f3145b2a87abb84bac83 zlib-CVE-2022-37434-bugfix.patch " |