diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | main/openssl/APKBUILD | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | main/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch | 66 |
2 files changed, 73 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/main/openssl/APKBUILD b/main/openssl/APKBUILD index c631ed740a3..55958c76783 100644 --- a/main/openssl/APKBUILD +++ b/main/openssl/APKBUILD @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ pkgname=openssl pkgver=1.1.1b _abiver=${pkgver%.*} -pkgrel=0 +pkgrel=1 pkgdesc="Toolkit for Transport Layer Security (TLS)" url="https://www.openssl.org" arch="all" @@ -12,7 +12,8 @@ makedepends_build="perl" makedepends_host="linux-headers" makedepends="$makedepends_host $makedepends_build" subpackages="$pkgname-dbg $pkgname-dev $pkgname-doc libcrypto$_abiver:_libcrypto libssl$_abiver:_libssl" -source="https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-$pkgver.tar.gz" +source="https://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-$pkgver.tar.gz + CVE-2019-1543.patch" case "$CARCH" in s390x) options="$options !check";; # FIXME: test hangs esac @@ -20,6 +21,8 @@ esac builddir="$srcdir/openssl-$pkgver" # secfixes: +# 1.1.1b-r1: +# - CVE-2019-1543 # 1.1.1a-r0: # - CVE-2018-0734 # - CVE-2018-0735 @@ -101,4 +104,5 @@ _libssl() { done } -sha512sums="b54025fbb4fe264466f3b0d762aad4be45bd23cd48bdb26d901d4c41a40bfd776177e02230995ab181a695435039dbad313f4b9a563239a70807a2e19ecf045d openssl-1.1.1b.tar.gz" +sha512sums="b54025fbb4fe264466f3b0d762aad4be45bd23cd48bdb26d901d4c41a40bfd776177e02230995ab181a695435039dbad313f4b9a563239a70807a2e19ecf045d openssl-1.1.1b.tar.gz +f11c7b8e938dca3528eee36ddb64421072e1fdd6d5dfc40452f36e2db954b3e9ae888416bb26dc73068a14c94404eb66352e37a988f04ecc08600554eab16c99 CVE-2019-1543.patch" diff --git a/main/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch b/main/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch new file mode 100644 index 00000000000..4d478c484c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/main/openssl/CVE-2019-1543.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 + +ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for +every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) +should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and +front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it +also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case +only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are +ignored. + +It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. +Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious +confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the +default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to +the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique +nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a +reused nonce. + +Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the +integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the +integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further +affected. + +Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe +because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user +applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce +length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. + +CVE-2019-1543 + +Fixes #8345 + +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> +Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406) + +(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6) +--- + crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c +index c1917bb86a6..d3e2c622a1b 100644 +--- a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c ++++ b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c +@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ typedef struct { + + #define data(ctx) ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data) + ++#define CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN 12 ++ + static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, + const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE], + const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc) +@@ -533,7 +535,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, + return 1; + + case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN: +- if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE) ++ if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN) + return 0; + actx->nonce_len = arg; + return 1; |