diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'main/xen/xsa404-4.16-1.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | main/xen/xsa404-4.16-1.patch | 239 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 239 deletions
diff --git a/main/xen/xsa404-4.16-1.patch b/main/xen/xsa404-4.16-1.patch deleted file mode 100644 index c101279eb7d..00000000000 --- a/main/xen/xsa404-4.16-1.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,239 +0,0 @@ -From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> -Subject: x86/spec-ctrl: Make VERW flushing runtime conditional - -Currently, VERW flushing to mitigate MDS is boot time conditional per domain -type. However, to provide mitigations for DRPW (CVE-2022-21166), we need to -conditionally use VERW based on the trustworthiness of the guest, and the -devices passed through. - -Remove the PV/HVM alternatives and instead issue a VERW on the return-to-guest -path depending on the SCF_verw bit in cpuinfo spec_ctrl_flags. - -Introduce spec_ctrl_init_domain() and d->arch.verw to calculate the VERW -disposition at domain creation time, and context switch the SCF_verw bit. - -For now, VERW flushing is used and controlled exactly as before, but later -patches will add per-domain cases too. - -No change in behaviour. - -This is part of XSA-404. - -Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> -Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com> -Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com> - -diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc -index 1d08fb7e9aa6..d5cb09f86541 100644 ---- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc -+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc -@@ -2258,9 +2258,8 @@ in place for guests to use. - Use of a positive boolean value for either of these options is invalid. - - The booleans `pv=`, `hvm=`, `msr-sc=`, `rsb=` and `md-clear=` offer fine --grained control over the alternative blocks used by Xen. These impact Xen's --ability to protect itself, and Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests --to use. -+grained control over the primitives by Xen. These impact Xen's ability to -+protect itself, and Xen's ability to virtualise support for guests to use. - - * `pv=` and `hvm=` offer control over all suboptions for PV and HVM guests - respectively. -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c -index ef1812dc1402..1fe6644a71ae 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c -@@ -863,6 +863,8 @@ int arch_domain_create(struct domain *d, - - d->arch.msr_relaxed = config->arch.misc_flags & XEN_X86_MSR_RELAXED; - -+ spec_ctrl_init_domain(d); -+ - return 0; - - fail: -@@ -2017,14 +2019,15 @@ static void __context_switch(void) - void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next) - { - unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id(); -+ struct cpu_info *info = get_cpu_info(); - const struct domain *prevd = prev->domain, *nextd = next->domain; - unsigned int dirty_cpu = read_atomic(&next->dirty_cpu); - - ASSERT(prev != next); - ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled()); - -- get_cpu_info()->use_pv_cr3 = false; -- get_cpu_info()->xen_cr3 = 0; -+ info->use_pv_cr3 = false; -+ info->xen_cr3 = 0; - - if ( unlikely(dirty_cpu != cpu) && dirty_cpu != VCPU_CPU_CLEAN ) - { -@@ -2088,6 +2091,11 @@ void context_switch(struct vcpu *prev, struct vcpu *next) - *last_id = next_id; - } - } -+ -+ /* Update the top-of-stack block with the VERW disposition. */ -+ info->spec_ctrl_flags &= ~SCF_verw; -+ if ( nextd->arch.verw ) -+ info->spec_ctrl_flags |= SCF_verw; - } - - sched_context_switched(prev, next); -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S -index 49651f3c435a..5f5de45a1309 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/entry.S -@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ UNLIKELY_END(realmode) - - /* WARNING! `ret`, `call *`, `jmp *` not safe beyond this point. */ - /* SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_VMX Req: %rsp=regs/cpuinfo Clob: */ -- ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(verw CPUINFO_verw_sel(%rsp)), X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_HVM -+ DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_VERW - - mov VCPU_hvm_guest_cr2(%rbx),%rax - -diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c -index c19464da70ce..21730aa03071 100644 ---- a/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c -+++ b/xen/arch/x86/spec_ctrl.c -@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ static bool __initdata opt_msr_sc_pv = true; - static bool __initdata opt_msr_sc_hvm = true; - static int8_t __initdata opt_rsb_pv = -1; - static bool __initdata opt_rsb_hvm = true; --static int8_t __initdata opt_md_clear_pv = -1; --static int8_t __initdata opt_md_clear_hvm = -1; -+static int8_t __read_mostly opt_md_clear_pv = -1; -+static int8_t __read_mostly opt_md_clear_hvm = -1; - - /* Cmdline controls for Xen's speculative settings. */ - static enum ind_thunk { -@@ -932,6 +932,13 @@ static __init void mds_calculations(uint64_t caps) - } - } - -+void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d) -+{ -+ bool pv = is_pv_domain(d); -+ -+ d->arch.verw = pv ? opt_md_clear_pv : opt_md_clear_hvm; -+} -+ - void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) - { - enum ind_thunk thunk = THUNK_DEFAULT; -@@ -1196,21 +1203,20 @@ void __init init_speculation_mitigations(void) - boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR)); - - /* -- * Enable MDS defences as applicable. The PV blocks need using all the -- * time, and the Idle blocks need using if either PV or HVM defences are -- * used. -+ * Enable MDS defences as applicable. The Idle blocks need using if -+ * either PV or HVM defences are used. - * - * HVM is more complicated. The MD_CLEAR microcode extends L1D_FLUSH with -- * equivelent semantics to avoid needing to perform both flushes on the -- * HVM path. The HVM blocks don't need activating if our hypervisor told -- * us it was handling L1D_FLUSH, or we are using L1D_FLUSH ourselves. -+ * equivalent semantics to avoid needing to perform both flushes on the -+ * HVM path. Therefore, we don't need VERW in addition to L1D_FLUSH. -+ * -+ * After calculating the appropriate idle setting, simplify -+ * opt_md_clear_hvm to mean just "should we VERW on the way into HVM -+ * guests", so spec_ctrl_init_domain() can calculate suitable settings. - */ -- if ( opt_md_clear_pv ) -- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_PV); - if ( opt_md_clear_pv || opt_md_clear_hvm ) - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_IDLE); -- if ( opt_md_clear_hvm && !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL) && !opt_l1d_flush ) -- setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_HVM); -+ opt_md_clear_hvm &= !(caps & ARCH_CAPS_SKIP_L1DFL) && !opt_l1d_flush; - - /* - * Warn the user if they are on MLPDS/MFBDS-vulnerable hardware with HT -diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h -index ff3157d52d13..bd45a144ee78 100644 ---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h -+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/cpufeatures.h -@@ -35,8 +35,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_RSB_HVM, X86_SYNTH(19)) /* RSB overwrite needed for HVM - XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SELFSNOOP, X86_SYNTH(20)) /* SELFSNOOP gets used by Xen itself */ - XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_MSR_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(21)) /* (SC_MSR_PV || SC_MSR_HVM) && default_xen_spec_ctrl */ - XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_LBR, X86_SYNTH(22)) /* Xen uses MSR_DEBUGCTL.LBR */ --XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_PV, X86_SYNTH(23)) /* VERW used by Xen for PV */ --XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_HVM, X86_SYNTH(24)) /* VERW used by Xen for HVM */ -+/* Bits 23,24 unused. */ - XEN_CPUFEATURE(SC_VERW_IDLE, X86_SYNTH(25)) /* VERW used by Xen for idle */ - XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_SHSTK, X86_SYNTH(26)) /* Xen uses CET Shadow Stacks */ - XEN_CPUFEATURE(XEN_IBT, X86_SYNTH(27)) /* Xen uses CET Indirect Branch Tracking */ -diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h -index 92d54de0b9a1..2398a1d99da9 100644 ---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h -+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/domain.h -@@ -319,6 +319,9 @@ struct arch_domain - uint32_t pci_cf8; - uint8_t cmos_idx; - -+ /* Use VERW on return-to-guest for its flushing side effect. */ -+ bool verw; -+ - union { - struct pv_domain pv; - struct hvm_domain hvm; -diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h -index f76029523610..751355f471f4 100644 ---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h -+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl.h -@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ - #define SCF_use_shadow (1 << 0) - #define SCF_ist_wrmsr (1 << 1) - #define SCF_ist_rsb (1 << 2) -+#define SCF_verw (1 << 3) - - #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__ - -@@ -32,6 +33,7 @@ - #include <asm/msr-index.h> - - void init_speculation_mitigations(void); -+void spec_ctrl_init_domain(struct domain *d); - - extern bool opt_ibpb; - extern bool opt_ssbd; -diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h -index 02b3b18ce69f..5a590bac44aa 100644 ---- a/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h -+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/spec_ctrl_asm.h -@@ -136,6 +136,19 @@ - #endif - .endm - -+.macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_VERW -+/* -+ * Requires %rsp=cpuinfo -+ * -+ * Issue a VERW for its flushing side effect, if indicated. This is a Spectre -+ * v1 gadget, but the IRET/VMEntry is serialising. -+ */ -+ testb $SCF_verw, CPUINFO_spec_ctrl_flags(%rsp) -+ jz .L\@_verw_skip -+ verw CPUINFO_verw_sel(%rsp) -+.L\@_verw_skip: -+.endm -+ - .macro DO_SPEC_CTRL_ENTRY maybexen:req - /* - * Requires %rsp=regs (also cpuinfo if !maybexen) -@@ -231,8 +244,7 @@ - #define SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_PV \ - ALTERNATIVE "", \ - DO_SPEC_CTRL_EXIT_TO_GUEST, X86_FEATURE_SC_MSR_PV; \ -- ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(verw CPUINFO_verw_sel(%rsp)), \ -- X86_FEATURE_SC_VERW_PV -+ DO_SPEC_CTRL_COND_VERW - - /* - * Use in IST interrupt/exception context. May interrupt Xen or PV context. |