main/squid: security fix (CVE-2019-18679)

ref #10946

2 files changed, 125 insertions, 1 deletions

diff --git a/main/squid/APKBUILD b/main/squid/APKBUILD
index c682f4c8081..af521aac707 100644
--- a/main/squid/APKBUILD
+++ b/main/squid/APKBUILD
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 # Maintainer: Natanael Copa <ncopa@alpinelinux.org>
 pkgname=squid
 pkgver=4.8
-pkgrel=0
+pkgrel=1
 pkgdesc="A full-featured Web proxy cache server."
 url="http://www.squid-cache.org"
 install="squid.pre-install squid.pre-upgrade"
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ linguas="af ar az bg ca cs da de el es et fa fi fr he hu hy id it ja ka ko lt
 	lv ms nl oc pl pt ro ru sk sl sr sv th tr uk uz vi zh"
 langdir="/usr/share/squid/errors"
 source="http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v4/squid-${pkgver}.tar.xz
+	CVE-2019-18679.patch
 
 	$pkgname.initd
 	$pkgname.confd
@@ -29,6 +30,8 @@ builddir="$srcdir"/$pkgname-$pkgver
 options="!check"  # does not work. Error message is about "applet not found", some issue with the installed busybox
 
 # secfixes:
+#   4.8-r1:
+#     - CVE-2019-18679
 #   4.8-r0:
 #     - CVE-2019-13345
 #   3.5.27-r2:
@@ -104,6 +107,7 @@ squid_kerb_auth() {
 	mv "$pkgdir"/usr/lib/squid/squid_kerb_auth "$subpkgdir"/usr/lib/squid/
 }
 sha512sums="2223f299950ded074faca6e3d09c15bc26e8644c3019b36a612f5d424e25b02a528c4b3c8a9463864f71edc29f17c5662f16ffda18c76317405cb97657e5e823  squid-4.8.tar.xz
+e2a38576105eb056640f334499504e10605e5b7e82bcd602fe019dd010beb2c70eddc931ca2b3e452f229a28de0f6c7fb6b770bcf2f3c406044286d8fed18490  CVE-2019-18679.patch
 15d95f7d787be8c2e6619ef1661fd8aae8d2c1ede706748764644c7dc3d7c34515ef6e8b7543295fddc4e767bbd74a7cf8c42e77cf60b3d574ff11b3f6e336c9  squid.initd
 7292661de344e8a87d855c83afce49511685d2680effab3afab110e45144c0117935f3bf73ab893c9e6d43f7fb5ba013635e24f6da6daf0eeb895ef2e9b5baa9  squid.confd
 89a703fa4f21b6c7c26e64a46fd52407e20f00c34146ade0bea0c4b63d050117c0f8e218f2256a1fbf6abb84f4ec9b0472c9a4092ff6e78f07c4f5a25d0892a5  squid.logrotate"
diff --git a/main/squid/CVE-2019-18679.patch b/main/squid/CVE-2019-18679.patch
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..9ad820d3190
--- /dev/null
+++ b/main/squid/CVE-2019-18679.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+commit 671ba97abe929156dc4c717ee52ad22fba0f7443
+Author: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date:   2019-09-11 02:52:52 +0000
+
+    RFC 7230: server MUST reject messages with BWS after field-name (#445)
+    
+    Obey the RFC requirement to reject HTTP requests with whitespace
+    between field-name and the colon delimiter. Rejection is
+    critical in the presence of broken HTTP agents that mishandle
+    malformed messages.
+    
+    Also obey requirement to always strip such whitespace from HTTP
+    response messages. The relaxed parser is no longer necessary for
+    this response change.
+    
+    For now non-HTTP protocols retain the old behaviour of removal
+    only when using the relaxed parser.
+
+diff --git a/src/HttpHeader.cc b/src/HttpHeader.cc
+index dd320d5..a36ad85 100644
+--- a/src/HttpHeader.cc
++++ b/src/HttpHeader.cc
+@@ -421,15 +421,12 @@ HttpHeader::parse(const char *header_start, size_t hdrLen)
+             break;      /* terminating blank line */
+         }
+ 
+-        HttpHeaderEntry *e;
+-        if ((e = HttpHeaderEntry::parse(field_start, field_end)) == NULL) {
++        const auto e = HttpHeaderEntry::parse(field_start, field_end, owner);
++        if (!e) {
+             debugs(55, warnOnError, "WARNING: unparseable HTTP header field {" <<
+                    getStringPrefix(field_start, field_end-field_start) << "}");
+             debugs(55, warnOnError, " in {" << getStringPrefix(header_start, hdrLen) << "}");
+ 
+-            if (Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser)
+-                continue;
+-
+             PROF_stop(HttpHeaderParse);
+             clean();
+             return 0;
+@@ -1386,7 +1383,7 @@ HttpHeaderEntry::~HttpHeaderEntry()
+ 
+ /* parses and inits header entry, returns true/false */
+ HttpHeaderEntry *
+-HttpHeaderEntry::parse(const char *field_start, const char *field_end)
++HttpHeaderEntry::parse(const char *field_start, const char *field_end, const http_hdr_owner_type msgType)
+ {
+     /* note: name_start == field_start */
+     const char *name_end = (const char *)memchr(field_start, ':', field_end - field_start);
+@@ -1403,19 +1400,41 @@ HttpHeaderEntry::parse(const char *field_start, const char *field_end)
+ 
+     if (name_len > 65534) {
+         /* String must be LESS THAN 64K and it adds a terminating NULL */
+-        debugs(55, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WARNING: ignoring header name of " << name_len << " bytes");
++        // TODO: update this to show proper name_len in Raw markup, but not print all that
++        debugs(55, 2, "ignoring huge header field (" << Raw("field_start", field_start, 100) << "...)");
+         return NULL;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser && xisspace(field_start[name_len - 1])) {
++    /*
++     * RFC 7230 section 3.2.4:
++     * "No whitespace is allowed between the header field-name and colon.
++     * ...
++     *  A server MUST reject any received request message that contains
++     *  whitespace between a header field-name and colon with a response code
++     *  of 400 (Bad Request).  A proxy MUST remove any such whitespace from a
++     *  response message before forwarding the message downstream."
++     */
++    if (xisspace(field_start[name_len - 1])) {
++
++        if (msgType == hoRequest)
++            return nullptr;
++
++        // for now, also let relaxed parser remove this BWS from any non-HTTP messages
++        const bool stripWhitespace = (msgType == hoReply) ||
++                                     Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser;
++        if (!stripWhitespace)
++            return nullptr; // reject if we cannot strip
++
+         debugs(55, Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser <= 0 ? 1 : 2,
+                "NOTICE: Whitespace after header name in '" << getStringPrefix(field_start, field_end-field_start) << "'");
+ 
+         while (name_len > 0 && xisspace(field_start[name_len - 1]))
+             --name_len;
+ 
+-        if (!name_len)
++        if (!name_len) {
++            debugs(55, 2, "found header with only whitespace for name");
+             return NULL;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+     /* now we know we can parse it */
+@@ -1448,11 +1467,7 @@ HttpHeaderEntry::parse(const char *field_start, const char *field_end)
+ 
+     if (field_end - value_start > 65534) {
+         /* String must be LESS THAN 64K and it adds a terminating NULL */
+-        debugs(55, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WARNING: ignoring '" << name << "' header of " << (field_end - value_start) << " bytes");
+-
+-        if (id == Http::HdrType::OTHER)
+-            name.clean();
+-
++        debugs(55, 2, "WARNING: found '" << name << "' header of " << (field_end - value_start) << " bytes");
+         return NULL;
+     }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/HttpHeader.h b/src/HttpHeader.h
+index 35a9410..be175b7 100644
+--- a/src/HttpHeader.h
++++ b/src/HttpHeader.h
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ class HttpHeaderEntry
+ public:
+     HttpHeaderEntry(Http::HdrType id, const char *name, const char *value);
+     ~HttpHeaderEntry();
+-    static HttpHeaderEntry *parse(const char *field_start, const char *field_end);
++    static HttpHeaderEntry *parse(const char *field_start, const char *field_end, const http_hdr_owner_type msgType);
+     HttpHeaderEntry *clone() const;
+     void packInto(Packable *p) const;
+     int getInt() const;